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Abstract
While a substantial portion of political theory addresses the issue of public, formal
communication&mdashparticularly in terms of its effects on democratic citizenship&mdashthere has been
comparatively little scholarship that considers the political impact of informal, non-public speech. In this
project, I present a theory of &ldquosocial speech&rdquo that fills in this gap, thereby providing a richer
understanding of politics and the lived experience of liberal democratic citizenship. I develop this new theory
in four stages. First, I begin by critiquing contemporary political theory's singular focus on public, political
speech, as exemplified by deliberative democratic and Anglo-American legal theorists. Second, I look to the
forefathers of liberal political speech theory (i.e. John Milton and John Stuart Mill) in order to rediscover a
classical political theory of social speech. Third, building off of this foundation, I establish my own political
theory of social speech, which identifies several mechanisms that explain how informal, everyday
communication may affect liberal democratic citizenship and political outcomes in both positive and negative
ways. Specifically, I argue that social speech: 1) develops the character traits that make for better or worse
democratic citizens; 2) contributes to social capital and trust (based on mutual interests, hopes and
objectives); 3) provides training for and information about one's unique political culture; and 4) forges the
affective ties that determine the borders of imagined political communities. Finally, I test my theory of social
speech through empirical observations and assessments of three common social speech situations: Internet
speak, safe space speech and social hate speech. These case studies prove that social speech actually does affect
democratic citizenship and political outcomes in accordance with the four mechanisms outlined in my theory
of social speech. And because these effects may be positive or negative, depending on both the form and
content of social communication, I conclude that there is a real need for political theory to develop
understandings of social speech that could inform public policies to encourage democratically advantageous
social speech and discourage democratically harmful social speech.
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ABSTRACT 
	  
SMALL TALK: THE SOCIALITIES OF SPEECH IN MODERN DEMOCRATIC LIFE 
Chloé Bakalar 
Rogers M. Smith 
While a substantial portion of political theory addresses the issue of public, formal 
communication—particularly in terms of its effects on democratic citizenship—there has been 
comparatively little scholarship that considers the political impact of informal, non-public speech.  
In this project, I present a theory of “social speech” that fills in this gap, thereby providing a richer 
understanding of politics and the lived experience of liberal democratic citizenship.  I develop this 
new theory in four stages.  First, I begin by critiquing contemporary political theory’s singular 
focus on public, political speech, as exemplified by deliberative democratic and Anglo-American 
legal theorists.  Second, I look to the forefathers of liberal political speech theory (i.e. John Milton 
and John Stuart Mill) in order to rediscover a classical political theory of social speech.  Third, 
building off of this foundation, I establish my own political theory of social speech, which identifies 
several mechanisms that explain how informal, everyday communication may affect liberal 
democratic citizenship and political outcomes in both positive and negative ways.  Specifically, I 
argue that social speech: 1) develops the character traits that make for better or worse 
democratic citizens; 2) contributes to social capital and trust (based on mutual interests, hopes 
and objectives); 3) provides training for and information about one’s unique political culture; and 
4) forges the affective ties that determine the borders of imagined political communities.  Finally, I 
test my theory of social speech through empirical observations and assessments of three 
common social speech situations: Internet speak, safe space speech and social hate speech.  
These case studies prove that social speech actually does affect democratic citizenship and 
political outcomes in accordance with the four mechanisms outlined in my theory of social 
speech.  And because these effects may be positive or negative, depending on both the form and 
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content of social communication, I conclude that there is a real need for political theory to develop 
understandings of social speech that could inform public policies to encourage democratically 
advantageous social speech and discourage democratically harmful social speech. 
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CHAPTER 1 
	  
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SPEECH 
 
“Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident.  
Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has 
endowed with the gift of speech.  And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or 
pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure 
and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is 
intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and unjust.” 
-­‐ Aristotle, Politics, Part I1 
 
“Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and 
communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common.” 
-­‐ John Dewey, Democracy and Education2 
 
Humans are social beings.  While we may exist as either private individuals or public 
actors at various moments, most people in the modern era spend the majority of their waking 
lives communing and communicating with others in the space in between – the social.  However, 
while there is a great deal of political theory that has addressed public, formal communication—
particularly in terms of its effects on democratic citizenship—there has been comparatively little 
scholarship that considers the political impact of informal, non-public speech.  In this project, I 
explore this informal, everyday communication—what I have deemed “social speech”—with the 
intention of proving that it actually does serve important political ends.  Namely, social speech is 
one of the most important influences in the development of an individual’s capacity for better or 
worse liberal democratic citizenship.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Aristotle, Politics, Part I. Accessed at: http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/politics.html.  
2 John Dewey, Democracy and Education (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, LLC, 2008), pp. 9. 
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Contemporary political theorists have generally appeared reluctant to consider casual 
interactions when developing their political theories of speech, even going so far as to imply that 
this kind of speech is not actually political.  Deliberative democratic and American legal theorists, 
in particular, tend to limit “meaningful” political speech to that communication, which is formal, 
reasoned and aimed at a higher, public good, thereby excluding social speech.  And as Jane J. 
Mansbridge explains, within “the discipline of political science, the subfield of political theory, and 
the subculture of certain activist groups, the label ‘political’… has a legitimating function for 
objects of study, a normative function in bringing into play criteria of judgment specific to political 
things, and a valorizing function in marking a particular activity as ‘serious.’”3  Thus, for 
contemporary political theorists to say that social speech is not political, they are also suggesting 
that it either does not matter (i.e. trivial) or is not of public value (i.e. private).  And by extension, 
they are implicitly marginalizing those ideas and peoples who are most associated with social 
speech.  In other words, by not addressing the realities of these groups, political theory is saying 
that their speech isn’t as good or important as others.   
Katherine Cramer Walsh has suggested that contemporary political scientists tend to 
devalue everyday communication for two reasons.  “First,” she writes, political scientists 
“generally believe that democracy hinges on deliberation, but the political talk that arises as a by-
product of casual interaction does not fit prevailing definitions of this venerable act.  As such, it 
has slipped through the cracks of recognition of objects worthy of serious study.”4  In other words, 
democratic political theory’s current preoccupation with the informed, reasoned, conscientious 
discussion lauded by deliberative democratic theorists has caused many to overlook those forms 
of speech that do not live up to the grand ideals of deliberation.  Second, Walsh points out that, 
while political scientists “have evidence that the transmission of information among members of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jane J. Mansbridge, “Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System,” in Deliberative Politics: Essays 
on Democracy and Disagreement, Stephen Macedo (ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 214. 
4 Katherine Cramer Walsh, Talking about Politics: Informal Groups and Social Identity in 
American Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 2. 
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the public matters for their individual opinions… we have little faith that members of the public 
actually engage in meaningful political talk.”5  This skepticism about the quality of actual public 
discourse has led many political scientists to turn to theories of communication that are more 
structured. 
The result of these two factors, Walsh explains, it that most contemporary political 
science scholarship about speech has been concerned only—or at least, primarily—with formal 
deliberation.  Political scientists tend to limit themselves to researching overtly political speech, 
which occurs in a formal institutional setting, among public persons.  Thus, with few exceptions 
(e.g. Mansbridge, Walsh), political science scholarship and political theories of speech have failed 
to incorporate social speech.  And to the extent that casual, everyday talk is actually studied, it is 
almost exclusively done so in settings manufactured by the researcher, providing the opportunity 
to discuss its existence, but not its content or potential effects.6 
But the apparent lack of interest in social speech in the political science discipline does 
not mean that this form of communication is truly unworthy of academic study.  Building off of 
feminist theory, I would say that, not only is it true that the personal is political, but the social is 
political as well.7  Indeed, throughout this project, my goal will be to prove that, by influencing the 
scope and quality of liberal democratic citizenship, social speech does serve a legitimate and 
powerful political purpose.  
 
I. The need for a political theory of social speech 
While social speech has always existed—and has, therefore, always affected political 
outcomes—I believe that there is currently a pressing need for an explicitly social political theory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid. 
6 See ibid., pp. 3. 
7 See, for example, Jean Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 23. 
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of speech.  I attribute this need to two recent trends: one in political theory; one in 
communication. 
The first trend involves a particular attitude towards political theory.  The recent rise in the 
popularity of deliberative democratic theory has signaled a move towards more abstract political 
theories of speech, which focus entirely on how people should speak or how they would 
deliberate in an ideal world under perfect conditions of rationality, information and respect.  
Unfortunately, these theories ultimately have little relevance to the practice of communication.  
When we examine the ways in which people really do communicate with one another, we find 
that they do not tend to behave according to the paradigms described by deliberative democratic 
theories – neither in terms of content nor style.   
First, even a cursory survey of human communication will reveal that it is not generally 
concerned with great political, philosophical or scientific issues.  Instead, when individuals talk 
with one another, it is usually in order to discuss the mundane and the trivial.  As Joseph Epstein 
explains, for most people,  
Other people is the world’s most fascinating subject.  Apart from other people, there can 
only be shoptalk, or gab about sports, politics, clothes, food, books, music, or some 
similar general item.  Talk is possible about the great issues and events and questions, 
both of the day and of eternity, about which most of us operate in the realm of mere 
opinion and often don’t have all that much—or anything all that interesting—to say.  How 
long, really, does one wish to talk, at least with friends, about the conditions for peace in 
the Middle East, the probable direction of the economy, the existence of God?  For most 
of us, truth to tell, not very long.8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Joseph Epstein, Gossip: The Untrivial Pursuit (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), pp. 
5. 
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In this passage, Epstein addresses a truth that many people would rather not admit – while the 
world now contains innumerable (and previously unfathomable) opportunities to discuss the 
grand questions of mankind with a diverse and geographically far-flung community of our own 
choosing, most of us would rather be discussing celebrity gossip, sports or what we ate for 
dinner.  In other words, the content of most communication is decidedly less political and public 
spirited, and unquestionably more private and social. 
 Second, not only does the content of most speech differ from what is generally assumed 
by ideal deliberative democratic theories, but so too does the style of speech.  Ideal speech 
theorists tend to assume that individuals communicate using rational, informed, respectful 
speech.  Speech, which does not adhere to the values of impartiality, publicity and autonomy, is 
often excluded from such theories.  However, while most individuals do incorporate some reason, 
information and civility into their arguments, they are also likely to feature passion and subjective 
feelings.  This “emotional speech” bears little resemblance to the ideals of much political theory. 
 Ultimately, it is important for political theorists to keep in mind that the vast majority of 
people are not public figures.  They do not enter the halls of Congress to debate issues of 
constitutional significance, nor are they broadcast nightly on the news, informing the world of the 
price of oil or the newest tax initiatives.  For most people, politics are not their highest priority.  
Instead, their lives are driven by more immediate concerns, like putting dinner on the table, 
deciding where to send their children to school and agonizing over who won the World Cup.  So 
when individuals do have the time to socialize with friends, family, colleagues and acquaintances, 
it is these latter concerns that tend to dominate.  (In fact, it is often considered rude to address 
political issues in social settings.)  
The gap between deliberative democratic theory and the practice of speech means that a 
substantial portion of political theory is now cutting itself off from lived experience.  As a result, 
these theories cannot easily or effectively be transferred to workable public policies.  So while I 
6	  
	  
	  
agree that there is certainly a need for “ideal theory” in the political science discipline, I also 
believe that, in order to remain relevant, we must develop political theories that relate to the world 
as it actually works.  And fortunately, I am not alone in this opinion.  The move towards more 
empirical and quantitative research in political science indicates that the discipline, as a whole, 
may be growing more receptive to political theories of speech that aim to explain something about 
the way people actually do communicate, and what that means for the political sphere.  
The second trend, which suggests that this might be a good time to address social 
speech in political theory, involves the expansion of social speech.  While social speech exists at 
all times and in all places—indeed, it predominates in communication, serving as the primary 
means by which private individuals communicate within their homes, out at pubs, etc.—it has 
become increasingly ubiquitous in the current day and age.  As Robert D. Putnam explains in 
Bowling Alone, social activities make up a substantial portion of human existence.  During the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, he estimates, Americans, on average,  
… attended church services and visited with relatives nearly every other week; ate dinner 
out, sent a greeting card to someone, and wrote a letter to a friend or relative about once 
every three weeks; played cards about once a month and entertained at home just about 
that often; attended a club meeting about every other month and had a drink in a bar 
almost that often; gave or attended a dinner party, went to the movies, and attended a 
sporting event roughly every two or three months; worked on some community project 
and played some team sport roughly twice a year; and wrote a letter to the editor every 
other year.9 
And the pervasiveness of social speech is especially notable, Putnam argues, when it is 
compared to the frequency with which Americans perform traditional political acts.  The average 
American, he explains, gets together with friends about twice as often as she works on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New 
York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2000), pp. 97. 
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community projects, and she sends a greeting card to a friend about thirty-five times for often 
than she sends a letter to the editor.10 
 Thus, the picture Putnam paints of American life is one in which individuals are extremely 
socially engaged.  While they may be less likely to take part in traditional political actions than 
they once were, Americans are spending a great deal of their time interacting with one another 
socially.11  The reasons for this are, of course, many and varied.  However, I would argue that 
there at least two primary factors that have pushed Americans towards more social speech. 
The first factor involves the significant income gaps that currently plague the United 
States.  As a number of political scientists and economists have noted, the late twentieth century 
has been one of the most inegalitarian periods in American history.  A recent study by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that, in the United States, between 1979 and 2007, the 
share of income going to higher-income households rose by about ten percentage points, while 
the share going to lower-income households fell by several percentage points.  This diverging of 
fortunes is even starker when one looks at the difference between the top one percent of 
households, whose income grew by 275 percent over that same period, and the bottom 20 
percent, whose income only grew by 18 percent.12  And since 2007, these trends appear to be 
going strong.  In a now infamous study by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, the two 
economists estimated that, in 2012, the top one percent of American earners saw their incomes 
rise by 19.6 percent, while the other 99 percent experienced only a one percent increase in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid., pp. 97-98. 
11 Note that Putnam believes that Americans are becoming less social, and that he laments this 
perceived decline.  See ibid., pp. 107-108. 
12 See Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, “Trends in the Distribution of 
Household Income Between 1979 and 2007. Available at: 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/10-25-HouseholdIncome.pdf. 
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incomes.13  Indeed, the authors argue, not since the Gilded Era have Americans seen such 
substantial material inequalities.14 
This current gap between the “have’s” and the “have not’s” has meant that social speech 
has come to play an especially important role in the lives of the latter.  Throughout history, social 
speech has provided a vital outlet for politically marginalized groups, who also tend to be more 
typically associated with the private or domestic sphere to which they have often been confined 
(i.e. women, minorities, etc.).  And I argue that the greater the distance between the least and 
most affluent members of a society—and thus, the greater the gap in political power and 
influence—the more important social speech becomes.  Not only do members of marginalized 
groups find solace in retreating into the social sphere during times of substantial inequality, but 
within this arena, they also find a space in which to engage in alternative political actions.  And 
this is true at least up until the point where inequality becomes so severe that it spurs mass 
political unrest and, even, revolution.   
The second primary factor that has influenced the growing prevalence of social speech is 
technological.  As the Internet has made its way into more and more homes, and people are 
increasingly accessing social networking sites in order to interact with a wider circle, the informal, 
everyday communication, which is indicative of these social spaces, has come to play a larger 
role in the lives of average citizens.  In other words, online communication has changed the way 
people talk to one another.  Because it favors informal, affective speech about seemingly trivial 
matter, that kind of social speech has become an increasingly dominant aspect of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Emmanuel Saez, “Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States 
(Updated with 2012 preliminary estimates).” Available at: 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf.  See also Thomas Piketty and 
Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,” in Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-39 (Tables and Figures updated to 2012, September 
2013). Available at: http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2012prel.xls.  
14 Ibid. 
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interaction.  And as the norms of online communication bleed into offline communication, we can 
only imagine that social speech will come to play an even larger role over time. 
But regardless of what is driving the rise in social speech, the important thing to keep in 
mind is that this kind of communication makes up, by far, the greatest portion of most people’s 
waking lives.  And as social beings, many people would also admit that it constitutes one of the 
most important aspects of their existence, influencing everything from what they eat to how they 
vote.  Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that social speech should receive special attention 
from political theorists who aim to explain and guide human behavior. 
 
II. Social speech in contemporary political theory: 
Although, in general, the political theory community has not adequately considered social 
speech and its political implications, there are a handful of scholars who have begun to address 
the concept.  Most notably, Mansbridge’s “everyday talk,” Putnam’s “schmoozing” and Walsh’s 
“casual interactions” all address variations of social speech from within the discipline of political 
science.  As such, they each served as a powerful inspiration for the political theory of social 
speech that I present in this project. 
First, in Mansbridge’s essay, “Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System,” she defines her 
“everyday talk” in much the same way as I imagine social speech, by juxtaposing it against more 
traditional models of deliberative speech: 
What I will call ‘everyday talk’ does not meet all of the criteria implicit in the ordinary use 
of the word ‘deliberation.’  It is not always self-conscious, reflective, or considered.  But 
everyday talk, if not always deliberative, is nevertheless a crucial part of the full 
deliberative system that democracies need if citizens are, in any sense, to rule 
themselves.  Through talk among formal and informal representatives in designated 
10	  
	  
	  
public forums, talk back and forth between constituents and elected representatives or 
other representatives in politically oriented organizations, talk in the media, talk among 
political activists, and everyday talk in formally private spaces about things the public 
ought to discuss—all adding up to what I call the deliberative system—people come to 
understand better what they want and need, individually as well as collectively.15 
This passage suggests that Mansbridge means to shift away from political theory’s current focus 
on ideal deliberation, and to include more informal interactions within the rubric of meaningful 
political speech.  Even speech that is not perfectly deliberative, she writes, is an important part of 
democratic self-governance.  Indeed, it is through this “everyday talk in formally private spaces” 
that society decides what issues are important.16 
 While the idea of everyday talk is an excellent first step to a political theory of social 
speech, I argue that it does not quite go far enough.  While Mansbridge attempts to incorporate 
the informal social sphere into her account of the democratic process, she is still overly tied to the 
institution of public speech.  This is evidenced by the passage above, in which, of her five 
examples of meaningful speech that do not fit the deliberative model, she includes four that are 
still clearly traditionally political.  Even the final example of private, everyday talk is limited by the 
caveat that it must consider the “things the public ought to discuss.”  
 Putnam goes one step further than Mansbridge does, in challenging the primacy of ideal 
deliberation and elevating the role of less formal speech in the democratic process.  In his 
landmark studies on social and political life in the contemporary United States, Putnam directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Jane Mansbridge, “Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System,” pp. 211. 
16 “In everyday talk and action the nonactivists test new and old ideas against their daily realities, 
make small moves—micronegotiations—that try to put some version of an idea into effect, and 
talk the ideas over with friends, sifting the usable from the unusable, what appears sensible from 
what appears crazy, what seems just from what seem tendentious.  In their micronegotiations and 
private conversations, nonactivists influence the ideas and symbols available to the political 
process not only aggregatively, by favoring one side or another in a vote or in a public opinion 
survey, but also substantively, through their practice.  They shape the deliberative system with 
their own exercise of power and reasoning on issues that the public ought to discuss” (Ibid., pp. 
214). 
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examines the social interactions that, at first glance, may seem entirely foreign to the political 
sphere.  In essence, he finds that participation in voluntary civil associations builds the individual 
skills and social capital necessary for effective democratic governance.  Importantly for the 
purposes of this project, Putnam’s findings are not limited to participation in community political 
groups.  While he does not believe that the more informal, organic interactions between private 
citizens—what he calls “schmoozing”—are as politically influential as more structured, political 
organizations, he does explicitly state that they matter.17  “To be sure, informal connections 
generally do not build civic skills in the ways that involvement in a club, a political group, a union, 
or a church can,” he writes, “but informal connections are very important in sustaining social 
networks.”18  By helping individuals build emotional connections and trust within a community, 
Putnam believes, casual, social speech contributes to the social capital necessary for a well 
functioning representative, participatory government. 
Likewise, Walsh presents a way of understanding the political impact of casual 
interactions (i.e. social speech) in her book, Talking about Politics.  Walsh claims that casual 
interactions, even more than political behavior, shape individual citizens’ social identities.19  As 
she explains, social identity is developed through an updating process, in which prior identities 
come into contact with and absorb information gathered through small group conversation.  
These social identities then become the lenses through which participants evaluate their political 
environments and their places within them.  “Social identities are not just one component of our 
worldviews,” Walsh writes.20  “Instead, we see the world through ideas of where we place 
ourselves in relation to others.”21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For an explanation of “schmoozing,” see Putnam, Bowling Alone, pp. 94-95. 
18 Ibid., pp. 95. 
19 See Walsh, Talking about Politics, pp. 8. 
20 Ibid., pp. 3. 
21 Ibid. 
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 Thus, Walsh is arguing that casual social encounters serve two related political functions.  
First, these group interactions encourage and enable individuals to delineate between their 
relevant community and the outside world.  In other words, they indicate which people are “us” 
and which people are “them.”  Second, the process of comparing oneself to others in face-to-face 
conversation helps participants understand what is appropriate for them, as members of these in-
groups.  As Walsh explains, informal talk is not just about exchanging information; rather, “the 
fundamental, politically relevant act is the communication of information about the kind of people 
individuals perceive themselves to be and the collective of group and community boundaries.”22  
Both Putnam and Walsh’s acknowledgements of the importance of everyday, social 
interactions represent vital validations of the political role of social speech. Putnam argues that 
schmoozing is one element in the process of building social capital, and Walsh claims that casual 
encounters teach citizens the boundaries between the relevant “us” and “them.”  However, while I 
agree with both of these accounts, I do not believe that they are the whole story.  In this project, I 
will argue that social speech actually serves multiple functions at the same time, including (but 
not limited to) building social capital and defining community boundaries.  
 
III. Defining social speech: 
In this project, I build upon the theories of Mansbridge, Putnam and Walsh (as well as 
many other political and social scientists) in order to develop my own political theory of social 
speech, which provides a comprehensive explanation for how quotidian, social conversations 
between average citizens can shape liberal democratic citizenship and political outcomes.  But 
before I can begin with my theory, I must first explain exactly what it is that I mean by the term 
“social speech.”   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid., pp. 42. 
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First, by speech, I am signifying conscious communication in any form.  This may include 
spoken words, written words, symbolic actions, texting, tweeting and non-verbal cues, such as 
eye rolling or smirking.  What matters most for this understanding of speech is that multiple 
individuals are communicating with one another – that they are engaging in a social act. 
Second, when I add the signifier “social,” I am referring to both the content and context of 
speech.  In terms of the former, social speech is extremely inclusive: it encompasses those 
subjects that are considered personal and appropriate to casual conversations between friends, 
family, acquaintances and colleagues.  Thus, although subjects that directly deal with public 
issues may sneak in (e.g. griping about taxes), the majority of social speech focuses on areas of 
interest that have traditionally been considered too trivial, sentimental, emotional, etc. for political 
analysis.   
It is also worth noting that the content of social speech may affect its form.  Often, the 
topics addressed through social speech are better expressed with the use of such tools as 
rhetoric and story telling, rather than through formal, rational deliberation.  Thus, these rhetorical 
tools are prominently featured in social speech, especially as compared to their usage in other 
forms of communication. 
In terms of context, social speech can be distinguished from purely political, public 
speech in that it takes place outside of the traditional public sphere, in what may be considered 
civil society.  In other words, social speech exists in the social – the space between the state and 
the individual.  In his essay, “Public and Private in Theory and Practice: Some Implications of an 
Uncertain Boundary,” Alan Wolfe describes the social as one part of the trichotomy (also 
including the public and the private) that constitutes contemporary human existence:  
Terminology being contentious here, let me formulate the trichotomy this way: there is a 
private sector in which we appropriately judge behavior by whether it maximizes 
individual freedom or self-interest; a public sector in which we make decisions that are 
14	  
	  
	  
meant to apply equally to everyone in the society (even as we recognize the near 
impossibility of doing this); and a realm of distinct publics.  These publics—by which I 
mean families and kinship networks, associations, ethnic and racial groups, linguistic 
communities, and other similar communities of interest, identity, and belief—are on the 
one hand collective: they are guided by shared norms, can impose sanctions on 
members, and try to perpetuate themselves as groups at the cost of overriding individual 
preferences.  But—hence the plural—such publics are not authoritative for the entire 
society; there are too many of them.  It is for this reason that they are, on the other hand, 
partially private: they can protect individual members against intrusive state intervention 
from outside, express particularistic rather than universalistic needs, and allow the 
individual members within the group to develop their personal identities (and self-
confidence) more fully.23 
These multiple “publics,” as Wolfe refers to them, are the loci of social speech.  And because 
social speech occurs within the space between the public and the individual, it is necessarily 
distinct from the communication that takes place within these two spheres.   
Thus, social speech is decidedly not the kind of official speech that occurs within 
institutions such as Congress, town halls and political programs on television.  Instead, social 
speech is that communication, which takes place throughout civil society, in intimate and semi-
private locations, such as coffee shops, sports bars, the Internet and even within the home.  It 
may involve communication that occurs in the course of any voluntary collective activity.  
Examples may include anything from book clubs to athletic leagues to online message boards. 
 Table 1.1 provides a visual representation of what is meant by social speech.  If speech 
occurs among individuals in the social sphere—or civil society—and refers to intimate, personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Alan Wolfe, “Public and Private in Theory and Practice: Some Implications of an Uncertain 
Boundary,” in Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy, 
Jeff Alan Weintraub and Krishan Kumar (eds.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 
pp. 196-197. 
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topics (the upper left-hand corner), it is an example of social speech.  This is also the case for 
speech that occurs among private citizens in the social sphere, but may involve more traditionally 
political topics, such as elections, immigration, taxes, etc. (the upper right-hand corner).  Finally, 
speech that takes place in the political sphere but does not involve issues of public importance 
(the lower left-hand corner) also constitutes social speech.  After all, it is only when political actors 
are speaking in their official capacity that their speech can be considered public.  When they 
communicate with one another as private citizens (e.g. creating goodwill and building 
camaraderie), they are engaging in social speech, regardless of their physical location.  
Examples of such speech might include Senators catching up with one another over coffee or the 
president inviting Congressmen to play basketball at the White House.  
Social Speech (Table 1.1): 
Content 
Context 
 Social Political 
Civil society ✓ ✓ 
Public sphere ✓ ✕ 
 
In sum, social speech is the activity that most of us call to mind when we think of what it 
means to be communicating.  It is the way that we communicate with friends, neighbors, 
colleagues and even strangers.  The only kind of speech that could not be considered social 
speech is that which takes place in the public sphere and considers solely issues of traditional 
public importance.  But as I explain throughout this project, that kind of speech represents only a 
very small portion of human interaction.  And it is often very difficult to locate.  Indeed, for the 
most part, purely public speech tends to bleed into social speech, making it impossible to know 
where public speech ends and social speech begins. 
16	  
	  
	  
As Nina Eliasoph explains in her essay, “Making a Fragile Public: A Talk-Centered Study 
of Citizenship and Power,” the fluid nature of most communication means that individuals tend to 
naturally incorporate both more social and more publicly oriented topics into their conversations.24  
In her study of the “backstage” interactions of an activist group, Eliasoph explains how members 
“nimbly transformed seemingly private topics of conversation into public ones and back again.”25  
She describes how a conversation about home décor can transition into a debate about the 
political implications of buying Navajo rugs from a reservation, and how a discussion about 
buying a new car could become a debate about “Freon, air condition, and ozone depletion.”26  
And similar examples abound in all corners of the world.  For the most part, there is no clear line 
separating political speech from social speech. 
 
IV. Locating social speech: 
While social speech may take place in any location, there are certain venues where it has 
had a particularly notable influence.  The Internet, for example, has been repeatedly decried by 
political and cultural theorists for the informal, unreflective nature of the communication that takes 
place within it.  Similarly, safe spaces, although much older than Internet speak, have traditionally 
been extremely conducive to social speech.  Indeed, safe spaces have often been defined in the 
Black feminist and LGBT literatures as homes for casual, unpracticed communication.  Finally, 
hate speech serves as one of the most politically influential vehicles of negative social speech. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Nina Eliasoph, “Making a Fragile Public: A Talk-Centered Study of Citizenship and Power,” in 
Sociological Theory, Vol. 14, No. 3 (November, 1996), pp. 262-289.  See also Walsh, Talking 
about Politics:   “Much political interaction occurs not among people who make a point to 
specifically talk about politics but emerges instead from the social processes of people chatting 
with one another.  When people report with whom they talk about politics, they tend to mention 
the people they are most likely to interact with about anything” (pp. 35). 
25 Eliasoph, “Making a Fragile Public,” pp. 275. 
26 Ibid. 
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In this section, I briefly review these three spaces in which social speech not only occurs, 
but dominates.  I will address these areas in more depth in Chapter Six, explaining the exact 
mechanisms by which the social speech that takes place in each of these venues comes to affect 
liberal democratic citizenship and political outcomes.  However, for now, in order to illustrate the 
concept of social speech, I will simply describe what such communication looks like in these 
three, very disparate instances. 
To begin, the Internet—and, specifically, social networking—is among the newest and, 
perhaps, most revolutionary venues for social speech.  As the Internet has grown in size and 
reach, it has become an increasingly important tool for communication.  With the technology to go 
online becoming more affordable and accessible every day, people from all demographics have 
begun to forgo face-to-face contact, and instead, use their computers and mobile devices to 
“speak” to one another.27 
And it is already clear that the manner in which most of these individuals are speaking to 
one another is decidedly social.  For the average user, the Internet fosters a private style of 
speech, which encourages her to contribute largely personal or intimate information (witness the 
popularity of the blogosphere) and to do so in a less formal style (witness the new language of 
abbreviations and emoticons).  The overall effect is a prevalence of social speech online. 
The empirical evidence bears this out.  In The Myth of Digital Democracy, Matthew 
Hindman studies Web usage patterns, and shows that Internet traffic is significantly more likely to 
involves intimate or social topics than political ones.28  Even researchers who are optimistic about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In 2010, Facebook (the most popular social networking site) had an audience, in the United 
States, of nearly 153.9 million users.  MySpace had 50 million users, LinkedIn had 26.6 million 
users and Twitter had 23.6 million users.  These numbers have only increased in the following 
years.  See Sarah Radwanick, “U.S. Digital Year in Review: A Recap of the Year in Digital 
Media,” comScore (February 2011). Available at: 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Presentations_Whitepapers/2011/2010_US_Digital_Yea
r_in_Review. 
28 See Matthew Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2009), pp. 60-61. 
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the possibility of citizens engaging in meaningful political discussions online admit that this is still 
a relatively rare phenomenon, and one that might be due to the very structure of the Internet, 
which tends towards the superficial and impersonal.29  Indeed, when given the choice—and what 
is the Internet if not a plethora of choice?—people have repeatedly shown that, when they are 
logged on, they prefer to talk about the latest gossip rather than world events and philosophical 
treatises.  So while the Internet may contain countless sources for political information and 
discussion, the communication that occurs via electronic devices is only rarely in clear pursuit of 
political purposes.   
Next, safe spaces represent a second venue in which one can find a preponderance of 
social speech.  While political theory typically associates safe spaces with the Black—and 
especially the Black female—community, these can actually develop wherever and whenever 
there are groups that are politically, economically and/or socially discriminated against.  In 
general, safe spaces are defined as places where members of marginalized groups can 
assemble to communicate with one another, outside and apart from the mainstream (e.g. the 
home, religious institutions, community organizations, etc.).  They may be physical locations that 
were designed to host these kinds of gatherings, or they may emerge wherever people come 
together.30  In either case, these “kitchen table” discussions enable participants, not only to affirm 
their own identifies, but also to challenge hetero-orthodox values and develop their own moral 
codes and ideologies.31   
Within safe spaces, speech tends to differ significantly from the reasoned, informed 
ideals of deliberative democratic theory.  Instead, safe space communication tends to be much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See, for example, Vincent Price, “Citizens Deliberating Online: Theory and Some Evidence,” in 
Online Deliberation: Design, Research, and Practice, Todd Davies and Seeta Pena Gangadharan 
(eds.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 41. 
30 Lisa Dodson, “At the Kitchen Table: Poor Women Making Public Policy,” in Women and 
Welfare: Theory and Practice in the United State and Europe, Nancy Hirschmann and Ulrike 
Liebert (eds.) (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001), pp. 186-187. 
31 See Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (New York: Routledge Classics, 2009), pp. 
111 
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more organic, often consisting of humor and shared narratives about issues of personal 
importance, such as family, work and entertainment.  Thus, in terms of content, safe space 
speech could be considered mostly social.  And as Patricia Hill Collins explains in Black Feminist 
Thought, communication in safe spaces is also mostly social in its style.  Safe space speech 
emphasizes dialogue, an ethics of caring and personal responsibility, she writes, all of which are 
indicative of social speech.32 
Finally, while hate speech is not a “location” of social speech in quite the same way that 
Internet speak and safe spaces are, it is an important form of social speech.  While many 
Americans typically associate hate speech with only its overtly political, public form, hate speech 
actually occurs at all levels of human interaction.  Indeed, when one understands hate speech as 
verbal or written harassment, based on ascriptive characteristics, it becomes clear that such 
communication often takes place in the social sphere.  Over the last several decades, official, 
state-sponsored messages of animosity and segregation may have abated in liberal western 
democracies, but it is still not uncommon to hear messages of hate towards marginalized groups 
coming from within social spaces, such as places of business, popular culture, sporting events 
and even university campuses. 
Indeed, even when hate speech does take place in the formal, political arena, it is still 
essentially social.  Attacks on one’s race, ethnicity, religion or gender, whether they occur in 
public or private settings, are decidedly intimate.  They strike to the core of how an individual may 
define herself.  As Mari J. Matsuda explains, “[r]acist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and 
disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group.”33  So wherever hate speech takes 
place, it is experienced as a personal affront, as opposed to a merely political attack.  And it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid., pp. 279-285. 
33 Mari J. Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story,” in Words 
that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, Mari J. 
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw (eds.) 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), pp. 23. 
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largely for that reason that many of the world’s liberal democracies have chosen to criminalize 
hate speech, whether it takes place publicly or socially.34 
 
V. Theory outline: 
Now that I have explained why a theory of social speech is important, who is currently 
looking at it, what I mean by the term and where these actions are taking place, I would like to 
explain how I think it is that social speech comes to affect liberal democratic citizenship and 
political outcomes in both positive and negative ways.  In this section, I will provide a brief outline 
of the four mechanisms by which I believe social speech comes to affect the political world:  
1. Social speech helps individuals build the character traits that make for better or worse 
democratic citizens. 
2. Everyday interactions contribute to social capital and trust (based on mutual interests, 
hopes and objectives). 
3. Social communication provides training for one’s unique political culture, informing 
individuals about what it means to be a good or bad citizen in the context of their political 
communities. 
4. Social speech leads to the affective ties that enable individuals to understand the borders 
of their communities.   
As I explain throughout this project, each of these mechanisms may have positive or negative 
implications for democratic governance, depending on both the form and the content of the social 
speech in question.  
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First, I argue that social communication helps individuals develop the character traits that 
will eventually determine what kinds of liberal democratic citizens they become.  All aspects of an 
individual’s life contribute to the development of her personality; however, because of its intimacy, 
inescapability and interactivity, social speech is especially likely to impact character development.  
And where social speech is constructive, encouraging and informative, that impact is likely to be 
positive.  Specifically, good social speech ought to result in the development of a virtuous and 
active character.  As Vincent Blasi argues, this means that individuals are likely to possess 
qualities such as “inquisitiveness, independence of judgment, distrust of authority, willingness to 
take initiative, perseverance, courage to confront evil, aversion to simplistic accounts and 
solutions, capacity to act on one’s convictions even in the face of doubt and criticism, self-
awareness, imagination, intellectual and cultural empathy, resilience, temperamental receptivity 
to change, tendency to view problems and events in a broad perspective, and respect for 
evidence.”35  And while these character traits may not be sufficient for good democratic 
citizenship, they are necessary in societies that expect their citizens to be involved, 
compassionate and passionate.   
Social speech not only results in good democratic character, however.  When social 
speech is mean, exclusive and discourteous, it is likely to lead to the development of personality 
traits that are undesirable from the perspective of liberal democratic citizenship.  Specifically, 
individuals tend to respond to negative social speech by becoming either aggressive, isolationist 
or insecure/meek.  These qualities not only make it unlikely that an individual will choose to 
engage in the political sphere, but they also ensure that she will be less successful, should she 
choose to do so.   
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Second, by engaging in social speech, I argue that people are simultaneously creating 
conditions of trust and building social capital.  When individuals interact with one another, they 
(ideally) develop positive feelings of trust, respect and empathy, which can then be expanded to 
apply to the community more broadly.  And it does not matter how small or seemingly insignificant 
an interaction may be – every social act is one more drop in the bucket of social capital.  And as 
Putnam explains, social capital is essential to the productive and efficiency of liberal democratic 
states.  In “Social Capital and Public Affairs,” he describes how social capital facilitates 
cooperation, serves as a template for future cooperation and contributes towards norms of 
generalized reciprocity.36  
Unfortunately, that is only part of the story.  While all kinds of speech contribute to social 
capital, not all instances of speech contribute positively to social capital.  Specifically, when the 
content of social speech is mean, exclusionary or derogatory, it not only fails to bring about 
conditions of trust, respect and empathy, but it may even diminish those values in society.  
Furthermore, even when social speech is positive and inclusive, it does not always apply equally 
across demographic groups. 
Third, I argue that casual, social interactions train individuals for their unique political 
cultures, serving as informal schools of civic education.  In these everyday conversations 
individuals learn (and also contribute towards the understand of) what is possible, important, right 
and feasible within their given societies.  In other words, using Andrew Perrin’s language, people 
develop their democratic imaginations.37  The democratic imagination serves as a kind of 
repertoire or lens, through which individuals understand and process their political environments.  
And to the extent that social speech contributes to the development of this lens, it is both 
necessary for and determinative of political action. 
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and Sciences, Vol. 47, No. 8 (May, 1994), pp. 5-19. 
37 See Andrew Perrin, Citizen Speak: The Democratic Imagination in American Life (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
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Social speech provides cultural and political training in a more literal sense as well.  Not 
only do individuals learn what is desirable and practical through everyday conversation, but these 
forums also provide people with opportunities to learn and practice the skills necessary for 
effective participation in public affairs.  Cooperation, compromise and clear expression are all 
tools that can be developed through social speech, and are absolutely essential in the political 
sphere. 
However, these positive benefits of social speech will only occur where such 
communication is democratic, egalitarian and amicable.  Where social speech is hateful, unequal 
or restrictive, the participants’ democratic imaginations are likely to develop in a much more 
limited fashion.  Rather than establishing pride in one’s community and a desire to engage in 
democratic politics, this kind of democratic imagination may lead to seclusion and shame.  Such 
negative social communication is also likely to provide poor training for liberal democratic politics. 
The fourth and final mechanism that I believe connects social speech to liberal 
democratic citizenship and political outcomes is its tendency to define communities.  When 
citizens participate in this kind of speech, they are highlighting their commonalities and mutuality.  
As a result, they build emotional connections to one another, thereby simultaneously and 
unconsciously forging the boundaries of their communities.  In other words, social speech 
provides the foundation for determining a line between the “us” and the “them.” 
And there are definite benefits to this community building.  First, on an individual level, 
humans tend to be happier and more fulfilled when they feel like they are members of cohesive, 
identifiable community.  Second, on a political level, people are more likely to participate in 
democratic self-governance and pursue communal ends when they understand themselves as 
belonging to a community.  As Mansbridge shows in her study of Selby, VT, this occurs as a 
result of both positive and negative pressures.38  Engagement with others on an intimate or social 
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level, she argues, makes citizens more excited about participating in local politics,39 encourages a 
minimum of decency while engaging in politics,40 and facilitates the political process.41 
But, unfortunately, that is not always the case.  Indeed, the development of an in-group 
necessitates the appearance of an out-group.  And while drawing a line between in-groups and 
out-groups can go a long way in establishing cohesion, love and solidarity among in-groups, it 
may also breed negative feelings towards members of out-groups.  Even within the in-group, a 
friendship model of government highlights the fact that not all people are friends.  Some members 
of a community are always going to feel rejected or marginalized by the group and, as a result, 
will be excluded from the political decision making process.  
Taken together, I argue that these four mechanisms explain much—if not all—of the 
political impact of social speech.  By contributing towards democratic character development, 
social capital, political/cultural training and boundary forging, informal everyday conversations 
help determine both the quality and scope of liberal democratic politics.  That is why it is so 
important that political scientists come to understand and appreciate social speech.  Indeed, while 
social speech is often considered a merely individual good or right, it is also a political value. 
 
VI. Dissertation Outline: 
The goal of this project is to design a new theory of speech to complement and fill in the 
gaps left behind by more traditional political theories—which only emphasize the overtly 
political—and to provide a richer understanding of the lived experience of the average democratic 
citizen.  I approach these tasks from four directions: 1) critiquing contemporary political theory’s 
singular focus on public, political speech; 2) rediscovering a classical political theory of social 
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speech; 3) developing a new theory of speech that emphasizes the power of social speech to 
influence democratic character traits, build social capital, train citizens in their unique political 
cultures, and create the emotional ties that bind communities together; and 4) providing empirical 
observation of the political effects of social speech situations. 
I begin, in Chapters Two and Three, by addressing the deficiencies (from the point of 
view of social speech theory) of the two most popular contemporary schools of free speech 
thought: deliberative democratic theory and Anglo-American legal theory, respectively.  Both 
schools, I argue, are clear examples of political theory’s current privileging of public, political 
speech.  In the case of deliberative democratic theory, although individual deliberative democrats 
vary widely in their understandings of how restrictive and idealistic their public spheres should be, 
they all promote visions of deliberation that emphasize rationality, information, politeness and 
public significance.  And in the case of Anglo-American legal theory, the Supreme Court is 
generally either fighting to defend speech that enables democratic self-governance (in the 
tradition of Alexander Meiklejohn) or that is likely to bring about progress and truth (in the tradition 
of Adam Smith, Louis Brandeis, John Stuart Mill, Wilhelm von Humboldt, etc.).  
Thus, in both deliberative democracy and Anglo-American legal theory, politically 
meaningful speech is only imagined as a very narrow sphere of communication – it involves 
issues of public importance and takes place in public arenas.  This “valuable” speech therefore 
tends to be much more formal than that, which takes place during casual, everyday interactions.  
For the most part, deliberative democratic and Anglo-American legal theorists tend to valorize 
speech that is reasoned, informed and objective, over and above speech that is passionate and 
evocative.  In doing so, however, I argue that these abstract, idealistic theories not only fail to 
capture the majority of communication, but they also implicitly marginalize those peoples that are 
associated with more emotional speech. 
26	  
	  
	  
Next, in Chapter Four, I examine the modern political thought that is credited with forming 
the foundation of deliberative democratic and Anglo-American legal theory.  Specifically, I take a 
second look at the two most oft-quoted classical theorists of free speech and the so-called fathers 
of the American and Western European free speech traditions: John Milton and John Stuart Mill.  
Although contemporary political and American legal theorists often explicitly ground their theories 
of freedom of speech on limited readings of Milton and Mill, which emphasize the value of public, 
political speech in promoting progress and/or democratic self-governance, they are actually 
omitting a central theme for both authors.  While the value that both Milton and Mill place on 
political speech about public ends certainly influences their justifications in favor of increased 
freedom of expression, they each also have a clear understanding of the importance and power 
of informal communication in the social sphere.   
For Milton, I explain, this translates into an appreciation of the central role that social 
communication takes in character formation.  It is only when one is able to experience all ideas, 
good and evil, and then freely choose the good that she can be considered to possess the kind of 
virtuous character necessary for individual salvation and good government.  This process may 
occur in the political sphere, but more often than not, it appears that Milton expects it to take 
place through everyday communications and expressions.   
Likewise, I show that Mill also understands the role that social interactions play in 
forming, not only the types of citizens that participants become, but also, through them, the 
institutions within which those citizens exist.  This idea can be found in Mill’s most popular work 
on freedom of speech, On Liberty, but it becomes even more obvious when his works are read as 
a whole.  Mill believes that an atmosphere of freedom of speech, where various ideas are free to 
engage in open debate, is valuable, not only because it is more likely to lead to the discovery of 
political truths, but, more importantly, because such an environment tends to breed the kinds of 
citizens necessary for a well-functioning participatory government aimed at social progress and 
the discovery of truths (of all kinds).  A society that values freedom of speech does not find truth 
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and progress simply because there are more ideas available to choose between, he argues; 
rather, it achieves these ends because it fosters individual traits such as rationality, 
inquisitiveness, distrust of authority/custom and selflessness, which lead to a more vibrant 
intellectual and political community.  Members of such a community are, in turn, more willing and 
able to engage in free and open debate.  In this way, a policy of freedom of speech both creates 
good citizens and is reinforced by those very citizens. 
In Chapter Five, I draw upon these readings of Milton and Mill in order to present my own 
political theory of social speech (outlined above).  In that chapter, I explain the four major 
(interrelated) mechanisms that I believe connect social speech to democratic citizenship and 
political outcomes: 1) Informal communication is a mechanism for creating the kind of character 
traits (e.g. inquisitiveness, distrust of authority, initiative, courage) that make good democratic 
citizens; 2) This form of communication builds social capital and trust (based on mutual interests, 
hopes and objectives), which makes politics run smoother; 3) Private and social interactions train 
us for our political culture, teaching us the rules of the game and how to be good citizens 
particular to our communities; and 4) More than any other kind of speech, intimate speech ties us 
to one another emotionally and helps us build the cognitive borders of our communities.  My goal 
for this chapter is to show that, while the content and form of social communication may 
technically be apolitical and non-public, these interactions do server very important political 
functions. 
Chapter Six provides an empirical representation of the theory presented in Chapter Five.  
In this chapter, I examine the three locations of social speech, which I discussed above—Internet 
speak, safe spaces and hate speech—in order to illustrate how the four mechanisms actually 
interact in real life.  I begin by addressing Internet speak and social networking, in both positive 
and negative forms.  On the positive side, I show how participation in online social networking 
leads to greater political participation.  On the negative side, I show how mean, divisive online 
speech (e.g. cyberbullying) causes victims to lose agency and to feel like outsiders in their 
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communities.  Next, I look at the “safe spaces” literature, in order to show how time spent in these 
social arenas offers members of marginalized groups the opportunity to, not only have their 
voices heard and their opinions respected, but also to challenge oppression and affirm one 
another’s humanity.  On the other hand, I acknowledge that, to the extent that safe space 
interactions are overly exclusionary, they may further cement differences and breed antagonism 
between the “us” and the “them.”  Finally, I consider the case of hate speech.  While I concede 
that hate speech may be somewhat politically useful as a societal “pressure valve,” I argue that, 
when it takes place in the social sphere, hate speech is likely to lead to psychological and 
physical harms.  These harms are not only detrimental to the individuals who are affected by hate 
speech, but also to society as a whole.  By both limiting the capacities of targets of hate speech 
to develop good democratic citizenship characteristics, and also dividing communities and 
decreasing social trust, social hate speech contributes to a weakening of liberal democratic 
states. 
Finally, in Chapter Seven, I explore and suggest policy options that might harness the 
democratic power of social speech, while also limiting its potential negative outcomes.  While this 
project focuses on an activity that provides the foundation to all liberal western democracies—
speech and communication—my purpose is not simply to defend greater protection for the liberal 
value of freedom of speech.  Rather, the goal of this project is to explore and demonstrate the 
democratic potential of a sphere of human interaction—social speech—that, until now, has largely 
been overlooked by political and legal theorists.  And when one looks closely at social speech, it 
truly does appear to serve some important political functions.  As political theorists and 
practitioners come to better understand social spaces, the speech that occurs within those 
spaces and the mechanisms that tie social communication to political outcomes, they will also 
have a better idea of how to regulate and promote speech in a positive fashion. 
More often than not, this will mean promoting a campaign of public awareness in order to 
alert the average citizen to the significance of social speech, and to encourage her to approach 
29	  
	  
	  
her everyday communications with the same purpose and deliberateness as she would any other 
democratic political activity.  Wherever possible, the goal should be to allow social pressures to 
regulate social speech, by encouraging that, which is positive, and delegitimizing that, which is 
negative.  However, self-regulation and promotion of new norms towards social speech is not 
always going to be feasible or adequately effective to exact the kinds of changes necessary to 
encourage positive social speech and discourage negative social speech.  In those cases, I 
argue, a combination of state, corporate and private actors may be called upon to construct the 
social into the best possible conduit for democracy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
	  
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
 
“The facts about deliberation in American settings, at least as I have gathered them, show that 
what happens when American citizens talk to each other is often neither truly deliberative nor 
truly democratic.” 
- Lynn M. Sanders, “Against Deliberation”42 
“Asking the question whether deliberation is a good thing is a bit like asking the question 
whether a saw is a good tool.  If you are making shelving, it is, but not if you are trying to 
repair a watch.” 
- Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory43 
 
Contemporary political and legal theorists have often seemed reluctant to incorporate 
casual conversations and interactions into their theories of freedom of speech.  When social 
speech is mentioned at all, it is usually only to dismiss it at as apolitical, and therefore, not worthy 
of official recognition.  This is especially true of two of the most prominent schools of speech 
theory: deliberative democratic theory and Anglo-American legal theory.  
In this chapter, I explore deliberative democratic theory’s treatment of social speech.  (I 
address Anglo-American legal theory in Chapter Three.)  I focus on deliberative democratic 
theory because I believe it currently represents one of the most influential strains of thought in 
contemporary political theories of speech.  While deliberative politics has been a major theme 
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within political theory at least as far back at Aristotle, it has gained significant traction in recent 
years, ever since Habermas connected it to the idea of popular sovereignty.44  Since then, as 
John S. Dryzek explains, the influence of deliberative democratic theory has only increased, as 
democratic theory has moved away from focusing on more traditional political topics, such as 
voting, constitutional rights and self-governance.45  “The deliberative turn,” he writes, “represents 
a renewed concern with the authenticity of democracy: the degree to which democratic control is 
substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged by competent citizens.”46  And this concern for 
democratic authenticity does not appear to be abating any time soon.  Thus, to the extent that 
deliberative democratic theory neglects a certain kind of communication (i.e. social speech), that 
omission may have serious consequences for how political theorists think about that speech. 
In this chapter, I address the lack of attention paid to social speech by deliberative 
democratic theorists in two parts.  First, I provide a brief survey of the literature that highlights 
differences between deliberative democratic theorists, while also pointing to several overarching 
themes within the school of thought.  In the second half of this chapter, I advance a critique of 
deliberative democratic theory from the perspective of a theory of social speech.  This critique 
centers on two oft-cited limitations to deliberative democracy: 1) its abstractness; and 2) its 
deliberateness.  
My first critique is that deliberative models are not sufficiently concerned with the way 
people actually live.  Throughout this project, I argue that political theory needs more than formal 
models of ideal speech.  In order to best understand and harness the political potential inherent in 
communication, political theorists need to consider the ways in which people actually do speak to 
one another.  Deliberative democratic theory, unfortunately, is too idealized and removed from 
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lived experience to explain much about how speech could be structure to result in a positive 
impact on liberal democratic citizenship. 
Second, I argue that, as an ideal theory, deliberative democracy is overly structured and 
rigid.  As a result, it is not adequately inclusive of the myriad forms that speech may take.  
Although there is variation from theorist to theorist regarding what exactly constitutes ideal 
deliberation, in general, these models emphasize rationality, perfect information, equality, 
symmetry and conscientiousness.  Thus, deliberative democratic theories are usually unable to 
incorporate the more casual forms of speech that tend to permeate social speech (i.e. such as 
story-telling, greeting or rhetoric ).47  And by dismissing them, deliberative democratic theorists 
have severely limited their possible field of study.  More importantly, they have done so in a way 
that disproportionately penalizes certain demographic groups.  Informal speech patterns tend to 
characterize many of the same demographic groups, which are already disadvantaged in the 
political process (i.e. black, female, lower income).  By telling those who are less skilled or natural 
at formal deliberation that they are communicating “wrongly,” deliberative democratic theorists are 
not only making it more difficult for them to have their voices heard and preferences adopted, but 
we are also telling them that they are political inferior. 
Several deliberative democratic theorists have already taken note of these critiques, 
however, and they have attempted to address them by developing modified visions of 
deliberation, which are meant to accommodate a wider and more realistic range of speech.  I end 
this chapter by addressing these revised deliberative democratic theories.  
But before I begin, it is important to note that I do not mean to launch a general attack on 
deliberative democratic theory.  I am not arguing, as several critics have, that deliberation is 
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either impossible or undesirable.48  Nor do I mean to say that the limitations inherent in 
deliberative democratic theory means that it is without merit or utility.  In this chapter, I merely 
make the much more limited claim that, insofar as it has been unable to incorporate social 
speech, deliberative democratic theory offers only an incomplete representation of the 
relationship between communication and politics.  For what it aims to do, however—which is to 
present a procedural model of democratic legitimacy that requires free, reasoned deliberation 
between equals, who are all orientated towards achieving a consensus that is in the public 
good—deliberative democracy has greatly contributed to both democratic and communicative 
theory. 
 
IV. Review of deliberative democracy: 
All deliberative democratic theorists begin with the belief that democracy is about more 
than a simple aggregation of private opinions.  Instead, they claim, there is something significant 
to be gained through the free and open discussion of ideas and attitudes.  Unlike John Stuart Mill, 
who worried that average citizens would struggle to discover truth and republican virtue without 
the influence of geniuses or social constraints, deliberative democratic theorists believe that, 
given adequate time, information and interest, the public should be able to talk its way into 
democratically justifiable policies.49  Through the exchange of reasoned, fact-based arguments 
between free and equal citizen, they argue, differences can be ironed out, consensus can be 
reached and a truly public opinion can emerge. 
The consensus that ideally results from deliberation should not be mistaken for truth, 
however.  While deliberation might produce truth, it does not necessarily do so.  What is 
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important for deliberative democrats is only that an argument is accepted through some proper 
form of discourse.  
Thus, deliberative democracy can be considered a proceduralist model of legitimacy.  In 
other words, the goal of deliberative democratic theorists is to design the conditions of 
deliberation in such a way that they ensure democratic legitimacy.  And once their procedural 
limitations have been met, deliberative democratic theorists generally consider the outcomes of 
deliberation to be democratically justifiable.  More than that, as Seyla Benhabib explains, 
deliberative democratic theorists often assume that their procedures of deliberation will “assure 
some degree of practical rationality.”50  The act of deliberating tends to provide participants with 
information,51 helps them to order their preferences by forcing them to engage in critical 
reflection,52 and contributes towards an “enlarged mentality,”53 all of which is thought to ensure, 
not only legitimate, but also democratically favorable outcomes. 
In general, there are two types of limitations that deliberative democrats tend to place 
upon deliberation: location-based and content-based.  First, nearly all deliberative democratic 
theorists agree that, before ideal deliberation can occur, there must exist an appropriate space for 
it—a public sphere—where participants can raise and discuss issues and opinions.  This 
deliberative democratic space is distinct in two respects.  First, public spheres are unique 
because, within them, discussion occurs apart from and opposed to the state (except in the case 
of parliaments).  Second, they have their own set of rules to entry.  In deliberative democratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Seyla Benhabib (ed.) (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 71. 
51 “Deliberation is a procedure for being informed” (Ibid.). 
52 “It is actually the deliberative process itself that is likely to… [lead] the individual to further 
critical reflection on his already held views and opinions” (Ibid.). 
53 “The process of articulating good reasons in public forces the individual to think of what would 
count as a good reason for all others involved.  One is thus forced to think from the standpoint of 
all involved whose agreement one is ‘wooing’” (Ibid.).  
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theory, the public sphere usually requires that all entrants be free, equal and capable of 
forming/acknowledging rational opinions.  
The second limitation that deliberative democratic theorists tend to place upon 
deliberation is content-based.  I find that, as a general rule, ideal deliberation must meet at least 
three requirements.  First, any opinions must be well informed and factually based.  Second, 
deliberation must be balanced and comprehensive, presenting all reasonable sides of an 
argument.  Third, any communication must be both expressed and also received with respect and 
civility.  Once these conditions are met, however, individual deliberative democrats allow for a 
wide array of discussion within the public sphere, ranging from the more to the less overtly 
publicly oriented.  Jürgen Habermas, for example, has a relatively liberal understanding of the 
scope of discourse that is appropriate for deliberation.  What matters to him is that deliberation is 
thoughtful and represents heterogeneous viewpoints, and thus, he believes the public sphere is 
able to accommodate subjects that are not traditionally deemed public (i.e. economic issues).  
James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, take a similar stance, presenting a set of criteria for 
deliberation that, in their own words, does “not require any particular style or quality of thought, 
much less the acceptance of any given premises.”54  Joshua Cohen, Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson, on the other hand, require that deliberators reason based on philosophical principles 
that everyone could be expected to accept.55 
 In this section, I briefly review these four schools of deliberative democracy—Habermas, 
Cohen, Gutmann/Thompson and Fishkin, et al.—which represent some of the most prominent 
and influential deliberative democratic theories to date.  By emphasizing both the continuities and 
also the differences between these theorists, I am able to characterize the wide range of 
deliberative democratic theory.  I am also able to show that, despite the existence of so many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, “Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative 
Polling and Public Opinion,” in Acta Politica, Vol. 40 (2005), pp. 285 
55 See below. 
36	  
	  
	  
conceptions of deliberation, deliberative democratic theorists, in general, are capable of paying 
only minimal attention to social speech.   
 
A.  Jürgen Habermas – The ideal bourgeois public sphere 
Habermas begins one of his most famous treatments of speech, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, with a historical analysis of the rise and fall of the bourgeois 
public sphere.56  He explains that this transformation occurs in two movements: 1) monarchical 
feudal society to liberal bourgeois public sphere; and 2) liberal bourgeois public sphere to modern 
mass social welfarism.  In the first movement, the ideal deliberative space emerges – the new 
bourgeois public sphere of eighteenth century Europe.  The second movement accounts for its 
downfall, which was rendered all the more tragic because it resulted in a newly representational 
culture. 
According to Habermas, the first transformation of the public sphere began in Western 
Europe and the United States in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Before that time, 
he explains, European politics were defined by theatricality and imagery.  Monarchs portrayed 
their power to the people through grand courts, demonstrations, costumes, etc.  In other words, 
power was represented before the people.  The people responded to these displays of power and 
opulence as passive spectators; they were there to observe the magnificence of the king, but not 
to play any active role in the state.57 
However, as Habermas explains, by the eighteenth century, the feudal regimes 
characterized by monarchical forms of government began to give way to more liberal, bourgeois 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, Thomas Burger (trans.) (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 
57 See ibid., pp. 1-14. 
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constitutional systems.58  The concurrent arrivals of capitalism and liberalism enabled Europeans 
to break away from the “representational” culture of the previous age.  These new doctrines 
created clear limits between the public state and the private sphere, valorized equality and 
popular consent, and provided the technology to include private citizens in a public dialogue.  And 
not only did these technological advances make information accessible to a wider audience, but 
the print media that developed alongside capitalism also ushered in a new way of examining the 
world.  Rather than seeing themselves as mere receptacles of information, private citizens were 
encouraged to critically reflect upon public issues.59  
Ultimately, Habermas believes that these developments paved the way to deliberation 
and the establishment of the bourgeois public sphere.  He claims that many private individuals of 
the eighteenth century, encouraged by the new participatory norms and technologies, began to 
privately read about the issues of the day and consider the opinions presented within the pages 
of their newspapers.  In doing so, they would approach the material analytically and thoughtfully, 
forming their own opinions about what they had read.  They would then wish to share these 
opinions by deliberating with their peers, who had also previously engaged in private reflection.  
These deliberative exercises were characterized by mutual respect and openness to hearing the 
informed, considered arguments of others.  Indeed, in this deliberation, the value of an 
individual’s argument was all that mattered; status ceased to be relevant, and conversation was 
conducted between de facto equals.  As Habermas writes, the bourgeois public spheres 
… preserved a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of 
status, disregarded status altogether.  The tendency replaced the celebration of rank with 
a tact befitting equals.  The parity on whose basis alone the authority of the better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See ibid., pp. 14-26. 
59 See ibid., pp. 24-25.  It should be added that this popular form of media also enabled the 
bourgeois citizen to experience more of the world than he was able to at any prior time.  Through 
the stories he read in the newspaper, his physical limitations melted away.  He could read about 
faraway places and events that might never have trickled down to him in the feudal era. 
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argument could assert itself against that of social hierarchy and in the end can carry the 
day meant, in the thought of the day, the parity of ‘common humanity’ (‘bloss 
Menschliche’)60 
With the possibility of such rational deliberation came a need for a space in which it could 
take place – the bourgeois public sphere.  As Habermas explains, deliberators sought to delimit 
spaces for discussion that were not tied to any state institutions.  And newspapers, coffee houses 
and reading clubs arose to fill this niche, becoming places where private citizens could come 
together vis-à-vis the state.  Newspapers and journals made information accessible, and the 
reading clubs, salons and coffee houses that then developed offered a place where people could 
go to discuss what they had read and their thoughts about it.  Thus, private individuals “soon 
claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to 
engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but 
publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor.”61   
By participating in deliberation within the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas believes, 
individuals not only confronted the state, but they also came to constitute a real public – one that 
could develop and express a true public opinion.62  However, it is important to note that, at the 
same time, participants also retained a sense of themselves as private citizens.  It was only by 
coming together that they formed a public and, therefore, public reason (or offentliches 
Rasonnement).63  This public reason could then serve as a counter-balancing force to state 
power.  
Building off of this supposedly historical precedent of the bourgeois public sphere of the 
eighteenth century, Habermas builds his own model of ideal deliberation in The Structural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid., pp. 36. 
61 Ibid., pp. 27. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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Transformation of the Public Sphere.64  “However much the Tischgesllschaften, salons, and 
coffee houses may have differed in the size and composition of their publics, the style of their 
proceedings, the climate of their debates, and their topical orientations,” he argues, “they all 
organized discussion among private people that tended to be ongoing; hence they had a number 
of institutional criteria in common.”65  Specifically, Habermas claims that the ideal deliberation 
represented in these bourgeois public spheres contains five aspects: 
1. People entering the public sphere must be well informed of the issues at hand.66 
2. Participants must have previously considered their opinions and developed reasoned 
arguments in support of them.67 
3. Participants must be open only to reasoned, rational arguments from others.68 
4. Deliberation must take place apart from and vis-à-vis the state.69 
5. The public sphere must be inclusive of all ideas and persons.70 
Thus, Habermasian ideal deliberation can be summarized as informed, considered, open and 
inclusive deliberation between private persons, acting vis-à-vis the state.  And as the venue for 
this kind of communication, the ideal bourgeois public sphere enables the formation of a public 
and public opinion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 It is important to note that Habermas significantly modifies his ideal of the public sphere in his 
later works.  See, for example, Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, William Rehg (trans.) (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1998).  However, since it is his treatment of deliberation and the public sphere presented in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere that is most often cited in deliberative democratic 
theory, I am limiting my analysis to that work. 
65 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, pp. 36. 
66 Habermas writes that, from the outset, the “stratum of ‘bourgeois’… was a reading public” 
(Ibid., pp. 23). 
67 See ibid., pp. 24-25. 
68 See ibid., pp. 36. 
69 “The inhibited judgments were called ‘public’ in view of a public sphere that without question 
had counted as a sphere of public authority, but was now casting itself loose as a forum in which 
the private people, come together to form a public, readied themselves to compel public authority 
to legitimate itself before public opinion.  The publicum developed into the public, the subjectum 
into the [reasoning] subject, the receiver of regulations form above into the ruling authorities’ 
adversary” (Ibid., pp. 25-26). 
70 See below. 
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Of course, the ideal bourgeois public sphere, from which Habermas’ theory of ideal 
deliberation is derived, never actually existed.  In particular, there was never a time during which 
all individuals were welcome to participate in deliberation.  And as Habermas writes, “[t]he public 
sphere of civil society stood or fell with the principle of universal access.  A public sphere from 
which specific groups would be eo ipso excluded was less than merely incomplete; it was not a 
public sphere at all.”71  In other words, for a public sphere to exist, it cannot exclude anyone.  
Unfortunately, all public spheres have had barriers to entry built right in.   
For example, the eighteenth century coffee houses and pubs that Habermas lauded 
contained at least two significant barriers to entry.  First, the bourgeois public sphere required 
some degree of both education (literacy, at the very least) and also property ownership.  As 
Habermas explains, even during the heyday of the bourgeois public sphere, the new “public 
remained rooted in the world of letters… education was the one criterion for admission—property 
ownership the other.”72  Although these preconditions did not necessarily exclude the lower 
classes and the poor from deliberation, they did so ipso facto.  “De facto,” Habermas writes, “both 
criteria demarcated largely the same circle of persons; for formal education at that time was more 
a consequence than a precondition of a social status, which in turn was primarily determined by 
one’s title to property.  The educated strata were also the property owning ones.”73  In other 
words, because both education and property ownership were highly correlated with upper class 
status, the bourgeois public sphere tended to consist mostly of those individuals who were 
already in a privileged social position before its advent. 
Second, although the bourgeois public sphere was open to all, in theory, it often excluded 
participants based on ascriptive characteristics (e.g. race, sex), in practice.  Deliberation may 
have been open to most free white men, but throughout history, women, slaves, immigrants and 
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73 Ibid. 
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racial/ethnic minority groups have been systematically excluded from the public sphere.74  And 
this was just as true during the era of Habermas’ ideal bourgeois public sphere.  As Nancy Fraser 
explains in her paper, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy,” as late as the eighteenth century, women and non-citizens were still barred 
from the public sphere.  These omissions on the basis of sex and property ownership, she 
argues, completely undermine the concept of a public sphere. 
Furthermore, even those who were allowed entry to the bourgeois public sphere were not 
actually all treated as equals, whose worth rose or fell with the value of their intellectual 
contributions.  Habermas’ public sphere is built on an oral bias – by definition, deliberative 
democracy demands that participants be able to share their ideas with others.  However, people 
are not all equally capable of doing so.  The most eloquent orator and the loudest speaker have 
distinct advantages over other participants, even if they do not have the better arguments.  Thus, 
deliberation tends to preference those who speak with greater ease and authority.75   
While he is aware of these deficiencies, Habermas is not overly concerned by the 
exclusive nature of the bourgeois public sphere.  What is important, he writes, is not that people 
have been excluded in practice, but that barriers to entry are theoretically attainable by all.  Once 
economic and social conditions evolved so that everyone had an equal opportunity to attain the 
private autonomy, which had previously characterized only the educated and property-owning 
classes, he explains, the public sphere was essentially safeguarded.76  Of course, this does not 
address the concern (discussed below) that the bourgeois public sphere’s requirement for 
reasoned, impersonal, well-informed deliberation necessarily discriminates against and 
disadvantages those groups that are not as practiced in such formal communication, namely, 
women, minorities, the poorly educated and the less wealthy. 
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Democracy,” in Social Text, No. 25/26 (1999), pp. 112. 
75 I discuss this critique at length later in this chapter, in Critique #2. 
76 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, pp. 86. 
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Nevertheless, despite these exclusionary tendencies, Habermas continues to admire the 
bourgeois public sphere, and laments the changes that took place within it during the early 
nineteenth century, when “the reasoning publics of the bourgeois-liberal democracies were 
transformed into the consuming publics of mass democracies.”77  He blames this shift on several 
related developments, all of which stemmed from the entrée of the masses into the public sphere 
and the deterioration of the distinction between public and private.  These include: 1) the 
flourishing of the social welfare state; 2) consumer culture; and 3) the new commercial media (i.e. 
the press, cable television and national broadcasting).78  Taken together, these three elements 
transformed individuals from the informed, reasoned, respectful deliberators of the eighteenth 
century into the nineteenth century consumers, whose communication tended towards social 
speech. 
First, the social welfare state not only added to the expectations that private citizens 
placed upon their states, but it also changed the way that they related to government.  “Citizens 
entitled to services relate to the state not primarily through political participation but by adopting a 
general attitude of demand—expecting to be provided for without actually wanting to fight for the 
necessary decisions,” Habermas explains.79  In other words, entitlement has led citizens to feel 
like they do not need to play as active a role in political decision-making and public opinion 
formation as they previously did.  Thus, their communicative energies could be spent on other 
topics. 
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more general.  For example, James Carey focuses on the effects of capitalism and consumer 
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Second, the move towards a more consumer culture meant that average citizens grew 
distracted from political affairs and issues of public importance.  The preoccupation with 
consumer goods meant that conversation tended to move away from ideal deliberation about 
public goods, and towards “the exchange of tastes and preferences.”80   
Finally, unlike the newspapers and journals of the eighteenth century, Habermas argues 
that the commercial mass media has served to disengage private citizens and discourage 
deliberation.  “In comparison with printed communications the programs sent by the new media 
curtail the reactions of their recipients in a peculiar way,” he writes.81  “They draw the eyes and 
ears of the public under their spell but at the same time, by taking away its distance, place it 
under ‘tutelage,’ which is to say they deprive it of the opportunity to say something and to 
disagree.”82  In other words, the commercial mass media has encouraged people to merely 
accept what they hear and not to consider themselves part of the public discussion.  To be sure, 
debate still exists in this new era, but private citizens watch it – they do not engage in it.  Because 
deliberation occurs between “experts” who are scripted and separated from the public by a 
television screen or radio speaker, it takes on the form of a spectacle.83  Not only are they taught 
to trust these expert opinions, but even if they were to maintain some analytical sense, 
disagreement is futile as there are few means of airing grievances. 
Furthermore, Habermas believes that, like the introduction of the social welfare state and 
consumer culture, new media technologies have had the effect of lowering standards of 
communication.  He argues that this occurs in two respects.  First, profit-seeking principles 
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81 Ibid., pp. 170-171. 
82 Ibid., pp. 171. 
83 “Today, the conversation itself is administered.  Professional dialogues from the podium, panel 
discussions, and round table shows—the rational debate of private people becomes one of the 
production numbers of the stars in radio and television, a salable package ready for the box 
office; it assumes commodity form even at ‘conferences’ where anyone can ‘participate.’  
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matter is made largely superfluous by that concerning form” (Ibid., pp. 164). 
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suggest that a commercialized mass media enterprise will try to maximize its appeal to the 
greatest possible audience.  This implies a lower overall standard than that attained by the letter-
reading participants in the bourgeois public sphere.  Second, because private persons are not 
engaged in the public discourse, they are left to discuss matters of minor importance.  Because 
the experts are separate from the public, individuals no longer desire to come together to discuss 
grand philosophical ideas, public policies or current events; instead, they talk to their peers about 
“tastes and preferences.”  Thus, the public sphere has become the sphere of culture – an 
apolitical space.   
Taken together, these three developments—the social welfare state, consumer culture 
and the commercialized mass media—have destroyed the public sphere.  Instead of the 
informed, considered, open deliberation that may have taken places between private persons in 
the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas believes that the new public consists merely of empty 
vessels that do not think critically about their world, but simply accept expert opinion.  The private 
act of reading the newspaper and formulating ideas and critiques has been lost.  As a result, 
when private individuals join together, they no longer have anything significant to discuss – all 
that is left to them is social speech.  And thus, Habermas believes, true public opinion has been 
lost. 
 
B. Joshua Cohen – The ideal deliberative procedure 
Unlike Habermas, Joshua Cohen is less concerned with the history of deliberation and 
the public sphere; instead, he takes a more overtly methodological approach to deliberative 
democracy.  A student of John Rawls, Cohen has developed a comprehensive theory of 
deliberative democracy, beginning from the Rawlsian belief that a well-ordered democracy 
“involves public deliberation focused on the common good, requires some form of manifest 
equality among citizens, and shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute 
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to the formation of a public conception of common good.”84  Unlike Rawls, however, Cohen 
doubts that these three features are the “natural consequences of the ideal of fairness.”85  Rather, 
he suggests that “they comprise elements of an independent and expressly political ideal that is 
focused on the first instance on the appropriate conduct of public affairs—on, that is, the 
appropriate ways of arriving at collective decisions.”86  In order to approach this ideal, Cohen 
argues, political theorists should stop trying to reflect ideal fairness in political arrangement, and 
should try, instead, to “mirror a system of ideal deliberation in social and political institutions.”87 
It is in the service of this goal that Cohen develops his theory of ideal deliberative 
democracy, which he first presents in his 1989 article, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.”  
He begins by defining the general concept of deliberative democracy.  “The notion of a 
deliberative democracy,” he writes, “is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in 
which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public 
argument and reasoning among equal citizens.”88  He adds that members of such a community 
are both committed to resolving collective choice problems through the use of public reasoning, 
and also to judging the legitimacy of their political institutions based on their capacity to host free 
public deliberation.89  
Next, Cohen outlines what he calls, the “formal conception” of deliberative democracy, 
which is characterized by five main features: 
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1. “A deliberative democracy is an ongoing and independent association, whose 
members expect it to continue into the indefinite future.”90   
2. Members of the democratic association agree that free deliberation among equals is 
the basis of legitimacy.  Thus, they share “a commitment to coordinating their 
activities within institutions that make deliberation possible and according to norms 
that they arrive at through deliberation.”91 
3. While all members of a deliberative democracy share “a commitment to the 
deliberative resolution of problems of collective choice,” such a community is also 
pluralistic in that it does not require “some particular set of preferences, convictions, 
or ideals.”92 
4. “Because the members of a democratic association regard deliberative procedures 
as the source of legitimacy, it is important to them that they terms of their association 
not merely be the result of their deliberation, but also be manifest to them as such.”93 
5. Members of a deliberative democracy “recognize one another as having deliberative 
capacities.”94 
Having presented these five main features of deliberative democracy, Cohen then uses them to 
frame an ideal process of deliberation, or the “ideal deliberative procedure.” 
 Deliberation, Cohen argues, consists of three aspects.  First, there is the need to 
determine an agenda.  Second, there is the need to propose various reasoned solutions to the 
issues on the agenda.  Third, there is the need to end by agreeing on a solution.  Different 
democratic models, Cohen claims, can be understood by how they determine these procedures.  
However, outcomes can be deemed democratically legitimate, he argues, only if “they could be 
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the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals.”95  Starting from that assumption, 
Cohen presents an ideal deliberative procedure, which contains four elements:  
1. Ideal deliberation is free. 
2. Ideal deliberation is reasoned. 
3. Participants in ideal deliberation are equal, both formally and substantively. 
4. Ideal deliberation aims at achieving a rationally motivated consensus. 
First, Cohen asserts that ideal deliberation is free in two ways.  It is free to the extent that 
participants are not bound by “the authority of prior norms or requirements,” but are, instead, 
beholden only to the product of their deliberation and the preconditions of that deliberation.96  
Ideal deliberation is also free in that participants understand its results to be a legitimate basis for 
action.  In other words, participants must believe that the fact that a decision was arrived at 
through deliberation provides “a sufficient reason for complying with it.”97 
Second, Cohen argues that ideal deliberation is reasoned in the sense that participants 
must state their rationales for advancing, supporting or criticizing a proposal.98  In doing so, ideal 
deliberative actors accept that their arguments will be either rejected or accepted based solely on 
the value of the reasons that they present.  Echoing Habermas, Cohen argues that an individual’s 
personal power or social position must be irrelevant to ideal deliberation – all that should matter is 
the force of her argument.  It is important to note that Cohen’s ideal deliberation specifies that 
reasons must actually be presented.  For a proposal to be accepted, he argues, it is not enough 
that a good reason could be presented in support of it, but it must actually be presented.99 
Third, Cohen states that the parties to ideal deliberation are equal, both formally and 
substantively.  By formal equality, he means that individuals are not singled out, but are all 
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equally subject to the same rules governing deliberation.  “Everyone with the deliberative 
capacities,” he writes, “has equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process.  Each can 
put issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer reasons in support of or in criticism of 
proposals.  And each has an equal voice in the decision.”100  By substantive equality, on the other 
hand, Cohen is referring to the requirement that societal inequalities do not seep into the 
deliberative arena.  In other words, the distribution of power and resources must not affect an 
individual’s ability to take part in and meaningfully affect the deliberative process.101 
Finally, Cohen’s ideal deliberation is aimed at achieving a rational consensus on the 
public good.  The goal of ideal deliberation, he writes, is “to find reasons that are persuasive to all 
who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by 
equals.”102  Cohen admits, however, that consensus may not always be possible within pluralistic 
societies.  Where “there are distinct, incompatible understandings of value, each one reasonable, 
to which people are drawn under favorable conditions for the exercise of their practical reason,” it 
may, in many cases, be difficult to achieve widespread agreement.103  In these instances, he 
argues, political decisions must be made through majority rule.104 
However, since first publishing “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in 1989, Cohen 
has made one significant modification to his ideal deliberative procedure.  Whereas, in its 
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previous iteration, Cohen refers to the requirement that reasons in ideal deliberation actually be 
“persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment 
of alternatives by equals,” in his more recent writings, he argues that acceptable public reasons 
are simply those that “others can reasonably be expected to acknowledge as reasons.”105  In 
other words, rather than requiring that consensus be achieved through real universal public 
reason, Cohen now argues that it is sufficient that a reason be theoretically acceptable to all.  And 
in a community of equals, the only reasons that all citizens can reasonably be expected to 
acknowledge are those framed in terms of the common good.   
Adding in this recent modification, Cohen’s theory of ideal deliberative procedure can be 
summed up as follows.  Individuals must come together as legal and substantive equals in order 
to express and receive well-reasoned, theoretically rational arguments.  As a community, they 
must work with the goal of reaching consensus, and upon doing so, they must then be willing to 
live in accordance with the results of the deliberative procedure. 
Thus, Cohen’s ideal deliberative procedure consists of both procedural and content 
restrictions.  As such, it may be considered a fairly narrow conception of what constitutes 
deliberation – it excludes the vast majority of everyday speech.  And as far as Cohen is 
concerned, these limitations are unproblematic.  Although he acknowledges the importance of 
other types of talk (e.g. public discussion) for democracy, Cohen insists that ideal deliberation 
must be narrowly construed in order to provide guidelines for how best to structure democratic 
institutions so that they might best embody the five features of the formal conception of 
deliberative democracy.106  Because ideal deliberative procedure is only meant to serve as a 
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theoretical construct (i.e. a standard for evaluating democratic institutions and procedures of 
collective decision-making), it is, therefore, not designed to be either inclusive or even realistic.   
 
C. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson – Four aspects of deliberation 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson present a similarly restrictive vision of what 
constitutes deliberation.  Sounding much like Cohen, the authors define deliberative democracy 
as “a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives) justify 
decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and 
generally accessible, with the aim of reaching decisions that are binding on all at present but 
open to challenges in the future.”107  Breaking down this definition, presented in Why Deliberative 
Democracy?, Gutmann and Thompson are arguing that there are four necessary aspects to 
deliberation:  
1. Reason-giving 
2. Accessible 
3. Binding 
4. Dynamic or provisional 
First, the reason-giving aspect of deliberative democracy is extremely important for 
Gutmann and Thompson.  In a democracy, they argue, it is essential that both public actors and 
private citizens use reasons to justify their decisions to one another.108  These reasons cannot be 
arbitrary (i.e. “merely procedural” or “purely substantive”), however.  Instead, reasons “should 
appeal to principles that individuals who are trying to find fair terms of cooperation cannot 
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reasonably reject.”  In other words, as in Cohen’s theory of the ideal deliberative procedure, 
Gutmann and Thompson require that deliberators develop and pursue only those justifications 
that they believe could be adopted by other free and equal citizens, who are equally inclined 
towards deliberation.  The reason for this is twofold.  First, this reason-giving requirement 
facilitates the process of reaching a mutually agreed upon decision, which is aimed at the public 
good.  Second, as Gutmann and Thompson explain, individuals should not be treated as “passive 
subjects to be ruled, but as autonomous agents who take part in the governance of their own 
society, directly or through their representatives.”109  Demanding that the reasons used in 
deliberation appeal to every one acknowledges and reinforces mutual respect.  Thus, by insisting 
that the reasons used in deliberation be acceptable to all, Gutmann and Thompson ensure that 
deliberation not only produces a justifiable result, but in doing so, participants also value one 
another as autonomous, worthwhile ends.   
Second, the Gutmann and Thompson demand that the reasons presented in deliberation 
must be accessible to all.  “To justify imposing their will on you,” Gutmann and Thompson write, 
“your fellow citizens must give reasons that are comprehensible to you.  If you seek to impose 
your will on them, you owe them no less.”110  In effect, this reciprocity requirement means that 
reasons must be public in two respects.  First, like Cohen, the authors assert that reasons must 
actually be shared during deliberation.  It is not enough for an argument to have a strong 
justification in theory; rather, that argument must be clearly expressed.111  Second, Gutmann and 
Thompson argue that deliberation must be public in terms of its content.  If an argument cannot 
be understood be all, then it is not appropriate within deliberation.112 
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Third, Gutmann and Thompson argue that deliberation must be aimed at reaching a 
binding conclusion.  In other words, deliberation is not just group speculation – it is talking with a 
distinct purpose.  “The participants do not argue for argument’s sake,” the authors write, “they do 
not argue even for truth’s own sake (although the truthfulness of their arguments is a deliberative 
virtue because it is a necessary aim in justifying their decision).  They intend their discussion to 
influence a decision the government will make, or a process that will affect how future decisions 
are made.”113  Thus, the authors clearly distinguish deliberation from other, less goal-oriented 
forms of communication.  Other types of speech may serve political purposes, Gutmann and 
Thompson concede, but unless they are purposely and self-consciously aimed at achieving 
political ends, they are not equivalent to deliberation.114 
Finally, Gutmann and Thompson address what they consider to be an oft-neglected 
aspect of deliberation – its dynamism.  The authors argue that deliberation is always an ongoing 
endeavor.  “Although deliberation aims at a justifiable decision, it does not presuppose that the 
decision at hand will in fact be justified, let alone that a justification today will suffice for the 
indefinite future,” they explain.115  Instead, deliberation is more like a never-ending dialogue, “one 
in which citizens can criticize previous decisions and move ahead on the basis of that 
criticism.”116  This is important for two reasons.  First, Gutmann and Thompson point out that 
deliberation—and the people who engage in it—is fallible.  Even when the outcome of 
deliberation is correct, there is no guarantee that it will remain so over time.  Thus, it is important 
that all deliberative issues be subject to reassessment.  Second, the authors acknowledge that 
not all deliberative outcomes will take the form of consensus.  When there is disagreement, it is 
important that those who lose in out in deliberation feel like they will have opportunities to 
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readdress the issue in the future.  If it were not for that guarantee, deliberative losers might be 
less likely to abide by the outcomes of deliberation.      
To summarize, Gutmann and Thompson argue that deliberation must be: 1) based upon 
shared reasons, which are both acceptable by and accessible to all; and 2) aimed at achieving a 
binding result, which is open to future reconsideration.  And this deliberation, they argue, is 
democratic insofar as it is both inclusive and also enables political decisions to become a function 
of the collective judgment of the public. 
Thus, Gutmann and Thompson claim that deliberative democracy is able to serve at least 
four distinct purposes: 1) promoting the legitimacy of collective decisions; 2) encouraging public-
spirited perspectives on public issues; 3) promoting mutually respectful processes of decision-
making; 4) helping correct mistakes made through collective actions.117  Not all kinds of 
deliberation are equally successful at achieving these goals, however.  By comparing several 
branches of deliberative democratic theory, Gutmann and Thompson present six features that 
they believe constitute the best form of deliberative democracy: 
1. Deliberation should be both instrumental (in that it enables citizens to arrive at the 
most justifiable political decisions) and also expressive (in that it symbolically 
validates the ideal of popular consent), albeit not always at the same time.118 
2. Deliberative democratic theory ought to contain procedural and substantive 
principles, both of which should be “treated as morally and politically provisional.”119  
In other words, both sets of principles must be subject to periodic revision and an 
ongoing process of deliberation. 
3. Deliberation should have more of a pluralist than a consensualist goal.120   
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4. Because of time constraints and the large number of citizens in contemporary 
democracies, deliberation ought to be more representative than participatory.121  
5. Deliberative should be made to apply to primarily the state, but also (to a lesser 
degree) to civil society.122   
6. Deliberation should involve both foreign and domestic issues.123  
The fifth feature on this list suggests that the Gutmann/Thompson model of deliberative 
democracy is limited, not only in terms of its procedure—reason-giving, accessible, binding, 
dynamic—but also in terms of its location and content.   
 As Gutmann and Thompson point out, there has been significant disagreement among 
deliberative democratic theorists regarding the proper location for deliberation.  While Habermas 
only requires deliberation within institutions that are core structures of a constitutionally organized 
democracy, others—such as Cohen—argue that deliberation could be extended to a number of 
civic associations, including corporations, labor unions, professional associations and even 
families.124  For their part, Gutmann and Thompson tend to align themselves with the latter group 
of deliberative democratic theorists.  In order to have a well-functioning system of deliberative 
governance, they point out, citizens must first learn how to deliberate.  And the private sphere 
provides individuals with opportunities to practice talking in ways that better enable them to 
engage in political deliberation.125  Thus, Gutmann and Thompson believe “that deliberation is 
desirable in many institutions of government and civil society, and especially in those institutions 
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that deal with major failures in civil society.”126  And as examples of appropriate non-state venues 
for deliberation, the authors point to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South 
Africa, as well as corporations.127   
However, the authors also believe that deliberation should not necessarily be extended to 
those civil “institutions and associations whose purposes are less public and whose effects are 
less far-reaching.”128  In other words, “the less the aims of institutions and associations in civil 
society coincide with those of ordinary politics, the less subject they should be to the force of 
deliberative principles.”129  So while deliberation might be appropriate within the public school 
system, for instance, Gutmann and Thompson believe that it should most likely stay out of the 
family and mass media.130  Thus, the vast majority of social speech is exempted from deliberative 
norms in Gutmann and Thompson’s theory.  (The Internet, in particular, is a poor location for 
deliberation, the authors argue, because it primarily hosts activity that “is not political but rather 
related to entertainment, shopping, travel, sex and personal relationships.”131)  And even when 
deliberation is appropriate in civil society, Gutmann and Thompson believe that it ought not to be 
externally mandated. In other words, the majority of social speech ought to be exempt from 
deliberative norms. 
This limitation does not present a problem for Gutmann and Thompson, however.  
Ultimately, the authors argue that deliberative democracy, as they have defined it, remains 
preferable to aggregative democracy because, while aggregate methods take “existing or 
minimally corrected preferences as given, as the base line for collective decisions,” deliberative 
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democracy subjects preferences to strict scrutiny and moral reasoning.132  And as Gutmann and 
Thompson explain in Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot be Avoided in 
Politics, and What Should be Done About It, the moral reasoning inherent to their vision of 
deliberation—which is delimited by the principles of reciprocity, publicity and accountability—
ensure that deliberation will result in morally desirable outcomes.133  
 
D. James Fishkin, et al. – Deliberative Polling 
More than any other deliberative democratic theorists presented in this chapter (and, 
perhaps, beyond), James Fishkin presents an explicitly practical theory of deliberative 
democracy.  Rather than treating deliberation as a mere philosophical construct, he and his 
colleagues have developed a method for incorporating deliberative principles into actual political 
decision-making.  And through his Deliberative Polling experiments, Fishkin has successfully 
introduced deliberation into dozens of political systems.  
Fishkin’s interest in Deliberative Polling began with a concern over democratic legitimacy.  
He worries that traditional public opinion polls—which are often used to inform public policy 
making—are unable to capture the true preferences of the public.  The problem, as Fishkin 
explains, is not that people do not respond to polling, but that they often do so with poorly 
considered and ill informed opinions about the issues under consideration.  Starting from Philip E. 
Converse’s work on nonattitudes, Fishkin argues that respondents to traditional public opinion 
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will not always be able to produce moral agreements, even when conducted with the principles of 
reciprocity, publicity and accountability.  Thus, their theory of deliberative democracy does not 
require that all decisions be made through deliberative procedures, but merely that, when other 
forms of decision-making are utilized, they must be subject to justification by a deliberative 
process at some point.  See Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? pp. 3. 
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polls are likely to choose their answers almost randomly, and without much consideration.134  
Furthermore, this time building on the research of Anthony Downs, Fishkin suggests that this may 
be nearly unavoidable.  Indeed, he argues that “rational ignorance” may be disincentivizing 
average citizens from becoming informed about public issues.135  “If I have one vote in millions,” 
Fishkin asks, “why should I spend the time and effort to become well informed on complex issues 
or politics and policy?  My individual vote, or my individual opinion, is unlikely to have any effect.  
And most of us have other pressing demands on our time, often in areas where we can, 
individually, make more of a difference than we can in politics or policy.”136  Unfortunately, if most 
of the population follows this logic—choosing not to learn about public policy issues—it is difficult 
to say that any measure of public opinion actually represents their true preferences.   
Given these limitations to traditional public opinion polls, Fishkin worries that any 
government, which relies upon these traditional measures of public opinion, could not possibly 
maintain democratic legitimacy.  If private individuals are too uninformed and disengaged to know 
their own preferences, how can they relate them to the state?  And if the public cannot represent 
its will to the state, how can a government ever democratically represent the wants and needs of 
its people?   
To answer these questions, Fishkin has turned to deliberative democratic theory.  Like 
the other deliberative democratic theorists in this chapter, he believes that, by enabling 
individuals to first become informed about an issue, and then discuss it with equals, in a 
respectful, open format, deliberation helps to reveal their true (or best) preferences.  However, 
unlike the other theorists in this chapter, Fishkin’s understanding of what constitutes deliberation 
is actually quite broad.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 See Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Ideology and 
Discontent, David Apter (ed.) (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261. 
135 See Anthony Downs, “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy,” in The Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 65, No. 2 (April 1957), pp. 135-150. 
136 Fishkin, “Consulting the Public Through Deliberative Polling,” pp. 128. 
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To illustrate, in the essay, “Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative Polling 
and Public Opinion,” Fishkin and his coauthor, Robert C. Luskin, define deliberation as the 
“weighing of competing considerations through discussion that is”:137   
1. Informed, and thus informative 
2. Balanced 
3. Conscientious 
4. Substantive 
5. Comprehensive 
First, by informed, the authors are referring to arguments that are “supported by appropriate and 
reasonably accurate factual claims.”138  In order for deliberation to be legitimate, they argue, 
participants must be presented with all relevant data.  Second, Fishkin and Luskin require that 
discussion not be one-sided; rather, “[a]rguments should be met with contrary arguments.”139  
Third, they explain that deliberators must be conscientious and “willing to talk and listen, with 
civility and respect.”140  Fourth, the authors require that participants try to assess arguments on 
their merits, divorcing them from “how they are made or who is making them.”141  Finally, Fishkin 
and Luskin argue that a deliberative exercise must be diverse and exhaustive.  In other words, all 
existing positions and arguments that are “held by significant portions of the population” ought to 
be represented and considered. 
While Fishkin and Luskin admit that these criteria may exclude “much everyday 
conversation,” they also insist that they are relatively undemanding.142  Indeed, compared to other 
deliberative democratic theorists, these conditions are strikingly inclusive.  For example, unlike 
Cohen, Gutmann and Thompson, the Fishkin/Luskin model of deliberation does not require that 
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arguments be limited to those that would reasonably be accepted by all.  Fishkin and Luskin also 
do not require that deliberation take place apart from, and vis-à-vis the state, as Habermas does.  
Essentially, all that Fishkin and Luskin require for communication to constitute deliberation is that 
it must be respectful, inclusive of the full range of informed opinions and based (as much as 
possible) on the validity of arguments. 
Thus, in practice, Fishkin and Luskin’s interpretation of deliberation is able to incorporate 
a fairly wide range of conversation.  However, as the authors admit, this model still fails to 
accommodate social speech.  While it may be less demanding than other deliberative ideals, the 
Fishkin/Luskin model remains too deliberate and structured to apply to everyday conversation.  
Specifically, the demands for informed reasons and norms of civility necessarily exclude the vast 
majority of social speech.  However, the fact that Fishkin and Luskin’s deliberation does not 
extend to that social speech, which characterizes the majority of communication that takes place 
between average citizens, does not mean that it does not apply to these individuals.  Indeed, 
Fishkin has been extremely successful at bringing deliberation to the masses through his 
Deliberative Polling (initially developed in 1988).143   
According to the website for Fishkin’s Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford 
University, “Deliberative Polling is an attempt to use television and public opinion research in a 
new and constructive way.”144  By creating conditions that are as close to ideal deliberation as 
possible amongst a randomly selected sample of individuals, Fishkin and his fellow researchers 
believe that they can estimate what an entire population would think and do if they were all able 
to become truly engaged by an issue.145  As Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell explain, Deliberative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Note that Fishkin directly refers to his Deliberative Polls as a fulfillment of Mill’s call for a 
“Congress of Opinions.”  See James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, “The Quest for Deliberative 
Democracy,” in The Good Society, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1999), pp. 7. 
144 The Center for Deliberative Democracy, “Deliberative Polling: Executive Summary.” Available 
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145 For more information on the process of deliberative polling, see James S. Fishkin, “The 
Televised Deliberative Poll: An Experiment in Democracy,” in Annals of the American Academy of 
60	  
	  
	  
Polling, “is designed to show what the public would think about the issues [at hand], if it thought 
more earnestly and had more information about them.  It is an attempt to provide some glimpse of 
a hypothetical public, one much more engaged with and better informed about politics than 
citizens in their natural surroundings actually are.”146  
Deliberative Polling is actually fairly straightforward.  First, individuals in a random, 
representative sample are polled on the issues under discussion.  Once a baseline has been 
established, those same participants are invited to spend a weekend together in order to discuss 
those issues.  Before they arrive, the participants are sent “carefully balanced briefing materials,” 
which they are instructed to review.147  Once they have reached the deliberative venue, 
participants are broken down into small groups where, with the help of moderators, they develop 
questions that can then be posed to experts and political leaders.  At the end of this process, a 
second poll is taken, during which participants are asked the original questions.  The differences 
between the first and second polls are thought to represent the conclusions that the public might 
reach, if they had all had the opportunity to be better informed and engaged in those issues. 
Since the advent of Deliberative Polling, Fishkin and his colleagues have conducted 
experiments dozens of times in the United States and abroad.  For example, in 2007, a group of 
parents from Northern Ireland, including both Protestants and Catholics, were brought together to 
deliberate on the future of schools in the town of Omagh.  Two years later, citizens from all 27 
countries in the European Union deliberated in 21 languages about the upcoming elections for 
European parliament.  And in 2011, South Korean citizens were gathered to participate in the first 
ever Deliberative Poll in Korea, where they discussed several aspects of the unification crisis 
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(e.g. conditions, timing, consequences).  The entire event was broadcast on the South Korean 
public broadcasting network, KBS.148   
As Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin explain in their article, “Broadcasts of Deliberative Polls: 
Aspirations and Effects,” many of these deliberative events have led to real policy changes.149  
For example, between 1996 and 1998, a series of eight Deliberative Polls were conducted for 
electric utility companies in the state of Texas, trying to assess how best to meet the needs of 
their service areas.  And in all eight events, the participants eventually decided that they would 
prefer a move towards greener energy, even if it would cost them more.  At the time of the polling, 
the companies were regulated monopolies, overseen by the Texas Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC).  The PUC took a “great interest” in the Deliberative Polling project, and indicated that the 
utilities would be expected to abide by the results.  And indeed, as a “direct result” of this, Texas 
became “a world leader in renewable energy.”150 
It is likely that Deliberative Polling has significant indirect effects as well.  Not only does 
deliberation—in its many iterations—help individuals both discover and create their will as a 
public, but it is also likely that this kind of communication influences community norms.  The 
emphases that all deliberative democratic theories place on rational, information-based reason 
giving; balance; objectivity; civility and mutual respect are bound to bleed into a population’s 
understanding of how individuals should commune with one another.  To the extent that this 
means that people come to view communication as an activity aimed at the public good, this may 
be a good thing.  However, to the extent that an adherence to deliberative democratic ideals 
means that that speech, which does not live up to its stringent standards—as well as those 
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individuals, who are more likely to be characterized by such speech—is devalued, deliberation 
may actually do serious harm. 
 
V. An assessment of deliberative democratic theory:  
 For the remainder of this chapter, I assess deliberative democratic theory in terms of the 
four representative schools of thought that I outlined in the previous section – Habermas, Cohen, 
Gutmann and Thompson, and Fishkin, et al.  I begin by briefly considering some of the 
advantages of deliberative democratic theory.  I then go on to review several common critiques of 
deliberation.  Finally, I present my own criticisms of deliberative democratic theory from the 
perspective of social speech.  Specifically, I argue that deliberative democracy is both too 
abstract and also too narrowly construed to be able to account for social speech.  As a result, 
these theories can only present a partial picture of the relationship between speech and politics. 
 To begin, there are several advantages to the deliberative concept of democracy.  
However, because numerous proponents of deliberative democratic theory have already written 
extensively about these advantages, I will limit myself to addressing only what I consider to be 
three of the most significant benefits of deliberation: 1) its good for the individual; 2) its tendency 
to promote an “enlarged mentality”; and 3) the democratic validity of its outcomes.151 
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 First, deliberative democracy begins with the premise that democratic legitimacy is 
contingent upon citizen involvement in decision-making.  This participatory requirement not only 
benefits the democratic state, however, it also represents a good for individuals.  As Aristotle 
explains, humans are, by nature, political animals.  And he argues that a political system, which 
requires individuals to participate in their own governance, enables them to achieve their highest 
sense of being (or telos).152  According to this logic, by insisting that private individuals engage in 
the political process, deliberative democratic theory contributes to their own personal fulfillment. 
 Second, deliberation may help to fulfill the natural human desire to be a part of a 
community.  Because deliberators rely on the force of their reasons to defend their arguments in 
a deliberative enterprise, they tend to choose their reasons based on what would be both 
acceptable and accessible to their fellow deliberators.  Indeed, in some cases, deliberative 
democratic theorists mandate that deliberators utilize only those arguments that could be 
accepted by all.  Habermas, for example, understands deliberation as a process in which 
participants must consider all those reasons that might count as good reasons for all those who 
are either involved in or effects by the issue under discussion.153  Similarly, Cohen’s theory of 
deliberative democracy demands that participants justify their arguments to one another using 
reasons that are acceptable to all.154  By putting everyone on equal terms, this requirement 
naturally unites the community – in order to craft a deliberative argument, an individual must put 
herself into the positions of her fellow deliberators, thus building empathy.  Furthermore, the 
“enlarged mentality” necessary for determining which arguments would be acceptable to all is, 
itself, a type of group solidarity.   
Finally, at least in its ideal, theoretical form, deliberation provides a way to democratically 
ascertain (or estimate) the public will.  Ideal deliberation, after all, reveals how the public might 
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think and act if they were given both adequate time and information to understand political issues, 
and also the opportunity to discuss their opinions with their equals.  This is almost certainly a 
more robust measure of the public will than any aggregate models of public opinion to date.  And 
not only is this knowledge theoretically valuable, but to the extent that the results of deliberation 
are adopted by public policy actors, it may also result in democratically superior (i.e. 
representative) outcomes. 
Of course, as a number of political theorists have recognized, there are also several 
significant disadvantages to deliberative democratic theory.155  As Lawrence R. Jacobs, Fay 
Lomax Cook and Michael X. Delli Carpini explain in their book, Talking Together: Public 
Deliberation and Political Participation in America, the major critiques of deliberative democracy 
can generalized into six categories: 1) elitist; 2) exclusionary; 3) manipulative; 4) divisive; 5) 
oppressive; and 6) politically insignificant.156 
First, the elitist critique of deliberative democracy is twofold.  In the first place, it refers to 
the potential selection bias inherent in deliberation.  While deliberative democratic 
experimenters—as exemplified by Fishkin—try to create random, scientific samples of 
participates, it is impossible to avoid the fact that only certain kinds of people are likely to actually 
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want to take part in deliberation.157  And unfortunately, the individuals who do participate in 
deliberation they tend to be wealthier, better educated and more politically involved than the 
population as a whole.158  In the second place, deliberative democratic theory is often criticized as 
being elitist in that it tends to ignore real inequalities by treating everyone equally.  In doing so, as 
John Forester explains, these theories “end up ironically reproducing the very inequalities with 
which they began.”159 
The second critique of deliberative democracy that Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini 
identify is that it is often deemed exclusionary.  Not only do voluntary deliberative proceedings 
tend to automatically omit certain segments of the population (i.e. those who are in a less 
powerful socioeconomic position), but even when politically disadvantaged individuals do partake 
in deliberation, “many of them are likely to find their voices and interests discounted or excluded 
because of entrenched inequalities in information and expertise, skill in public speaking and 
persuasion, and other resources that systematically advantage certain participants in deliberative 
forums.”160  Even the seemingly innocuous deliberative goal of consensus tends to have a 
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silencing affect on minority participants.  As Lynn Sanders explains, when societies are already 
characterized by significant inequalities, focusing on what is common tends to suppress the 
voices of those who find themselves on the periphery.161  Thus, societal power imbalances find 
their way into deliberation, even when all socioeconomic groups are technically included.  And 
those who are less likely to be heard through traditional political processes are also less likely to 
be heeded in deliberation. 
Third, a number of critics have speculated that deliberation may actually be manipulative.  
These opponents of deliberative democracy argue that deliberation is too focused on reason, in 
terms of the acquisition, processing and expression of information.162  Not only does this 
dependence on reason bias the process of deliberation, but it is also probably unrealistic for 
many individuals.163  Those who are less at ease with a reason-based approach to 
communication are likely to be less directly engaged in deliberation.  Rather than taking part in a 
discussion that might be overly intimidating to them, these individuals may prefer to stay quiet 
and simply rely on expert opinion. 
Fourth, Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini note that opponents of deliberative democracy 
allege that such theories are often divisive and oppressive.  By insisting that individuals express 
divergent opinions in a public forum, critics worry, deliberative democracy may actually intensify 
divisions and disagreements.164  Indeed, even to the extent that agreements can be reached, 
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such a consensus may only be hiding or stifling genuine difference.165  As Sanders writes, in 
many deliberative cases, “[c]alling for compromise… may be perilously close to suppressing the 
challenging perspectives of marginalized groups.”166 
Finally, deliberative democratic critics often point to the fact that these theories are 
extremely difficult translate into political outcomes.  And to the extent that deliberation actually 
can be made to affect politics, many suggest that these effects may actually be negative – 
reinforcing cynicism and disengagement.167   
 Building off of the list of criticisms presented by Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini, I have 
developed my own twofold critique of deliberative democratic theory, from the perspective of a 
theory of social speech.  As should be evident from my treatment of Habermas, Cohen, 
Gutmann/Thompson and Fishkin, et al. in the preceding section, I believe that theories of 
deliberative democracy have a tendency to actively exclude social speech.  More than that, I 
argue that these theories are actually designed to be incapable of accommodating social speech.  
For the remainder of this section, I argue that the failure of deliberative democratic theory to 
represent the kind of everyday social speech that characterizes most human interactions is the 
result of two inescapable characteristics: 1) its abstractness; and 2) its deliberateness. 
 
A. Social speech critique #1: Deliberative democratic theories are too abstract 
Deliberative democratic theory is not derived from any concrete, systematic 
understanding of human behavior.  Rather, deliberative democracy is more of an abstract theory, 
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based on ideal conditions and principles.  It begins by positing at least four broad assumptions 
about human interactions.  First, deliberative democratic theories assume that people are capable 
of engaging with one another with openness and mutual respect.  Second, they assume that 
individuals will be able to look beyond social differences, treating everyone as equals and judging 
them only on the strength of their arguments.  Third, they believe that all deliberative participants 
will be willing and able to express themselves using only reasonable, informed and morally 
justified arguments.  Finally, these theories assume that individuals can—or, at least, should—put 
aside their own self-interests aside and work towards some amorphous common good.  
Individual deliberative democratic theorists may emphasize some of these assumptions 
more than others.  They may also incorporate additional assumptions, based on the specifics of 
their theories (e.g. if they believe that deliberation requires a sharp distinction between the state 
and civil society; if they prefer one singular public to a multitude of smaller publics).168  However, 
whether neatly expressed or merely implied, all of the deliberative democratic theorists addressed 
in this chapter begin with these four assumptions. 
Unfortunately, as Sanders explains, “[t]he (careful) articulation of these formal 
standards… is a far cry from an assessment of the probability of meeting them.”169  And indeed, 
the vast majority of real, practiced speech only barely resembles the visions of communication 
presented by deliberative democratic theorists, such as Habermas, Cohen, Gutmann, Thompson 
and Fishkin, et al.  As several critics of deliberative democracy have already noted, this is 
because conversations do not usually consist of reasoned, informed inclusive speech, 
respectfully expressed, and aimed at reaching a conclusive decision.  Frederick Schauer, for 
example, explains that, while there may be some examples of successful deliberation in real life, 
it is clear that deliberation “is hardly the dominant form of American public discourse, as even the 
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briefest sojourn into talk radio, sound-bite television, and tabloid print journalism will attest.”170  
Similarly, although Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini attest that many Americans are now 
communicating with one another in politically meaningful ways—what they call, “discursive 
participation”—they note that this speech “still falls short of the hopes and optimism of 
deliberative democratic theorists.”171  They explain that the kind of “just talk” that characterizes 
most human interaction does not even come close to approximating deliberative democracy’s 
expectations for universality, representativeness and rationality.  It is also not particularly likely to 
lead to result in general agreement.172 
This gap between deliberative theory and practice is due to the fact that most people do 
not naturally adhere to the principles of civility, reason and balance in their daily communications.  
It may even be unrealistic to assume that they could do so on any large scale.  For one thing, it is 
extremely difficult for individuals to completely put aside their personal preferences in favor of the 
common good.  (Often, it is nearly impossible to separate the too.)  And even when such a 
discussion is possible, not all individuals are equally capable of communicating using the formal, 
reason-based approach that is required in deliberation.173 
There has been relatively little empirical research testing the accuracy of deliberative 
democratic assumptions, however.  Until recently, the preference for the abstract over the 
concrete in deliberative democratic theory has meant that most scholarship on the subject has 
tended to focus more on the theory than the practice of deliberation.  “A great deal of work has 
tried to define what scholars mean by deliberation,” explain Mark Button and Kevin Mattson.  “Not 
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enough has been said about how deliberation actually works among citizens.”174  And for the 
most part, what empirical research does exist on deliberation is limited to isolated studies, such 
as decision-making in town hall meetings;175 group meetings;176 informal local conversations;177 
Deliberative Polls and National Issues Forums;178 and experiments in individual laboratory 
settings.179 
However, there have been some notable efforts to assess the practicality of deliberative 
democratic theory.  Sanders, in particular, has looked at jury studies in order to test the feasibility 
of attaining the high standards imposed on human behavior by deliberative democratic theory.180  
Juries closely mimic deliberation in a real world setting, in that people participating in a jury are 
communicating—ideally, using reason and empirical evidence—in order to solve a common 
problem.181  Thus, if it is possible for people to behave according to deliberative standards—by 
bracketing status differentials, treating one another with equal respect and focusing on the value 
of reasoned argument—in a jury, deliberative democratic theories may not be that far off. 
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Unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case.  Sanders finds that people on juries 
are not actually capable of behaving in the ways that deliberative democratic theory might 
suggest.  “When Americans assemble in juries,” she explains, “they do not leave behind the 
status, power, and privileges that they hold in the outside world.”182  Rather, individuals tend to 
reproduce external power dynamics in two ways.  First, jurors tend to coalesce behind a leader or 
foreperson.  And, while gender, race and wealth do not directly determine who rises to power in a 
jury, Sanders explains, these factors do “increase the likelihood of behavior that leads to selection 
as head of the jury,” such as speaking first, sitting at the head of the table, etc.183  Thus, just as in 
the outside world, the jury leader tends to be a college-educated, white male.184  Second, even in 
conversation, some individuals (and their perspectives) have a disproportionate influence.  Those 
who speak louder and more often have a higher likelihood of their opinion prevailing in jury 
deliberations than those who speak more softly and less often, regardless of the value of their 
inputs.  And as Sanders points out, higher status individuals tend to be louder and more vocal 
than lower status individuals.  Thus, those who are already privileged in society tend to have an 
especially strong influence in jury deliberations.    
Sanders believes that these problems are unavoidable in the current American system.  
As long as material prerequisites are unevenly distributed, individuals maintain different levels of 
persuasiveness, and some people are less likely to be heard than others, it will be impossible to 
reproduce ideal deliberation in the real world.185  “Deliberation requires not only equality in 
resources and the guarantee of equal opportunity to articulate persuasive arguments,” she writes, 
“but also equality in ‘epistemological authority,’ in the capacity to evoke acknowledgement of 
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one’s arguments.”186  Unfortunately, this kind of equality is practically impossible in an inherently 
unequal society.  
Of course, deliberative democratic theory is not necessarily meant to be replicated in real 
life – or even to apply to it.  As David Estlund explains, much of deliberative democratic theory is 
designed to be abstract.  It is supposed to reflect an ideal, or a goal to which political actors 
should aspire.  In other words, it “is not something to be emulated in practice, but a tool of thought 
and analysis by which appropriate sites for political engagement can be identified.”187  And 
certainly, this is true for some of the theorists presented in this chapter.  As discussed above, 
Cohen very explicitly insists that his theory of deliberative democracy is only meant to serve as “a 
standard for evaluating democratic institutions and procedures of collective decision-making.”  
And, as Estlund explains, Habermas can also be read to be saying that it would be unrealistic, 
utopian and, even, undesirable to design political institutions that closely resemble his ideal 
deliberative speech situation.188  Thus, Estlund is able to argue that any fears that deliberative 
democratic theory privileges “the calm giving and receiving of reasons,” in practice, are 
unwarranted.189  To the extent that critics of deliberative democracy are worried that these 
theories place unrealistic and biased standards on speech, he writes, it is only because they have 
failed “to put the ideal deliberative situation in its proper theoretical place.”190 
To the extent that Estlund is correct—and deliberative democratic theory is only 
supposed to provide abstract, theoretical constructs—I believe that its utility is severely limited.  
While there is certainly some academic value in understanding, approximately, how people might 
communicate under ideal democratic conditions, political theory also has to provide insights into 
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how to translate that information into practical results.  Thus, deliberative democratic theories that 
do not extend to real world politics must, at the very least, be supplemented by more practical 
theories of communication.   
There are several prominent deliberative democrats who do seem to be making more 
practical claims with their theories, however.  For example, Fishkin, and other adherents to the 
Deliberative Polling project, are clearly trying to insert deliberative democratic principles into real 
political decision-making.  And as Schauer points out, while Gutmann and Thompson may initially 
appear to be providing only “an aspirational vision of public deliberation as an exercise in ideal 
theory,” they are also, simultaneously, making the “claim that this vision is the appropriate 
decision for dealing with the fact of disagreement in a nonideal world.”191 
Unfortunately, these more practical theories of deliberative democracy fall victim to the 
problems cited above.  Because they are based on unrealistic abstractions of human relations, 
most deliberative democratic theory fails when it is put into practice.  To the extent that is 
impossible to produce perfect conditions of equality and openness in the real world, I believe that 
deliberative democratic theory is ultimately unworkable.   
 
B. Social speech critique #2: Deliberative democratic theories are too deliberate 
As stated above, one consequence of the fact that deliberative democratic theory is 
founded on abstractions and ideals is that the standards for what constitutes deliberation are 
extremely rigid.  While individual deliberative democratic theorists do differ somewhat in what 
they deem to be deliberation—as the preceding discussions of Habermas, Cohen, 
Gutmann/Thompson and Fishkin, et al. make clear—they all place strict, formal requirements on 
speech.  To summarize, for speech to constitute deliberation, it must generally consist of 
informed, reasoned and balanced dialogue, conscientiously aimed at reaching a mutually 
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acceptable result (if not always consensus).  In other words, deliberation must be thoughtful, 
structured and purposeful.  Thus, one might say that, far from being informal or casual, 
deliberation is actually highly deliberate.  
The deliberateness of deliberation is not exactly neutral, however.192  Any time that a 
political theory places formal, rigid standards upon a type of communication, that ideal will 
necessarily privilege certain ways of speaking.  It will also tend to privilege certain kinds of people 
– specifically, those who are most skilled at and comfortable with that ideal form of speech.   
In the case of deliberative democratic theory, the requirements placed upon deliberation 
mean that it is incapable of accommodating the unrehearsed, impassioned and personal 
conversations that characterize everyday, social speech.  As Young explains, there are at least 
three types of social speech that clearly do not fall within the deliberative democratic model: 1) 
greeting; 2) rhetoric; and 3) storytelling.193  By omitting these articulations of social speech, 
deliberative democratic theory not only misses out on a substantial portion of politically relevant 
speech, but it also marginalizes those groups that are most associated with these kinds of 
speech. 
First, as Young explains, while “greeting” may be a kind of speech that doesn’t really say 
anything, it also acts as “a logical and motivational condition for dialogue that aims to reach 
understanding in that the parties in the dialogue recognize one another in their particularity.”194  In 
other words, greetings are “gestures of politeness and deference,” which, by promoting 
friendliness and respect, ultimately facilitate communication.195  Rhetoric is also politically 
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influential, Young argues, in that it enables speakers to appeal to those with different aims, values 
and interests.  When speaking to a heterogeneous group, “it is not enough to make assertions 
and give reasons,” she writes.  “One must also be heard.”196  Rhetoric—in the form of “humor, 
wordplay, images, and figures of speech”—promotes discussion by capturing the listener’s 
attention and evoking and emotional response.197  Finally, Young explains how storytelling is 
often used in situations of vast cultural or class differences, in order to help individuals develop 
the empathy necessary for achieving justice.  Narrative, she argues, by revealing the experiences 
of different groups; helping to build cross-cultural understandings of various values and cultural 
particularities; and illuminating a “total social perspective,” helps to alleviate the 
misunderstandings—“or a sense of complete lack of understanding”—that between different 
groups.198  As a result, diverse peoples are able to recognize their commonalities. 
Similarly, Sanders also believes that testimony is essential to any full communicative 
theory of democracy.  Testimony, she points out, had a long history in America—especially in 
black politics and churches—before it was mostly overshadowed by the elite predilection for 
rational, impersonal deliberation.199  And because testimony “encourages consideration of the 
worthiness of perspectives not obviously rooted in common ground and not necessarily voiced in 
a calmly rational way,” a political theory that validates such speech would be able to embrace 
difference and minority viewpoints.200   
Unfortunately, standard models of deliberative democratic theory are too deliberate to 
include greeting, rhetoric and storytelling/testimony (thereby ensuring that they miss out on these 
potential political impacts of social speech).  Instead, as Young explains, deliberation tends to 
favor three kinds of speech that are not equally accessible to all groups in society: assertive, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Ibid., pp. 130. 
197 Ibid., pp. 130-131. 
198 Ibid., pp. 131-132. 
199 Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” pp. 370. 
200 Ibid., pp. 372. 
76	  
	  
	  
formal and rational speech.201  First, the deliberation democratic requirements that 
communication must both emphasize reasons and also be goal oriented mean that “[s]peech that 
is assertive and confrontation is here more valued than speech that is tentative, exploratory, or 
conciliatory.”202  Second, the norms of deliberation ensure that deliberators will be biased towards 
arguments based on logic and clear, formal reasoning, rather than personal appeals.  “Speech 
that proceeds from premise to conclusion in an orderly fashion that clearly lays out its inference 
structure is better than other speech,” Young explains of deliberation.203  “It is also better to assert 
one’s position in terms of generalities and principles that apply to particular instances.”204  Finally, 
deliberative democrats tend to emphasize reason over passion.  “Dispassionate and 
disembodied” communication is considered preferable to the kind of emotional appeals that 
characterize so much of human communication.205   
By elevating the status of these kinds of formal deliberation at the expense of social 
speech, deliberative democratic theory privileges those who are more skilled at the former and 
rejects those who are more adept at the latter.  And unfortunately, proficiency in assertive, logical, 
rational deliberation is not equally distributed across demographic groups.  Men, in particular, 
tend to acquire a more assertive communicative style, while women often develop as more timid 
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205 Ibid.  As Young explains, deliberative democratic theorists “tend to presuppose an opposition 
between mind and body, reason and emotion.  They tend falsely to identify objectivity with calm 
and absence of emotional expression” (Ibid.).  They also incorrectly believe that it is even 
possible—much less desirable—to form a dichotomy between passion and reason.  In fact, 
reason and emotion often come together in political action.  See Jane J. Mansbridge, “Everyday 
Talk in the Deliberative System,” in Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and 
Disagreement, Stephen Macedo (ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): “The emotions 
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conversationalists.206  Similarly, wealthy, educated members of the majority community are more 
likely to have been trained to structure their arguments around logic and reason than who are 
lower down on the socioeconomic scale.  Thus, it is the groups that are already disadvantaged in 
liberal democracies (i.e. female, racial minorities and lower income) that are more likely to be 
unpracticed in and uneasy about deliberation.  On the other hand, those who are more powerful 
in society (i.e. male, white and higher income) tend to be more comfortable with this kind of 
communication.   
Indeed, even if these differences in speaking styles are somewhat overblown—as several 
deliberative democratic theorists have argued (see below)—that does not take away from the 
argument that the deliberateness of deliberation privileges wealthy, white males.  Regardless of 
how deliberative modes of speech are actually distributed across demographic groups, what 
matters most is that they are not seen to be equally distributed.  To the extent that deliberation 
favors assertiveness, formal logic and reason, and to the extent that these styles of speech are 
typically associated with privileged groups, deliberative democratic theory implicitly elevates the 
status of these individuals.  Likewise, to the extent that deliberation rejects informal social 
speech, and to the extent that this type of speech is often associated with marginalized members 
of society, deliberative democratic theory serves to diminish the status of these individuals.207 
Many deliberative democratic theorists would respond that there is nothing inherently 
unequal about the deliberative preference for informative, reasoned, rational argument over social 
speech.  Gutmann and Thompson, for example, claim that there is no reason to believe that 
certain societal groups are less capable of presenting their arguments according to deliberative 
standards than others.  “As a generalization,” they write, “it would be hard to show that defenders 
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207 See Barry Hindess, “Representation ingrafted upon democracy?” in Democratization, Vol. 7, 
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of the disadvantaged have been less reasonable in presenting their arguments than defenders of 
the status quo.”208  Thus, Gutmann and Thompson suggest that the inferior political outcomes 
experienced by marginalized groups in democracies should be attributed, less to any lack of 
“deliberative competency,” and more to their lack of power.209  Deliberation, the authors argue, 
actually levels the political playing field – at least as compared to bargaining and other more 
overtly aggressive political methods.210 
But this somewhat misses the point.  Gutmann and Thompson—as well as all other 
deliberative democratic theorists in this chapter—assume that it is somehow possible to separate 
out power from deliberation.  But as Ian Shapiro explains, power relations always find their way 
into deliberation.  While he consents that collective life is not entirely reducible to power relations, 
Shapiro points out that “power suffuses all collective life” – including deliberation.211  In The State 
of Democratic Theory, Shapiro suggests that there are two ways in which power can insert itself 
into deliberation.  First, he points out that the more socially powerful might lie and stall discussion, 
in order to undermine proper deliberative procedures.212  However, Shapiro also believe that this 
possibility can be assuaged by limiting the right to demand more deliberation only to those parties 
whose basic interests are at stake (the vulnerable party).  Second, regardless of whether 
governments assemble citizens into a sphere of deliberation, they cannot force them to behave 
according to the rules of deliberation.  For example, they cannot ensure that people will deliberate 
towards the best result rather than bargain towards the easiest conclusion.  “Governments can try 
to structure things so as to make deliberation more or less likely, but ultimately, deliberation 
depends on individual commitment.  By its terms, deliberation requires solicitous goodwill, 
creative ingenuity, and a desire to get to the best answer.  Even juries sometimes choose to 
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rightly trouble critics” (Ibid.). 
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bargain rather than to deliberate when they want to go home, and, when they do, there is little 
anyone can do about it.”213 
Furthermore, as I have argued, power relations and hierarchies influence deliberation 
right from the beginning, by determining who will be skilled at deliberate communication and, 
more importantly, who will be seen as being skilled at deliberate communication.  Those who 
exist among the more privileged spheres of society receive training in deliberation that far 
surpasses that, which is received by members of groups that have traditionally been excluded 
from mainstream politics.  Thus, socially advantaged individuals may find that they have a more 
seemingly natural fluency in deliberation than members of marginalized groups.214  
So while deliberative democratic theorists like Gutmann and Thompson assume that 
everyone starts from a roughly equal discursive playing field, that is not, in fact, the case.  Some 
individuals start out with a handicap in formal deliberation, while others have a leg up.  And those 
who are comfortable with deliberation will ultimately find themselves in a position to reinforce their 
preexisting social superiority and political leadership.215 
 
III. The role of social speech in deliberative democratic theory: 
Although the theories of deliberative democracy presented in this chapter are generally 
unable to account for the role that social speech plays in politics, that does not mean that all 
deliberative democracy is necessarily incompatible with social speech.  Indeed, several 
deliberative democratic theorists have already recognized the need to expand their theories of 
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political communication to include more informal, everyday speech.  And to that end, these 
theorists have suggested a number of ways in which deliberative democracy could be amended 
in order to be able to account for social speech. 
Mansbridge, for example, suggests that several prominent deliberative democratic 
theories could potentially be modified in ways that would enable them to address something akin 
to social speech – what she calls, “everyday talk.”216  First, referring specifically to Gutmann and 
Thompson’s theory of deliberative democracy, Mansbridge argues that the criteria they use for 
judging deliberation in a public assembly—reciprocity, publicity and accountability—could easily 
be revised to apply to everyday talk as well.217  Second, she argues that Cohen’s four elements of 
the ideal deliberative procedure—free, reasoned, equal, consensus—could also each be 
amended to be more inclusive of social speech.218  
Other critics of traditional theories of deliberative democracy have argued that, these 
models not only ought to be explicitly opened up to include those forms of communication that are 
most commonly associated with social speech, but that such an expansion is entirely feasible.  
For instance, Dryzek claims that there is no reason for deliberation to be restricted to the cold, 
reasoned, informed discussions that are generally indicative of the term; rather, he argues that 
deliberation can be understood to include such forms of speech as rhetoric, humor, emotion and 
storytelling.219  Indeed, Dryzek’s modified ideal of deliberation has only two conditions:  1) Is that 
communication neither coercive nor threatening; and 2) Can it connect the particular to the 
general?220  Anything that falls within those two perimeters, he argues, is a legitimate form of 
deliberation. 
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Thus, Dryzek’s definition of deliberation does not limit acceptable communication to that 
formal, political discussion, which only takes place within the institutional structures of liberal 
democracy.  Specifically, he argues that focusing only on deliberation within “the representative 
institutions and legal system of liberal democratic states” ties that mode of communication to “a 
needlessly thin conception of democracy, growing ever thinner in light of the constraints that the 
capitalist market economy imposes upon effective state democracy.”221  Instead, Dryzek believes 
that both the state and civil society should be construed as appropriate arenas for discursive 
democracy.  Thus, his theory of deliberation appears to actually embrace social speech in civil 
society.222  
Unfortunately, despite his aims to make deliberative democracy more inclusive, Dryzek’s 
model of deliberation may not actually be as accommodating of social speech as it first appears.  
In practice, his two conditions for what constitutes deliberation actually eliminate several 
important forms of social speech.  Greeting, rhetoric and storytelling, for example, all appear to be 
too coercive to be considered deliberation under Dryzek’s model.223  And from the perspective of 
social speech, these exclusions are significant.  As stated above, greeting, rhetoric and 
storytelling are all common elements of informal, everyday conversation, and they each play a 
vital role in the political process.  To the extent that Dryzek’s revised theory of deliberative 
democracy is unable to adequately account for these more democratic forms of social speech, it 
remains deficient and prone towards inequalities.  
 
VI. Conclusion: 
The attempts of certain deliberative democratic theorists—i.e. Mansbridge and Dryzek—
to reimagine deliberative democratic theory in such a way that it is less obviously biased towards 
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argumentative speech provide substantial steps in the direction of a political theory of social 
speech.  Unfortunately, as should be clear from this chapter, Mansbridge and Dryzek are, by far, 
the exceptions among deliberative democratic theorists – the majority of deliberative democratic 
theory remains neglectful of social speech.  First, as an abstract theory, it is often expressly 
unconcerned with basing its assumptions in lived experience.  As a result, deliberative democratic 
theory bears little resemblance to the kind of speech that typifies human interaction, and it often 
fails when put into practice.  Second, the deliberateness of deliberation means that it is too formal 
and rigid to apply to most speech.  Only that speech, which is free, reasoned, conscientious and 
goal oriented can be considered deliberation, which leaves out the vast majority of informal, 
everyday interactions.   
This lack of interest in social speech, evident in several of the major strains of 
deliberative democratic theory, has gone a long way to disconnect a substantive portion of 
political theory from real life interactions, their political implications and the inner-workings of 
democratic life.  Indeed, it may be fair to say that political theory’s tendency to muse about ideal 
conditions has not only cleaved off the largest chunks of lived experience, but has also 
contributed to charges about political theory’s irrelevance.  What the discipline needs in order to 
fully understand the impact of speech on politics in general—and democratic citizenship 
specifically—is a theory of social speech that can complement more traditional and contemporary 
theories of speech by embracing the way people actually communicate. 
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CHAPTER 3 
	  
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: 
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 
 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 
-­‐ The First Amendment of the United States Constitution224 
"The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least 
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint 
or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure 
freedom from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liberties as 
adequate to supply the public need for information and education with respect to the significant 
issues of the times… Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, 
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members 
of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." 
-­‐ Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)225 
 
Freedom of expression is among the most fundamental liberties protected by the United 
States Constitution, as evidenced by its placement in the First Amendment to the Bill of Rights.226  
And while the Supreme Court had little to say about the scope of freedom of speech in the early 
years of the American Republic, since 1919, it has taken an active role in interpreting this portion 
of the First Amendment.  Taken together, the sum of post-World War I First Amendment 
jurisprudence can be read like a theory of freedom of speech.  And while that theory may not be 
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entirely consistent, there are some notable commonalities.  Principle among these commonalities 
is the theme that speech does not merit protection because it is a good, in and of itself; rather, 
freedom of speech must be upheld, the Supreme Court has argued, because it contributes to the 
wider values of truth and democratic self-governance. 
The Supreme Court’s instrumentalist justifications for freedom of speech have meant that 
the First Amendment does not apply to all communication.  As Stanley Ingber argues, Courts that 
invoke the marketplace of ideas model of the First Amendment justify freedom of speech on the 
basis of “the aggregate benefits to society,” which leaves the First Amendment open to major 
limitations on speech if it can be determined that that is what would be to the greatest benefit to 
society.227  Similarly, if freedom of speech is “merely a correlate of democracy then it need extend 
only to communication pertinent to democratic decisionmaking.”228  In other words, 
communication, which does not further the marketplace of ideas or democratic self-governance 
concerns, receives only limited constitutional protection, and can be legally abridged when it 
infringes upon other significant societal interests.  Thus, contrary to popular belief, freedom of 
speech is not actually absolute in the United States.229  The Supreme Court has, indeed, ruled 
that speech, which involves a “clear or present danger,” insults, obscenity, defamation, disruption 
to school activities or a breach of the peace, can all be prohibited or punished. 
But what of that speech, which the Supreme Court does not mention?  In this chapter, I 
show how the American judiciary’s treatment of freedom of speech has focused primarily on 
public, political speech.  It is this kind of speech, the Court has repeatedly argued, that leads to 
the discovery of truth and democratic self-government, and therefore, merits constitutional 
protection.  But the labels “political” and “public” only apply to a small fraction of communication.  
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The vast majority of speech that takes place in the world is social speech, and I argue that it, too, 
contributes to the pursuit of truth and effective democratic self-governance.  However, by failing 
to adequately address this most pervasive and popular form of speech, the Supreme Court has 
implied that is not as valuable as political, public speech. 
I begin this chapter by reviewing the early American history of freedom of speech.  
Supreme Court Justices and American legal theorists, alike, have a tendency to couch their 
readings of the First Amendment in a historical context.  In looking back to the experiences and 
intentions of the Founding Fathers, “originalist” constitutional scholars believe that they can 
interpret the right to freedom of speech in a way that is true to the spirit of the nation.  While I do 
not believe that a historical analysis of the First Amendment is necessary for developing a theory 
of social speech, I would argue that it is important for contextualizing the judicial decisions and 
legal theory that followed. 
In the second section of this chapter, I provide an overview of the Supreme Court’s 
opinions on freedom of speech since 1919.  The Supreme Court’s theory of freedom of speech is 
perhaps more influential than anything else when it comes to determining the average citizen’s 
ideas about what constitutes valuable or meaningful communication; thus, I believe it deserves 
special attention.  Rather than focusing on the opinions of individual justices or courts, I look at 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment rulings as an inconsistent but intelligible whole.  While this 
approach may be more challenging in some respects, it also allows me to develop a more 
cohesive analysis of free speech jurisprudence that is also larger in scope.  And what I find, in 
this section, is that the Supreme Court has repeatedly defined the First Amendment through the 
use of two major arguments: 1) the marketplace of ideas; and 2) democratic self-governance.  I 
argue that, while these rationales have been utilized by the Court to explicitly protect a wide 
range of public and political communication, they have not been extended to apply to social 
speech.   
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In the following section, I present my own critique of American jurisprudence on freedom 
of speech, from the perspective of a theory of social speech.  I highlight the Supreme Court’s brief 
and vague statements regarding private speech in order to show that it has not sufficiently 
addressed the issue of social speech.  And to the extent that the Court’s consequentialist reading 
of freedom of speech has only been applied to political, public speech, I argue that this poses a 
major problem for the theoretical study of communication.  First, it devalues a huge sphere of 
human interaction, one that has significant implications for political life.  Second, it means that the 
Court is missing an opportunity to regulate and structure democracy at the ground level. 
Finally, I provide a brief overview of some of the leading American legal critiques of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  I find that, while there is a great deal of interest in the Supreme 
Court’s distinction between public and private speech, there is comparatively little attention being 
paid to the status of social speech in the First Amendment.  And although American legal 
scholarship may be moving in a direction that is more conducive to social speech, it is not yet 
adequately attentive to this form of communication. 
 
I. A brief history of freedom of speech in the United States: 
The early American colonists lived under a legal system that was considerably more 
hostile to freedom of speech concerns than that, which currently exists in the United States.  
Much of this early attitude towards freedom of expression can be attributed to the repressiveness 
in England, from where many of the colonists originated.  At the time that the New World was 
being settled, the English approach towards freedom of expression was defined by two legal 
systems: 1) seditious libel; and 2) prior restraint in publishing. 
First, the English common law tradition of seditious libel made it illegal to publish anything 
that was disrespectful of the church, the state or its officers.  And punishment was potentially 
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severe, often consisting of the death penalty.  As Sir William Blackstone explains, the premise for 
such a strict system of censorship is that “dangerous or offensive writings,” which are found to be 
“of a pernicious tendency,” disrupt the “preservation of peace and good order.”230  Those, like 
Blackstone, who supported English seditious libel statutes, believed that if citizens were free to 
openly question and criticize the church, the state or its representatives, it would likely result in 
social upheaval and unrest.  Even the exposure of true and accurate criticisms was therefore 
illegal, as these were perhaps even more likely to cause turmoil than false allegations.   
Second—as I describe more thoroughly in Chapter Two—during the time of colonization, 
England also had a significant censorship apparatus in place, taking the form of a licensing 
system.  In 1538, King Henry VIII issued a proclamation that required all individual to acquire a 
license before they could print anything, including books, pamphlets, etc.  The immediate result of 
this system of prior restraint was the formation of printing monopolies, which effectively stifled the 
publication of unorthodox and oppositional opinions.  Even when Parliament overthrew King 
Charles I and dismantled the existing licensing system, a new licensing statute quickly replaced it 
in 1643.  This system remained in place until 1694. 
Coming from this repressive environment, many early Americans were not very accepting 
of unusual or dissident opinions.  And this attitude was reflected in the laws of the individual 
states, which, under the Articles of Confederation, were left to determine the scope of individual 
rights and liberties.  Often, the most restrictive state controls on speech during the colonial period 
concerned blasphemous speech.  In 1612, for example, under Virginia’s “Lawes Divine, Morall 
and Martiall,” the Governor was entitled to declare the death penalty for any individual who 
denied the “holy and blessed Trinitie.”231  This law also explicitly outlawed “Blasphemy,” “taking 
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Gods holy name in vain,” and “traitorous words against his majesties person, or Royall 
Authority.”232  Similarly, a “The Massachusetts Act Against Heresy and Error” of 1646 punished 
those who denied the immortality of the soul with banishment.233  And in 1660, that state 
famously hanged a woman, named Mary Dyer, who refused to remain silent about her Quaker 
beliefs.234 
And, as in Britain, colonial states also vigorously targeted seditious libel.  While there 
were only a handful of trials for seditious libel in the United States before the American 
Revolution—as opposed to hundreds in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries—governors (in concert with their Councils) and elected Assemblies exerted great power 
in order to stifle critical opinions.235  As Mary Patterson Clarke asserts, “[l]iterally scores of 
persons, probably hundreds, throughout the colonies were tracked down by the various 
messengers and sergeants and brought into the house to make inglorious submission for words 
spoken in the heat of anger or for writings which intentionally or otherwise had given offense.”236   
In Virginia, for example, this meant that a military Captain was stripped of his rank for 
uttering “treasonable words,” an individual was convicted of “scandalous, mutinous, and 
seditious” words criticizing the house on a tax issue, and even a member of the Governor’s 
Council was heavily fined for referring to the governor as a law-breaker.237  In Maryland, a law 
against mutinous and seditious speech was sharply criticized for the punishments it exerted, 
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which included “Whipping, Branding, Boreing through the Tongue, Fine, Imprisonment, 
Banishment, or Death.”238  And in Massachusetts, between 1637 and 1647, convictions for 
seditious speech were issued for John Wheelright, Anne Hutchinson and over half a dozen of 
their followers; Peter Hobart and others from the Hindman affair; and Robert Child and his six 
associates.239 
However, that approach began to soften by the mid-eighteenth century.  In a highly 
influential case in 1735, John Peter Zenger was prosecuted for seditious libel in response to 
several attacks that the newspaper he printed, the New York Weekly Journal, issued against the 
Royal Governor of New York, William Cosby.  Although the truth of an attack did not constitute a 
defense for seditious libel under either English common law or the new American legal codes, 
Zenger’s lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, appealed to the jury on those grounds.  And, ultimately, the 
jury agreed with him.  Defying the judge’s ruling, the jury declared Zenger non guilty of seditious 
libel.240  As Anthony Lewis explains, while this decision could not formally change the law, it 
“reverberated around the colonies and discouraged further prosecutions for seditious libel.”241 
In the aftermath of the Zenger decision, James Alexander (who was Zenger’s attorney 
until he was disbarred for accusing the presiding judge of bias) published a vigorous series of 
defenses of freedom of speech.  He was eventually joined by several other critics of seditious 
libel, who believed that the people had a right to know about the conduct of those in power.242  
And while libertarian voices were relatively few and far between during the mid-eighteenth 
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century, a number of other political philosophers and activists began espousing arguments in 
favor of freedom of expression.243 
In this atmosphere of the mid- to late-eighteenth century, politics began to shift gears.  
With political actors being influenced by the events of the time, as well as the political thought of 
those such as John Milton and John Locke, states started introducing protections for freedom of 
expression into their individual constitutions.  In 1776, Virginia became the first state to insert 
freedom of the press into its Declaration of Rights.  Section 12 of that article, drafted by George 
Mason, reads:  “The freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and can never 
be restrained but by despotic Governments.”244  That same year, the state of Pennsylvania made 
freedom of speech a constitutional right.  Its first constitution stipulated, “That the people have a 
right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom 
of the press ought not to be restrained.”245  The following year, the independent republic of 
Vermont copied its statement on freedom of speech in it own constitution.  And in 1780, 
Massachusetts adopted a constitution, which explicitly protected freedom of the press.  All in all, 
by 1787, nine of the original thirteen colonies had enacted constitutions and/or foundational 
documents included declarations of a right to some kind of freedom of expression. 
This did not mean, however, that freedom of expression was protected by the states in 
the same sense that it is today.  For example, Pennsylvania still continued to suppress loyalist 
speech and harass Quakers over their religious beliefs even after it adopted its freedom of 
expression clause.246  As Lewis argues, freedom of speech may not have had much actual force 
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during this period.  Indeed, it looks as if the state bills of rights may have been considered more 
“admonitions to state legislatures,” as opposed to enforceable, legal provisions.247 
Fortunately, a new national Bill of Rights was just on the horizon.  By 1787, it had 
become clear to many Americans that the fledging nation required a stronger constitution than 
that, which the Articles of Confederation had to offer.  Thus, at a Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia, on September 17, 1787, a new constitution was proposed.  This new constitution 
had no bill of rights, and therefore, no protections for freedom of expression.  Many Antifederalists 
feared—among other things—that a constitution devoid of guaranteed rights and liberties would 
give the federal government too much power, and it might eventually threaten the people.  In 
order to assuage these fears, John Hancock proposed a plan: upon ratification of the new 
constitution, the first Congress would have to adopt a bill of rights.   
A number of the Founding Fathers were hostile to this idea, however.  Notably, James 
Madison feared that any efforts to enumerate individual rights risked implying that other, 
unnamed rights were unprotected.  Furthermore, he was skeptical that a bill of rights would be 
effective.  Looking at the experiences of the individual states, Madison pointed out that their bill of 
rights were often violated “by overbearing majorities in every State.”248 
Nevertheless, after only a brief debate, Madison’s proposal was unanimously defeated by 
the state delegations, and it was decided that the new Congress would enact a national bill of 
rights.  Thus, in the first session of the United States Congress, Madison proposed twenty 
constitutional amendments concerning individual rights.  These twenty proposals were then 
condensed into twelve, and passed along to the states, which ratified ten of them.  These ten 
amendments were officially adopted when the state of Virginia ratified them on December 15, 
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1791—thereby fulfilling the requirement that they be approved by three-fourths of the states—and 
together, they came to be known as the Bill of Rights.   
As cited at the beginning of this chapter, the First Amendment of the United States Bill of 
Rights guarantees that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”249  What exactly that means, however—especially as regards freedom of speech—
has been hotly contested.   
For one thing, at the time of ratification, the hierarchy between the federal constitution 
and state and local law was still unclear.  While the United States Constitution was always meant 
to be binding on the states regarding sections that particularly referred to the states (e.g. the 
contract clause), many early American political actors believed that the First Amendment applied 
only to Congress.  Thus, through much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the states 
often followed their own rules and regulations regarding freedom of speech.  And this attitude was 
supported by the Supreme Court’s 1833 decision in Barron v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore, which stated that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government.250  It was 
not until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1865 that states began to see substantial 
new federal restrictions on their policies towards freedom of speech.251  And even then, the 
Supreme Court continued to find that the First and Second Amendments did not apply to the 
states.252  It was only in 1925, with the decision in Gitlow v. New York—which first established the 
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incorporation doctrine—that the constitutional right to freedom of speech was made to apply to 
the states.253 
 The language of the First Amendment is also extremely—and intentionally—vague.  And 
because the First Amendment passed in both houses of Congress with almost no recorded 
debate, there is limited historical information available to provide guidance on how it ought to be 
understood.  Thus, there has been a great deal of speculation among political theorists and 
actors about how the Founding Fathers meant for the First Amendment to be interpreted.   
 In his 1963 book, Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History: Legacy of 
Suppression, Leonard W. Levy published a controversial account of the First Amendment.  
Pointing to the First Amendment’s foundations in English common law, he argued that is 
impossible to know exactly how much of this tradition the Framers meant to infuse into freedom of 
speech.  Their language is simply too vague.  Perhaps they did mean to express a broad freedom 
of speech, he speculated.  Or perhaps they did not know, themselves, what they meant.  “It is not 
even certain that the Framers themselves knew what they had in mind,” Levy wrote, “that is, at 
the time of the drafting and ratification of the First Amendment, few of them if any at all clearly 
understood what they meant by the free speech-and-press clause, and it is perhaps doubtful that 
those few agreed except in a generalized way and equally doubtful that they represented a 
consensus.”254 
The only aspect of the Framers’ intentions that Levy was sure of was that they did not 
envision an absolute freedom of speech.  There were always going to be limits, he explained.  
First, Levy suggested that, building off of the experience of censorship in England, perhaps the 
Framers only designed the First Amendment to forbid acts of prior restraint on speech.  Second, 
he argued that the Constitution’s freedom of speech was almost certainly constructed with an 
exception for seditious libel.  “What is clear is that there exists no evidence to suggest an 
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understanding that a constitutional guarantee of free speech or press meant the impossibility of 
future prosecutions of seditious utterances,” Levy wrote.255  “The security of the state against 
libelous advocacy or attack was always regarded as outweighing any social interest in open 
expression, at least through the period of the adoption of the First Amendment.”256 
And certainly, this reading of the First Amendment appears to have been born out by the 
numerous wartime revisions to freedom of speech.  In the late eighteenth century, President John 
Adams infamously oversaw the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which gave 
federal authorities the power to prosecute any individual suspected of plotting against the federal 
government.257  The Act also prohibited the writing, printing, speech and publishing of “any false, 
scandalous and malicious writing… with intent to defame” or bring “into contempt or disrepute” 
the government of the United States, either house of Congress of the United States or the 
President of the United States, as well as expression that is meant “to excite against them, or 
either of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the 
United States, or to incite any unlawful combinations therein.”258  Thus, the Alien and Sedition Act 
threatened political discussion until it expired in 1801.   
However, this was not the end of wartime prohibitions on speech.  During the Civil War, 
President Abraham Lincoln also infringed upon First Amendment rights in an effort to ensure the 
preservation of the nation.  After the issuance of his Emancipation Proclamation in September 
1862, there were significant criticisms directed against Lincoln and the federal government.  
Rebel and anti-war newspapers openly denounced the Proclamation—calling it “bloody” and 
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“barbarous”—and personally attacked Lincoln.259  These publications helped to fuel the growing 
opposition in the nation.  And in response, Lincoln appointed several generals to keep the peace 
in the various states. 
In 1863, Lincoln appointed General Ambrose Burnside Union Commander of the 
Department of Ohio.  Acting under the president’s authority, Burnside quickly declared martial law 
and issued General Order No. 38, which criminalized any declaration of sympathies for the 
enemy.260  With that order in place, he began to go after anti-war protestors, the most notable of 
which, was a former Ohio congressmen, named Clement L. Vallandigham.  Although 
Vallandigham was against slavery, personally, he was also a diehard Copperhead and a firm 
believer in state rights.  On May 1, 1863, he gave a speech in Mount Vernon, Ohio, in which he 
declared the Union “wicked, cruel, and unnecessary.”261  He called for “King Lincoln’s” removal 
from office, and claimed that his war was waged only for the “purpose of crushing out liberty and 
erecting despotism.”262  Livid, Burnside had Vallandigham arrested and charged with uttering 
“disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the 
Government in its efforts to suppress unlawful rebellion.”  Vallandigham was then convicted by 
military tribunal and sentenced to close confinement.  Only a month later—and against Federal 
Judge Thomas Drummond’s explicit orders—Burnside also seized and closed the offices of the 
Chicago Times, on account of its history of “disloyal and incendiary sentiments.”   
Although Lincoln interceded—communing Vallandigham’s sentence to banishment to the 
Confederacy and restoring publication of the Chicago Times—the unrest regarding censorship 
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began to escalate.  Democratic editors and journalists called tyranny, and even Republican 
newspapers worried that the administration had blundered.263 
In May 1864, two Copperhead newspapers, the New York Journal of Commerce and the 
New York World, even went so far as to publish a forged presidential proclamation ordering the 
draft of an additional 400,000 men.  At this, Lincoln, himself, ordered both the suppression of the 
New York Journal of Commerce and the New York World and also the arrest of the editors of 
those papers.  The Independent Telegraph System, which transmitted the story, was also seized 
and its transmissions were ceased.  As Lincoln argued, freedom of speech is not justified in all 
instances.  And while the infringement of rights ought to be avoided in times of peace, in times of 
war, such measures may be necessary.  “I can no more be persuaded that the Government can 
constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the 
same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace,” Lincoln writes in his latter to Erastus Corning, 
“than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, because it 
can be shown not to be good food for a well one.”264  In other words, sometimes the ends must 
justify the means.265 
A similar attitude was adopted during World War I.  At that time, the Espionage Act of 
1917 hindered freedom of speech by making it a crime to write or say anything that might 
encourage disloyalty or interfere with the draft.  As a result, “subversive” books were removed 
from bookstores and libraries.266  A Federal Censorship Board was created to regulate these 
activities, and anyone found guilty of such acts, would be subject to a fine of $10,000 and 20 
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years in prison.  This Act was reinforced the following year, with the passage of the Sedition Act 
of 1918, which made it illegal to “utter, print, write, or publish disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or 
abusive about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United 
States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag… or the uniform of the Army 
or Navy of the United States.”267  Any language that “intended to bring the form of government… 
or the Constitution… or the military or naval forces… or the flag… of the United States into 
contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute” was also forbidden.268 
Virtually every major war that the United States has fought has been accompanied by 
some limitations on freedom of speech.  And indeed, the courts have often been extremely 
lenient with these kinds of disruptions to civil rights and liberties.  Thus, Levy’s theory that the 
First Amendment was actually meant to be read much more narrowly than it currently is initially 
appears to have some credence.   
However, only 25 years after publishing his treatise on the repressive themes of the First 
Amendment, Levy retracted most of his claims regarding the narrowness of the First Amendment.  
While he still maintains that the prevailing early American legal theory of freedom of speech was 
repressive, he also finds that the experience of speech was often quite different.  He argues that 
the law was frequently unenforced, and members of the press could therefore act as if it did not 
exist.269  Thus, the press was actually able to be extremely critical of political actors. 
A number of legal theorists have argued even more strongly that the Framers’ actually 
intended for the First Amendment to be read broadly.270  And indeed, this attitude has often been 
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reflected in the aftermath of wartime prohibitions on freedom of speech.  Wartime censorship has 
often been derided—even in its own time—for being against the wishes of the Founding Fathers, 
and contrary to the principles of the Constitution.  For example, when the Alien and Sedition Acts 
of 1798 expired, President Thomas Jefferson pardoned all those convicted under the Act, and 
Congress voted to institute reparation to its victims.271  After only two days, Lincoln withdrew the 
order of arrest and resumed publication of the New York Journal of Commerce and New York 
World.  And, of course, Congress did eventually repeal the Sedition Act of 1917. 
Thus, there are two conflicting themes present in the early American history of freedom of 
speech: one more repressive and one more inclusive.  And indeed, in the end, it hardly matters 
which way the Framers leaned when they wrote the Bill of Rights.  For one thing, as a 
heterogeneous group that needed to make serious compromises in order to ensure passage of 
both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, it is inaccurate to think of the Framers as having any 
one intention.  And even if they had all been of one mind, many of their intentions for other 
amendments have grown outmoded over the years.  So while these original conversations about 
what the founding American documents should mean are important, they ought not necessarily 
dictate current understandings. 
Much more important than determining the intentions of the Founding Fathers regarding 
freedom of speech, I believe, is understanding how the First Amendment has been interpreted by 
the judicial branch.  As the branch of government that has been charged with interpreting the 
Constitution, it is the judiciary’s reading of the First Amendment that is authoritative in law.  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to know what the early American judiciary thought of these two strands, 
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as the Supreme Court heard less than a dozen First Amendment cases between 1791 and 
1889.272  All of that changed, however, in the early twentieth century. 
 
 
II. Modern American jurisprudence on freedom of speech in the First Amendment: 
As David M. Rabban explains, attitudes towards freedom of speech underwent a radical 
transformation after the repression of World War I.273  During this period, the Supreme Court 
began hearing a significant number of First Amendment cases.274  Thus, a true jurisprudential 
interpretation of the First Amendment finally emerged.  And apart from the wartime exceptions, I 
argue that the modern Supreme Court’s justification of the First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech can be sorted into at least two major arguments: 1) the marketplace of ideas; and 2) 
democratic self-governance.275  Each of these arguments—used at different points and to 
different degrees—represents the lens through which freedom of speech is understood.  They 
also, therefore, dictate the limitations that the Supreme Court has placed upon this fundamental 
liberty.276 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Michael Gibson argues that this was due to the then-prevailing view among federal judges that 
the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.  See Michael T. Gibson, “The Supreme Court and 
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263-333. 
273 See David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997).  See also Harry Kalven, Jr. A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1988). 
274 Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, pp. 19. 
275 Some have suggested that the Supreme Court also utilizes a third justification for freedom of 
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276 See Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Things as Free Speech …and it’s a good thing too (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 104. 
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To begin, the classic marketplace of ideas justification for freedom of speech refers to the 
argument that competition between ideas will eventually lead to the triumph of truth over 
falsehood.277  In other words, this theory posits that a process of vigorous debate, populated by a 
multitude of perspectives and ideas, will ultimately lead to intellectual development progress.278  
For such competition to occur, however, people must be willing and able to participate in open, 
reasoned debate.  The freer the public forum in which the debate takes place, the more likely it is 
that truth will be discovered and adopted.  When external, authoritative forces (i.e. the state) try to 
stifle discussion and authoritatively impose truths from above, they limit the market’s ability to 
properly do its job.279 
This Millian argument that freedom of speech is necessary for a thriving marketplace of 
ideas is perhaps the Court’s most important and oft-cited justification for its reading of the First 
Amendment.280  Indeed, the Supreme Court has defended freedom of speech as a means of 
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Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 123, No. 1 (November, 1974), pp. 45. 
278 The link between free speech and progress, it should be noted, is not an uncontested one.  
See Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty, Isaiah Berlin (ed.) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 40-41. 
279 For a more thorough discussion of the marketplace of ideas theory of freedom of speech, see 
the discussion in Chapter Four. 
280 The term “marketplace of ideas” can be found in the majority, concurring and/or dissenting 
opinions of at least 74 United States Supreme Court cases.  
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achieving truth and social progress in several of its most influential and historic First Amendment 
cases.281  Most notably, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States 
introduced the marketplace of ideas argument into the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and 
cemented this concept into the popular imagination.282 
Modern American free speech jurisprudence could be said to have begun with Holmes’ 
dissent in Abrams, in which he waxed eloquently about the battle between truth and falsehood, 
ultimately concluding that freedom of expression is the best way to encourage the discovery of 
truth.  As described above, the Espionage Act of 1917 had made it illegal to criticize the United 
States government in any way that might impede the war effort.  In this case, the defendants had 
printed two leaflets that they then distributed by throwing off the top of a building.  The first leaflet, 
signed "revolutionists," denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second 
leaflet, written in Yiddish, denounced the war and U.S. efforts to impede the Russian Revolution. 
The defendants were charged and convicted, in a 7-2 decision, for inciting resistance to the war 
effort and for urging curtailment of production of essential munitions.  They were each sentenced 
to 20 years in prison. 
 The majority opinion, written by Justice John Hessin Clarke, held that the Espionage Act 
and its amendments did not violate the First Amendment.  However, it is Holmes’ dissenting 
opinion that has had the most lasting influence in this case.  Like Mill, he believed that the truth is 
rarely—if ever—obvious.  The only way to discriminate good ideas from bad ones, Homes 
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argued, is to allow them all an opportunity to battle face-to-face.  In such a competition, incorrect 
ideas should be dismissed, partially correct ideas should be sorted out and the truth should be 
revealed.  As Holmes writes, 
The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
carried out.  That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.  It is an experiment, as all 
life is an experiment.  Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon 
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.283   
Thus, Holmes argued that he would rather “be safe, not sorry” when it comes to freedom speech.  
Not only might any idea potentially constitute (or contain some portion of) the truth, but also even 
false ideas serve an important purpose, he wrote, in that they help to bring the truth to light.   
Holmes argued that no amount of censorship could lead the people towards truth.  
Instead, he believed that the only way to ensure that truth will emerge is for society to be 
structured as an open forum, where different ideas can be expressed, compared and refuted.  In 
other words, there must be a free and open marketplace of ideas.  Holmes cautioned that the 
American people ought to be “eternally vigilant” against any attempts to censor on the basis of 
content.  To the extent that censorship is ever appropriate, he wrote, it is only when “the 
expression of opinions” may “so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and 
pressing purpose of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.”284   
So despite the broad theoretical defense of freedom of speech in the Abrams dissent, 
Holmes also reminded readers that the First Amendment is not meant to include everything.  In 
this case, Holmes argued that Abrams’ leaflets did not present a “clear and present danger,” but if 
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they had, the government would have been justified in silencing speech.285  “It is only the present 
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to 
the expression of an opinion where private rights are not concerned,” Holmes wrote.286  And as C. 
Edwin Baker points out, this limitation does not infringe upon the classic marketplace of ideas 
theory.287  Remember Mill’s example of the corn dealers, he tells the reader.  Even the truest and 
fairest of opinions may be suppressed if they are expressed under such circumstances as to do 
harm or incite violence. 
This dissent marked a major turnaround for Holmes.  Only two years earlier, in Debs v. 
United States, Holmes had led the Court in ruling against Eugene V. Debs, a leader of the 
Socialist Party of America, who gave a speech in Canton, Ohio, protesting United States 
involvement in World War I.288  Debs, Holmes wrote in his majority opinion, had violated the same 
Espionage Act that he considered unconstitutional in the Abrams case.  And in the 1919 case, 
Schenck v. United States, writing for a unanimous court, Holmes argued that the distributor of a 
circular—which argued that the draft was a major wrong, motivated by capitalism, and ought to be 
protested against—was not protected by the First Amendment.289  He argued that the character 
of every act depends on its circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent," 
Holmes wrote.290  
While Holmes continued to utilize the “clear and present danger” test for assessing the 
constitutionality of speech, he began to adopt a more permissible attitude only shortly after 
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Schenck.  Francis Canavan has suggested that this change may be largely attributed to a run-in 
between Holmes and Zechariah Chafee, Jr.291  In 1919, Chafee wrote an article in the Harvard 
Law Review, criticizing Holmes’ decision in Schenck for applying the “clear and present danger” 
test too restrictively.  Within a few months of meeting Chafee for tea to discuss their opinions, 
Holmes had adopted his view, and had used the clear and present danger formula as a positive 
rule to defend freedom of speech in the Abrams dissent. 
And once Holmes began to read the First Amendment right to freedom of speech more 
broadly, he was not to be stopped.  As Ronald Dworkin puts it, although Holmes’ “skepticism 
made him reluctant to overturn any legislative decision, [and he] was slower to be converted, he 
was a lion once he was.”292  So with Holmes leading the way, the Abrams dissent became 
orthodoxy by the 1960’s.   
Indeed, as early as 1925, in Gitlow, Holmes—this time writing for the majority—continued 
with his argument that speech ought to be allowed to compete freely in an open market unless it 
presents a clear and present danger.293  And two years later, in Whitney v. California, the Court 
supported a vision of freedom of speech that was not only consistent with Abrams, but also 
added an additional justification for freedom of speech: democratic self-governance.294   
In this case, Charlotte Anita Whitney, a member of the Communist Labor Party of 
California, had been prosecuted under that state's Criminal Syndicalism Act.  The Act prohibited 
advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime, including "terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing a change in industrial ownership… or effecting any political change."295  In a 
unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not 
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violate the Constitution, claiming that it did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Equal 
Protection Clause, and that freedom of speech was not an absolute right.  The majority argued 
"that a State… may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances… tending to… endanger 
the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means.”296   
Nevertheless, it is the concurring opinion, written by Justice Louis D. Brandeis and signed 
by Holmes, which most clearly portrayed their Court’s growing understanding of the First 
Amendment.  In this opinion, Brandeis argued that only clear, present and imminent threats of 
"serious evils" could justify suppression of speech.  This is because the liberty of speech is not 
only the “secret of happiness,” but also 
… [F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensible to 
the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly, 
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should 
be a fundamental principle of the American government.297 
Thus, in this defense of freedom of speech, Brandeis presents both justifications that mentioned 
above: marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance.  
First, Brandeis argued that freedom of expression is “indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth.”298  In other words, as stated above, he asserted that speech must be 
allowed to exist in an open forum so that all opinions are given the opportunity to compete.  
Second, Brandeis wrote that the act of citizen discussion is an important aspect of democratic 
self-governance.  An “inert people” is “the greatest menace to freedom,” he explained.  And in 
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order to ensure that citizens engage in meaningful discourse, speech must be free and open.299  
Brandeis also pointed out that freedom of speech is the “secret to happiness” – it is how human 
beings find fulfillment.300  As a fundamental element of what it means to be human, he argued, 
speech ought not to be infringed upon. 
The argument from democracy stems from the idea that, in a democracy, the people are 
sovereign.  Three implications flow from this principle.  First, as a sovereign body, the people 
must have access to all relevant information if they are to decide which propositions to accept 
and which ones to reject.  Second, an open public forum also allows the sovereign people to 
express their desires to their leaders.  Finally, if government actors really are servants of the 
people, the people must have some avenues for criticizing them, and even removing them when 
necessary.  Thus, open debate is necessary for proper self-governance.301 
This justification for freedom of speech is perhaps most associated with Alexander 
Meiklejohn.302  In his book, Free Speech: And Its Relation to Self-Government, Meiklejohn 
suggests that democratic self-governance—and not the pursuit of truth—is the main reason 
behind the broad freedom of expression that can be found in Article 1, Section 6 of the United 
States Constitution.303  “The First Amendment is not, primarily, a device for the winning of new 
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truth, though that is very important,” he explains.304  “It is a device for the sharing of whatever 
truth has been won.  Its purpose is to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest 
possible participation in the understanding of these problems with which the citizens of a self-
governing society must deal.”305  In other words, Meiklejohn believes that freedom of speech 
exists to ensure that all members of the voting public are informed about the issues and 
procedures that are relevant to their responsibilities as good democratic citizens. 
And if the purpose of freedom of speech is to further democracy, then it is only that 
speech, which is likely to achieve that end that will be fully protected.  As Meiklejohn writes, if 
the principle of freedom of speech is derived… from the necessities of self-government 
by universal suffrage, there follows at once a very large limitation on the scope of the 
principle.  The guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then assured to all 
speaking.  It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues 
with which voters have to deal—only, therefore, to the consideration of matters of public 
interest.306 
In other words, it is only political, public-minded speech that is protected under the democratic 
self-governance justification for freedom of speech.  As Ingber explains, “[a] right founded upon 
the deliberative role of citizens in a democratic political order need not apply to all forms of 
expression; the debates over artistic merit, the best style of personal life, or the quality of Mrs. 
Smith’s pies would probably not qualify for protection.”307 
 While the democracy justification for freedom of speech may not have achieved the same 
status in popular culture as the marketplace of ideas, it has been instrumental in the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of freedom of speech.  Meiklejohn, himself, has been directly cited in at 
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least 30 Supreme Court opinions—majority, concurring and/or dissenting—to First Amendment 
cases.308  And his argument, grounding freedom of speech in democratic self-governance, has 
been featured in numerous decisions, including: Garrison v. Louisiana; Jay F. Hein, White House 
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, et al., Petitioners v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc., et al. (Kennedy’s concurrence); McDonald v. Smith (Brennan’s concurrence); 
United States and Department of Agriculture, Petitioners v. United Foods, Inc. (Breyer’s dissent); 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC, et al. Petitioners v. Ken Bennett, Arizona 
Secretary of State, John McComish v. Ken Bennett, Arizona Secretary of State (Kagan’s dissent); 
and Herbert v. Lando et al (Brennan’s dissent).309  Perhaps most directly, this approach was 
utilized in the case of Stromberg v. California.310  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Charles 
Evan Hughes wrote:  “The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end 
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained 
by lawful means is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”311 
 Taken together, these two justifications for freedom of speech—marketplace of ideas and 
democratic self-governance—have continued to form the basis of First Amendment jurisprudence 
up to the present day.  Most often the are presented in the context of the Court’s ongoing battle to 
determine what speech deserves First Amendment protection and what speech does not.  For the 
remainder of this section, I review several of the most noteworthy and influential Supreme Court 
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cases, determining the scope of freedom of speech.  In doing so, I discuss, not only the major 
limitations that have been placed upon constitutionally protected speech (e.g. insults, obscenity, 
libel), but also which arguments have been utilized to justify those limits.  And while these 
reasons could be utilized to justify the constitutional protection of certain social speech, I argue 
that the Court has generally implied that they only apply to explicitly political, public speech.   
 To begin, the “fighting words” restriction on freedom of speech is one of the longest 
established limitations to the First Amendment.  The Court’s history of such restrictions dates 
back to the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.312  Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's 
Witness, was arrested in November 1941 for calling a city marshal a "God-damned racketeer" 
and "a damned fascist" in a public forum.313  However, under Chapter 378, Paragraph 2 of the 
Public Laws of New Hampshire, it was illegal to address “any offensive, derisive or annoying word 
to anyone who is lawfully in any street or public place… or to call him by an offensive or derisive 
name.”314  Since Chaplinsky did not deny having made these comments (aside from the name of 
the deity), he was convicted by the state of New Hampshire. 
 Chaplinsky appealed this decision on the grounds that this portion of the Public Laws of 
New Hampshire violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech.  
However, writing for the majority, Justice Frank Murphy pointed out that the First Amendment 
does not protect all speech.  Citing Chafee’s Free Speech in the United States, Murphy argued 
that “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words – those 
by which their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the beach” do 
not fall within the scope of the First Amendment.315  He argued that this is because these kinds of 
speech are of “such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
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them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”316  In other words, since 
Murphy understood the First Amendment to be justified according the marketplace of ideas 
theory, he believed that it did not protect speech, which did not sufficiently contribute to the 
discovery of truth – at least in instances where that speech may have other negative effects (i.e. 
provoking a violent reaction).  Thus, the legal statute was deemed constitutional, and the lower 
courts’ decisions were upheld. 
In Roth v. United States, the Court continued to refine its position on what constitutes 
acceptable speech, this time by directly addressing pornography.317  Samuel Roth operated a 
New York book-selling business that sold pornographic materials and also distributed erotic 
circulars.  He was found to be in violation of a federal obscenity statute, which criminalized the 
sending of “obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy” materials.  Roth's case was combined with Alberts 
v. California, in which David Alberts challenged a California obscenity law after his similar 
conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene 
advertisements for his products. 
These cases represented the first time that the question of whether or not the First 
Amendment applied to obscenity had “been squarely presented to this Court.”318  Prior to these 
cases, the Court’s stance on obscenity had been strongly influenced by the English common law, 
which defined any material as obscene, which tended to “deprave and corrupt those whose minds 
are open to such immoral influences.”319  Roth provided the Court with an opportunity to institute 
a stricter standard for obscenity, defining it as any material whose “dominant theme taken as a 
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whole appeals to the prurient interest” to the “average person, applying contemporary community 
standards.”320  However, this did not mean that the Court believed that obscenity constituted 
protected speech.  Indeed, writing for the majority, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. held that 
obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."321  Thus, the 
convictions for Roth and Alberts were upheld. 
The First Amendment, Brennan argued, was not intended to protect every form of 
expression.  Citing the both the marketplace of ideas and the democratic self-governance 
rationales, he explained that the constitutional rights to freedom of speech and the press were 
“fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”322  It is for these reasons that speech is protected – not any 
inherent right people have to speak freely.  Thus, any “ideas having even the slightest redeeming 
social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing 
climate of opinion” are protected by the First Amendment (unless they encroached upon more 
important interests.323  However, implicit within this argument, Brennan argued, is the claim that 
any materials that are "utterly without redeeming social importance" are outside the purview of 
the First Amendment.  And obscenity, he claimed, is one such kind of speech. 
This case did not settle the issue of pornography, however.  Although Chief Justice Earl 
Warren concurred with the majority’s decision regarding the constitutional status of pornography, 
he worried that obscenity had been defined too broadly, and might be made to apply to “the arts 
and sciences and freedom of communication generally.”324  Justice John Marshall Harlan split his 
decision—dissenting in Roth and concurring in Alberts—on the basis that obscenity law ought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid.  See Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech, pp. 8. 
323 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
324 Ibid. 
112	  
	  
	  
be decided at the state level.325  Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas dissented entirely, 
arguing that the First Amendment did, in fact, cover obscenity.326  And ultimately, Brennan later 
reversed his position on obscenity in the 1973 case, Miller v. California, in which he helped to 
devise a three-pronged approach for determining obscenity.327   
Nevertheless, in 1964, in New York Times v. Sullivan—which was decided together with 
Abernathy v. Sullivan—the Court established guidelines for defamation and libel, which drew 
heavily upon the majority decision in Roth.328   In this case, the New York Times had featured a 
full-page advertisement, which alleged that Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s arrest for perjury in 
Alabama was part of a larger campaign to impede upon King’s civil rights efforts.  The 
Montgomery city commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, filed a libel action against the newspaper and four 
black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the 
Montgomery police defamed him personally.  Under Alabama law, he did not need to prove that 
he had been harmed.  And since the ad had included factual errors, the defendants were unable 
to claim truth as a defense of their speech, so a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was 
unavailable. Thus, Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment. 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Brennan ruled in favor of the New York Times.  Citing his 
opinion in Roth, Brennan revisited his argument that First Amendment “was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas.”329  “The maintenance of the opportunity for free political 
discussion,” he argued, ensures that government remains “responsive to the will of the people 
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and that changes may be obtained by lawful means.”330  Thus, Brennan believed that effective 
democratic self-governance required that citizens be free to (sharply) criticize and question the 
state and its actors.331  He argued that the First Amendment protects the publication of all 
statements (even false ones) about public officials, except when they are made with actual malice 
(i.e. with the knowledge that they are false or with reckless disregard for their veracity).  This 
became known as the “actual malice” standard, and puts a high burden of proof on the plaintiff, 
making it extremely difficult to show that there was any wrongdoing.   
In writing this decision, Brennan also relied heavily on the marketplace of ideas theory.  
He even pulled directly from John Stuart Mill when he argued that false or questionable 
statements are an unavoidable feature of reasoned discussion, whether made in good faith or 
bad.332  In order to protect an open exchange, people must be free to say things that may be 
wrong without fear of legal repercussions.  “Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of 
proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred,” he 
explained.333  Furthermore, he pointed out that even false statements could contribute positively 
to discussions by making the truth stand out even brighter. 
Following the decision in Sullivan, the Supreme Court decided several landmark cases 
regarding the scope of symbolic speech.334  First, in 1969, the Court heard Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District Et Al.335  This case involved 15-year-old John Tinker, his 
sister, 13-year-old Mary Beth Tinker and 16-year-old Christopher Echardt.  Together with their 
parents, the three students decided to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to 
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their Des Moines schools during the Christmas holiday season.  Upon learning of their intentions, 
and fearing that the armbands would provoke disturbances, the principals of the Des Moines 
school district decided that all students wearing armbands would be asked to remove them or 
face suspension.  When the Tinker siblings and Echardt wore their armbands to school, they 
were asked to remove them.  When they refused, they were suspended until after New Year's 
Day. 
The main question that the Court faced was whether the symbolic action of wearing a 
black armband to school constituted either political speech or disruptive conduct.  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Abe Fortas began by pointing out that the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment does, indeed, protect symbolic speech, and that this actions in this case were 
“closely akin to ‘pure speech.’”336  He then went on to address the limits of symbolic speech within 
the school environment.  Fortas argued that it has long been the Court’s opinion that First 
Amendment rights extend to schools.  “It can hardly be argued,” he wrote, “that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”337  However, Fortas also admitted that there is a “need for affirming the comprehensive 
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional 
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”338  In other words, he argued that 
the school environment implies limitations on freedom of expression.   
However, in this case, Fortas believed that the principals lacked justification for imposing 
limits on the wearing of black armbands.  “In order for the State in the person of school officials to 
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,” he argued, “it must be able to show that 
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its action was caused by more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness 
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”339  And in this case, no such justification was 
found.  Indeed, the principals had failed to show that the forbidden conduct would “materially and 
substantially interfere with requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school.”340 
Fortas worried that the restrictions on black armbands were motivated more out of a 
concern for the message being portrayed than a concern for school order.  And this, he 
considered to be a significant problem, as he believed that students must be free to explore 
multiple ideas and perspectives (barring any constitutionally valid reason why they should not).  
“The classroom,” he wrote, “is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”341  And the future of the 
United States “depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of 
ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of 
authoritative selection.’”342   
Harlan took a similar approach to understanding freedom of speech just two years later, 
in Cohen v. California.343  This case considered the circumstances of 19-year-old Paul Robert 
Cohen, who, while walking through a Los Angeles County Courthouse corridor, wore a jacket 
emblazoned with the words “FUCK THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR.”  He was charged under a 
California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any 
neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct."  Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 
days in jail. 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court found in favor of Cohen, arguing that the California statute 
violated freedom of expression as protected by the First Amendment.  Writing for the majority, 
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Harlan argued that Cohen could not rightfully be punished for expressing his opinion regarding 
the “inutility or immorality of the draft,” unless he showed intent to either incite violence or disrupt 
the draft.344  And although his use of the word “fuck”—which is often associated with provoking 
violent reactions—could have placed Cohen within the “fighting words” exception to the First 
Amendment (see Chaplinsky), the fact that this epithet was not “directed to the person of the 
hearer” meant that no one should have taken it as a direct insult.345  Besides, Harlan argued, 
there was no evidence that substantial numbers of people would be provoked into some kind of 
physical action by the words on Cohen’s jacket (see Tinker).  
Harlan then addressed the argument that the state might have an interest in punishing 
the “public utterance of this unseemly expletive in order to maintain what they regard as a 
suitable level of discourse within the body politics.”346  And he argued that the constitutional 
backdrop of the right to freedom of speech suggests that such restrictions would only be 
appropriate under the already established exceptions (e.g. obscenity, insults, fighting words).  
“The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and 
populous as ours,” Harlan wrote.347   
It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the area of public 
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of 
each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable 
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport 
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.348 
Thus, much as in Whitney, the Cohen decision is based on the premise that freedom of speech is 
not only a necessary element for the discovery of truth, but that it also helps to ensure the 
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principles of democratic self-governance.  While, in the short term, this broad understanding of 
freedom of speech may appear to cause “only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive 
utterances,” Harlan wrote, these are actually only “necessary side effects of the broader enduring 
values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve.”349   
 The Supreme Court continued to address issues surrounding symbolic speech well after 
the Vietnam War came to an end.  And as in both Tinker and Cohen, the cases that have come to 
the forefront are those in which the symbolic speech in question was of a directly political and 
public nature.  The flag burning cases, in particular, provide excellent examples of the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to view actions that express a directly political message as protected speech. 
 The 1989 case, Texas v. Johnson, involved the political protest of Gregory Lee 
Johnson.350  As a way of expressing his dissatisfaction with the policies of President Ronald 
Reagan’s administration and certain Dallas-based corporations, Johnson engaged in a 
demonstration in the streets of Dallas during the Republican National Convention.  The protestors 
marched, shouted political slogans and engaged in “die-ins” at several local businesses.  While 
Johnson did not directly engage in any of the vandalism that took place during this protest, he did 
accept an American flag that was taken from another protestor, who had stolen it from a flagpole 
outside of one the local businesses.  When the demonstration came to an end outside of the 
Dallas City Hall, Johnson lit the flag on fire.  As it burned, the protestors chanted, “America, the 
red, white, and blue, we spit on you.”  Johnson, alone, was tried and convicted under a Texas 
law, which outlawed “the desecration of a venerated object,” and was sentenced to one year in 
jail and a $2,000 fine.351  After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the 
case went to the Supreme Court. 
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In another 5-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag constituted 
protected expression under the First Amendment.  Writing for the majority, Brennan found that 
Johnson's actions clearly fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively 
political nature.  And because no breach of the peace occurred either at the time of the flag 
burning or in response to it, he wrote, the State was not able show that it had a valid interest in 
preventing a breach of the peace, which would justify Johnson’s conviction for flag desecration.  
Rather, the State’s claim was that “an audience that takes serious offense at particular 
expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace, and that the expression may be prohibited 
on this basis.”352  However, Brennan argued that the fact that an audience takes offense to 
certain ideas or expression does not justify prohibitions of speech.353  (Indeed, the likelihood that 
a certain opinion will provoke offense may actually imply that it needs constitutional protection.354)  
The state does not have a right to censor the content of speech “simply because society find the 
idea itself offense or disagreeable,” he wrote.355  Certainly, no official actor can “prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”356 
However, the same year that the Court heard Texas v. Johnson, Congress passed the 
Flag Protection Act, which made it illegal to destroy an American flag (or any likeness of an 
American flag), which may be “commonly displayed.”  This resulted in several prosecutions, 
including United States v. Eichman (in which Eichman set a flag on fire on the steps of the United 
States Capitol in protest of the government’s domestic and foreign policy) and United States v. 
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Haggerty (in which Haggerty burned flags in Seattle in protest of the passage of the Flag 
Protection Act).  Both cases were argued together in 1990, under United States v. Eichman.357 
Again, the question at stake was whether or not the government had the power to punish 
the symbolic speech act of flag burning.  And again, the Court narrowly (5-4) ruled that the 
government was unjustified in suppressing free expression on the basis of its content.358  In one 
of his last majority opinions, Brennan conceded that the federal statute did not contain any 
“explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct”—as in Johnson—however, 
he argued that there could be no doubt that that was its intention.359  Because the statute allowed 
the flag to be burned in a disposal ceremony, but prohibited protestors from setting it ablaze at a 
political protest, it was clearly aimed at silencing the expression of a political belief.  As such, it 
had to be subject to “the most exacting scrutiny.”360  In other words, when the state attempts to 
infringe upon freedom of speech on the basis of its content, it has a special obligation to show an 
overriding interest in suppressing that speech.361 
Taken together, this body of First Amendment cases reveals an attitude towards freedom 
of speech that is considerably more forgiving than that, which was present in the early years of 
the Republic.  By couching freedom of speech within the arguments for the marketplace of ideas 
and democratic self-governance, the modern United States Supreme Court has developed a 
doctrine that allowed for greater expression of ideas than perhaps anything that had come before. 
 However, just as there was no one, authoritative understanding of freedom of speech 
during the Colonial Era, there is also no one, continuous reading of that liberty in the Post-World 
War I Era.  Indeed, while I believe that American jurisprudence, as a whole, can be taken as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
358 Ibid.  See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).   
359 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
360 Ibid.  See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
361 This does not mean, however, that the Supreme Court has always maintained content 
neutrality in practice.  During the 1940s and 1950s, the Justices commonly distinguished between 
“high value” and “low value” speech when deciding First Amendment cases.  For example, see 
Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
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theory of the freedom of speech, it is a theory that is rife with inconsistencies and exceptions.  
Chief among these are the limitations that the Supreme Court has placed upon the fundamental 
liberty of freedom of speech.  As I have explained throughout this section, even within a relatively 
broad framework of freedom of speech, that liberty has never been understood to be absolute.  
Because the Supreme Court values freedom of speech in terms of the goods that it results in (i.e. 
the discovery of truth and democratic self-governance), it has had little problem restricting that 
speech, which it believes does not adequately contribute to those goods – at least in cases where 
there is another competing interest.  Thus, as described in this section, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that freedom of speech does not extend to “fighting words,”362 obscenity,363 private 
defamation,364 disruptions to the educational environment365 or speech that poses an imminent 
breach of peace.366   
But the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance justifications for freedom of 
speech have done more than just establish exceptions to the First Amendment – they have 
actually created entire classes of communication.  In the following section, I argue that, in addition 
to the explicit restrictions on freedom of speech that I discussed in this section, the Supreme 
Court has also implicitly limited its understanding of that liberty to that communication, which 
takes place in a public forum and involves issues of clear political importance.  And as a result of 
the privileged position that has been afforded political, public speech, social speech has been 
neglected.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
363 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
364 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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III. Social speech in modern American jurisprudence on freedom of speech in the First 
Amendment? 
The Supreme Court’s marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance justifications 
for freedom of speech have led to the creation of a two-tiered approach to freedom of speech – 
speech that contributes to these goals merits protection; speech that does not contribute to these 
goals does not necessarily merit protection.  Often, these two tiers have corresponded with the 
divisions between both political and non-political speech, and also public and private speech.  
Since public, political speech is both more directly connected to the pursuit of political truth and 
progress, and also more clearly impacts the capacity for democratic self-governance, it tends to 
receive the highest level of First Amendment protection.  On the other hand, private, non-political 
speech, because its connection to these social goods is not always as obvious, tends to receive a 
lower level of protection.  Indeed, in some cases, the Supreme Court has deemed that such 
speech is entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment.367 
In this section, I review the distinction that the Supreme Court has made between public, 
political speech and private, non-political speech.  I argue that, the Supreme Court’s 
consequentialist reading of the First Amendment displays a clear bias towards political or public 
speech over non-political or private speech.  And while this preference is often merely implied in 
the Court’s rulings, I show that it has also been explicitly stated.  This does not mean, however, 
that I believe private speech has been entirely excluded from American jurisprudence.  Indeed, I 
show that, at certain points, the Supreme Court has shown openness towards private speech.  
Unfortunately, these efforts have been mostly unclear, undeveloped and inconsistent.  And to the 
extent that the Supreme Court tends to define private speech as that communication, which takes 
place in civil society, but still concerns the public good, I argue that it does not accommodate the 
full breadth of social speech. 
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As the previous cases suggest, the Supreme Court tends to claim that political speech is 
the foundation of the First Amendment.  In Whitney, for example, Brandeis’ opinion specifies that 
freedom of thought and expression are necessary to “the discovery and spread of political truth 
[emphasis added].”368  Similarly, in the Roth decision, Brennan argued that the American 
freedoms of speech and the press were both founded to “assure unfettered interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people [emphasis added].”369  
Brennan also seems to equate freedom of speech with political speech in Sullivan, when he 
writes that government responsiveness to the will of the people requires “to opportunity for free 
political discussion [emphasis added].”370  
In some cases, the Supreme Court has actually been even more explicit in its preference 
for political, public speech, claiming that it is the “core value” of the First Amendment.371  In Carey 
v. Brown for example, Brennan argued that public issue picketing—a clear example of political 
speech—“has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”372  
That same year, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., Justice John Paul Stevens used the First 
Amendment to protect an NAACP boycott on the grounds that this expression “sought to bring 
about political, social, and economic change” in Mississippi.373  And in both First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti and Consolidated Edison v. PSC, Justice Lewis F. Powell authored majority 
opinions, which maintained that speech regarding a political issue “is at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protections.”374   
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And indeed, the jurisprudence on defamation relies heavily on the distinctions between 
political, public speech and non-political, private speech.375  Throughout the nation’s history, it 
had been argued that, in order for democracy to flourish, there must be opportunities for free and 
open discussion about public officials.  As Madison wrote in his Report on the Virginia Resolution, 
“In every state, probably in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits 
and measures of public men, of every description, which has not been confined to the strict limits 
of the common law.  On this footing, the freedom of the press has stood; on this foundation it 
stands.”376  And because the Supreme Court has adopted this view that the nation has an 
overriding interest in information and discussion about state actors, it has afforded constitutional 
protections to defamation and libel about these public individuals (except in cases that meet the 
actual malice standard).377  “Purely private defamation,” however, because it “has little to do with 
the political ends of a self-governing society,” does not merit the same protections.378  Thus, in 
the 1974 case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, the Supreme Court found that the Sullivan standard for 
defamation and libel did not apply in the case of an individual who was neither a public official nor 
a public actor.379  Private citizens, the majority opinion reads, ought to be allowed more protection 
from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye.  This means that defamation against 
private individuals does not fall within the First Amendment. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly decided to afford First Amendment protections 
to speech on the basis of its political nature.  Speech that constitutes public discussion or clearly 
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contributes to the discovery of a political truth is afforded protection (barring an overriding 
interest) largely on the basis of its political nature – even when that speech takes place outside of 
the public sphere, between private individuals.380  Thus, any attempt to censor or punish acts of 
political protest—such as, demonstrators burning the American flag, anti-war individuals wearing 
certain articles of clothing and blacks hosting a sit-in a “whites only” area to protest segregation—
must be subject to the “most exacting scrutiny.”381  Indeed, the American judiciary seems to think 
that political speech is so important that even corporations should have a right to engage in it.382   
While these cases protecting speech on the basis of its important political content and 
public context do not necessarily imply that the Supreme Court would find that the First 
Amendment does not protect private speech, they do strongly suggest that this is the case.  As 
David A. Richards explains in his essay, “Public and Private Discourse of the First Amendment,” 
the negative implication of the Supreme Court’s understanding that the First Amendment protects 
public discourse is “that private discourse is or should be correspondingly unprotected.”383  
Indeed, if the Supreme Court believes that the First Amendment exists primarily to protect that 
speech, which leads society down a road to political progress and better governance, it only 
makes sense that it would also conclude that speech, which does not appear to serve these 
goals, is excluded.  And while the Court admits that it cannot know exactly which speech will 
matter politically and which will not, its decisions do suggest that it has, at points, shied away 
from affording full constitutional protections to private speech. 
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There are several examples of the Supreme Court refusing to extend First Amendment 
protection to speech because it is not sufficiently political.  In Miller v. California, for example, 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger argued that certain obscene material was outside the scope of 
freedom of speech because it did not amount to the kind of political speech that the First 
Amendment was designed to protect.  “[T]o equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and 
political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material,” he wrote, “demeans the grand 
conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom.”384  
And in Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Stevens claimed that the social interest in protecting 
pornographic films “is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in 
untrammeled political debate.”385 
Miller and Young do not represent the whole of American jurisprudence on private 
speech, however.  Despite these cases and the clear preference for political, public speech, 
which has been portrayed over the past hundred years, the Supreme Court has not yet 
articulated a clear, reasoned policy towards private speech.  And this lack of clarity has resulted 
in some very messy and inconsistent casework.  Indeed, before joining the Supreme Court, Elena 
Kagan wrote an article for The University of Chicago Law Review, in which she argued that the 
law regarding government restrictions on private speech “is largely a mess, resisting any 
coherent understanding.”386 
Thus, while there are numerous instances in which the Court has suggested—or explicitly 
argued—that public, political speech is the basis of the First Amendment, there are also several 
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cases in which it has displayed a more open attitude towards private speech.387  Unfortunately, to 
the extent that Supreme Court has acknowledged freedom of private speech, it has only ever 
been as a brief (and uninformative) aside.  The justices may claim that private speech deserves 
the same protection—and should be subject to the same limitations—as public, political speech, 
but they never explain why.  In Stevens’ majority opinion for Bartnicki et al. v. Vopper, for 
example, he presented the case as “a conflict between interests of the highest order—on the one 
hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, 
on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more specifically, in fostering private 
speech.”388  But while the interest in individual privacy has been long established in the United 
States, Steven makes no attempt to explain why there is an interest in fostering private speech.  
Similarly, in his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that the right to personal 
privacy involves, not only the “right to be left alone,” but also the interest in “fostering private 
speech.”389  But he did not clarify what the interest in fostering private speech might entail, or to 
whom this interest belongs.  Citing Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Breyer merely 
asserted that the state should resist policies of disclosure, which might lead to a “natural 
reluctance to discuss private matters.”390   
The case of Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District provides an especially 
illuminating example of the Supreme Court’s cursory treatment of non-political, non-public 
speech.391  This case involved a junior high school teacher, Bessie Givhan, who repeatedly 
complained to the school administration about alleged racial discrimination and segregation.  Her 
complaints antagonized the principal, ultimately resulting in her dismissal.  Givhan sued, claiming 
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that because her termination came about as the result of her speech, it violated her First 
Amendment rights.  And the district agreed.392 
The Fifth District Court reversed this decision, however.393  The majority argued that, in 
this case, it was unnecessary to engage in a balancing analysis for speech by public 
employees.394  According to the court, that was because Givhan’s speech was entirely outside 
the scope of the First Amendment.395  In other words, not only did the majority argue that 
Givhan’s speech did not constitute protected speech, but they also asserted that speech in the 
“private forum” is not even covered by the First Amendment.396  In other words, the ruled that 
private speech is entirely outside the scope of freedom of speech. 
Speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice William Rehnquist rejected this 
reading of the First Amendment.  He argued that the location of speech does not determine its 
constitutional status, and thus, the fact that Givhan’s conversations took place in the principal’s 
private office did not disqualify her speech from First Amendment protection.397  And if Givhan’s 
speech was protected under the First Amendment, Rehnquist argued, it could only lead to her 
dismissal if the school board could show that it violated other significant interests. 
In arriving at this decision, Rehnquist pointed out that the First Amendment forbids only 
abridgement to the “freedom of speech,” and neither that amendment nor American free speech 
jurisprudence says anything “to indicate that this freedom is lost to the public employee who 
arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 See Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 404 F. Supp. 1225 (N.D. Miss. 1975). 
393 See Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977). 
394 Ibid.  See Pickering v. Board of Education, 225 NE 2d 1 (1967); Mt. Healthy City School 
District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
395 The majority also pointed out that the First Amendment does not protect speech that is forced 
upon an unwilling audience.  Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 555 F.2d 1309 
(5th Cir. 1977). 
396 Ibid. 
397 Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
128	  
	  
	  
public.”398  Thus, Rehnquist appeared to be rejecting the Court’s previous distinction between 
political, protected speech and non-political, less-protected speech.  While he said nothing about 
private persons, Rehnquist did argue that private speech by a public employee merits the same 
protections and considerations as public speech by a public employee.  In other words, he 
claimed that private speech should not be excluded from free speech protections simply because 
it is private.  Rather, Rehnquist argued that private speech should be understood just as political 
speech: it has the First Amendment’s protection unless it falls under one of the categories of 
unprotected speech, already defined.    
Considering the relative dearth of Supreme Court cases, which consider the 
constitutional status of non-public, non-political speech, this is a significant statement.  And 
considering the Court’s frequent allusions to the special status of public, political speech, this 
opinion is also surprising.  And yet, despite Rehnquist’s bold claim that there is no constitutional 
justification for differentiating between political and non-political speech, his decision only barely 
touches on the subject.  In fact, this argument only merits three sentences of the decision.  As 
Frederick Schauer explains, there is nothing in the Givhan decision explaining “why private 
communication falls into the same category as spreading one’s views before the public, with the 
exception of one rather unusual source for First Amendment doctrine.  The Court looked at and 
relied on the text of the First Amendment!”399  But that is not a sufficient explanation in this case.  
While Schauer admits that “most of our First Amendment doctrine is based on the very strong 
wording of that amendment,” he also points out that it provides very little guidance in difficult 
cases, such as these.400  For although it is true that the First Amendment makes no explicit 
distinction between public and private speech, it also fails to differentiate between any other types 
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communication (e.g. commercial and non-commercial speech, defamation and non-defamation, 
etc.).  And yet, the Supreme Court has undoubtedly ruled that these kinds of distinction do exist.   
Furthermore, not only does the Supreme Court fail to explain its rationale for suddenly 
equating public and private speech in Givhan, but it also neglects to explain what it means by the 
term “private speech.”  For example, is private speech private in that it is directed at a particular 
individual, as opposed to a wider, more abstract audience?  Is private speech private only when it 
takes place within a private location in civil society?401  Or is private speech private because of its 
intimate, personal and (seemingly) politically trivial content?  To the extent that Rehnquist claimed 
that the First Amendment applies equally to both public and private speech, he ought to have 
explained what kind of speech that covers.  But by not elaborating on his decision, the question 
remains open. 
It can be inferred, however, that the Supreme Court is not addressing the third possible 
definition of private speech in the Givhan case.  Givhan’s speech was clearly directed at a 
particular individual (the principal) and took place in a private location (the principal’s office).  But 
the content of her speech was decidedly political and related to the public good.  Thus, in 
affording constitutional protection to Givhan’s speech the Court said nothing about how it would 
treat private speech that is not so directly related to the public good. 
But this, of course, is the essence of social speech.  Certainly, Givhan’s communication 
represents one type of social speech.  However, social speech, as I have defined it, includes two 
other types of social speech as well: 1) private, personal communication that takes place in 
political institutions; and 2) speech that takes place in a private forum and involves issues of a 
more personal or trivial nature.  Thus, even though the Court ruled that Givhan’s type of social 
speech falls within the First Amendment, it has said nothing about the constitutional status of the 
other two types.  In other words, while there may be precedent for recognizing a First Amendment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 See ibid., pp. 232-234. 
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right to one kind of social speech, there is still no reason to believe that the Supreme Court 
means to extend explicit constitutional coverage to all casual, everyday speech.   
 Unfortunately, the American legal theory community has only rarely provided critical 
assessments of this element of American jurisprudence on freedom of speech.  While the 
Supreme Court is frequently evaluated for both the rationales it utilizes and the results it 
achieves, many legal theorists tend to accept the assumption that meaningful, constitutionally 
protected speech must be public and political.  And this attitude is largely reflected in the 
scholarship regarding non-public, non-political.  To the extent that some legal theorists have 
found a right to freedom of private speech in the First Amendment, they—like the Court in 
Givhan—tend to focus on private speech that concerns issues of public importance.  The rest of 
social speech, however, is either ignored or considered outside the scope of the First 
Amendment.  In the next section, I visit some of the most prominent of these critiques, and draw 
attention to the lack of concern for social speech in the American legal theory community.  
 
IV. American legal theory on the Supreme Court’s reading of freedom of speech in 
the First Amendment: 
It is extremely difficult to demonstrate a lack of attention to any particular theme within a 
field of study.  So while it is relatively simple to highlight instances in which the legal theory 
community addresses the issue of social speech, it is much more challenging to show that the 
majority of legal theorists ignore or avoid social speech.  However, in this section, I attempt to do 
exactly that.   
I begin this section by presenting several of the most prominent American legal theory 
critiques of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the public/private divide within First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech.  While this is not meant to be a comprehensive list, those theories that 
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I do discuss allow me to explore some key aspects of the constitutional debate regarding the 
status of non-political, non-public speech.  And what I find is that, from the perspective of a theory 
of social speech, it does not matter whether or not a particular theorist supports the hierarchy of 
speech.  In either case, I explain, she is still extremely unlikely to believe that social speech ought 
to fall within the realm of public law.  I show that, even theorists who believe that the Supreme 
Court should afford the same protection to private speech as public speech tend to equate private 
speech with communication about political/public issues, which takes place within civil society.  
And, as stated above, this only represents one segment of the larger concept of social speech.  In 
order for American legal theory to adequately address social speech, I argue, it would also need 
to consider speech about personal, intimate issues.  And thus far, there are only a handful of 
American legal theorists who have attempted this endeavor. 
To begin, the public/private divide has played a central role in American legal critiques of 
First Amendment jurisprudence.402  In general, there appear to be two sides to the debate.403  
First, there are those who condone the separation between public, political speech and private, 
non-political speech.  These theorists tend to point to the consequentialist justifications of the 
First Amendment, and thus, they echo the Supreme Court’s rulings that speech, which 
contributes to the discovery of truth and the goal of democratic self-governance, merits greater 
protection than speech, which does not.  Second, there are those American legal theorists who 
condemn the separation between public, political speech and private, non-political speech.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 See, for example, Meiklejohn, “The First Amendment Is an Absolute,” pp. 245-266; David M. 
Rabban, “The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years,” in The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 90, No. 3 
(January 1981), pp. 514-595; Edward G. White, “The First Amendment Comes of Age: The 
Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America,” in Michigan Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 
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(1978); Robert H. Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” in Indiana 
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403 Both sides of the debate tend to agree, however, that the protection of political speech is a 
crucial element of the First Amendment.  See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory 
of Judicial Review (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 93-94. 
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In terms of those who support a constitutional division between public and private 
speech, there are several scholars whose writings have been especially influential.  Henry 
Schofield, for example, presents a historical justification for limiting First Amendment freedom of 
expression to public, political speech.  Writing around the time of Abrams, Schofield argues that a 
chief objective of the American Revolution was to abolish English common law regarding freedom 
of expression, which—as stated above—was largely limited to restricting prior restraint in 
publishing.404  Thus, as he explains, the first Continental Congress deemed freedom of the press 
one of only five invaluable rights, without which a person could not be free.405  The participants in 
that 1774 Congress believed that the importance of freedom of the press consisted  
in the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, and in the diffusion of 
liberal sentiments on the administration of government, the ready communication of 
thought between subjects, and the consequential promotion of union among them 
whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated into more honorable and just 
modes of conducting affairs.406 
Schofield claims that this declaration—along with several other early documents regarding 
freedom of the press—proves that, at the time of the nation’s founding, freedom of expression 
was thought to be “confined to matters of public concern such as those enumerated… and does 
not extend to matters of private concerns.”407 
Similarly, Thomas M. Cooley also argues that the First Amendment exists to prevent 
repression of political discussion, only.408  He claims that the First Amendment freedoms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Henry Schofield, “Freedom of the Press in the United States,” in Essays on constitutional law 
and equity, and other subjects, Vol. II, Henry Schofield (ed.) (Boston: The Chipman Law 
Publishing Company, 1921), pp. 521-522. 
405 Ibid., pp. 522. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid.  
408 See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the 
Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 
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speech and press were designed to be more than a mere guarantee against prior restraint.409  
But that does not mean that these liberties were meant to apply to all communication.  Rather, 
Cooley states that the purpose of the freedoms of speech and press “has evidently been to 
protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to keep secure their right to 
free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to 
bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism 
upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon 
them.”410  Private speech, on the other hand, is generally outside the scope of freedom of speech.  
Indeed, Cooley writes that the First Amendment only applies to private speech if there is a public 
policy reason for protecting that communication.411 
Similar accounts of the distinction between private and public speech in First Amendment 
abound in early twentieth century legal theory.412  And it is important to note that, within these 
theories that respect a difference between public and private speech, it is almost always the 
former kind of communication that receives the highest First Amendment protection.413  Indeed, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 “Conceding, however, that liberty of speech and of the press does not imply complete 
exemption from responsibility for everything a citizen may say or publish… it is still believed that 
the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is secured by the constitutional 
provisions, inasmuch as of words to be uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and 
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410 Ibid., pp. 421-422. 
411 See ibid., pp. 440. 
412 For more examples, see Thomas Schroeder, “The Meaning of Unabridged Freedom of 
Speech,” in Free Speech for Radicals (New York: The Free Speech League, 1916), pp. 37-44; 
Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights (Chicago: University of 
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is extremely rare that private speech is afforded any explicit constitutional protection under these 
schemes. 
One notable exception can be found in Schauer’s essay, “‘Private’ Speech and the 
‘Private’ Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School District.”414  While Schauer appears to accept a 
distinction between private and public speech, he does not believe that the former is necessarily 
less deserving of First Amendment protections than the latter.  He points out that the free speech 
theories that form the foundation of the First Amendment—marketplace of ideas and the 
principles of democratic self-governance—“are directed more toward the interests of society, and 
also to the interests of the listeners, than they are toward the interests of the speaker.”415  
Because these theories “protect speakers only instrumentally in the service of these broader 
interests,” Schauer explains that it is easy to “imagine granting less protection to private 
speech.”416 
However, as Schauer argues, just because private speech could be viewed as less 
valuable than public speech in this theory, that does not mean that it should be.  He recognizes 
that “a great deal of political speech takes place outside of the public forum.”417  “To find the ‘true’ 
forum for political discussion and commentary in this country,” Schauer writes, “we should not 
journey to the theaters, the parks, or the streets, or read newspapers, magazines, placards, 
posters, or billboards.  Rather, we must go to the pool halls, the factories, the bars, the private 
offices, the barbershops and the proverbial living room in Peoria.”418  In other words, Schauer 
believes that, for most people, it is civil society—and not formal political institutions—that provides 
the background of their political communication. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 See Schauer, “’Private’ Speech and the ‘Private’ Forum.”  See also Steven Shiffrin, 
“Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology,” in UCLA Law Review, Vol. 
25, No. 915 (1978), pp. 561. 
415 Schauer, “’Private’ Speech and the ‘Private’ Forum,” pp. 237. 
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417 Ibid., pp. 236. 
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Indeed, Schauer not only argues that political speech in the private sphere allows private 
citizens to explore issues of governance, but he also suggests that it may serve the same self-
expressive and cathartic purposes as political speech in the public sphere.419  Furthermore, 
Schauer argues that private political speech can even help correct—or, at least, challenge—
orthodoxy from the ground up.420  At the very least, he points out that it would be absurd to argue 
that the First Amendment protects speech criticizing an elected official on the news, but that 
same speech, if spoken face-to-face, is not protected.421  Thus, he argues that the First 
Amendment must be read to include private speech.   
Nevertheless, even Schauer’s formulation of a First Amendment that distinguishes 
between public and private speech excludes social speech.  While he recognizes the value of 
non-public speech, he never addresses the issue of non-political speech.  Indeed, private speech, 
for Schauer, ought to be protected precisely because it is home to a significant portion of political 
speech concerning issues of the public good.  Private speech that involves more personal, 
intimate issues, on the other hand, seems to be outside the scope of his argument.422  Thus, a 
great deal of social speech is omitted. 
This is even truer for the majority of American legal theorists who accept the 
public/private speech divide.  To the extent that they consider private speech to be less relevant 
to the First Amendment than public speech, they are most likely to place social speech on an 
even lower rung in the hierarchy.  In fact, such communication is generally not even mentioned.   
Not all American constitutional scholars take this approach, however.  By the mid-
twentieth century, many American legal theorists had begun to call into question the distinction 
between public and private speech.  For example, both Chafee and Thomas I. Emerson have 
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136	  
	  
	  
rejected the notion that the Supreme Court can differentiate between public and private 
speech.423  Steven Shiffrin also claims that, “[a]ny distinction between public or important speech 
and private or trivial speech may be unworkable.”424  Similarly, Cass R. Sunstein suggests that all 
speech is essentially public.  Just as the New Deal eliminated the notion that there is a private 
sphere, which is immune from government regulation, he argues, free speech theory should do 
the same.  Sunstein believes that legal theorists ought to reject the notion of private speech, and 
instead, accept that there are actually two classes of public speech – one that the state must 
leave unregulated.425   
Even Meiklejohn, who began his career by arguing that the Constitution protects some 
speech more than others, eventually found the division between public and private speech 
unsustainable.426  Initially, Meiklejohn had argued that there were two kinds of speech, each of 
which was protected under a different portion of the Constitution.  First, there was the right to 
absolute freedom of speech—discussed above—which can be found in Article 1, Section 6 of the 
United States Constitution.  This portion of the Constitution, Meiklejohn explained, protected that 
speech, which contributed towards the proper functioning of self-government.  Second, there was 
the more limited right to freedom of speech, which was justified by the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process clause.427 
Meiklejohn noted (regretfully) that the Supreme Court often merged these two 
justifications for freedom of speech into one.  “With some hesitation and uncertainty,” he claimed, 
the Supreme Court “has thrust aside the ‘privileges and immunities’ clause of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment and has chosen, in the state field, to protect but freedom of speech of the First 
Amendment and that of the Fifth, under the due process clause which is taken directly from the 
latter.”428  According to Meiklejohn, this meant that certain opportunities for public speech were 
being blocked, and democratic self-governance thereby suffered.  
Eventually, Meiklejohn came to realize that it was, indeed, very difficult to distinguish 
between public and private speech.  He had defined public, First Amendment-protected speech 
as communication that is related to the collective self-determination of a free people.  But as he 
conceded, this does not apply only to speech regarding government processes.  “[T]here are 
many forms of thought and expression within the range of human communications from which the 
voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values,” he wrote.429  Specifically, 
Meiklejohn was referring to four spheres of communication: education; philosophy and science; 
the arts; and public discussions of public issues.  He argued that, to the extent that these types of 
communication tend to bear upon public issues, they are relevant to democratic government.  
Thus, the division between public speech and private speech fell apart. 
This does not mean, however, that Meiklejohn, and those who, like him, reject a division 
between public and private speech, mean to incorporate all social speech into their theories of 
freedom of speech.  The more private kinds of communication that these theorists wish to absorb 
into the category of protected speech are worthwhile largely because they contain political ideas.  
But what of that social speech, which involves only personal and intimate issues?  Again, this 
kind of speech is left out of the debate.  That is, except to the degree that certain free speech 
theories are deemed almost absurd in that their broad understanding of protected speech could 
be construed to apply to all communication – even the very personal.430   
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The one thing that all of these free speech critics discussed in this section have in 
common is that they each take it for granted that freedom of speech applies more to certain kinds 
of speech than others.  By accepting the Supreme Court’s premise that freedom of speech is 
justified, not as a good in itself, but for its ability to result in social goods, these legal theorists also 
acknowledge that speech, which does not further these social goods, is less deserving of the First 
Amendment’s protection.431  And while they may disagree about exactly which kinds of speech 
contribute to these social goals, nearly all American legal theorists concur with the Supreme 
Court that political, public speech is at the heart of the purpose of the First Amendment.  This is 
generally true in relation to private speech, but it even truer in relation to social speech.  Plenty of 
theorists may worry about the Court’s distinction between public and private speech, but the 
question of where social speech might fit in to a theory of freedom of speech is hardly ever 
broached.  
Having performed a search of American law reviews and journals, I found that the terms 
“political speech” and “public speech” have appeared in at least 998 and 997 articles, 
respectively.  The term “social speech,” on the other hand, has only come up in 92 American law 
review articles.  And of those 92 essays, the vast majority of authors are not referring to social 
speech, as I have defined it, but rather, to “serious” social speech.  This serious social speech is 
merely a corollary to political and religious speech.  Whereas purely political speech may involve 
issues of government and governance, this version of social speech covers that communication, 
which concerns social issues of public importance.  Essentially, to the extent that the term “social 
speech” has been utilized in these American law review articles, it is as the branch of political 
speech, which deals with issues like abortion, gay marriage, marijuana legalization, etc.  Used in 
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139	  
	  
	  
this sense, social speech is placed in contrast to both artistic and commercial speech, and not 
political speech (as I have done).432  
Indeed, “serious” social speech is quite similar to the kind of private speech that I discuss 
above, and which has been addressed by numerous American legal theorists.  And again, while 
this terminology suggests that legal theorists have extended their constitutional analyses to 
speech that is non-public, not all private speech is tantamount to social speech.  In fact, private 
speech only represents one portion of what I have called social speech.  Namely, it tends to refer 
to speech that is private in the sense that it takes place in civil society (as opposed to formal 
political institutions), but is not private (or intimate, personal, etc.) in terms of its content.  Like the 
Supreme Court, these American political theorists of private speech tend to only consider that 
speech, which expresses topics of political value. 
This lack of attention to the full range of social speech suggests that the majority of 
American legal free speech theorists consider it to be a non-issue.  In other words, while most of 
these theorists do not appear openly hostile to a reading of the First Amendment that 
incorporates social speech, by not even mentioning the possibility, they are also implicitly 
suggesting that it does not belong.  Nevertheless, to the extent that the American legal theory 
community has struggled with the issue of how private or “serious” social speech relates to the 
First Amendment, I would argue that they have not gone far enough.  For the most part, I believe 
that this approach is still overly attached to the overtly political nature of First Amendment 
speech.  Rather than argue that the First Amendment applies to all social speech that takes place 
within civil society—as I do—these kinds of legal theorists refer either to public speech about 
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social issues or private speech about political issues.  Indeed, I could find only 92 American law 
review articles that utilize the term “social speech.”   Of these, only six essays actually refer to a 
concept that remotely resembles what I have presented in this project.433  And there is only one 
instance of an American law review article acknowledging the political power inherent in social 
speech: Orville Lee’s “Legal Weapons for the Weak?”434  
There is reason to be optimistic that this will change, however.  While social speech has 
had a meager presence in First Amendment scholarship up until this point, it is possible that the 
discourse could expand to include it.  The Supreme Court has already conceded that its 
understanding of the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech may expand as the needs of 
citizens grow.435  And as Rabban explains, even those American legal theorists who favor a sharp 
distinction between public and private speech tend to agree “that First Amendment guarantees, 
although never subject to abridgment, can be broadened to accommodate society’s desire for 
additional free expression.”436  Schofield, for example, argued that, although private speech does 
not fall within the purview of the First Amendment, what was once considered private might 
eventually come to be considered public, political speech.437  Similarly, Cooley believed that, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 See Patrick M. Garry, “The First Amendment in a Time of Media Proliferation: Does Freedom 
of Speech Entail a Private Right to Censor?” in The University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 65, 
No. 183 (Winter 2004); Darren Bush, “The ‘Marketplace of Ideas:’ Is Judge Posner Chasing Don 
Quixote’s Windmills?” in Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 1107 (Winter 2000); Jeanne M. 
Craddock, “Constitutional Law-‘Words that Injure; Laws that Silence:’ Campus Hate Speech 
Codes and the Threat to American Education,” in Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 22, 
No. 1047 (Spring 1995); James R. O’Connor, “The Tenth Anniversary of the ABA Capital Defense 
Guidelines: The Road Traveled and the Road to be Traveled,” Part Two, in Hostra Law Review, 
Vol. 42, No. 647 (Winter 2013); Thomas J. Curtin, “The Name Game: Cybersquatting and 
Trademark Infringement on Social Media Websites,” in Journal of Law & Policy, Vol. 19, No. 353 
(2010); Orville Lee, “Legal Weapons for the Weak? Democratizing the Force of Words in an 
Uncivil Society,” in Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 26, No. 847 (Fall 2001). 
434 In this essay, Lee argues that social speech may have significant “force.”  However, he does 
not elaborate on the power of social speech, in general, nor does he ever discuss the status of 
social speech in the First Amendment.  Rather, this paper considers the personal and political 
impact of hate speech.  See ibid. 
435 See the opening quotation from Justice Frank Murphy’s majority decision for Thornhill v. 
Alabama. 
436 Rabban, “The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years,” pp. 568. 
437 Schofield, “Freedom of the Press in the United States,” pp. 529. 
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while freedom of speech should always be at least “as broad as existed when the constitution 
which guarantees it was adopted,” that does not mean this liberty cannot expand and grow even 
broader.438  So the more that people begin to recognize the value in all social speech—not just 
private speech regarding issues of public importance—the more that efforts may be made to 
absorb it into existing theories of freedom of speech.   
 
V. Conclusion: 
The question posed by this chapter is not, “Should social speech, as a whole, be 
protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?”  (There are already 
more than enough American legal theorists arguing that the First Amendment protects either too 
much or too little speech.439)  Rather, the question raised by this chapter is whether or not the 
Supreme Court has developed an understanding of freedom of speech that accounts for social 
speech.  In other words, is social speech covered by the First Amendment freedom of speech 
(i.e. subject to its protections and restrictions)?440  And to the extent that the Supreme Court has 
not included social speech within its First Amendment analyses, what does that imply about its 
perceived value?  Equally importantly, what does it mean that constitutional scholars tend to 
accept and reproduce this oversight? 
For the most part, it appears that American legal theorists are not looking at how social 
speech might fit into a theory of freedom of speech.  And, of course, the Supreme Court has also 
said very little about where social speech fits in to its theory of the First Amendment – except for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 429. 
439 For example, Schauer claims that the United States is now underwritten by the ideology that 
free speech is good, and more freedom of speech is better.  This attitude is no longer just an 
ideology, but it has become a true orthodoxy.  See Schauer, “The First Amendment as Ideology,” 
pp. 13.  See also Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986), pp. 23. 
440 Coverage, after all, does not necessarily equate to protection.  See, for example, the 
defamation cases. 
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what it has implied by this silence.  (For the sake of comparison, the phrase “public speech” can 
be found in the majority, concurring and/or dissenting opinions of at least 49 First Amendment 
Supreme Court cases.441  The phrase “political speech” has similarly occurred in 116 cases.442  
The term “social speech,” on the other hand, cannot be found in a single opinion issued by the 
Supreme Court.443)  Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the dearth of social speech 
analyses belies an attitude that is dismissive of this type of communication.  And this attitude, I 
believe, may be based on an incomplete understanding of the relationship between speech and 
liberal democratic citizenship and political outcomes. 
 The American legal community has decided that some speech is so essential to 
American values—i.e. the pursuit of truth and democratic self-governance—that it must be clearly 
defined and explicitly protected.  Since social speech may not initially appear to contribute to 
these social goods, however, it has not merited the same degree of consideration within the 
context of the First Amendment as more political, public forms of expression.  But by determining 
that social speech is irrelevant to the First Amendment, Supreme Court Justices and American 
legal scholars are actually making a claim that this speech does not matter.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 See, for example, Dennis et al. v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Perry Educational 
Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association et al., 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities 
Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Jay F. Hein, White House Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives, et al., Petitioners v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., et al., 551 
U.S. 587 (2007). 
442 See, for example, Citizens United, Appellant v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010); Mitch McConnell, et al. v. Federal Elections Commission, et al., 540 U.S. 93 (2003); 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California et al., 475 U.S. 1 (1986); 
Shaun McCutcheon, et al., Appellants v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); 
Charles W. Burson, Attorney General and Reporter for Tennessee, Petitioner v. Mary Rebecca 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
443 The closest that the Supreme Court ever got to using the term “social speech” was in 
Metromedia, Inc., et al. v. City of San Diego, et al., 453 U.S. 490 (1981).  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Byron Raymond White argued that outdoor advertising (i.e. billboards) provides “valuable 
commercial, political and social information” to the public.  However, he was referring to 
messaging about “social causes,” rather than social speech, as I have defined it. 
143	  
	  
	  
The fact that American legal theorists and practitioners have generally failed to address 
the place of social speech in the First Amendment does not mean that there is no room for it, 
however.  Much as in the case of private speech, if social speech can be proven to substantially 
contribute to the marketplace of ideas, democratic self-governance or another significant societal 
good, then it could possibly be absorbed into the Supreme Court’s doctrine of freedom of speech.  
In such a case, it might be afforded protections and subject to restrictions, which are similar to 
what is applied to political, public speech.  The trick is merely to show that social speech does 
serve valuable social and political purposes.  It is to that task that I turn in Chapters Four and 
Five.   
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CHAPTER 4 
	  
RETHINKING CLASSICAL LIBERAL SPEECH THOUGHT: JOHN MILTON AND JOHN 
STUART MILL ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE SOCIAL	  
	  
“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the 
field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.  Let her and 
Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?” 
-­‐ John Milton, “Areopagitica”444 
“The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human 
race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still 
more than those who hold it.  If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” 
-­‐ John Stuart Mill, On Liberty445 
 
Freedom of speech enjoys unparalleled esteem in liberal democratic societies.  
Contemporary theories of speech, as exemplified by deliberative democratic and legal theorists 
(discussed in Chapters Two and Three, respectively), particularly valorize this liberty.  And in 
practice, lawmakers consistently elevate freedom of speech to the status of a fundamental right, 
often placing it first and foremost in national bills of rights.  The First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, for one, famously guarantees that “Congress shall make no law… abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press.”446  Throughout the world, other nation states (including 
many with lesser commitments to democratic, liberal values) have followed suit.  From 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 John Milton, “Areopagitica a Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of 
England” (Memphis, TN: General Books, 2010), pp. 26. 
445 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in On Liberty and Other Essays, John Gray (ed.) (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 21. 
446 United States Constitution, Amendment 1. 
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Switzerland to India to the Philippines, regardless of how it is actually exercised, national 
constitutions explicitly acknowledge the importance of free expression by including it among their 
fundamental rights.447 
So while there is significant variation between theories and practices regarding the exact 
contours of what constitutes that speech, which ought to be protected, there is little doubt that the 
dual freedoms of thought and expression do and should form the bedrock of modern liberal 
society.  And this consensus is no accident.  A respect for freedom of conscious and the 
corresponding freedom of expression has stemmed out of the Lockean liberal tradition, which 
emphasizes the right of all men to think for themselves.   
In his essay, “A Letter on Toleration,” John Locke explicitly argues for a separation 
between church and state, but the issue at stake is actually much broader – Locke considers this 
separation necessary because he believes that it is impossible for the state to compel morality.  
He claims that “liberty of conscience is every man’s natural right, equally belonging to dissenters 
as to themselves; and that nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion either by law or 
force.”448  In other words, individuals must be masters of their own thoughts and consciences.  
This is as true for those who fall within the mainstream as for those who exist on the periphery.  
Governments must tolerate all viewpoints, even the conflicting ones.  This means that state 
censorship based on the content of speech is highly problematic for Locke.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Art. 16 Freedom of expression and of information, of Title Two: Fundamental Rights, 
Citizenship and Social Goals, of the Constitution of the Swiss Confederation states: “1) Freedom 
of expression and of information is guaranteed. 2) Everyone has the right freely to form, express, 
and impart their opinions. 3) Everyone has the right freely to receive information to gather it from 
generally accessible sources and to disseminate it.”  Part III Fundamental Rights, Article 19 
Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. in the Constitution of India (1949) 
states: “(1) All citizens shall have the right… to freedom of speech and expression.”  Article III, 
Section 4 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippine states: “No law 
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”  
448 John Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration” (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1950), 
pp. 52. 
146	  
	  
	  
Locke’s ideas regarding freedom of thought have had far-reaching consequences, 
perhaps most notably in the writing of the United States Constitution.  Many of the Founding 
Fathers consciously sought to incorporate Locke into the nation’s legal tradition, and his influence 
on the First Amendment clauses for freedom of religion, speech and assembly can be seen in 
their writings of the time.  In James Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments,” for instance, the signer of the Constitution and future president appropriates an 
argument straight out of Locke, claiming “that religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator 
and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force of 
violence.”449  Men, Madison argues, must be enabled to reach conclusions about religion and 
morality independently and without compulsion.  Thomas Jefferson takes this line of thinking even 
further in “The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom,” when he applies Locke’s 
arguments in favor of freedom of religion to freedom of speech, as well:  “[T]ruth is great and will 
prevail if left to herself; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to 
fear from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free 
argument and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict 
them.”450  Not only do people have a right to dictate their own moral codes, Jefferson argues, but 
the intervention of a state actor may actually be harmful to this process. 
Locke’s influence on the founding of the United States government can be seen, not only 
in its broad strokes, but also in its many caveats and limitations.  Like Locke—who only touts 
toleration for certain ideas and people—the Framers of the Constitution have a fairly limited 
understanding of freedom of speech; they tend to focus almost exclusively on protecting a kind of 
formal speech, which concerns only topics of public interest.451  And as I discussed in Chapters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 James Madison, “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,” 1785. 
Available at: http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html. 
450 Thomas Jefferson, “The Virginia Act For Establishing Religious Freedom,” 1786. Available at: 
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/vaact.html. 
451 “I say, first, no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules which are 
necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate. … [Second], 
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Two and Three and, this has been no less true for the contemporary political and legal theorists 
of speech who have followed in their footsteps.  Today’s political theories of free speech often 
deem only “public speech” (i.e. that which takes place in Congress, town hall meetings, televised 
political debates, or anywhere else where people are deliberating in their official capacities about 
issues of public importance) worthy of protection from state involvement.  The issues addressed 
by these contemporary theories can be grouped into two categories: 1) How best to structure 
public speech so that it achieves positive democratic outcomes, including self governance, as 
well as the pursuit of truth and progress; 2) How to balance freedom of speech against other 
competing rights, such as equal dignity and respect. 
While these are worthwhile concerns, the contemporary focus on public, political speech 
questions has meant that political and legal theorists have failed to address the impact of more 
informal social speech on liberal democratic politics.  As stated in the previous chapters, this is a 
significant omission.  Not only is social speech the most prevalent form of communication for the 
average person, but it is also instrumental in shaping the kind of citizen that she will turn out to 
be.   
Fortunately, the idea that one’s social interactions, as a private individual, may influence 
her choices and abilities, as a political actor, is not new.  Indeed, it stems from a theoretical 
tradition that predates even Locke, and includes two of the fathers of the contemporary tradition 
of free speech: John Milton and John Stuart Mill.  In this chapter, I discuss these two theorists of 
speech and the social.  First, I begin by highlighting the influence that Milton and Mill have had on 
practical and theoretical representations of freedom of speech.  Next, I examine their individual 
theories of freedom of speech more closely, exploring the role that social speech plays in 
determining good citizenship and political outcomes.  Although neither theorist directly addresses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a 
bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the 
protection and service of another prince… Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the 
being of a God” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” pp. 50-52). 
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social speech in his writings, I argue that both Milton and Mill do suggest that the liberties of 
thought and expression, which are usually considered individualistic freedoms, are actually 
already social.   
First, I show how, in “Areopagitica,” Milton argues that freedom from prior restraint in 
publishing is necessary on the grounds that it leads to the development of good character.  It is 
only when people are confronted by both good and evil ideas, and then freely choose the good, 
that they can be considered truly virtuous.  This process of moral development can occur in all 
spheres of thought and communication, but it is especially likely to take place in the social.  And 
while the origins of good character are social, Milton believes that individual virtue is necessary to 
the health of a nation.  Only a morally virtuous citizenry, he claims, will be able to question 
authority and keep the state in line.  Thus, Milton’s theory of freedom of expression conveys the 
political value of speech in its myriad forms and contexts, including the social. 
Second, I suggest that Mill’s concept of the social and its relationship to politics is 
perhaps even more robust than Milton’s theory.  While Mill does not explicitly connect his theories 
of the social with his discussions on freedom of expression in his most notable text on speech, 
“On Liberty,” it is evident throughout his writings that Mill sees social communication as 
necessary to both the individual and the political sphere.  For Mill, there is no more natural desire 
than the desire to communicate with others, and a personal connection to one’s community is 
necessary to his concept of individualism.  “The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, 
and so habitual to man,” he writes, “that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of 
voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself as otherwise than as a member of a body; and 
this association is riveted more and more, as mankind are further removed from the state of 
savage independence.”452  And as Nancy J. Hirschmann explains, “the context in which Mill’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in On Liberty and Other Essays, John Grey (ed.) (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 164. 
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individuals live is a social one, not (merely) an individualistic one.”453  It is only by communicating 
with others than an individual can experience and conceptualize herself as an individual.   
I argue that Mill’s theory of the social influences his theory of freedom of speech in two 
ways.  First, Mill’s emphasis on the importance of social interactions can be interpreted to 
suggest that they may serve as an important venue for the discovery of truth.  Second, Mill’s 
theory of social constructivism implies that social communication is necessary for individuals to 
acquire and hone the kind of character traits that are conducive to participatory government 
aimed at social progress.  By relating to others in the social sphere, people are likely to be 
influenced by social pressures (and even the threat of social pressures) in such a way that they 
seek to become more rational, inquisitive, distrustful of authority, etc.  Mill also believes that 
social interactions can combat selfishness and habituate people into becoming the kind of 
citizens who associate their own happiness with that of the whole.  These character traits are 
essential to Mill’s vision of good republican government.  
Although contemporary Anglo-American free speech theorists tend to ground their work 
in the tradition of Milton and Mill, they often neglect the social aspects of these theories.  In this 
chapter, I attempt to remedy this omission by reexamining these seminal texts of the freedom of 
speech literature, and highlighting the ways in which they speak to the powerful role of social 
speech.  My goal is not to prove that the more traditional readings of Milton and Mill, which 
emphasize public, political speech, are simply wrong.  Public, political speech is clearly important 
for both theorists.  However, insofar as contemporary theories of free speech fail to also address 
the place of more informal, social communication, I argue that they are incomplete.   
 
I. The influence of Milton and Mill on contemporary political and legal thought: 
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John Milton is often cited as the forefather of the modern liberal conception of freedom of 
speech.  To be sure, Milton hardly paints himself as a liberal in his writings.  Those who study him 
closely are quick to point out that his most famous and oft-cited work concerning freedom of 
expression, Areopagitica a Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of 
England, makes only a very restricted argument in favor of liberty.  In this essay, Milton argues 
only for increased freedom in publishing, being prompted by the new laws for a priori censorship 
that arose during the politically tumultuous mid-Seventeenth Century.  
In November 1640, financial pressures led King Charles I to convene the Long 
Parliament.  One of the new legislature’s first actions was to abolish the Court of Star Chamber, 
the offshoot of the King’s Privy Council, which had served as the primary setting for prosecuting 
political dissidents, religious rebels and any person who defied royally sanctioned monopolies of 
the printing trade.   Although this action was more of an attack on royal prerogative than an overt 
policy in favor of freeing the press, the elimination of the Star Chamber, in effect, meant a 
temporary suspension of the licensing policy that had been in existence for over a hundred years.  
The result was an outpouring of new religious and political ideas.454  It was in this atmosphere of 
free and open dissent that civil war broke out. 
Concerned about dissention in its own ranks and the success of royal propaganda, 
Parliament chose to reinstate government control over printing in June 1643.  The ensuing 
Licensing Order of 1643 required that “no Order or Declaration of both, or either House of 
Parliament shall be printed by any, but by order of one or both the said houses: nor other Book, 
Pamphlet, paper, or part of any such Book, Pamphlet, or paper, shall from henceforth be printed, 
bound, stitched or put to sale by any person or persons whatsoever, unless the same be first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 See Vincent Blasi, “Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment.” Occasional 
Papers, Paper 6 (1995). Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsop_papers/6:  “Tudor 
and early Stuart licensing had been variable though sometimes Draconian, often corrupt, and 
usually porous.  The elimination in 1641 of the institutions of press control caused a dramatic 
increase in both the volume of advocacy and the range of views expressed.  By one count, the 
number of pamphlets published during the year 1640 was 22; in 1642, it was 1,966.” 
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approved of and licensed under the hands of such person or persons as both, or either of the said 
Houses shall appoint for the licensing of the same.”455  This meant that before any book could be 
published, it must first pass government inspection.  While Parliament was the primary 
enforcement agency, the printers were also called upon to police themselves.  Through their 
trade organization, the Stationers’ Company, all master printers who held printing patents were 
legally required to report their peers who printed without a license.  Specialized licensers were 
also appointed to review potential publications in different categories (i.e. law, philosophy, 
mathematics).  If these licensers were deemed too permissive by Parliament, they could be 
subject to imprisonment along with the offending writers and printers.   
During this same period, members of Parliament finally recognized that they would need 
an alliance with Scotland if they were to maintain any chance of winning the English Civil War.  
The Scots provided military resources, but in return, they also demanded a religious settlement in 
England along Presbyterian lines.  This prospect was controversial among members of 
Parliament, including many Presbyterians who were uncomfortable with Scottish 
Presbyterianism’s strict Calvinist theology and its subordination of secular institutions.  In the 
hope of finding a compromise, Parliament created the Westminster Assembly, which would 
become a formal congress of 120 English clerics, 20 laymen from the Lords and Commons and 8 
Scottish representatives.  However, even months after its founding, tensions and bitter disputes 
still raged within the Assembly.  Some of the most contentious debates on issues such as 
parliamentary autonomy and toleration became public, migrating into the House of Commons, the 
army camps and the street.  In response, many notable essays on religious toleration were 
written and published in violation of the Licensing Order of 1643. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455 “Ordinance for correcting and regulating abuses of the Press” (June 14, 1643) in “Table of 
acts: 1643,” C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (eds.) Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-
16660 (1911): IV-XVIII, British History Online. Available at: http://www.british-
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152	  
	  
	  
One of the most famous and enduring of these essays was Milton’s “Areopagitica.”  
Following a disillusioning marriage to Mary Powell in 1642 (although the couple later reconciled, 
Powell initially abandoned Milton after only one month of marriage), Milton authored a treatise on 
the subject of divorce.  In his 1643 pamphlet, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton made 
the controversial argument that an incompatibility of personalities, even without any 
accompanying infidelity, might be a valid justification for divorce.  Not only was Milton unable to 
obtain licensing for this publication—he published it anyway—but the claims within it immediately 
branded Milton as a “dangerous radical with licentious sympathies.”456 
This experience of censorship almost certainly helped motivate the writing of 
“Areopagitica,” which served as a direct response to the Licensing Order of 1643.  And indeed, at 
first glance, Milton’s plea against this law for prior restraint in publishing appears extensive.  He 
encourages governments to censor that which is “scandalous, seditious, and libelous,”457 but 
otherwise employs broad language when referring to freedom from licensing.  And Milton’s grand 
rhetoric about the battle between Truth and Falsehood—the portion of “Areopagitica” that is most 
discussed by speech theorists—suggests a potentially extensive justification for freedom of 
speech.  However, there are three aspects of “Areopagitica,” which suggest that Milton did not 
mean to extent freedom of expression to all people and all ideas.   
First, as Leonard W. Levy argues in his essay, “Freedom of speech in Seventeenth-
Century Thought,” in order to fully understand “Milton’s ‘dream of free speech, to utter, and to 
argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties,’” one must note that “his use of the 
personal pronoun is significant, for his well-advertised tolerance did not extend to the thought that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Blasi, “Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment.” 
457 “But that other cause of licensing books, which we thought had died with his brother 
quadragesimal and matrimonial when the prelates expired, I shall now attend with such a homily, 
as shall lay before ye, first the inventors of it to be those whom ye will be loath to own; next what 
is to be thought in general of reading, whatever sort to books be; and that this Order avails 
nothing to the suppression of scandalous, seditious, and libellous books, which were mainly to be 
suppressed” (Milton, “Areopagitica,” pp. 3). 
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he hated.”458  The terms “scandalous, seditious, and libelous” actually contained a great deal for 
Milton, including religious viewpoints that he deemed treacherous.  Thus, Milton did not 
encourage toleration of religious viewpoint that he deemed dangerous and heretical.  His vision of 
freedom of expression extended only to “neighboring differences, or rather indifferences,” which 
in 1644, meant variations on Protestantism.459  In fact, Milton specifically excluded both “popery, 
and open superstition”—believing it should be “extirpated”—and also that, “which is impious or 
evil absolutely either against faith or manners”—arguing that “no law can possibly permit” it—from 
his treatise on freedom of expression.460   
Second, in his “Areopagitica,” Milton barely mentioned the topic of extending freedom of 
the press to polemical news writers.461  To the extent that he did address these controversial 
authors, he argued that royalist writings (i.e. “that continued court-libel against the Parliament and 
City, printed, as the wet sheets can witness, and dispersed among us) ought to be censored.462  If 
the new licensing system were to be justified in any way, he argued, it was in providing this 
“prime service.”463 
Finally, in later writings, Milton made it clear that he did not intend for anything but 
serious intellectual work, written by academic and/or religious scholars, to ever truly be free.  
Even the high level of discourse that merited freedom from restraint should not be made open 
and available to all, he claimed.  In his essay, “Of True Religion, Heresy, Schism, and Toleration,” 
Milton explained his worry that a scholarly discussion of scripture might “unsettle the weaker 
sort.”  While he still believed that such a debate should be allowed to occur, his suggestion was to 
make discussion as impenetrable as possible for the average man.  If scholars were going to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 Leonard W. Levy, “Freedom of Speech in Seventeenth-Century Thought,” in The 
Antioch Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, Essays: Personal & Political (Spring, 1999), pp. 171-172. 
459 Milton, “Areopagitica,” pp. 27. 
460 Ibid.   
461 See Levy, “Freedom of Speech in Seventeenth-Century Thought,” pp. 172. 
462 Milton, “Areopagitica,” pp. 14. 
463 Ibid. 
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publish their ideas, he argued, “[a]t least, then, let them have to write in Latin, which the common 
people understand not; that what they hold may be discussed among the learned only.”464  Thus, 
the goal of Milton’s “Areopagitica” was not to promote free speech as it is understood today; 
rather, he aimed to protect the publication of only that speech that appealed to him (both 
religiously and politically), while at the same time limiting its audience to those who might not be 
“unsettled” by new ideas. 
Despite these illiberal elements, Milton’s elegant prose has had a significant influence on 
contemporary theories concerning freedom of speech.  And while they may overestimate his 
commitment to a broad liberty of conscience, many of the most prominent political theorists of 
speech believe the modern discourse about free speech to have begun with Milton.  In Free 
Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry, for example, Frederick Schauer argues that Milton’s 
“Areopagitica” is “the earliest comprehensive defense of freedom of speech.”465  Similarly, in The 
System of Freedom of Expression, Thomas I. Emerson dates the birth of the “argument that the 
rights of citizens should include a far broader scope for free expression” to John Milton’s speech 
in the Long Parliament.466  And as Lee Bollinger explains, “the life history of the [free speech] 
principle dates back several centuries, at least to the seventeenth century, which is when John 
Milton wrote his famous defense of liberty of speech and press in Areopagitica.  The 
contemporary rhetoric of free speech, the language and terms used to think and talk about the 
principle, draws heavily on the writings of the earlier centuries.”467  Thus, Bollinger claims that 
Milton has been instrumental in elevating the importance of the concept of free speech above 
where it had ever been before. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 John Milton, “Of True Religion, Heresy, Schism, Toleration,” in The Prose Works of John 
Milton. Vol. II. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1848, pp. 405. 
465 Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), pp. 15. 
466 Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 
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Others choose to show deference to “Areopagitica’s” foundational influence on freedom 
of speech theories by opening their own writings with its most famous passage.  Both C. Edwin 
Baker and Zachariah Chaffee begin the first chapters of their canonical books—Human Liberty 
and Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Speech, respectively—with Milton’s battle between 
Truth and Falsehood.468  And a number of contemporary political speech theorists, by focusing 
almost exclusively this one passage, have used Milton to justify the marketplace of ideas theory.  
Stanley Ingber, for example, claims that the “classic image of competing ideas and robust debate 
dates back to English philosophers John Milton and John Stuart Mill.” 469  So while the term 
“marketplace of ideas” was not actually coined until Justice Holmes’s 1919 dissent in Abrams vs. 
United States, Ingber claims that it is has its earliest foundations in Milton’s theory. 
The United States Supreme Court has also been clear in its veneration of Milton’s theory 
of freedom of expression, dating the beginning of the concept back his “Areopagitica.”  For 
example, when considering a licensing tax for newspaper advertisers in Grosjean v. American 
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, Justice George Sutherland’s majority opinion begins its history of the 
First Amendment with a discussion of Milton:  “As early as 1644,” Sutherland writes, “John Milton, 
in an ‘Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing’… vigorously defended the right of every man 
to make public his honest views ‘without previous censure’; and declared the impossibility of 
finding any man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the same time good enough to 
be allowed to perform its duties.”470  The Supreme Court has also frequently cited Milton when 
deciding in favor of a broad reading of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.  For 
instance, in 1961, Justice Tom C. Clark repeatedly cited Milton in his majority opinion for Times 
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Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, et al., in an attempt to prove the dangers of prior restraint.471  Then 
in 1972, Justice William O. Douglas utilized Milton in his concurring opinion for Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, striking down a law that limited lectures on birth control.  “The teachings of Baird and those 
of Galileo might be of a different order,” he writes, “but the suppression of either is equally 
repugnant.  As Milton said in the Areopagitica, ‘Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue 
freely according to conscience, above all liberties.’” 472 
Not only has Milton carried historical and jurisprudential significance for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but his influence can also be seen in the language that justices have adopted to 
discuss freedom of speech.  In Abrams v. U.S., Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famed dissent 
sets a precedent for nearly all freedom of speech cases.473  And his writing bears a striking 
resemblance to “Areopagitica.”  “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market,” Holmes argues, “and that truth is the only ground 
upon which their wishes can safely be carried out.  That, at any rate, is the theory of our 
Constitution.”474  This analogy is clearly indebted to Milton’s battle between Truth and Falsehood.  
But Milton, of course, is not the only forbearer of the contemporary liberal notion of 
freedom of speech.  Indeed, if Milton has been considered the father of free speech theory, then 
John Stuart Mill has been deemed his son and rightful heir.  Those who date the beginning of 
contemporary political speech theory to Milton almost always turn to Mill in their next breath.  
Again, this is especially true of the United States Supreme Court, which has drawn from both 
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theorists to support a marketplace of ideas justification for freedom of speech.  In 1964, for 
example, when the Supreme Court used Milton to justify the protection of all ideas—especially 
false ones—under the marketplace of ideas theory in New York Times v. Sullivan, it included 
citations to Milton and Mill, side-by-side.475 
The coupling of Milton and Mill is, in many ways, a natural one.  There does, indeed, 
appear to be a direct lineage between the two theorists, with Milton introducing the idea that 
society benefits by allowing an open struggle between Truth and Falsehood, and Mill developing 
it to its full potential.476  And it is clear from historical texts that Milton truly did influence Mill’s 
writings.  His father, who “cared little for any English poetry,” had “the highest admiration” for 
Milton’s poems, and assuredly introduced them to his son during the latter’s rigorous 
education.477  Later in life, Mill had occasion to become familiar with “Areopagitica,” finding 
excerpts of it in his own library’s copy of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s The Friend and reading 
Thomas Babington Macaulay’s tribute to Milton in the Edinburgh Review in 1825.478  And in 1837, 
Mill proves his familiarity with “Areopagitica” by referencing Milton in his review of Thomas 
Carlyle’s French Revolution.479 
Like Milton, Mill’s theory in favor of freedom of speech must also be understood as a 
reaction to his historical and personal circumstances.  Mill’s childhood was remarkable in many 
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respects.  As the eldest child of utilitarian philosopher and leader of the Philosophical Radical 
movement, James Mill, the young Mill was subject to a rigorous and demanding education.  
Under his father’s strict tutelage, Mill was taught Greek beginning at age three and Latin five 
years later.  By his early teens, he had made a wide survey of history, including many of the 
Greek and Latin classics; performed extensive work in logic and mathematics; and mastered 
political economy, legal philosophy and metaphysics.  This knowledge was reinforced by Mill’s 
daily instruction of his own younger siblings, as well as evening with his father, during which the 
young Mill was called upon to share everything that he had learned that day.480 
As Mill explains in his Autobiography, the stress of his schooling and social isolation (as 
well as other factors) led to a severe “mental crisis” in 1826.481  In response to this breakdown, he 
began to reassess the value of an education in analytic ability, when divorced from the 
development of a capacity for feeling.  And his positive experience with poetry—especially 
William Wordsworth—encouraged him in the belief that the cold rationalism of an Enlightenment 
education needed to be combined with an education in sentiment and feeling.482   
Thus, Mill began to explore the Romantic Movement that had sprung up in response to 
the rigid moral code of the English Victorian era.  Mill ultimately aimed to reconcile the utilitarian 
philosophies of his father, Jeremy Bentham and the other Radicals with key figures of 
Romanticism, such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and 
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Wordsworth.483  And in doing so, he developed a version philosophic radicalism that was meant 
to incorporate the best elements of each school of thought – utilitarian morality combined with an 
appreciation for feeling. 
It was as part of this intellectual endeavor that Mill began to develop his own ideas about 
the social, and to identify the critical role that social and cultural institutions play in human 
development.  Mill believed that, in order to become the kind of creative, active individuals, with a 
preference for higher pleasures, who would push society towards progress, people must be 
allowed certain liberties.484  Specifically, he argued that freedom of thought and discussion are 
essential for creating individuality.  Where people are encouraged to merely accept and conform 
to custom, they are unlikely to generate anything new.  On the other hand, where a culture of free 
and open discussion exists, people are likely to critically assess the status quo and reflect upon 
their own ideas.  As a result, these individuals are able to push society forward.  Thus, Mill had a 
strong interest in fostering the social institution of freedom of speech. 
And Mill’s theory of freedom of speech, while also not exactly liberal by contemporary 
standards, is considerably more inclusive than that, which Milton proposed.  For one thing, Mill 
seems to move away from the notion of freedom of the press as freedom only from prior restraint, 
broadening the call for government non-interference in speech.  For another, he seems to 
suggest that freedom of speech—while still not appropriate for all—ought to be applied to a wider 
audience.  And at the very least, Mill does not openly worry that laic individuals ought to be 
shielded from deep philosophical discussion. 
These differences between Milton and Mill make the latter considerably more relatable to 
contemporary notions of freedom of speech.  This may explain his special prevalence in political 
theories of speech, even as compared to Milton.  For example, although Justice William Brennan 
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160	  
	  
	  
cited both Milton and Mill in the Sullivan decision, Mill was clearly his starting off point.  In 
establishing guidelines for defamation and libel, Brennan pulled directly from Mill when he 
claimed that, for a statement to be considered libel, a publisher must be aware that it was false or 
that she acted recklessly in terms of its truth – the “actual malice” standard.  Drawing from Mill, 
Brennan argued that false or questionable statements are an unavoidable feature of reasoned 
discussion, whether made in good faith or bad.485  And in order to protect an open exchange, he 
claimed, people must be free to say things that may be wrong without fear of legal 
repercussions.486  Finally, much like Mill’s “On Liberty,” Brennan asserts that this is nothing to 
worry about: false statements can even contribute positively to discussions by making the truth 
stand out even brighter. 
But the Supreme Court is not the only place where Mill’s impact on freedom of speech 
has been felt.  In Free Speech, Alan Haworth argues that one way to measure Mill’s influence is 
by taking stock of the lines from “On Liberty,” which have entered the common stock of 
epigrams.487  And indeed, Haworth claims that both of Mill’s lines, “If all mankind minus one were 
of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had 
the power, would be justified in silencing mankind,” and also “All silencing of discussion is an 
assumption of infallibility,” have made it into the American vernacular.488  As he explains, both of 
these “passages are familiar to people who have never heard of John Stuart Mill, as well as to 
those who have, but who could not give you a half-way adequate account of what his argument 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
485 “[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and… it must be protected if the freedoms 
of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ they need to survive” (Ibid.). 
486 “Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not 
mean that only false speech will be deterred” (New York Times v. Sullivan). 
487 Alan Haworth, Free Speech (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 33. 
488 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
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actually is.”489  And any time that freedom of speech comes up in the media, it is likely that these 
and similar phrases will be utilized “quite out of context.”490 
Mill, after all, while frequently cited, is also often misunderstood.  Like Milton, many who 
call upon Mill to justify freedom of speech paint him as more of a liberal than he actually was.  
While these misreadings may corrupt his message, they do not diminish Mill’s influence.  Even 
one of Mill’s staunchest critics, Willmore Kendall, has admitted that the scope of arguments 
utilized by liberal democrats today “have not varied perceptibly since Mill.”491  Virtually all liberal 
theorists of freedom of speech quote from and draw upon Mill when forming their arguments.  
Indeed, it is nearly impossible to delineate the full breadth of his influence on political theory, legal 
theory and practical attitudes towards freedom of speech. 
To summarize, both Milton and Mill have had a profound effect on the ways that liberal 
democratic citizens conceptualize their relationships to the state and each other.  Whether used 
as a jumping off point, a foil or historical background, both Milton and Mill’s theories on freedom 
of speech have gone on to inform nearly every free speech author or commentator, from 
deliberative democratic theorists to Anglo-American legal academics to Supreme Court justices.  
As such, their theories have transcended the purely philosophical, and have grown to form the 
basis for a practical understanding of one the world’s most cherished fundamental rights – 
freedom of speech.   
This immediate connection to lived experience suggests that, when free speech scholars 
analyze these canonical theories, they have a particular duty to provide a full and accurate 
representation of the texts.  To the extent that Milton and Mill are aware of the potential 
advantages and dangers of social interactions—a claim that I will take up in the following 
sections—today’s scholars ought to consider the place of social speech when reading these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 Ibid., pp. 34. 
490 Ibid. 
491 Willmoore Kendell, “The ‘Open Society’ and its Fallacies,” in The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (December, 1960), pp. 972-979. 
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theories.  Unfortunately, readings of Milton and Mill that focused almost entirely on the public and 
political elements of speech in their theories have put all free speech theory on a path that 
ignores social communication and its implications for both individual development and political 
outcomes.  For the remainder of this chapter, I seek to correct this problem by directly addressing 
the role that social interactions play in the theories of both Milton and Mill. 
 
II. John Milton on virtue and truth in the social: 
As stated above, Milton’s “Areopagitica” should not be read as a justification for a 
completely liberal understanding of freedom of expression.  Nevertheless, in this section, I argue 
that Milton’s framework for understanding (partial) freedom from prior restraint in publishing 
contains, within in, the potential for protecting a wide range of communication.  Specifically, I 
propose a reading of Milton that emphasizes his laudatory attitude towards social communication.  
First, I begin by suggesting that, because Milton does not argue for freedom of expression based 
on its own intrinsic good, but rather, grounds his arguments in the beliefs that the exchange of 
ideas is necessary in order to create a virtuous citizenry—which is necessary for a healthy 
state—he is able to incorporate social speech into his theory.  After all, according to Milton, the 
process of building good character and virtue is not limited to traditionally political speech 
between public actors; rather, character development takes place in all spheres of interaction, 
including (and especially) the social.  Thus, Milton can be read to be advocating the protection of 
social speech on the grounds that it contributes to virtue.  Second, at the end of this section, I 
present Milton’s discussion of Truth in “Areopagitica,” which provides additional evidence that he 
understands the value of social communication. 
For Milton, good and evil come together in the world – they are inextricable.  “Good and 
evil we know in the field of this world grow up together almost inseparably,” he writes, “and the 
knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with the knowledge of evil, and in so many 
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cunning resemblances hardly to be discerned, that those confused seeds which were imposed 
upon Psyche as an incessant labour to cull out, and sort asunder, were not more intermixed.”492  
If good and evil are two sides to the same coin, it is impossible to know the one without also 
knowing the other.  Thus, evil ideas serve an important purpose for Milton:  Through exposure to 
evil, one can also locate the good, and thereby access a virtuous path.493 
Milton’s road to virtue requires two steps.  First, an individual must be exposed to both 
good and evil.  It is not enough to adopt good, godly ideas if those are the only ideas that a 
person has ever known.  Such an individual might outwardly be following the righteous path, but 
she can never be truly virtuous.  Instead, experience with a diversity of ideas—including bad or 
evil ideas—is necessary for the creation of good people.  As John Durham Peters explains in 
Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition, “[w]ithout contraries, there is no 
knowledge; without knowledge, there is no virtue.  In this Milton offers a beautifully clear 
justification for liberty of publication: diverse writings and arguments teach us good and evil—or 
good via evil.”494 
Second, once a person has seen good and been tempted by evil, in order to be 
considered virtuous, she must freely and independently choose the good.495  As Milton writes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 Milton, “Areopagitica,” pp. 20. 
493 Evil ideas are distinct in their ability to promote good.  Comparing evil books to bad meats, 
Milton writes that, while both may fulfill an immediate need, only the former are likely to teach a 
valuable lesson:  “For books are as meats and viands are; some of good, some of evil substance; 
and yet God, in that unapocryphal vision, said without exception, RISE, PETER, KILL AND EAT, 
leaving the choice to each man’s discretion.  Wholesome meats to a vitiated stomach differ little 
or nothing from unwholesome; and best books to a naughty mind are not unapplicable to 
occasions of evil.  Bad meats will scarce breed good nourishment in the healthiest concoction; 
but herein the difference is of bad books, that they to a discreet and judicious reader serve in 
many respects to discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate” (Ibid., pp. 9). 
494 John Durham Peters, Courting the Abyss: Free Speech and the Liberal Tradition (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 78. 
495 Milton does not, however, advocate going out and truly experiencing all the vice in the world in 
order to be able to choose virtue.  Rather, he thinks that this is one of the most important 
functions of books: they allow us to see what the world has to offer without actually committing 
sin.  “Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the 
constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we 
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“[h]e that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet 
abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring 
Christian. … I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that 
never sallies out and sees her adversary but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is 
to be run for, not without dust and heat.”496  For Milton, virtue cannot be imposed from up above.  
One cannot be told how to be virtuous; one must actively choose to be virtuous.  And if the world 
were suddenly free from all vice, people would also be the worse for it because they would never 
be free to make the virtuous choice.  “They are not skillful considerers of human things,” Milton 
writes, “who imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of sin.”497  It is impossible to abolish 
sin without also abolishing to opportunity to attain virtue. 
And virtue, of course, is an important goal for Milton.  Virtue is necessary, not only for its 
positive relationship to individual happiness and personal salvation, but also because of a 
secondary advantage: its influence on good citizenship.  A successful state requires a virtuous 
citizenry, Milton believes.  As Vincent Blasi explains in his essay, “Free Speech and Good 
Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the Present,” Milton argues that only citizens who possess 
“strength of will, acuteness of perception, ingenuity, self-discipline, engagement, breadth of 
vision, perseverance” will have the fortitude to keep the state in line.498  All harm, he explains, 
“even that harm that flows from malignant political energy, can best be contained and repaired by 
a citizenry that is energized in a countervailing way: intellectually independent, morally engaged, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
more safely, and with less danger, scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all 
manner of tractates and hearing all manner of reason?  And this is the benefit which may be had 
of books promiscuously read” (Milton, “Areopagitica,” pp. 10). 
496 Ibid., pp. 10. 
497 Ibid., pp. 23. 
498 Vincent Blasi, “Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the Present,” in 
Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era (Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone (eds.)) 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 64. 
165	  
	  
	  
politically resilient, not afraid to speak out or stand to up.”499  In other words, it is only a virtuous 
citizenry that is likely to confront the state and promote vitality.500 
That is why it is so important to Milton that policies be adopted to encourage the 
development of virtue.  And freedom of expression, Milton believes, is absolutely essential to this 
process.  Not only is freedom of expression a divine—and thus, irrefutable—right, but by 
permitting ideas to be expressed, the state ensures that the population will be exposed to both 
the good and evil that make virtue possible.501  If books are censored before publication, if the 
public cannot expose itself to a variety of ideas, individuals will be robbed of the opportunity to 
choose the virtuous path.  Not only do they suffer as individual souls, but the health of the state 
suffers as well. 
This does not mean, however, that Milton wanted all ideas to be free.  As stated above, 
Milton’s vision of freedom of expression is limited in terms of its content, proscribing arguments in 
favor of Catholicism and royalism, as well limiting the reception of scholarly ideas that might 
unsettle the general public.  But Milton’s freedom of expression is also relatively expansive in 
terms of form and context.  Because Milton does not value freedom of expression primarily as a 
political tool, but rather, as a method of building virtue, he does not limit his theory to those kinds 
of speech that consider only political topics and take place in public settings.  Instead, Milton 
wishes to promote any exchange of ideas that might promote virtue, and that opens him up to 
looking at social speech. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 Ibid., pp. 65. 
500 As Blasi argues, “Milton’s case for free expression depends in no small degree on his 
observation… that vitality is the defining quality of a political community, and that vitality cannot 
be maintained—stagnation will inevitably set in—if the prescriptions of Custom and Authority are 
allowed to go unchallenged” (Blasi, “Milton’s Areopagitica and the First Amendment”). 
501 “I conceive therefore, that when God did enlarge the universal diet of man’s body, saving ever 
the rules of temperance, he then also, as before, left arbitrary the dieting and repasting of our 
minds; as wherein every mature man might have to exercise his own leading capacity” (Milton, 
“Areopagitica,” pp. 9). 
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 Indeed, people do not learn to be virtuous solely through reading serious political texts 
and internalizing grand ideas about the public good.  Building good character and virtue is an 
inherently intimate task.  More often than not, people develop their character through socialization 
and intimate interactions.  Milton asserts at least this much when, midway through “Areopagitica,” 
he mocks the idea of using prior censorship to help shape public morals.  To do so, he argues, 
would require an impossible infrastructure – one that is capable of censoring all daily activities, as 
they all play a role in the development of character:   
If we think to regulate printing, thereby to rectify manners, we must regulate all recreation 
and pastimes, all that is delightful to man.  No music must be heard, no song be set or 
sung, but what is grave and Doric.  There must be licensing dancers, that no gesture, 
motion, or deportment be taught our youth but what by their allowance shall be thought 
honest; for such Plato was provided of.  It will ask more than the work of twenty licensers 
to examine all the lutes, the violins, and the guitars in every house; they must not be 
suffered to prattle as they do, but must be licensed what they may say.  And who shall 
silence all the airs and madrigals that whisper softness in chambers?  The windows also, 
and the balconies must be thought on; there are shrewd books, with dangerous 
frontpieces, set to sale; who shall prohibit them, shall twenty licensers?  The villages also 
must have their visitors to inquire what lectures the bagpipe and the rebeck reads, even 
to the ballatry and the gamut of every municipal fiddler, for these are the countryman’s 
Arcadias, and his Monte Mayors.502 
In this passage, Milton is arguing that the myriad ways in which people express themselves and 
share their ideas—music, dancing, lyric poetry—influence the people that the audiences or 
recipients will become.   
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Milton then goes on, in the next paragraph, to remark more explicitly upon the absurdity 
of allowing or expecting licensers to regulate the intimate and social spheres: 
Next, what more national corruption, for which England hears ill abroad, than household 
gluttony: who shall be the rectors of our daily rioting?  And what shall be done to inhibit 
the multitudes that frequent those houses where drunkenness is sold and harboured?  
Our garments also should be referred to the licensing of some more sober workmasters 
to see them cut into less wanton garb.  Who shall regulate all the mixed conversation of 
our youth, male and female together, as is the fashion of this country?  Who shall still 
appoint what shall still be discoursed, what presumed, and no further?  Lastly, who shall 
forbid and separate all idle resort, all evil company?503 
In other words, it is no more the business of the state to dictate which books a person may read 
than it is its responsibility to tell individuals how much they may eat, what they may wear or who 
they may talk to.  All of these aspects of daily life build character (and are also expressive of it), 
and ought to be free from extreme state coercion. 
 Taken together, these two passages suggest that Milton’s argument against the prior 
censorship of books can be extended to apply to social speech and communication as well.  
Indeed, Milton explicitly states that there is no real difference between the effects of reading a 
book and the effects of everyday social interactions on a person’s moral character – both 
activities are highly formative.  “And albeit whatever thing we hear or see, sitting, walking, 
travelling, or conversing, may be fitly called our book,” Milton writes, “and is of the same effect 
that writings are, yet grant the thing to be prohibited were only books, it appears that this Order 
hitherto is far insufficient to the end which it intends.”504  If books must exist freely so that 
individuals may use them to become good people, and if everyday interactions serve the same 
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purpose as books, it seems fair to conclude that Milton’s case for freedom can be extended to 
social speech. 
 A second, subtler place in Milton’s writings where one can find his appreciation for 
traditionally apolitical ideas and communication is in his statements on Truth.  The free thought, 
writing and speech that Milton encourages is all meant to get people closer to Truth.  While Milton 
accepts that humankind may never actually discover the whole Truth of the universe, he believes 
that to search for it is a divine task.  And it is not an easy one.  As Milton explains, fragments of 
Truth have been scattered all over the universe, and it is Man’s responsibility to assemble the 
pieces: 
Truth indeed came once into the world with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape 
most glorious to look on: but when he ascended, and his Apostles after him were laid 
asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that story goes of the 
virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the four 
winds.  From that time ever since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, 
imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and 
down gathering up limb by limb, still as they could find them.505  
With Truth scattered all about, it is unlikely that humans will be able to discover it simply by 
listening to public figures of reading political texts.  Rather, it should be expected that people 
would find pieces of truth in all aspects of life, from the unusual to the most mundane. 
 Therefore, Milton believes that humans should constantly be striving towards Truth in 
their everyday interactions.  And that search is never-ending.  Even if parts of the Truth are 
discovered, if they are not constantly exercised and practiced, they will atrophy.  “Well knows he 
who uses to consider, that our faith and knowledge thrives by exercise, as well as our limbs and 
complexion,” Milton writes.  “Truth is compared in Scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters 
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flow not in perpetual progression, they sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition.”506  
Thus, Milton provides a way for people to find value in their everyday interactions and 
conversations – even these small acts are contributing to the larger goal of discovering and 
strengthening divine Truth. 
 In sum, Milton’s theory of freedom of expression may actually be both more and less 
restrictive than it is commonly seen to be.  It is more restrictive in that it is neither content neutral, 
nor does it value expression for its own intrinsic good.  However, Milton’s theory is also less 
restrictive than its usage in contemporary political theories of speech and American jurisprudence 
may suggest.  Because he considers free and open expression to be valuable as a tool for 
building good, virtuous character traits among the citizenry—which is necessary to the health of a 
state—Milton is able to incorporate all speech that serves this purpose into his theory.  And as his 
discussion of the influential role that art, music, food, etc. plays in character development implies, 
Milton is likely to have considered social communication among those expressions that merit 
protection.  This position is underscored by his passages on the discovery of Truth, which further 
suggest that Milton believed that there is great value in social speech. 
 
III. John Stuart Mill on the social pursuit of truth and republican character:  
In his most famous essay on freedom of speech, “On Liberty,” John Stuart Mill makes a 
powerful argument in favor of this fundamental freedom – Mill chooses to emphasize freedom of 
speech because he believes it is the liberty from which all others spring.  And freedom of speech, 
for Mill, is not merely the ability to verbalize one’s thoughts and opinions without external 
restraint; rather, it also contains the ability to think unreservedly.  Mill supports this understanding 
of freedom of speech from the beginning of his essay, “On Liberty,” when he introduces “the 
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Liberty of Thought: from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of 
writing” in the final paragraph of the introduction.507 
It is important to note, however, that although “On Liberty” is Mill’s most famous and oft-
quoted essay on freedom of speech, it is not sufficient to appeal solely to that work when trying to 
understand Mill’s views on the subject.  While that essay is his most forceful and direct treatment 
of the subject, “On Liberty” also represents what was perhaps a unique and controversial moment 
in Mill’s thought.  In On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill, Gertrude 
Himmlefarb suggests that there may actually have been two Mills: the Mill from “On Liberty” and 
the “other Mill.”508  The Mill of “On Liberty,” she argues, was strongly influenced by Harriet 
Taylor’s more radically liberal views.  The other Mill was perhaps less optimistic about a liberty in 
which all are all “pursuing their own good in their own way.”  Indeed, this Mill actually rejects the 
anarchy of unqualified freedom and demands government intervention to right social wrongs. 
  While other Millian commentators have offered different explanations for the discrepancies 
between “On Liberty” and his other works, most agree that “On Liberty” is somewhat exceptional 
in its liberalism.509  Thus, in order to most accurately represent Mill’s political thought, it is 
important to look, not only at “On Liberty,” but also at his writings as a whole.  And when his 
works are examined in their entirety, one finds that Mill is not only someone who is deeply 
concerned with the individual and the political, but he also has a strong conception of the social.  
Indeed, even in “On Liberty,” it is the acts of speaking and writing—both of which are inherently 
social—that Mill chooses to highlight.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 Mill, “On Liberty,” pp. 19. 
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509 See, for example, Isaiah Berlin, “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life,” in Four Essays on 
Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Joseph Hamburger, “Individuality and Moral 
Reform: The Rhetoric of Liberty and the Reality of Restrain in Mill’s On Liberty,” in Political 
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In this section, I explore Mill’s theory of the social in relation to freedom of speech.  I begin 
by presenting an overview of Mill’s theory of freedom of speech, with an emphasis on the 
limitations that he places upon that liberty.  I then challenge traditional readings of Mill that 
emphasize the role of political, public speech in his theory.  While I agree that Mill aims to protect 
such speech on the basis of its potential contribution to social progress, I suggest that social 
speech also has a place in his theory.  Namely, not only does social speech serve as an 
important venue for the discovery of truth, but it also contributes to the process of creating good 
citizens.  In both ways, social speech is able to impel society towards progress, which is, indeed, 
Mill’s standard for determining what speech merits protection. 
To begin, Mill considers the ability to express oneself openly and unabashedly to be a 
fundamental trait of human existence.  To communicate and share ideas with others is a major 
element in his image of the good life.  However, Mill does not justify his theory of speech on the 
grounds that it is what makes people happiest.  Rather, he values freedom of speech primarily 
because he believes that a free and open sphere of communication is essential to the discovery 
of truth and the social progress that results from that endeavor.  
As Mill explains, truth can only be discovered if new ideas are generated and allowed to 
enter into a public forum, where they will be debated, picked apart and tested against existing 
dogma.  Through this process, new truths are discovered and accepted, and old falsehoods are 
rejected.  Thus, legal censorship is especially problematic for Mill because he believes that all 
speech is potentially valuable.  First, he argues that it is impossible to know with certainty that any 
opinion is untrue.510  To silence an idea is “an assumption of infallibility,” and no matter how 
intelligent or powerful a person may be, she can never be absolutely sure that she is correct.  
Thus, it is better to err on the safe side, and allow the expression of all opinions.511  Second, Mill 
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511 Ibid., pp. 22. 
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points out that, even if an opinion is not entirely true, it may contain part of the truth.512  Indeed, 
he seems to think that this is most often the case with “popular opinions, on subjects not palpable 
to sense.”513  Such ideas, he argues “are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth.  They 
are part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, 
and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited.”514  The 
existence of even the tiniest morsel of truth, however, is enough to make an idea valuable to Mill.  
And it is only “by the collision of adverse opinions,” that these partial truths can be revealed.  
Third, Mill argues that freedom of speech is important because even a true opinion will lose some 
of its value, becoming a mere prejudice, if it is not subjected to open questioning.515   
Even entirely false ideas have a place in Mill’s struggle to discover truth.  Not only are 
individuals more likely to abandon erroneous beliefs when they are subjected to an open 
exchange of ideas, but they also help to secure good ideas.  By forcing others to reexamine and 
reaffirm their beliefs in the process of debate, false ideas ensure that truth does not decline into 
mere dogma.  It is not enough for Mill that one hold an unexamined belief that happens to be true; 
one must understand why the belief in question is the true one. 
This is especially important for Mill, who, at the time of his writing, worried that his 
Victorian contemporaries had become complacent, unquestioning followers of traditions and 
custom.  And for Mill, there was no worse situation than when people have stopped exploring and 
questioning the world around them.  Thus, he adds a final justification in favor of freedom of 
speech – discussion helps ensure that the truth remains vital.  “And not only this,” he argues, “but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512 “Secondly, though that silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain 
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whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any 
chance of being supplied” (Ibid., pp. 59).  
513 Ibid., pp. 52. 
514 Ibid. 
515 “Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered 
to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, 
be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds” 
(Ibid., pp. 59). 
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fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and 
deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal 
profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any 
real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.”516  Those ideas that are held 
to be sacrosanct and are never questioned become dogmas.  As a result, their meaning is lost.  
Freedom of speech must exist, Mill claims, in order to ensure that all ideas are constantly 
questioned and revisited. 
Thus, to silence even one person, Mill argues, is to do a disservice to all – the speaker, 
as well as the rest of society.  As he famously writes in “On Liberty,” “[i]f all mankind minus one, 
were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no 
more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in 
silencing mankind.”517 
It is important not to mistake Mill’s enthusiasm for freedom of speech with a belief in the 
inherent value of all speech, however.  Freedom of speech may be important, but it is not an 
inalienable human right for Mill.  Kendall explains that the idea “of a ‘right to freedom of speech, a 
capacity on the part of every man to say what he pleases that society must respect, because he 
is entitled to it—of a right that men have to live in the kind of society that Mill projects—is a later 
development.  It occurs in different countries for different reasons and under different auspices; 
but to the extent that it is intended seriously it represents a complete break with Mill.”518  As 
stated above, even in “On Liberty,” Mill only presents a consequentialist argument in favor of the 
principle of free speech:  Freedom of speech is not a good in itself; rather, it is a good principle in 
that it enables society to achieve valuable ends.  In other words, Mill claims that societies ought 
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518 Kendall, “The ‘Open Society’ and its Fallacies,” pp. 976. 
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to embrace this liberty, not for its own sake, but more importantly, because he believes that the 
free and open exchange of ideas is necessary to achieve social progress.  
This logic leads to a significant exception in Mill’s theory:  If free speech is justified on the 
basis that it leads to social progress, then the principle should only apply to that speech, which 
furthers this goal.  And a close examination of Mill’s body of work suggests that he actually 
imagined a wide realm of communication that did not merit free speech protection.   
For example, Mill argues that censorship may be justified when speech violates his Harm 
Principle, which states: “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, 
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.  That the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not 
sufficient warrant.”519  However, because harm is so contingent upon context, this caveat can be 
made to apply to any virtually any speech.520  Take, for instance, Mill’s example of the corn-dealer 
critics.521  When they are merely expressing their ideas, they are behaving legitimately; when 
those same ideas are expressed pointedly and in order to incite an angry mob, however, the 
speakers have crossed a line and no longer have claims to protection.  Thus, for Mill, speech’s 
immunity from censorship largely depends on the way it is perceived. 
Mill’s intellectually snobbish tendencies also tend to limit the scope of his theory of 
freedom of speech.  Despite his grand rhetoric about the importance of freedom for all in “On 
Liberty,” there are also more restrictive, elitist themes that permeate his theory of freedom of 
speech.  Indeed, Mill believes that, for the majority of people, to be free does not necessarily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 Mill, “On Liberty,” pp. 14. 
520 See Nancy J. Hirschmann, Class, Gender, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008):  “Mill takes a conceptual approach to freedom, 
even in his central liberty of thought and expression.  That is, because of the ways in which 
expression can lead to action, the context of speech is important.  ‘Even opinions lose their 
immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their 
expression as positive instigation of some mischievous act’” ( pp. 223).  
521 Mill, “On Liberty,” pp. 62. 
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equate to participation in any communicative endeavors; rather, for the average individual, a 
central aspect of freedom is the ability and desire to be guided by one’s superiors.  In his January 
9th, 1831 essay, “The Spirit of the Age,” Mill argues that society is constantly “enlarging the stock 
of the truth.”522  But this is only because the wisest men of each age are able to build upon the 
knowledge gleaned by the wisest men of previous ages.523  Note that he credits intellectual elites 
with progress, and not society as a whole.  Mill argues that, because “the multitude (by which I 
mean the majority of all ranks)” are only capable of reflexively accept the truths of their age, they 
do not benefit from the knowledge that was developed before their time.524  Thus, they are no 
closer to understanding truth than the inhabitants of previous ages.  To the extent that the 
masses are closer to truth, “it is only in so far as they are guided and influenced by the authority 
of the wisest among them.”525 
This means that the pursuit of progress is not just about promoting freedom of speech for 
the geniuses, so that they might explore ideas – it is also about developing a population that can 
accept genius.  “Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they have always 
done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few,” Mill 
explains.526  “The initiation of all wise or noble things, comes and must come from some 
individual.  The honour and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that 
initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes 
open.”527  Mill believed that one of the problems of the age in which he lived was that people had 
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of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXII – Newspaper Writings December 1822-July 1831 Part I, Ann 
Robson and John Robson (eds.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986). Available at 
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524 Ibid. 
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526 Mill, “On Liberty,” pp. 74. 
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lost the ability or willingness to follow leaders.528  Either the majority of people did not have the 
natural propensity to follow their superiors (opting to join in the tyranny of the majority instead), or 
society was simply lacking in good leaders. 
Even in “On Liberty,” a careful reading reveals hints that Mill does not actually mean for 
everyone to be equally free to speak. “Genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of 
freedom,” he writes.529  “Persons of genius are, ex vi termini, more individual than other people—
less capable, consequently, of fitting themselves, without harmful compression, into any of the 
small number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the trouble of 
forming their own character.”530  As Hirschmann points out, if Mill believes that “people of genius 
are ‘more individual,’ then average men and women must be less so, and ignorant laborers even 
less.”531  Because the more individual (eccentric) people are likely to contribute disproportionately 
to the discovery of truth, it appears that freedom of speech is more important for elites than the 
people at large. 
It is important to note, however, that Mill’s elitism is not based on any ideas of inherent 
inferiority based on ascriptive characteristics (e.g. race or sex).  On the contrary, Mill argues that 
everyone, in principle, has the potential to contribute to intelligent discourse.  But despite this 
theoretical equality, Mill believes that circumstances and cultural influences can cause people to 
develop in ways that may prevent many from attaining their intellectual potential.  In other words, 
despite their capacity for intelligence, Mill argues, he does not believe that “the body of the 
people… will ever have sufficient opportunities of study and experience, to become themselves 
familiarly conversant with all the inquiries which lead to truths by which it is good that they should 
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regulate their conduct, and to receive into their own minds the whole of the evidence from which 
those truths have been collected, which is necessary for their establishment.”532   
And as far as Mill is concerned, this is an acceptable state of affairs.  While it might be 
nice if all people were capable of deep philosophical thought, such a society would be 
unsustainable, he argues.  The world needs laborers, and people who must work are not going to 
have the time to experience the world or study logic – at best, they will learn as much as they can 
about their own existence.  So while “it is right that every man should attempt to understand his 
interest and his duty… [and] that he should follow his reason as far as his reason will carry him, 
and cultivate the faculty as highly as possible… reason itself will teach most men that they must, 
in the last resort, fall back upon the authority of still more cultivated minds, as the ultimate 
sanction of the convictions of their reason itself.”533  In other words, people should know their 
places.  Those who do not have the opportunity to adequately develop their mental acuity should 
learn, instead, how to listen to the intellectual betters. 
 These elitist elements do not necessarily threaten Mill’s conception of freedom of 
speech—since no one can know ahead of time who will be the geniuses, Mill generally insists 
that it is best to err on the side of caution and allow a wide range of free speech—but they do 
suggest that Mill may not have been quite as liberal as he is often portrayed to be.  Whereas the 
libertarian reading of Mill’s arguments for freedom of speech paints that freedom as nearly 
absolute, even in “On Liberty,” Mill does not present himself as a champion of all speech.  He 
does not defend free speech at all costs, but, again, only that speech, which is likely to further the 
goal of social progress.   
In practice, this limitation is often understood to mean that Mill’s freedom of speech is 
only meant to apply to traditionally political speech that takes place in a public forum.  After all, if 
the goal of free speech is to push society forward, it would make sense that that speech, which 
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concerns issues of public importance and takes place between political actors, ought to merit 
protection.  And certainly, I do not mean to argue that this prevailing interpretation of Mill’s theory 
of free speech is incorrect.  For the most part, those who argue that Mill was primarily concerned 
with speech between public figures and about political issues can and do find a compelling case 
within “On Liberty.”  In this essay, Mill clearly does appear to privilege public, political speech.  
And when one considers Mill’s more conservative writings on speech (i.e. his 1825 Westminster 
Review article and his “Spirit of the Age” essays of the 1830’s, in which he frets over the negative 
consequences of a freedom of speech open to all), Mill also appears to profess a lack of faith in 
the common man.534   
Nevertheless, I do mean to show that there is more to Mill’s theory of freedom of speech 
than the protection of political, public speech, which is typically emphasized.  Specifically, I argue 
that, when Mill’s theory of freedom of speech is read in conjunction with his theory of the social, it 
creates an impression of a philosopher who deeply valued and respected the political power of 
social communication.  Mill believes that, by both serving as a mechanism through which truth is 
discovered, and also by influencing the development of character traits that may encourage good 
citizenship, social speech has an important role to play in the push towards social progress.  As 
such, it merits special consideration under his theory of freedom of speech.  For the remainder of 
this section, I explore these two functions of social speech.  First, I revisit Mill’s argument for 
freedom of speech on the basis that it is necessary for the discovery of truth, in order to show that 
social speech is a necessary element of that process.  Second, I review Mill’s theory of social 
constructivism in order to explain how social interactions and pressures may come to shape the 
character traits that define good citizenship.  
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and rather than furthering the advance of truth, it was seen as hindering, as often as not, the 
acquisition of truth and, still more, of wisdom” (On Liberty and Liberalism, pp. 41). 
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Mill believes that the discovery of truth is necessarily a social endeavor, as evidenced by 
his emphasis on the importance of communication in attaining that goal.  Certainly, new ideas 
come from individuals, but idea formation is not a wholly personal activity; rather, it is the result of 
social connections.  Exposure to the arguments of others enables a person to truly reflect on her 
own belief system and experiences, bolstering correct ideas and revising those that are proven 
wrong.535  According to Mill, this is because events and thoughts can only be rightly interpreted 
through discussions with others.  “He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and 
experience,” Mill explains.536  “Not by experience alone.  There must be discussion, to show how 
experience is to be interpreted.  Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and 
argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it.  
Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning.”537  A 
life lived in isolation from the opinions of others renders the proper development of ideas 
impossible. 
This is the case in the political realm, but it is also true for more informal, social 
conversations.  Even in a person’s most intimate affairs, it is difficult for her to make good 
decisions when she has no other advice or perspectives from which to draw than her own.  As 
Mill explains, “it is also a maxim of experience, that in the multitude of counselors there is 
wisdom; and that a man seldom judges right, even in his own concerns, still less in those of the 
public, when he makes habitual use of no knowledge but his own, or that of some single 
advisor.”538  Experience and private reflection simply are not enough for an individual to make 
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536 Mill, “On Liberty,” pp. 24-25. 
537 Ibid., pp. 25. 
538 John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,” in On Liberty and Other 
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sense of her experiences.  It is through social speech that she comes to understand the world 
and move human knowledge forward in the discovery of truth. 
But that is not the only reason why social speech is important for Mill.  Mill suspects that, 
even in eras of intellectual stagnation, there will always be those geniuses who thrive and push 
forward the development of new ideas.  He writes:  “There have been, and may again be great 
individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery.  But there never has been, nor 
ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people.”539  The problem, when people 
are not encouraged to freely and openly express their thoughts and opinions, is not just that new 
ideas will be slow coming, but that, without these social interactions, the average citizen will not 
develop the kind of active character necessary for good governance and social progress.   
Mill believes that humans are social beings.  As he explains in “Utilitarianism,” mankind is 
naturally imbued with “the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a 
powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, 
even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilization.”540  As a result of 
this desire, people tend to want to engage with one another.  And as a social constructivist, Mill 
believes that one’s interactions with others ultimately have profound effects on her individual 
development. 
Indeed, Mill’s understanding of the social is closely intertwined with his concept of 
individualism.  The one cannot exist without the other, and individuals are constantly being 
shaped by their social circumstances while they are, at the same time, shaping those same 
structures.  As Karen Zivi explains in her essay, “Cultivating Character: John Stuart Mill and the 
Subject of Rights,” “Mill never conceived of the individual as completely extractable or isolatable 
from society.  To attribute such a concept of the subject to Mill… is to miss his recognition that 
individuals are never purely willing or self-interested, but are, rather, constituted through social 
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networks and thus vulnerable to both the positive and negative influences of society.”541  In other 
words, Mill argues that an individual’s relationship to the whole affects the kind of person that she 
will become.  It is through interpersonal interactions that people learn and develop the character 
traits that define them as individuals.542   
In “The Subjection of Women,” for example, Mill provides an account of how people are 
socialized into fitting their social positions.543  Through exposure to societal expectations and 
norms—as well as formal education—Mill shows how women, in particular, may come to see 
themselves as the intellectual, moral and physical inferiors of men.544  Women do not just believe 
this, but they also internalize these expectations, becoming exactly what the world expects them 
to be.545  Thus, women are both produced by and reproducers of the social arrangements they 
were born into.  As Hirschmann explains, for Mill, “[t]he average woman has so internalized the 
tyranny of ‘common public opinion’ as to be its ‘auxiliary’; the critical and analytical abilities that 
might allow her to see through it have atrophied so atrociously (if they were ever developed at all) 
that she seems incapable of even questioning, let alone rejecting, it.”546  
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Journal of Political Science. Vol. 50, No. 1 (January, 2006), pp. 52. 
542 See Bruce J. Baum, “J. S. Mill on Freedom and Power,” in Polity, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Winter, 
1998). 
543 John Stuart Mill, “The Subjection of Women,” in On Liberty and Other Essays. John Gray (ed.) 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 225. 
544 “A dominant theme in ‘The Subjection of Women’ is that women are how and who they are 
because of a patriarchal culture that made them.  Restraints on liberty can thus come from the 
very structure of society itself, which can both limit and enhance capacities; and it can prevent 
people not only from acting on certain desires but from having such desires in the first place” 
(Hirschmann, The Subject of Liberty, pp. 62). 
545 Mill argues that these social constructs ultimately harm, not only women, but men as well.  As 
he explains, conflict and discussion are necessary for people to fully develop their mental and 
moral capacities.  When women are not the equals of men, men are not challenged within their 
homes, and they begin to deteriorate:  “Even a really superior man almost always begins to 
deteriorate when he is habitually (as the phrase is) king of his company: and in his most habitual 
company the husband who has a wife inferior to him is always so” (Mill, “The Subjection of 
Women,” pp. 574). 
546 Hirschmann, The Subject of Liberty, pp. 63. 
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And as Mill explains, everything that an individual does contributes to this process of 
personal and societal development.  As he writes in A System of Logic, “our mental states, and 
our mental capacities and susceptibilities, are modified, either for a time or permanently, by every 
thing which happens to us in life.”547  Thus, Mill clearly means to include all interactions—even 
the most intimate experiences of the social sphere—among those that shape individual identity.  
Indeed, his statements on moral reprobation suggest that Mill believes that one’s social 
relationships not only can, but ought to be actively utilized to positively impact the moral 
development of her character.548   
Throughout his writings, Mill argues that there is only so much that the law should 
proscribe – thoughts, opinions and self-regarding actions are generally off limits.  This does not 
mean, however, that Mill believes that a poor moral character and the actions that are reflected 
by it ought to be left alone.  As he explains in “Utilitarianism,” “the idea of penal sanction, which is 
the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but also into that of any kind of 
wrong.  We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be 
punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if 
not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.”549  In other words, to call someone 
wrong is to admit that she ought to be punished in some way.  When that wrong takes the form of 
a moral failing, and it is therefore inappropriate for the state to act, it is up to the social sphere to 
provide sanctions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547 Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles 
of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, 8th Ed (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
Publishers, 1882), pp. 1048. Available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/27942/27942-pdf.pdf 
548 “Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and 
encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter.  They should be for ever stimulating 
each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings 
and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and 
contemplations” (Mill, “On Liberty,” pp. 84). 
549 Mill, “Utilitarianism,” pp. 184. 
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This principle of the social enforcement of morality can also be found in “On Liberty.”  As 
Mill explains, acts that are injurious to others (i.e. “[e]ncroachment on their rights; infliction on 
them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; falsehood or duplicity in dealing with 
them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence from defending 
them against injury”) merit, if not always moral retribution and punishment, at least moral 
reprobation.550  Going even further, Mill argues that it is “not only these acts, but the dispositions 
which lead to them, [that] are properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may lead 
to abhorrence.”551  Thus, Mill believes that individuals should be punished in the social sphere for 
any number of asocial (or wicked) character traits, including cruelty, spite, envy, greed, vanity, 
etc.552 
This desire for social punishment does not come out of any spitefulness or vengeance on 
Mill’s part; rather, he argues that people should be socially chastised for their moral failures so 
that they might improve themselves.  Mill believes that social pressures are an extremely 
powerful and effective force—even more so that state actions—in compelling individuals to 
modify their behaviors.553  Even the mere threat of social sanctions is often enough to impact the 
way that an individual chooses to live her life.  As Mill explains, most people are afraid of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 Mill, “On Liberty,” pp. 87.  “When… a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable 
obligation to any other person or persons,” he writes, “the case is taken out of the self-regarding 
class and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term” (Ibid., pp. 
90). 
551 Ibid., pp. 87. 
552 “Cruelty of disposition; malice and ill nature; that most anti-social and odious of all passions, 
envy; dissimulation and insincerity; irascibility on sufficient cause, and resentment 
disproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineering over others; the desire to engross 
more than one’s share of advantages…; the pride which derives gratification from the abasement 
of others; the egotism which thinks self and its concerns are more important than everything else, 
and decides all doubtful questions in its own favor;—these are moral vices, and constitute a bad 
and odious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are not 
properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness” 
(Ibid.). 
553 “Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of 
right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social 
tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld 
by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into 
the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself” (Ibid., pp. 8-9). 
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experiencing the displeasure of their social peers, and will actively avoid it if they are aware how 
to do so.  “Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, 
and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order,” Mill writes, “and since this judgment 
and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it 
beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself.”554  In other 
words, by simply laying out societal expectations, a community can generally ensure that its 
members will try to adopt and conform to them, whether consciously or unconsciously.  Thus, 
communication in the social sphere significantly influences individual moral character. 
And by shaping the morality of individuals, interactions in the social sphere also 
necessarily impact the development of good citizenship.  Indeed, Mill admits as much in “The 
Subjection of Women,” when he writes that the family—the original social community—acts as 
the first school of citizenship:  “The family, justly constituted, would be the real school of the 
virtues of freedom… It will always be a school of obedience for the children, of command for the 
parents.  What is needed is, that it should be a school of sympathy in equality, of living together in 
love, without power on one side or obedience on the other.”  In this passage, not only does Mill 
claim that the family unit is a primary forum for learning the rules of citizenship, but he also 
suggests that this social institution might be structured in ways that encourage character traits 
that are more conducive to good republican citizenship.555  
It is important to remember that Mill is not simply engaged in a descriptive pursuit, but a 
normative one as well.556  As he explains in A System of Logic, the science of ethology should not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 Ibid., pp. 86. 
555 For a more elitist reading of Mill’s views on education, see Maurice Cowling, Mill and 
Liberalism, Second Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
556 See George R. Wright, “A Rationale from J. S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause,” in The 
Supreme Court Review, Vol. 1985 (1985), pp. 149-178:  “The end is social progress through 
individual character development.  Without suggesting, of course, that good character should 
generally be legally enforced, Mill believed that character could be better or worse, higher or 
lower, and his approach to free speech is inseparable from this assumption” (pp. 158); See also 
Zivi, “Cultivating Character”:  “His point is less to construct impermeable barriers between 
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only look at how characters are formed, but should also attempt to show how to build the kinds of 
citizens that serve social ends:  “When the circumstances of an individual or of a nation are in any 
considerable degree under our control, we may, by our knowledge of tendencies, be enabled to 
shape those circumstances in a manner much more favorable to the ends we desire, than the 
shape which they would of themselves assume.  This is the limit of our power; but within this limit 
the power is a most important one.”557  The circumstances to which Mill refers in this passage are 
varied, but he would certainly agree that social arrangements can and should be manipulated in 
order to create good citizens.   
One way that Mill thinks social institutions can be structured to encourage good 
citizenship is by promoting an atmosphere of free speech.  As Harry Clor explains, “[w]hat is most 
interesting about Mill’s case is the centrality of its concern for the development of human 
character; the crux of the argument is that liberty promotes better human beings.”558  A standard 
of freedom of speech, Mill believes, encourages individuals to communicate with one another in 
the social sphere, thus enabling them to cultivate characters that are active, inquisitive, 
thoughtful, rational and willing to speak up against authority and custom.559  Free and open social 
speech also encourages mental acuity and intellectual curiosity, both of which are highly valued 
by Mill.560  And, of course, all of these character traits are not only goods in themselves, but they 
are also necessary for citizens to possess if they are to engage in the discovery of truth and the 
push towards social progress that Mill aims for.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
individuals and society than it is to distinguish the kinds of social arrangements that may retard 
individual development from those that might cultivate character more favorably” (pp. 54). 
557 Mill, A System of Logic, pp. 1055. 
558 Harry M. Clor, “Mill and Millians on Liberty and Moral Character,” in The Review of Politics. 
Vol. 47, No. 1 (January, 1985), pp. 4. 
559 See Andrew Valls, “Self-Development and the Liberal State: The Cases of John Stuart Mill 
and Wilhelm Humboldt,” in The Review of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 253. 
560 As Hirschmann explains, Mill “loathes the mediocre masses who conform to common opinion 
and fail to think for themselves, for this makes way for the antithesis of individual liberty, namely 
the tyranny of the majority” (Hirschmann, The Subject of Liberty, pp. 63-64). 
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Freedom of speech in the social sphere does not only create citizens that are likely to be 
good at accessing truth, however.  Just as importantly, Mill believes that these communicative 
interactions ultimately encourage individuals to become compassionate, unselfish and interested 
in protecting the greater good.  By engaging with others at a social level, he explains, individuals 
come to associate their own interests with the interests of the community.  
So long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with those of others; there is at 
least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests.  Not only 
does all the strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each 
individual a stronger personal interests in practically consulting the welfare of others; it 
also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an 
even greater degree of practical consideration for it.  He comes, as though instinctively, 
to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others.  The good of 
others becomes a thing to him naturally and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the 
physical conditions of our existence.561  
Thus, individuals who engage in social speech become the kinds of good republican citizens who 
act and think in terms of the collective good, not just their own immediate, individualistic whims.   
And this is extremely important to Mill’s conception of morality.  Mill considers selfishness 
to be one of the greatest human vices, and relates it to the lower pleasures.  An association 
between one’s individual good and the good of all, on the other hand, is Mill’s standard for utility:  
“[T]he utilitarian standard… is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of 
happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the 
happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the 
world in general is immensely a gainer by it.”562  In other words, when an individual values the 
good of others above her own, overall happiness in the world increases.  And although it may not, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 Mill, “Utilitarianism,” pp. 165. 
562 Ibid., pp. 142. 
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in every instance, increase the happiness of the individual who may be sacrificing her immediate 
wants for the good of the community, Mill does seem to think that it will contribute to that 
individual’s ability to be happy in the long run.563  
Furthermore, not only is a community-minded attitude good for the moral health of the 
individual, but it also highly conducive to good republican governance.  As Mill explains in 
“Considerations on Representative Government,” a successful polity depends on the virtuosity of 
its citizens.  “If we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good government in all its 
senses, from the humblest to the most exalted, depends,” he writes, “we find that the principle of 
them, the one which transcends all others, is the qualities of the human beings composing the 
society over which the government is exercised.”564 When a state contains good citizens, who 
value the good of all, it can rest assured that those individuals will make political choices that 
benefit its long-term success.  
Thus, Mill believed that it was extremely important—not only to the individual, but also to 
the state—to cultivate republican virtue and combat selfishness among citizens.  In fact, as 
Joseph Hamburger explains, “[s]o great was his wish to stamp out selfishness that the 
achievement of moral reform coexisted with and sometimes superseded individual liberty.”565  
And it was as part of this endeavor that Mill developed his theory of freedom of speech.   
In sum, Mill’s statements on the social can be used to enhance the theory of freedom of 
speech that he presents in “On Liberty.”  It may be true that public, political speech makes the 
most obvious contribution to progress and the public good by advancing the search for political 
truths, but it is difficult to say that social speech does not also contribute to this process.  
Furthermore, as I explain, the pursuit of truth is not the primary Millian justification for freedom of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 In “Utilitarianism,” Mill states that people need two things to be happy: 1) a feeling of 
community and 2) mental cultivation.  Both of these goods can only be fully achieved through 
social interactions.  See ibid., pp. 144-145. 
564 Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,” pp. 225. 
565 Joseph Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), pp. 133. 
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speech.  Freedom of speech is important to Mill in that it promotes social progress.  To the extent 
that social speech not only contributes to the pursuit of truth, but also helps individuals develop 
the character traits that make for good citizens (i.e. inquisitiveness, compassion, selflessness, 
etc.), it serves an important role in achieving that end.  
 
IV. Conclusion: 
In this chapter, I have explored the two most oft-quoted classical theorists of freedom of 
expression, and the so-called fathers of the Anglo-American free speech tradition: John Milton 
and John Stuart Mill.  I have shown that, while both theorists certainly do value political speech 
about public ends, they both also have a clear understanding of the political implications of 
informal, social communication.   
In “Areopagitica,” Milton argues that freedom from prior restraint in publishing is 
necessary because it leads to the development of good character.  People must have the 
opportunity to confront both good and evil ideas in order for them to be able to freely choose the 
good, and thus be considered truly virtuous.  Milton suggests that this may occur in any and all 
spheres of human interaction, including (and perhaps especially) the social.  Likewise, it is 
evident throughout Mill’s work that he views the social as inextricably entwined with both 
individual and political development.  It is through social interaction and communication, Mill 
argues, that we both discover truth and also cultivate good citizenship characteristics.  By 
engaging in free and open speech in civil society individuals develop character traits (i.e. 
intellectual curiosity, distrust of authority and assertiveness) which encourages them to think and 
act in ways that promote social progress.  They also learn to see the common good and to 
identify their own good with that of the community.  This selfless, community-minded mentality is 
a vital element of any functioning republic. 
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Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, as contemporary theorists of 
speech have taken up Milton and Mill’s writings, their references to social communication have 
often been lost or overlooked.  Specifically, deliberative democratic and legal theory tend to utilize 
Milton and Mill to emphasize the importance of public, political speech while (explicitly or 
implicitly) diminishing the role of social speech.  Orthodox deliberative democrats restrict 
themselves to studying only that speech, which achieves deliberative ends.  Although deliberative 
democratic theories vary considerably, they all share a vision of deliberation that emphasizes 
values such as rationality, perfect information, politeness, public significance and a shared goal of 
consensus.  As these traits are, by and large, uncharacteristic of social speech, such theories 
rarely explicitly address the everyday, casual conversations that define most human interaction.  
Similarly, legal theorists fail to consider social speech to the extent that they tend to limit their 
interest to communication that either encourages democratic self-governance or that which will 
bring about truth and progress.  As a result, they overlook social interactions and focus on those 
speech activities that clearly engage issues of public importance. 
This does not necessarily need to be the case, however.  In Chapter Five, I will draw from 
the social aspects of Milton and Mill’s theories—as well as numerous other sources in philosophy, 
psychology, communications, etc.—in order to develop my own political theory of social speech.   
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CHAPTER 5 
	  
A THEORY OF SOCIAL SPEECH: THE FOUR MECHANISMS THAT TRANSFORM 
EVERYDAY TALK INTO POLITICAL ACTION 
	  
“The greater the multiplicity of small affairs, the more do men, even without knowing it, acquire 
facility in prosecuting great undertakings in common.” 
-­‐ Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. II566 
“Can a group that comes together initially sharing only jokes and consumer takes ever become 
an incubator of citizenship, of the sort that Aristotle and de Tocqueville described?  There is good 
reason to think so...” 
-­‐ Nina Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics567 
 
As I have explained in the previous chapters, despite their reliance upon modern 
theorists who espouse the political value of social interactions and communication (i.e. John 
Milton and John Stuart Mill), deliberative democratic theorists and American legal theorists have 
mostly ignored or discounted day-to-day, informal conversation when developing their 
justifications for freedom of speech.  The result has been an overall weakening of these theories.  
Not only do deliberative democratic and American legal theories fail to represent the empirical 
realities of speech, but they also miss out on the political implications of an entire sphere of 
communication – social speech. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America: Volume II, Henry Reeve (trans.) (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1899), pp. 602. 
567 Eliasoph, Avoiding politics: How Americans produce apathy in everyday life (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 87-88. 
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As I show throughout this project, casual, quotidian communications represent the 
majority—if not the entirety—of what most liberal democratic citizens understand as speech.  And 
this is not likely to change any time soon.  As technology has evolved and communicative norms 
have changed, a greater portion of communication seems to be characterized by informal, social 
speech than ever before.  Specifically, with mass communication replacing more classic models 
of face-to-face interaction, the informal, seemingly apolitical speech that is indicative of these 
high-tech social spaces has come to play a larger role in the lives of average citizens.  
Furthermore, as the distance between the least and the most advantaged Americans has 
increased in recent decades, the desire to retreat within the private and social spheres seems to 
have increased as well.  Thus, while social speech has always existed—in homes, coffee shops, 
etc.—it is becoming an increasingly dominant form of communication.  So by limiting their focus 
only to legal or political forms of speech, deliberative democratic and legal theorists ultimately end 
up excluding a great deal of human interaction.   
The failure of deliberative democratic and American legal theories of speech to 
accurately represent the full breadth of communicative experiences is not merely an empirical 
problem, however.  The lack of attention to social speech means that contemporary theories of 
speech also frequently omit what Lawrence R. Jacobs, Ray Lomax Cook and Michael X. Delli 
Carpini refer to as the “indirect effects of discursive participation on the public policy process.”568  
Too often, contemporary theorists overlook social conversation as a political force because they 
are overly focused on identifying concrete political outcomes.569  But there are other, more subtle 
ways in which social speech can and does affect liberal democratic citizenship and political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568 Lawrence R. Jacobs, Ray Lomax Cook and Michael X. Delli Carpini, Talking Together: Public 
Deliberation and Political Participation in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2009), pp. 87. 
569 Note that social speech does often result in concrete political outcomes.  As Robert 
Wuthnow’s study of small group discussions shows, participation in informal discursive groups is 
positively correlated with an increase in time and money that an individual devotes to 
organizations committed to the issues under discussion.  See Robert Wuthnow, Sharing the 
Journey: Support Groups and America’s New Quest for Community (New York, Free Press, 
1994). 
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outcomes.  In particular, even allowing that certain aspects of identity may be genetically or 
biologically determined, one’s experiences of social speech helps to forge her political identity 
from early childhood.  This political identity then goes on to shape all of an individual’s political 
choices in life, from her interest in particular public policy issues to her willingness to participate in 
the electoral process to her conception of what constitutes her community.  Thus, not only does 
social speech facilitate or spur traditional political action and expression, but it also represents 
political action in its own right.  And by not adequately addressing social speech, many prominent 
contemporary theories of speech fail to capture the full range of political action.   
In this chapter, I seek to address these weaknesses and incoherencies by supplementing 
deliberative democratic and American legal theories of speech with my own theory of speech – 
one that addresses and incorporates that speech, which is commonly found in the social sphere.  
First, I provide a brief overview of what I mean by “speech” and, specifically, “social speech.”  
Next, I develop and expand upon my argument that, when individuals communicate in civil 
society, discussing intimate topics and areas of shared interest, they are actually serving distinct 
and valuable political ends.  Specifically, I identify and describe four interrelated mechanisms that 
connect social speech to political outcomes: 1) Informal communication is a mechanism for 
creating the kind of character traits that make better or worse democratic citizens; 2) This form of 
speech builds social capital and trust (based on mutual interests, hopes and objectives), which 
can make politics run smoother among those to whom it applies; 3) Social interactions impart 
democratic knowledge, teaching people what it means to be citizens of their particular 
communities; and 4) More than any other kind of speech, social speech ties individuals together 
emotionally and helps them build the cognitive borders of their communities.  Depending on the 
form and content of social speech, I argue, each of these mechanisms may have positive or 
negative implications for the political health of a community.  Finally, at the end of this chapter, I 
discuss two discrete advantages of a theory of social speech over those theories that focus 
primarily on political and public speech.  Namely, I argue that a theory of social speech not only 
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provides a more complete, inclusiveness picture of human communication (by including such 
forms of speech as rhetoric, testimony and story-telling), but it also able to address many of the 
problems of inequality that plague other contemporary theories of speech. 
It is important to note that I do not mean to explore social speech for its own intrinsic 
goodness.  Instead, I am primarily concerned with the way that speech—in all its forms and 
locations—can inform democracy in both positive and negative ways.  This is a goal that I share 
with many of the classical and contemporary theorists I discuss in the previous chapters. 
 
I. What is social speech? A brief review. 
As I explained in Chapter One, by speech, I am referring to all forms of conscious, 
deliberate communication, including: spoken words, written words, actions, etc.  What matters for 
this theory’s understanding of speech is that individuals are communicating and engaging with 
one another.  They are neither being talked at nor are they speaking to themselves. 
Second, by social speech, I am referring to both the content and context of speech.  
Social speech is extremely inclusive in terms of its content.  It encompasses subjects that are 
frequently considered too personal for the public sphere, and are more appropriate to casual 
conversations between friends, family, acquaintances and colleagues.  While subjects that 
directly deal with public issues may be included, social speech generally consists of more 
personal or social issues.  In other words, social speech addresses topics that are generally 
considered trivial, sentimental, emotional, etc., and may be better expressed through such forms 
as rhetoric, story-telling, etc., rather than through ideal rational deliberation. 
In terms of context, social speech is most commonly associated with civil society.  Social 
conversations occur between private individuals, and they generally take place outside of the 
traditional public sphere and formal political institutions (i.e. Congress, town halls, political 
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programs on television).  To the extent that this kind of communication does occur within the 
public sphere, it is only when political actors are interacting outside of their official capacities that 
they can be said to be engaging in social speech.570  Most often, however, when thinking about 
what constitutes social speech, one imagines the kind of interactions that take place in private, 
semi-private or social locations, such as coffee shops, sports bars, the Internet and the kitchen 
table.    
In short, social speech is how private people share their thoughts, feelings and opinions 
with one another.  It includes everything from rivals arguing over a sporting event to neighbors 
bragging to one another about their children’s latest accomplishments to strangers posting on an 
online message board to the familial advice doled out around a kitchen table.  The only 
interactions that this theory of social speech excludes are those that are most frequently studied 
by political scientists: public deliberation concerning political issues.571   
 
II. The four democratic mechanisms of social speech: 
Now that I have clarified what I mean when I refer to social speech, I turn to a discussion 
of how social speech actually influences liberal democratic citizenship and political outcomes.  As 
stated above, I have identified four related mechanisms through which, I believe, informal, 
everyday conversation not only impacts traditional political action, but also actually constitutes 
political action.  These mechanisms can be defined up as follows: 
1. Character development 
2. Social capital formation  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 However, social speech also often serves as a precursor to more traditional political actions.  
See Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003):  “World leaders meeting at a summit will frequently devote 
an initial session to getting to know one another in very much this [informal, personal] fashion, 
before they get down to the business of bargaining and exchanging” (pp. 184). 
571 See Ch. 1 for a diagram depicting social speech. 
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3. Cultural and political training 
4. Boundary forging 
While there is a significant amount of overlap between these four mechanisms, I argue that they 
each signify a unique and discrete function of social speech.  Mechanism #1: Character 
development, for instance, refers to social speech’s ability to influence and breed character traits 
that make for better or worse liberal democratic citizens.  On the other hand, Mechanism #2: 
Social capital formation concerns the tendency of social speech to establish conditions of social 
capital and trust within a community.  And Mechanism #3: Cultural and political training refers to 
the training in one’s unique political culture that takes place when an individual engages in social 
speech.  Finally, Mechanism #4: Boundary forging refers to the effect that social speech has on 
construction of boundaries between imagined communities. 
 In this section, I introduce and elaborate upon each of these four mechanisms.  I pay 
particular attention to the ways by which each mechanism may result in either a positive or a 
negative impact on liberal democratic citizenship and political outcomes, depending on the form 
and content of social speech.  Later, in Chapter Six, I apply this framework to three examples of 
social speech in order to illustrate how these mechanisms function in real world conditions.    
 
A. Mechanism #1: Character development 
It is important to remember that character is not stagnant and it is not developed in a 
vacuum.  Rather, as an individual goes through life, her character is in a state of constant 
evolution, responding and adapting to her relationships with others and her lived experiences.  In 
other words, human beings are socially constructed – they develop their individual personalities 
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largely as the result of their interactions with the world around them.572  And as verbal animals, 
many of these formative human interactions take place through speech.  As the primary means 
through which individuals express themselves, relate to one another and formulate ideas, speech 
plays a particularly powerful role in character development.  This is true regardless of the content 
of speech or the location where it takes place.  All speech—from the most traditionally political to 
the most informal and social—is capable of leaving its mark on the characters of all those who 
engage in it.  
Social speech, however—as compared to the kind of public, political deliberation that 
usually defines theories of freedom of speech—represents an especially influential mechanism 
for character development.  This is the result of three defining characteristics of social speech: 
intimacy, inescapability and interactivity.  First, because social speech both comes from within an 
individual’s own community (involving her neighbors, peers, friends, coworkers, etc.), and also 
includes personal, private topics of conversation, it tends to be experienced as an intimate act.  
The relatively high degree of intimacy inherent in social speech means that such interactions are 
likely to result in a deeper, more profound impact on character development than more formal, 
removed expressions of traditionally political speech.  Second, social speech represents a 
constant influence, which is impossible to escape.  It can take place anywhere and at any time, 
doggedly following people throughout their daily lives.  The only way for an individual to truly 
escape the influence of social speech is for her to avoid others altogether.  But as long as she 
does engage with the community, the persistent, inescapable power of social speech will 
continue to guide the progress of her character on a daily basis.  Finally, social speech is, by 
nature, interactive (as opposed to passive), which largely accounts for its especially educative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 See Jean Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002).  As Cohen explains, this is a dynamic process, involving the interaction 
between external, social forces and internal, individual choices.  “While people do not invent the 
traditions, patterns or norms into which they are at first socialized,” she writes, “as they become 
individualized they do invent and reinvent the unity of their lives and their unique identities (of 
course in interactive, communicative processes)” (Ibid., pp. 49). 
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effects.  Unlike traditional forms of political speech, in which individuals tend to act as mere 
recipients of information, social speech encourages them to serve as active participants in the 
process of communication.  This participatory aspect of social speech makes its impact on 
character development especially potent. 
These three characteristics of social speech—intimacy, inescapabilty and interactivity—
explain why individuals tend to absorb the experience of informal, everyday conversation more 
fully than other forms of communication.  After all, building character is an inherently intimate 
task.  It goes straight to the heart of human development.  So not only are the messages that are 
expressed through social speech more enduring, but the lessons learned through participation 
also tend to be more impactful and durable.  Thus, while social speech may, at first glance, 
appear benign, it actually exerts significant influence on the characters of all those that it touches.   
Many political theorists have recognized the potential for social interactions, in particular, 
to influence individual character development.  Indeed, the social constructivist argument for 
character development—emphasizing the special role played by informal, everyday 
communication—dates at least as far back as the fathers of free speech theory: John Milton and 
John Stuart Mill.  For both Milton and Mill, however, it is not enough to simply observe that social 
interactions influence character development.  Rather, both theorists, noting this relationship, aim 
to structure institutions and social arrangements in such a way as to promote the development of 
politically advantageous character traits. 
To briefly summarize my arguments in Chapter Four, Milton and Mill argue that one’s 
character is born out of the interaction between the individual and society.  First, Milton believes 
that developing one’s character is simultaneously a private/intimate and a social experience.  
Focusing on the importance of building a “virtuous” character, he argues that people cannot learn 
virtuosity entirely on their own.  Instead, Milton claims that virtuous character traits can only be 
born out of the interaction between ordinary social activities and private reflection.  As individuals 
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respond to the stimuli and people around them, they learn to distinguish good from bad, virtuous 
from evil.  This sorting process, to the extent that it is performed correctly, is what makes a good 
person.  But in order to make these determinants, individuals must first be given the opportunity 
to expose themselves to everyday interactions and social conversations.573  Similarly, Mill 
believes that one’s character is a function of both personal and social influences.  Individuals, he 
argues, must communicate with one another in order to build the rational, active, selfless 
character traits that are necessary for a well functioning republican government aimed at social 
progress.  This is true for speech in the political realm, but it is also true for more informal 
conversations as well.  As Mill explains, even in our most intimate affairs, it is difficult for a person 
to make good decisions when she has no other advice or perspectives from which to draw than 
her own; rather, individuals need discussion in order to make the most of their lived experiences. 
While both Milton and Mill tend to focus on the positive potentialities of social interactions, 
it is important to note that neither theorist is arguing that just any social discussion will suffice for 
the purpose of developing politically advantageous character traits.  While all social speech has 
the capacity to significantly affect the personalities of those who engage in it, those effects may 
be either positive or negative from the perspective of particular political arrangements.  After all, 
certain forms of state require certain kinds of citizenries (with a prevalence of certain character 
traits) in order to function properly.  And different experiences of social speech—depending on its 
form and content—can result in different kinds of character traits, each of which may be more or 
less beneficial in an individual political context. 
  For the remainder of this section, I examine the impact of social speech on character 
development within the context of a liberal democratic state.  I show that, depending on its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
573 As I discussed in Chapter Four, at the very least, Milton’s argument against a priori censorship 
in Areopagitica indicates that he would not support efforts by the state to limit exposure to social 
communication.  If, as he claims, the free publication of books is required for individuals to 
become good people (because it exposes them to new ideas), and if everyday interactions serve 
the same purpose as books, it seems fair to conclude that Milton’s argument for freedom of 
speech should extend to the private and social spheres. 
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content and form, social speech will have a tendency to mold the personalities of those who 
engage in it in ways that may work to either the benefit or the detrimental of all members of a 
liberal democratic community.  I begin by looking at the kinds of character traits that are required 
of liberal democratic citizens in order to maintain a well functioning political system (e.g. 
confidence, courage, curiosity, etc.), and I consider the ways that a certain type of social speech 
(i.e. respectful, inclusive, encouraging social speech) can be used to help achieve these 
characteristics among ordinary individuals.  I then end this section by addressing the negative 
potentialities of social speech from the perspective of character development.  Namely, I consider 
the argument that divisive, derogatory social speech may result in character traits that are 
anathema to liberal democratic ends (e.g. aggressiveness, passivity, insecurity, etc.).  
First, however, I would like to reiterate the point that different forms of state thrive with 
different types of populaces.  In a liberal democratic state, for example, qualities such as self-
control, respect, selflessness, curiosity, engagement and a willingness to question 
authority/custom are required of citizens if they are going to be capable of and willing to properly 
perform the political functions that liberal democratic states demand of them (e.g. voting, 
protesting, providing campaign contributions).  More generally, if a liberal democratic system is to 
be successful, it must be populated by citizens that are endowed with both a Miltonian “virtuous” 
character, and also a Millian “active” character. 
As Harry M. Clor explains in Public Morality and Liberal Society: Essays on Decency, 
Law, and Pornography, personal virtuosity is necessary for liberal democracies in two ways.574  
First, because such a regime is founded upon the notion of self-governance, democratic rulers 
must expect that citizens will, at least on occasion, govern themselves.  In these instances, Clor 
argues, the regime “needs reasonable assurance that most people most of the time will be 
capable of self-control and [will be] prepared to desist from, at least, the grosser forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574 See Harry M. Clor, Public Morality and Liberal Society: Essays on Decency, Law, and 
Pornography (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996). 
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incivility.”575  In other words, before they can entrust their citizens with meaningful political power, 
liberal democratic states must be confident that they will generally behave with restraint and 
respect towards their compatriots.  Second, and “more directly political,” Clor claims that “a 
republican polity needs citizens of respectable character because vital public policies affecting 
everyone will be determined by the consent of those citizens.”576  Thus, he believes that liberal 
democratic citizens must be capable of following Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative – they 
must view one another as ends in themselves, and not simply as means to an end.577  “Our kind 
of polity depends substantially upon mutual respect among citizens,” Clor explains, “persons who 
view each other pornographically, or as mere objects and opportunities for self-gratification, are 
unfit for any sustained cooperation in the conduct of civil affairs.”578  In other words, it is not 
enough for liberal democratic citizens to be virtuous in the sense of recognizing “good” and “evil,” 
but they must also maintain a sense of republican virtue, understanding that the general welfare 
is more important than (or, more accurately, constitutive of) their private self-interests. 
Virtuousness only represents one half of good liberal democratic citizenship, however.  In 
order for individual citizens to engage in a participatory political system, they must also display an 
active character.  In his essay, “Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the 
Present,” Vincent Blasi supports this viewpoint, suggesting that successful liberal democratic 
states must possess an active citizenry, one characterized by a willingness to get involved in 
community affairs, to take risks and to question authority.579  And not only must liberal democratic 
citizens be willing to participate actively in the political process, but they must also be capable of 
doing so respectfully and effectively.  These positive character traits—which Blasi claims are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575Ibid., pp. 68. 
576 Ibid. 
577 See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor (trans.) (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
578 Clor, Public Morality and Liberal Society, pp. 68. 
579 See Vincent Blasi, “Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the 
Present,” in Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era. Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. 
Stone (eds.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 86-90.   
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developed as the consequence of living in a society that promotes a general respect for freedom 
of speech—may be useful across a wide range of political regimes, but they are especially 
necessary for liberal democratic states.  This is due to three elements of governance, he argues, 
which, while not exclusive to democratic states, are essential to their healthy functioning: 1) 
checking; 2) compromise; and 3) adaptation.580 
First, Blasi argues that democracy’s system of checks and balances, because it 
presupposes the potential for abuse by powerful actors, only works if “citizen guardians” can 
boast four active character traits: independent mindedness, distrust of authority, perseverance 
and the ability to judge on the grounds of evidence and argument.  The first two character traits—
independence of mind and distrust of authority—are important protectors against government 
abuse because “abuses can usually be rationalized, excused, or ignored by observers who are 
temperamentally inclined not to question their inertia-driven perceptions of regularity and good 
faith.”581  Citizens who are independently minded and skeptical of authority, however, are less 
likely to blindly accept the choices made by state actors.  Rather, such individuals are prone to 
vigilance and suspicion regarding government action.  When these independent, mistrustful 
democratic citizens do find that wrongdoings have occurred, it is important that they then be 
willing to speak out against the state.  That is why Blasi also suggests that perseverance is 
essential to civilian checks on government action.  “Miscreant officials seldom go quietly once 
their transgressions are brought to light,” Blasi explains.582  In order to affect changes against 
corruption, citizens must be willing and able to fight persistently and tirelessly against those in 
power, many of who may have considerable resources available to them in order to protect their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580 In addition to these three “collective endeavors”—checking, compromise and adaptation—
Blasi identifies three other capacities that are specifically necessary for the proper functioning of 
democratic states: 1) willingness to participate in collective acts; 2) responsibility for social 
outcomes; and 3) collective energy, resilience and aspiration.  Each of these essential democratic 
traits, Blasi argues, stems from the “ethic of distrust” that speech tends to foster.  See Ibid., pp. 
90. 
581 Ibid., pp. 87. 
582 Ibid. 
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position.  They must also be able to appeal to the rationality of their fellow citizens.  As Blasi 
writes, “a populace accustomed to judging on grounds of evidence and argument rather than 
preconception or loyalty is more likely to heed the whistleblower.”583  Again, when citizens are 
trained to blindly follow their political leaders, they are less likely to take note of rebellious voices.   
Second, Blasi highlights the role that compromise plays in achieving collective ends 
within a democratic state, and argues that it takes a certain kind of citizen to accept and work 
within such a cooperative system of governance.  When citizens lack hopefulness, self-
confidence, and a sense of perspective, democratic compromise is unachievable.  “[C]ompromise 
is built on hopes,” Blasi explains.  “It is easier to stay engaged, to find value in that half a loaf, if 
tomorrow may bring change for the better.”584  He also adds that compromise tends to be 
contingent upon “the self-confidence and sense of perspective of those who are asked to settle 
for less.”585  Those who lack these traits are less capable of achieving meaningful compromise 
with others.  And where the ability to compromise effectively is lacking, such individuals are often 
unable to properly negotiate their differences.  This may promote feelings of resentfulness of 
alienation, resulting in serious negative repercussions for the democratic well being of all.586   
Third, Blasi emphasizes the importance of liberal democratic citizens having a “dynamic 
frame of reference” and a general receptivity to change in order to be adaptable to changing 
circumstances.587  Good judgment and creativity are also essential when navigating a rapidly 
changing environment.  Indeed, in a constantly evolving world, “heavy reliance on tradition or 
authority” will only get an individual so far; instead, “[w]hat is needed is perceptiveness, boldness, 
independence of mind, the willingness to experiment, flexibility—in short, the capacity to make 
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584 Ibid., pp. 88. 
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
587 Ibid., pp. 88. 
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choices.”588  And while an easy adaptability is useful for members of all political states, Blasi 
claims that the ability to adapt easily is especially necessary of democratic citizens.589   
Fortunately, social speech may serve as a useful mechanism for establishing all of these 
democratically advantageous character traits among private citizens.  As described above, 
individuals develop their character traits (at least in part) through regular participation in social 
speech activities.  Through the process of communicating freely with other community members, 
individuals are likely to learn useful social skills, such as cooperation, openness and empathy.  
And when social speech is characterized by positive, respectful and community-minded dialogue, 
these individuals are also likely to develop a number of corresponding democratic character traits, 
including: confidence, independence of judgment, willingness to take initiative, diligence, courage, 
self-awareness, resilience, respect for others, openness to new ideas, curiosity, creativity, distrust 
of authority and respect for empirical evidence.590  While these virtuous and active character traits 
may not be sufficient to constitute good democratic citizenship, they are necessary in liberal 
democratic societies that expect their citizens to be involved, compassionate and passionate.  
And as social speech participants develop a habit of interacting with others and receiving positive, 
nurturing feedback regarding those interactions, they gain both the strength and courage to 
engage with the wider political world, as well as the capacity to do so according to liberal 
democratic values.  
Social speech does not always result in the formation of these positive democratic 
character traits, however.  Although some social speech is likely to result in individual 
characteristics that are advantageous for liberal democratic governance (e.g. confidence, mutual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
589 It is unclear, however, why Blasi believes that adaptability is more important in a liberal 
democratic state than any other form of political community. 
590 This list of character traits borrows from both Vincent Blasi’s account of the relationship 
between a broad policy of freedom of speech and the development of democratic characters, as 
well as Steven Heyman’s critique of that argument.  For more information, see ibid., pp. 84; 
Steven Heyman, Free Speech and Human Dignity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 
60. 
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respect and perseverance), it is important to emphasize the possibility that social speech can 
potentially result in character traits that make participation in democratic politics more difficult.  
When social speech is characterized by divisive and demeaning messaging, for example, any 
positive outcomes resulting from a policy of freedom of speech may be virtually nullified.  Rather 
than grow into either the “virtuous” beings that Clor describes or the “active” characters that Blasi 
envisions, individuals who regularly participate in this kind of negative social speech may be apt 
to grow into adults who are ill equipped for participation in liberal democratic political life.   
In his seminal work, The Nature of Prejudice, Gordon W. Allport suggests a number of 
potential negative effects on individual character, which can result from exposure to mean, 
harassing speech, especially when it takes place within civil society.  These include: ego 
defenses, obsessive concern, denial of membership, withdrawal and passivity, clowning, 
strengthening in-group ties, slyness and cunning, identification with dominant group (self-hate), 
aggression against own group, prejudice against out-groups, sympathy, fighting back (militancy), 
enhanced striving, symbolic status striving, neuroticism, the self-fulfilling prophecy.591  While 
these psychological responses to negative social speech may initially appear somewhat 
disconnected, each item in Allport’s list can be grouped into one of three categories of character 
traits that are detrimental to liberal democratic governance: 1) aggressiveness; 2) isolationist; and 
3) insecurity.   
As Allport explains, when an individual feels herself to be either rejected or attacked 
within her social sphere, she “is not likely to develop dignity and poise;” rather, she tends to 
develop defense mechanisms and a defensive character.592  “Like a dwarf in a world of giants,” 
Allport explains, “[s]he cannot fight on equal terms.”593  Thus, such an individual may respond to 
social assaults by becoming one of three types of people.  She may grow aggressive, lashing out 
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against the community that has rejected her.  She might “cheat the giants when [s]he can,” thus 
allowing her to experience some fleeting revenge, or she might “in desperation occasionally push 
some giant off the sidewalk or throw a rock at him,” in order to release frustration.594  
Alternatively, she may respond to her social circumstances by becoming introverted and isolating 
herself, either as an individual or within a community of equivalent social rejects.  In other words, 
she might withdraw, “speaking little to the giants and never honestly.”595  Finally, this individual 
might react to negative social speech by growing overly insecure.  She might eventually come to 
absorb the message that she is unworthy and unwelcome in society, and thus, she might either 
“begin acting the part that the giant expects,” or adopt her “master’s own uncomplimentary view 
of dwarfs.”596 
When an individual feels like she has been deemed unworthy of being treated with equal 
respect and dignity by her peers, she is likely to start to doubt her own autonomy and personal 
efficacy.  This lack of confidence makes it unlikely that such an individual will believe that she has 
the right (much less the power) to try to determine political outcomes.  She may not even have 
the desire to cooperate and engage with a community that has rejected her.  Or she may choose 
to participate, but with destructive militancy and anger.  Regardless of which path she takes, an 
individual on the receiving and of negative social speech is likely to have a more difficult time 
engaging in traditional political activities than one who has enjoyed positive, encouraging social 
speech.  After all, aggressiveness, isolationism and insecurity, while they may be reasonable 
responses to negative social speech, are not conducive to participatory, self-governing political 
procedures. 
It is important to note, however, that I am not arguing that the type of social speech one is 
exposed to is either perfectly or entirely determinative of her character.  Certain individuals will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 Ibid., pp. 142-143. 
595 Ibid., pp. 142. 
596 Ibid., pp. 143. 
206	  
	  
	  
able to shrug off negative social speech and go on to develop character traits that are highly 
conducive to liberal democratic political systems; others may experience nothing but kind, 
nurturing social speech and still end up as introverted, passive or abrasive individuals.  Indeed, 
character development is surely influenced by a number of factors, only one of which is social 
speech.  However, among those factors, social speech, as an ongoing reflection of one’s entire 
social environment, is likely to have an especially influential effect on form that her character 
takes. 
 
B. Mechanism #2: Social capital formation 
Social speech does not just affect the personal characteristics of individuals; it also 
influences the ways in which they relate to one another.  Thus, in this section, I consider a second 
mechanism by which social speech tends to affect liberal democratic citizenship and political 
outcomes: social capital formation.  First, I argue that, by engaging in positive, encouraging social 
speech, individuals may amass social capital, which then facilitates cooperative and coordinated 
democratic action.  Essentially, when individuals learn to trust, respect and empathize with one 
another through their individual, social interactions, they can then begin to extend those feelings 
towards their mutual community.  In the second half of this section, however, I suggest that this 
might be an overly optimistic way of looking at social capital formation.  As I point out, not all 
social speech is positive or encouraging.  Much of the social speech that an individual will 
encounter in life is of a nastier, more confrontational nature.  In those cases, social speech is 
more likely to breed distrust than trust, disrespect than respect, and estrangement than empathy.  
And even when social speech is of a positive nature, the resulting social capital still has its 
limitations.  An individual may transfer her personal feelings of trust, respect and empathy, which 
she has developed through her social group, to a social capital that applies to a larger 
community, but the extent of that expansion will always be limited by what she considers to be 
207	  
	  
	  
her relevant community.  If her social groups tend to exclude members of particular demographic 
groups, for example, she is unlikely to think of members of that group as part of her relevant 
community.  She is also, therefore, unlikely to afford them social capital. 
To begin, however, I would first like to define the concept of social capital.  Robert D. 
Putnam has famously put forth a theory of social capital that both highlights the role that social 
interactions play in establishing the generalized trust, respect and empathy, and also emphasizes 
the importance of these sentiments for the proper functioning of democratic states.  In his 1994 
article, “Social Capital and Public Affairs,” Putnam defines social capital in relation to physical and 
human capital, claiming that all three types of capital serve as “tools and training that enhance 
individual productivity.”597  Social capital, however, specifically “refers to features of social 
organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit.”598  In other words, social capital is the set of underlying expectations, faiths and 
good will that make common action possible.   
This social capital, Putnam argues, can be developed in various ways, through any 
number of social encounters.  While his own research often addresses the role that membership 
in more traditionally political organizations and associations plays in building social capital, 
importantly, Putnam also finds that participation in informal, social activities increases the amount 
of social capital present within a given political community.  Specifically, he argues that 
participation in seemingly apolitical social clubs tends to increase social capital significantly.  In 
his Italian experiments, for example, Putnam finds that the political success of a region is highly 
correlated with not just the overtly political involvement of its citizens, but also with their 
participation in social organizations, such as “choral societies and literary circles, Lions Clubs, 
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and soccer clubs.”599  Even membership in a group as benign as a literary club, Putnam claims, is 
likely to lead to increased political action and awareness.  “Intense personal, intellectual, and 
occasionally even political bonds are forged in these lively discussions,” he claims.  “Regular 
participants become more involved in wider community affairs as well, moving from Dante to 
Doing.”600   
The reason for this connection is that, when an individual positively engages with others 
at a social level, she is not only likely to be acquiring feelings of trust, respect and empathy for 
those particular others, but she is also developing those sentiments generally.  These generalized 
feelings of trust, respect and empathy can then be mentally expanded so as to apply to the wider 
political community.  As Robert J. Boechmann and Tom R. Tyler suggest in their article, “Trust, 
Respect, and the Psychology of Political Engagement,” discrete, individual feelings of social 
capital often lead to broad notions of social capital.  By participating in community activities, 
individuals not only come to trust and understand one another, but also the community at large.  
“When a person engages in activities with members of his or her community,” the authors write, 
“it leads to a sense of trust that transcends the immediate encounter.”601  This larger concept of 
trust, born out of individual actions, then influences one’s political choices. 
And it does not matter how small or insignificant a social interaction may appear – each 
and every instance of social speech provides an opportunity to build social capital.  In Bowling 
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Putnam cites several seemingly trivial 
examples of social speech—including “getting together for drinks after work, having coffee with 
the regulars at the diner, playing poker every Tuesday night, gossiping with the next-door 
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neighbor, having friends over to watch TV, sharing a barbeque picnic on a hot summer evening, 
even simply nodding to another regular jogger on the same daily route”—in order to make exactly 
this point, that every social interaction may ultimately come to inform a sense of community trust, 
respect and empathy.602  “Like pennies dropped in a cookie jar,” he writes, “each of these 
encounters is a tiny investment in social capital.”603  In other words, regardless of what people are 
saying and where, as long as they continue to talk and engage with one another at a social level, 
they are inherently contributing towards the trust, respect and empathy that constitute social 
capital. 
Putnam’s theory of social capital can be summed up as follows:  As individuals come to 
associate and communicate with one another at an informal, social level, they are simultaneously 
developing the wider connections that are necessary within a participatory, democratic form of 
governance.604  And because social speech is so ubiquitous—especially as compared to more 
traditional forms of political speech—it serves as one of the most influential forces in the 
construction of social capital.   
Putnam does worry, however, that, while social speech has always been an important 
aspect of traditional American life, it has recently become less and less prevalent.605  He claims 
that nearly all demographic groups—men and women; urban, suburban and rural; wealthy, poor 
and middle class; black, white and all other racial groups; northerners and southerners; etc.—
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have recently witnessed declining trends in civic engagement.606  As a result, he believes that 
social capital has been diminishing as well, thus causing democracy to suffer. 
 In the years since Putnam published his first articles on social capital, however, many 
researchers have come to question both his data and his lamentations about the current state of 
socializing in the United States.607  Some critics suggest that social interactions may actually be 
more common now than Putnam admits, pointing out that Americans are still more likely to join 
voluntary associations than citizens of other nations.608  Others believe that Putnam may be 
judging contemporary Americans misleadingly and unfairly, by comparing them to Americans 
during the boom of civic involvement—which took place in the 1950’s—but was not indicative of 
any period before or after.609  And even if Putnam is right, and people truly are engaging in civic 
organizations less often, several theorists of social capital have pointed out that Americans may 
still be partaking in civic conversations of a more informal, social nature.  Robert Wuthnow, for 
example, suggests that less structured, more casual associations (e.g. support groups, 
neighborhood gatherings and spirituals meetings) may have taken the place of the traditional 
Elks, PTA’s and bowling leagues.610  And if one were to add “Internet groups” to that list of loosely 
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structured, casual associations in which people have been participating, Wuthnow’s claims sound 
even more probable.   
Thus, it is likely that, while the form of social interactions may have shifted, its prevalence 
has not – social speech continues to play an important role in the everyday lives of private 
citizens.  And as such, it influences the development of social capital, thereby resulting significant 
impacts on democratic politics.  For the remainder of this section, I discuss what I consider to be 
the three facets of social capital—trust, respect and empathy—which, as a product of social 
speech, come to affect liberal democratic citizenship and political outcomes in both positive and 
negative ways. 
Putnam claims that social capital facilitates political action in at least three ways.   
Networks of civic engagement, he claims: 1) “foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity; I’ll do 
this for you now, in the expectation that down the road you or someone else will return the 
favor”;611 2) “facilitate coordination and communication and amplify information about the 
trustworthiness of other individuals”;612 and 3) embody past success at collaboration, which can 
serve as a cultural template for future collaboration.”613  All three of these functions essentially 
boil down to the same claim, however – that social speech teaches individuals to trust, respect 
and care for one another enough so that they can overcome collective action problems and 
engage in long term, mutually beneficial political activities. 
 First, trust is an important element of any political system that demands that citizens 
make personal sacrifices in the short term, in hopes of receiving communal benefits in the long 
term.  In other words, trust helps to alleviate the fear that would otherwise paralyze liberal 
democratic states.  After all, why would a rational individual invest the time and effort into 
becoming an educated voter if she does not have faith that her compatriots will do the same?  
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Why would she willingly pay into Social Security as a young adult if she does not believe that 
others will contribute to these funds when it is her time to collect?  Why would she participate in a 
rally is she thinks that she might be the only one to show up?  Trust is what makes it possible for 
individuals to act against their immediate self-interests, in the expectation that their sacrifices will 
ultimately be worthwhile. 
Thus, trust in one’s fellow citizens serves as a facilitator for democratic political action.  
As James S. Coleman theorizes in “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” where 
social trust is present, that sentiment is likely to “facilitate productive activity” much in the same 
way as physical and human capital.614  As a result, “a group within which there is extensive 
trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more than a comparable group 
without that trustworthiness and trust.”615  And, indeed, generalized trust does appear to be 
positively correlated with participation in traditional political activities.  People are more likely to 
participate in the political process when they have trust in their compatriots.  Boechmann and 
Tyler, for example, find that a generalized sense of trust, developed through social interactions, 
spurs greater participation in traditional political activities, including voting.616  More broadly, in 
The Civic Culture Revisited, Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sydney Verba report a reliable 
association between interpersonal trust and healthy democratic states.617 
 A similar positive relationship has also been found to exist between respect and 
traditional political action.  In communities defined by a general sense of mutual respect, 
individuals are more willing to cooperate with unknown and potentially distant others.  This is true 
in two respects.  First, those who feel respect towards fellow members of their community are 
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more likely to engage in collective action.618  Second, those who feel as if their community is 
respecting them and their needs are more likely to not only participate voluntarily in communal 
affairs, but also to make personal sacrifices in order to aid the group.619 
 Finally, the empathy aspect of social capital plays a significant role in determining 
democratic outcomes.  To the extent that social speech is able to build empathy between 
members of a community, those individuals are able to understand and appreciate the wants and 
needs of one another.  This insight then colors political action. 
Benjamin Barber’s theory of “strong democratic talk” may help to shed some light on the 
relationship between empathy and political action.  While his vision of strong democratic talk is 
too restrictive to apply to all social speech, several aspects of his theory can easily be extended 
to apply to social speech as well.620  In particular, his treatment of the “affiliation and affection” 
functions of strong democratic talk is useful in order to understand how empathy—brought about 
through social speech—may come to affect democratic political action.  
Barber admits that “[t]alk of every kind—cognitive, prudential, exploratory, conversational, 
and affective—can enhance empathy.”621  Thus, while he specifically writes about strong 
democratic talk, one might infer that the ability to breed empathy can apply to any number of 
communicative types, including social speech.  And not only is social speech capable of 
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producing empathy, but empathy, according to Barber, is also a uniquely important prerequisite 
for reaching lasting political consensus.  “Empathy has a politically miraculous power to enlarge 
perspectives and expand consciousness in a fashion that not so much accommodates as 
transcends private interests and the antagonisms they breed,” Barber writes.622  By affirming 
feelings of commonality and affection among community members, empathy allows individuals to 
recognize that they are not the only ones with needs that must be fulfilled, and to appreciate the 
value of working together in order to attain the best possible political outcomes for all. 
Barber is quick to distinguish between natural empathy and political empathy, however.  
“[T]he attachments we feel toward natural kith and kin can be constricting and parochializing,” he 
explains.  “[T]hey can exclude and subvert rather than nourish citizenship.”623  The empathy 
derived from communication, on the other hand, “arouses feelings that attach precisely to 
‘strangers,’ to those who do not belong to our private families or clubs or churches.”624  In other 
words, empathy turns strangers into people who matter.  It makes the “other’s” interests relevant 
to one’s own self-interest. 
Unfortunately, social speech is not always (or even equally) successful at building social 
capital.  As indicated by Barber, speech can enhance empathy.  That does not mean that it 
always will.  And although polite, considerate social speech may be likely to breed generalized 
feelings of trust and respect, other, more negative, forms of social speech may lead to the 
opposite result: distrust, skepticism and contempt for others.625  In general, when social speech is 
mean or derogatory, it is highly unlikely that participants will develop generalized feelings of trust, 
respect or empathy.  
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Furthermore, even in an ideal situation—in which social speech is characterized by 
positive, inclusive dialogue—social speech is still limited in its capacity to bridge social capital 
across different demographic groups.  Much of the time, when individuals engage in social 
speech, they are communicating with people who are like them, either in terms of background, 
viewpoint or geographical location.  As Eric M. Uslaner explains, often, “membership in voluntary 
organizations and informal socializing has no need to tap faith in people who are different from 
ourselves.  We socialize we people we already know.”626  And in these all-too-frequent cases, 
while individuals may be building social capital amongst themselves and then applying it to a 
wider community, they are not necessarily expanding their trust, respect and empathy to 
everyone.  Positive individual encounters may evolve into a broader articulation of social capital, 
as Putnam argues, but individuals will only really extend that social capital to those that they 
consider part of their relevant groups.  And if certain socioeconomic groups are systematically 
omitted from an individual’s social encounters, then she is unlikely to psychologically associate 
members of those groups with her community, and therefore, also unlikely to afford them her 
social capital. 
This limitation has revealed itself in a number of empirical studies, which have sought to 
challenge Putnam’s generally rosy picture of social capital.627  In “Social-Capital Formation and 
American Fraternal Association: New Empirical Evidence,” for example, Jason Kaufman and 
David Weintraub look at several American fraternal organizations to better understand the extent 
to which voluntary social interactions are capable of bridging social capital across various 
socioeconomic dimensions.  The authors theorize that, “[b]y indoctrinating members in the 
practice of self-governance, individual accountability, institutional loyalty, and an ethos of mutual 
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No. 4 (Winter, 2000-2001), pp. 570. 
627 See Dietlind Stolle, “Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: The Development of Generalized Trust 
in Voluntary Associations,” Political Psychology, Vol. 19 (September, 1998); Nancy L. 
Rosenblum, Membership and Morals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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aid, fraternal participation might well promote political participation.”628  But while they do discover 
that social interactions help to build democratic values across certain dimensions (i.e. class and 
geographical space), Kaufman and Weintraub also find that participation in informal, voluntary 
associations has not been an effective means for encouraging social capital across ethnicity, race 
or gender.   
Much of the reason for this failing, the authors suggest, is that voluntary associations are 
likely to be both officially restrictive and also self-selecting.629  And, as stated above, if a particular 
group is consistently excluded from social gatherings, then any resulting social capital will likely 
disregard members of that community.  Thus, while positive social speech might lead to the 
development of social capital, it may often only manifest in the form of small, local, relatively 
homogenous communities. 
The potential segmentation of social capital is clearly troublesome from the perspective of 
democratic citizenship and political outcomes.  To the extent that social speech may encourage 
discrete, non-intersecting spheres of social capital—that will often reflect socioeconomic 
groupings—it is likely to worsen any preexisting political antagonisms between these groups.  If 
an individual feels generalized trust, respect and empathy only for her relevant community (but, 
through her social interactions, has developed a narrow idea of what constitutes that community), 
she is likely to have significant trouble striking compromises when she enters the political sphere 
and encounters members of her community who might be less like her. 
Even if the segmentation of social capital did not pose a threat to political compromise 
and cooperation, it would still represent a problem for liberal democratic states.  After all, every 
community’s social capital is not equal.  All positive social speech may potentially breed social 
capital, but the existence of certain social structures is likely to result in different variations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628 Jason Kaufman and David Weintraub, “Social-Capital Formation and American Fraternal 
Association: New Empirical Evidence,” in The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 35, No. 1 
(Summer, 2004), pp. 2. 
629 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
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social capital.  And some of these variations may be more politically effective than others.630  
Especially for members of already disadvantaged groups, the intragroup social capital that these 
individuals develop through their social institutions may not be as useful in terms of facilitating 
political action as the social capital that is developed among members of more advantaged 
groups.  Deborah J. Warr, for example, looking at women and minorities, finds that social capital 
actually does very little for members of these groups.631  Low-income women, she argues, 
develop social capital through their everyday interactions, generally with other low-income 
women.  The result is a form of social capital, which is not only different from the social capital 
established by their male and/or wealthy counterparts, but may also be of less political value.   
I revisit these issues later in this chapter, in the section for Mechanism #4: Boundary 
forging.  Even at this point, however, it should be clear that the inequality inherent in the process 
of social capital development represents a major concern for the liberal democratic values of 
equality and inclusiveness.  In its most positive, nurturing form, social speech may help 
individuals create the kind of social capital that then facilitates democratic politics; however, even 
then, as long as socioeconomic groups are not perfectly integrated within the social sphere, it is 
unlikely that the resulting social capital will be adequately broad to include all members of a 
political community. 
 
C. Mechanism #3: Cultural and political training 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 See Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”: “All social relations and 
social structures facilitate some forms of social capital; actors establish relations purposefully and 
continue them when they continue to provide benefits.  Certain kinds of social structure, however, 
are especially important in facilitating some forms of social capital” (pp. S105).    
631 Deborah J. Warr, “Gender, Class, and the Art and Craft of Social Capital,” in The Sociological 
Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 497-520.  See also Ronald La Due Lake and 
Robert Huckfeldt, “Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation,” in Political 
Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1998), pp. 567-584. 
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In order for democracies to flourish, they must breed the right kind of citizens, and they 
must also maintain some degree of social capital.  As stated above, it is unrealistic to assume 
that a rational individual—even one with a virtuous, active character—will willingly take on the 
personal sacrifices of participating in a liberal democratic state if she does not believe that her 
compatriots will do so as well.  And it is difficult to imagine how she will be able to cooperate and 
compromise with others in order to achieve mutual ends if the political sphere if her community 
does not boast an atmosphere of trust, respect and understanding.   
There is more to democratic political participation than having the right character traits 
and believing in one’s fellow citizens, however.  Before they can become capable of participating 
fully and effectively in political affairs, citizens must first learn the skill sets, values and underlying 
assumptions applicable to their unique political communities.  This knowledge represents not only 
an individual intrinsic good (as individuals feel personally connected to the polis), but it is also 
necessary for the ongoing health and existence of the democratic community as a whole.  After 
all, it is both technically and philosophically impossible for the liberal democratic state machinery 
to thrive without a citizenry that is informed of its norms, standards and procedures, and can 
therefore act in accordance with them.  As Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson aver, 
“democracy cannot thrive without a well-educated citizenry.”632  And as Gutmann and Thompson 
explain, education, in this case, refers not only to knowledge about institutions and public policy, 
but also a familiarity with community-wide understandings of the acceptable range of definitions 
for ideas such as truth, fairness, justness and the good.633 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 35. 
633 Education, of course, also refers to the attainment of more traditional political knowledge.  As 
Michele P. Claibourn and Paul S. Martin explain, however, even seemingly non-political groups 
still provide political information.  See Michele P. Claibourn and Paul S. Martin, “The Third Face 
of Social Capital: How Membership in Voluntary Associations Improves Policy Accountability,” in 
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2 (June, 2001), pp. 192-201:  “When members of a 
group chat informally about politics and current affairs they are likely to pass along quality 
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There are many ways through which democratic citizens acquire this knowledge and 
learn what it means to belong to their unique societies and political systems.  They memorize 
their national historical myths in school at a young age.  They are told of their responsibility to 
vote through political advertisements during campaign seasons.  They celebrate national holidays 
en masse throughout their lives, frequently even when living abroad.  Unfortunately, political 
scientists who study civic education have often overlooked one of the most common and 
influential methods of cultural and political training – social communication and interactions.634   
In this section, building upon Andrew Perrin’s work on the “democratic imagination,” I 
suggest that even the simplest, most casual speech acts, when seen as part of an ongoing 
process of socialization, actually function as important informal venues for cultural and political 
training.635  Not only do these encounters educate individuals about the norms, practices and 
expectations of their communities, but they also have the potential to literally train people in good 
democratic citizenship.  By enabling individuals to practice at communication and compromise, 
social speech endows them with the skills necessary to participate in liberal democratic politics.  
This does not mean that social speech will always necessarily result in positive outcomes for 
liberal democratic citizenship, however.  Where social speech contains negative, derogatory or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
information.  Hence, participation in voluntary associations increases the likelihood of exposure to 
others with relevant political information” (pp. 194). 
634 Not all political scientists have neglected social speech, however.  Eliasoph, for example, has 
repeatedly claimed that social participation generates and spreads community knowledge.  “While 
not exclusively or even primarily politically motivated,” she explains, “these [sociable] gatherings 
offer the familiarity that is a necessary precondition for some kinds of public life.  Sociable familiar 
gatherings can create an infinitely nuanced stock of common sense and feeling, common 
knowledge and myths, common style; rhythm and manners; background knowledge for how to 
act and how to be” (Eliasoph, Avoiding politics, pp. 12). 
635 See Norman H. Nie, Jane Junn and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry, Education and Democratic 
Citizenship in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996).  In this book, Nie, Junn 
and Stehlik-Barry explain how formal education teaches citizens, not only the skills, but also the 
values and norms necessary for living in a democracy:  “[F]ormal education encourages cognitive 
development and enables citizens to understand the long-term trade-offs necessary in 
democracy.  In this way, more formal education adds continuously to the extent to which citizens 
exhibit characteristics of enlightenment in an addictive or cumulative fashion” (Ibid., pp. 6).  While 
this study focuses on formal education, its conclusions may also apply to informal educational 
experiences, such as social speech.  
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discriminatory messaging, it is likely that participants will develop narrow democratic 
imaginations, constrained by thoughts of what they cannot or should not do or aspire to.  And 
where social speech is structured in such a way as to exclude some or privilege certain kinds of 
speech, it becomes difficult for participants to learn how to cooperate and connect with others in 
ways that would be beneficial for democratic politics.  Thus, depending on its content and form, 
social speech affects the cultural and political of individuals in both positive and negative ways. 
To begin, social interactions are important mechanisms for learning what is appropriate 
within a given political community.  Indeed, it is through informal, everyday communication that an 
individual comes to appreciate the full scope of her unique political environment.  In his book, 
Citizen Speak: The Democratic Imagination in American Life, Perrin draws heavily from 
sociology’s study of culture and political psychology in order to explain the connection between 
an individual’s social speech experiences and her democratic imagination – or her understanding 
of “what is possible, important, right, and feasible.”636  One does not learn a group’s accepted 
standards and practices privately, through mere reflection, he argues; rather, this knowledge 
base is developed through interactions with others.  And although all speech—including political 
or public speech—may result in certain educative effects, Perrin notes that social speech is 
especially likely to contribute to the foundational knowledge required for democratic citizenship.   
While traditionally political talk informs the democratic imagination, Perrin argues, it does 
so in an inconsistent (and often negative) manner.  He claims that certain kinds of political talk 
(e.g. negative campaigning), because they “tend to increase cynicism about politics and thereby 
decrease participation,” actually decrease “the breadth of the democratic imagination (and of 
democratic practice).”637  Social speech, on the other hand, not only helps to form the democratic 
imagination, but it also tends to increase its breadth.  Through informal, everyday interactions, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
636 Andrew Perrin, Citizen Speak: The Democratic Imagination in American Life (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 2.  
637 Ibid., pp. 43.  See also Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, Going Negative: How 
Attack Ads Shrink and Polarize the Electorate (New York: Free Press, 1995). 
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individuals are able to gain a real sense of what it means to be a part of their communities, 
beginning from an early age.  As Perrin writes, one’s “conversation with others at work, at home, 
in schools, organizations, associations, and neighborhoods, and through media like newspapers, 
television, movies, books, and the Internet” are a vital factor in teaching her about her community 
and how to navigate it.638  
Thus, one’s chosen social group (the people with whom an individual engages in social 
speech) has a unique and distinctive influence on the scope of her democratic imagination.  As 
Perrin explains, group settings serve “to constrain and enable citizens’ democratic imaginations.  
A key element of this idea is that the same citizens, placed in different political microcultures, may 
think, talk, and practice citizenship differently.”639  Exposure to different people, locations and 
ideas, therefore, may lead to vastly different potential imaginings.640  This partly explains why 
members of different social groups may have divergent opinions about the same political 
phenomena.  It also suggests that one’s social group is extremely important in determining not 
only the type of democratic citizen she will become, but also the content of her political beliefs. 
At the same time that one’s social group is teaching participants about their communities, 
social interactions are also forging new understandings of the community and revising old ones.  
In other words, when individuals are communicating with one another at an informal level, they 
are not only learning their community’s standards and practices, but they are also helping to 
generate those understandings at the same time.  Thus, the democratic imagination is more than 
just a necessary precondition for meaningful political action – the process of forming one’s 
democratic imagination, through social speech, can also be seen as a political action in its own 
right.  By contributing to the social construction of shared meanings and understandings of a 
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639 Ibid., pp. 130. 
640 It is important to note that Perrin does not believe the democratic imagination to be a fixed 
entity; rather, it is constantly evolving and reforming as citizens “learn and forget cultural elements 
over time” (Ibid., pp. 8).  See also Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Britain, 1758-1834 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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particular community, individuals may not be directly affecting the electoral process, but they are 
influencing it indirectly by fostering discourse.641  
Of course, as Perrin explains, social speech does also have a more direct and obvious 
on political outcomes as well.  As explained above, the socially constructed democratic 
imagination is “the set of resources and experiences that Americans ‘think with.’”642  Thus, it 
informs an individual’s political views at the very core.  As Perrin claims, the democratic 
imagination determines an individual’s understanding of: 1) the range and scope of her public 
sphere; 2) the gamut of possible political outcomes; and 3) the list of acceptable and legitimate 
actions that she might undertake in order to achiever these outcomes.643  In other words, it is like 
a kind of “repertoire,” from which individuals draw in order to make their political decisions.644  
Similarly, one might compare this foundational knowledge to a lens, through which 
individuals see the political world and their relationship to others within it.  Thus, individuals rely 
upon their democratic imaginations in order to determine, not only what they can do, but also 
what it is they want out of life.  When they are designing their own image of the good life (both in 
a moral sense and also in terms of their individual self-interest), individuals necessarily consult 
their personal repertoires to determine which values and goals are worthwhile, and which are 
not.645  In other words, having learned not only which principles are prized by her community, but 
also what is feasible to achieve, the individual comes to shape her own wants and expectations 
according to those standards. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641 See Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini, Talking Together: “This emphasis on discourse and civil 
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642 Perrin, Citizen Speak, pp. 20. See also Michael Schudson, Watergate in American History: 
How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past (New York: Basic Books, 1992). 
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Like Perrin, I agree that social speech ought to be considered a political act, both 
intrinsically and also in recognition of its influence on more traditional political actions.  To the 
extent that social speech colors the political landscape through a dynamic process of determining 
ideas about what is good, right, proper and important, those who take part in such discourses are 
certainly behaving politically.  As Richard Rorty explains, “[w]hat binds societies together are 
common vocabularies and common hopes.”646  Any activities that conspire to determine the 
structure of these vocabularies and hopes are thereby political.  Furthermore, the common 
vocabulary of right and wrong, good and bad, expected and undesirable, possible and 
impossible, which is generated (and regenerated) and then garnered through social speech 
eventually comes to serve as the context in which all other political decisions are made.  Indeed, 
it is difficult to imagine how one might engage in civic affairs in the United States, for example, 
without first picking up American norms of civility and politeness, Lockean liberal values or pop 
culture representations of chattel slavery.  While one does not necessarily have to adopt or 
accept all of this information, to participate in American politics, she does need to be aware of its 
existence.  Thus, social speech, by helping to build these disparate knowledge bases, makes 
possible and promotes democratic participation. 
Nevertheless, despite the merits of Perrin’s theory of the democratic imagination, I 
suggest that there are two significant omissions from Perrin’s book, which ought to be added in 
order to present a more complete picture of the role that social speech plays in the cultural and 
political training of liberal democratic citizens.  First, in focusing so intently on the importance of 
repertoires, Perrin neglects a second, more literal sense in which social speech could be said to 
provide individuals with the training necessary for full and equal participation in political life.  After 
all, social speech not only provides individuals with information, but it also offers them the 
opportunity to actually practice at communication and compromise – proficiencies that are 
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essential in a liberal democratic state.  My second criticism of Perrin’s theory is that, while he 
accepts that political speech may have a negative impact on the democratic imagination, he fails 
to address the negative potentialities in social speech.  I suggest that social speech, to the extent 
that it may reflect a society’s discriminatory and authoritarian themes, is likely to teach 
participants these same anti-democratic values and practices.  This information, once absorbed, 
may severely limit an individual’s desire and aptitude for political participation. 
First, it is important to address the literal sense in which social speech provides training 
for liberal democratic citizenship.  As suggested above—in the section for Mechanism #1: 
Character development—the ideal liberal democratic citizen is not expected to behave as a mere 
bystander to the political process; rather, she ought to actively participate in politics.  In order to 
be capable of doing so, however, she must first be taught how to participate.  
At the heart of all citizenship activities are civic skills and capabilities (i.e. communication 
and compromise), which are honed through regular participation in social communication.  Often, 
an individual who is engaging in social speech might not even notice that she is training these 
talents – but she is still developing them all the same.  For example, by regularly communicating 
with others in a social context, an individual is likely to be exposed to new ideas and arguments, 
which she might then be called upon to evaluate.  In order to ensure that she is heard among her 
social peers, that same individual might also need to, not only express her views effectively, but 
also negotiate them with others.  And because it is likely that one’s social speech partners are 
part of her social group—and therefore subject to prolonged and repeated interactions—she 
might frequently be forced to compromise, cooperate and strike deals.   
Each of these skills—assessing new arguments and information, negotiating with others 
and cooperating—is essential for performing vital democratic political functions.  After all, how 
can one cast an intelligent vote if she has not learned how to evaluate the candidates’ 
225	  
	  
	  
arguments?  How can she protest effectively if she has not learned how to make herself heard?  
How can she accept a majoritarian electoral outcome if she has not learned compromise?  
Unfortunately, not all social speech actually results in a civic education that is quite so 
conducive to liberal democratic citizenship.  After all, social speech not only influences the 
political sphere, but it is also, at the same time, shaped by political institutions.  If those 
institutions do not adequately represent the liberal democratic values of equality and 
inclusiveness, it is probable that social speech will fail to teach those principles as well.  These 
deficiencies may harm democratic citizenship in two ways: 1) shaping the democratic imagination 
in such a way that it represents illiberal ideologies; and 2) providing training that hinders one’s 
abilities to engage in democratic politics.   
First, reflecting back on Perrin’s discussion of the democratic imagination, it seems likely 
that social speech, which is hateful, derogatory or restrictive, may severely and negatively impact 
an individual’s understanding of “what is possible, important, right, and feasible.”  Namely, such 
negative social speech may cause its targets to feel limited in their opportunities and 
expectations.  It may also lead those who are in more privileged positions to develop an inflated 
sense of what they deserve as compared to others.  As a result, both sets of individuals will make 
choices in their personal and political lives that reflect preexisting power imbalances, thus 
exacerbating the problem of inequality.  These choices may range from exclusion to isolation, 
from antagonism to passivity, from anger to fear.  And while these reactions may accurately 
reflect the true norms, standards and practices of an individual political community—and in that 
sense, social speech is providing valuable civic information—they are working against the ideals 
of liberal democracy.  Ergo, inegalitarian, derogatory social speech is also providing a negative 
affect of liberal democracy. 
Second, although it is widely accepted that a healthy civic culture requires some “training” 
in democracy outside of the formal, national process, it is important to understand that the form 
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this “training” takes matters in terms of the results for citizenship.  As Carole Pateman explains in 
Participation and Democratic Theory, in order for informal education to result in positive 
democratic outcomes, such communication must take place within democratic structures.647  
“There is something paradoxical in calling socialization inside existing organizations and 
associations, most of which, especially industrial ones, are oligarchical and hierarchical, a training 
explicitly in democracy,” she writes.648  In order to acquire training explicitly in democracy, 
Pateman argues, an individual must first have some experiences with similar institutions at a 
more social or personal level. 
And empirically, this does appear to be the case.  Social experiences and interactions, 
when they take place within liberal democratic structures, do seem to lead to greater feelings of 
political efficacy and competence than social speech that takes occurs within a more authoritarian 
arrangement.  In The Civic Culture, for example, Almond and Verba explain that this is because 
individuals tend to export the experiences and expectations of their social interactions to into a 
political context.649  “[I]f in most social situations the individual finds himself subservient to some 
authority figure,” they explain, “it is likely that he will expect such an authority relationship in the 
political sphere.  On the other hand, if outside the political sphere he has opportunities to 
participate in a wide range of social decisions, he will probably expect to participate in political 
decisions as well.”650  Not only do the authors argue that the latter individual will expect to play a 
more active role in his own governance than the former individual, but they also claim that he will 
be better equipped to do so.   
Drawing from their cross-cultural study of political attitudes and behaviors in the United 
States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico, Almond and Verba find that an individual’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970). 
648 Ibid., pp. 45. 
649 Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 
1965). 
650 Ibid., pp. 271-272. 
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remembered opportunities for participation in the family and at school are positively correlated 
with a high score on the political competence scale in all five countries.651  And while the positive 
correlation between opportunities for participatory involvement in the social sphere and political 
competence may be true at all levels of human development, the authors find that adult 
experiences of involvement in the workplace display a notably higher correlation with political 
competence than other forms of social interaction.652  Thus, it appears that having the opportunity 
to participate in one’s home, school and (especially) workplace increases the probability that an 
individual will display a high level of political competence.  This political competence, according to 
Almond and Verba, then significantly increases the chances that an individual will engage 
effectively in politics.653     
Unfortunately, opportunities for participation in the social sphere are not equally 
distributed among socioeconomic groups.  Upper and middle class individuals, for example, are 
more likely to have both grown up within a participatory family structure and also to have received 
a more engaging education than those individuals on the lower end of the socioeconomic 
scale.654  And in terms of the workplace, in all five countries that they study, Almond and Verba 
find that lower income individuals are more likely to report feeling both that they are not consulted 
about on-the-job decisions, and also that they are not free to complain about decision that had 
been made, than were higher income individuals.655  This discrepancy between democratic social 
experiences means that upper and middle class individuals are likely to be better suited to 
political action than lower class individuals, who may not have receive similar training.  Indeed, if 
lower income individuals are less likely to gain the experience of participation in the social sphere 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 Ibid., pp. 284. 
652 “The structure of authority at the workplace is probably the most significant—and salient—
structure of that kind with which the average man finds himself in daily contact” (Ibid., pp. 294). 
653 Almond and Verba claim that “in many ways… the belief in one’s competence is a key political 
attitude” (Ibid., pp. 140). 
654 Ibid., pp. 284. 
655 Ibid., pp. 280-283. 
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than higher income individuals, it only stands to reason that they will then, on the whole, be less 
prepared for political participation as well. 
There are, of course, a number of institutions in the social sphere that provide valuable 
political and social training for lower income individuals, which I discuss in Chapters Six and 
Seven.  Churches, for example, have long played an important role in teaching residents of 
poorer communities the skills they need to engage with the wider political world.  Similarly, 
community groups have been proven to present excellent opportunities for civic education.  In 
their study of the relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation, Henry E. 
Brady, Verba and Kay Lehmann Schlozman find that “[c]ivic skills are less stratified by SES 
[socioeconomic status]” than one might expect from previous research, and that this is at least 
“partly because social characteristics such as affiliation with ‘congregational’ churches are not 
highly correlated with SES and these affiliations serve as training ground for civic skills.”656 
Nevertheless, it remains worrisome that the positive and negative training effects of 
social speech are not necessarily equally distributed among socioeconomic groups.  To the 
extent that members of the least advantaged groups are likely to receive a civic education, which 
makes their political participation more challenging than that, which members of the most 
advantaged groups receive, social speech can be said to be unfairly diminishing their abilities as 
democratic citizens.  And to the extent that the democratic imaginations of all individuals are 
handicapped by illiberal themes within the social sphere, social speech may actually be working 
against democratic political outcomes.  Thus, it is important to keep in mind that, although social 
speech may serve a highly useful function in providing individuals with the cultural and political 
training required of liberal democratic citizenship, the outcome of social speech is highly 
contingent on its content, tone and structure.   
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D. Mechanism #4: Boundary forging 
Finally, the last liberal democratic function of social speech that I address in this chapter 
is its ability to not only help individuals draw the boundaries between political communities, but 
also to define the relationships within those communities.  By participating in social speech, 
individuals are unconsciously forging the frontiers of their communities – drawing a line between 
the “us” and the “them.”  These distinctions are especially important in societies that demand a 
great deal of their citizens (i.e. modern liberal democracies).  As Michael Sandel expresses it, 
when citizens are asked to make personal sacrifices for the good of their political communities, 
“the question remains why do these persons, the ones who happen to live in my country, have a 
claim on my concern that others do not.”657  The answer, this section suggests, is that we tend to 
feel a connection to these people because we feel like we are one of them – we all share a past, 
present and future.  So while we may not care about each individual member of our political 
communities, we do believe that these people, as a part of an “us,” merit certain sacrifices.  
Those other people, on the other hand—those strangers, foreigners, etc.—do not merit the same 
consideration because we do not feel a similar psychological attachment to them.  We do not feel 
that our fates are intertwined with and interdependent of those others to nearly the same degree. 
It is important to note that, although social speech’s boundary forging mechanism 
overlaps considerably with the social capital formation mechanism, they are not, in fact, the same 
thing.  Social capital is what (ideally) springs up among members of a community.  It is how they 
relate to one another once they already are an “us.”  Boundary forging, on the other hand, is how 
individuals become an “us” in the first place.  The forces that unite a community are highly related 
to those that promote trust, respect and empathy within that community, but these are, indeed, 
two separate processes. 
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(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 17.  
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While I discussed social capital at length earlier in this chapter (see Mechanism #2: 
Social capital formation), in this section, I focus exclusively on social speech role in the process of 
boundary formation.  First, I explain how, through everyday speech, individuals come to develop 
and acknowledge the psychological boundaries of their political communities.  By highlighting 
commonalities and mutualities, I argue, social speech delineates what is “us” and what is “them.”  
And because it is often intimate and personal, social speech goes beyond the function of merely 
establishing in-groups and out-groups, and it actually creates affective attachments to the “us.”  In 
other words, not only does social speech help individuals identify members of their communities, 
but it also serves to build affective connections to those within their communities.  Second, I 
explore two implications of a strong sense of community – one individual and one political.  On 
the individual level, I argue that people tend to be happier when they feel like they are a part of a 
community.  By learning to associate one’s individual good with the good of her community, that 
person is likely to live a more fulfilling life than one who has not reached those same conclusions.  
On a political level, I argue that a positive, friendship-based association with one’s community 
makes an individual more likely to participate in politics, pursue community ends, vie for 
unanimous political results and (potentially) represent herself authentically.  Third, I present two 
arguments regarding the negative aspects of boundary forging: 1) It creates outsiders (either 
members of out-groups or members of in-groups who feel marginalized), who are likely to be 
excluded from politics; and 2) To the extent that boundaries are drawn along the lines of 
friendship, they may unfairly silence certain segments of a community. 
To begin, the affective connection to what constitutes “us” and the disconnection from 
“them” is not naturally inherent among people living within the same geographical boundaries.  
There are fairly effortless ways to establish these relationships, however.  Individuals may not be 
born automatically loving those with whom they share national borders (nor are state efforts 
particularly effective at instilling such affections on their own), but people do eventually learn to 
differentiate between “us” and “them”—and ultimately emotionally connect with “us”—through 
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their social interactions and communications.  Indeed, this may be the most significant political 
function of social speech.  As Katherine Cramer Walsh argues in Talking about Politics: Informal 
Groups and Social Identity in American Life, when people speak to one another informally, the 
primary political implication of that speech “is not simply the exchange of information about policy 
stances.  Instead, the fundamental, politically relevant act is the communication of information 
about the kind of people individuals perceive themselves to be and the collective of group and 
community boundaries.”658 
This information about who “us” is and what that means might often reveal itself subtly, 
but it is also embedded within virtual every imaginable instance of social speech.  As Joseph 
Epstein explains in his book, Gossip: The Untrivial Pursuit, informal, even the most seemingly 
frivolous communication (i.e. gossip) creates social bonds by placing both the speaker and the 
recipient in collusion with one another.659  It provides an implicit acknowledgement of one’s 
participation in a shared culture with commonly understood norms and standards.  “But to accept 
gossip from another person is also to enter into intimacy of a complex kind,” Epstein writes, “the 
bestowal of the gossip along with its acceptance implies the acknowledgement that we are both 
men and women of the world, both operate in the same moral universe, both find the same things 
funny, outrageous, insuperable.”660  In other words, seemingly innocuous, everyday conversation 
enables individuals to both identify within a community and also to determine who else is a 
member of that community.  Social speech highlights commonalities, bringing those similarities to 
the foreground. 
In Barber’s terms—discussed above in the section for Mechanism #2: Social capital 
formation—when “two neighbors [are] talking for the first time over a fence, or two college 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
658 Katherine Cramer Walsh, Talking about Politics: Informal Groups and Social Identity in 
American Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 42. 
659 See Joseph Epstein, Gossip: The Untrivial Pursuit (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
2011): “Listening to gossip can be likened to receiving stolen goods; it puts you in immediate 
collusion with the person conveying the gossip to you” (pp. 3). 
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freshmen [are] talking over a first cup of coffee,” they are not just getting to know one another, but 
they are also “exploring their mutuality” at a deeper level as well.661  Even the banalities of 
everyday talk, by representing a common and tacitly acknowledged standard of behavior, help to 
identify a shared culture.662  In the process of “getting to know you,” a social speaker is also 
automatically “getting to know us” – she is exploring the “common context, traits, circumstances, 
or passions that make of two separate identities one singular we.”663  And, of course, this is a 
dynamic process.  At the same time that individuals are learning commonalities and defining who 
is “us,” they are also contributing to that dialogue, thereby influencing the composition of “us.”   
Naturally, most people will eventually grow to feel a connection to “us.”  And that 
connection—based upon a common history, a common set of norms, a common purpose, etc.—
is not just rational, but it is emotional as well.  Social speech, due to its tendency to manifest with 
a relatively personal style and tone, takes information about individual commonalities and 
transforms them into a larger sense of a community.  As Barber explains, although we may 
“convey information, articulate interests, and pursue arguments” through words, “it is through 
tone, color, volume, and inflection that we feel, affect, and touch each other.” 664  And it is there 
that social speech has the upper hand over other forms of speech.  Through the use of these 
rhetorical devices, social speech is able to build real, affective communities. 
It is important to note, however, that social speech, by itself, is only part of how 
communities are developed and defined.  The process of determining an “us” is not entirely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
661 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 184. 
662 “And our talk is peppered with ritual speech: greetings and goodbyes, prayers and 
incantations, exclamations and expletives, all of which in their banality and conventionality 
express and reinforce the daily structures of common life” (Ibid., pp. 187). 
663 Ibid., pp. 184. 
664 Ibid., pp. 187.  Note that Barber distinguishes the discovering commonalities function of 
speech from its tendency to develop a sense of affection:  “Although conversation clearly can 
help to build friendship and nourish affection and thus to knit together a viable community, the 
exploration of mutuality through conversation is a function of talk that is distinct from that of 
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bottom-up; rather, it involves the interaction between both bottom-up and top-down forces.  
Indeed, the social interactions that are so important in building communities are influenced by, 
and take place within the context of, top-down government decisions structuring membership.   
And just as communities are built through the intersection of individual and state actions, 
so too do the personal ties that one feels to her perceived community serve important purposes 
at both a personal and a political level.  At the individual level, humans—as social beings—have a 
tendency to not only understand themselves in relation to others, but they also want to feel like 
they are part of a group.  By providing them with that feeling of membership, social speech 
enables individuals to achieve a more desirable state of being, and helps to ward off the 
psychological damage posed by social isolation.  And at the political level, affective connections 
to a community not only increase the likelihood that an individual will participate in democratic 
government, but they also help to ensure that when she does so, she will be willing to make the 
personal sacrifices necessary to benefit the whole.  Furthermore, since politics occurs in the unit 
of the state, any actions that contribute to the outlines of those states—who should be included 
and who should be excluded—are likely to have significant geopolitical consequences.  Thus, 
social speech becomes political action in its own right. 
 Before discussing the more directly political implications of social speech’s boundary 
forging mechanism, it is important to examine the effects that this process has on the individual.  
As I discussed earlier in this chapter—and in more in depth in Chapter Four—John Stuart Mill’s 
theory of the individual suggests that a person can only truly understand herself, as an individual, 
within a social context.  In other words, one’s individual identity cannot be wholly divorced from 
her social identity.  As people go through life, their prior individual identities (to the extent that 
they exist) confront group dynamics, thus influencing those dynamics and being influenced by 
them.  
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 The importance of one’s social identity cannot be overemphasized.  Not only does it 
fundamentally affect the choices that an individual makes in life by providing her with information 
about what is appropriate for “someone like me” to believe and to do, but it may also serve as her 
very raison d’être.665  The desire to feel like a member of a social group represents an essential 
aspect of human existence.  Without such human connections, an individual may not only fail to 
develop a full sense of self, but she may eventually come to find life not worth living.   
In the first real study of its kind, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, Emile Durkheim explores 
the potentially severe negative consequences of social isolationism.666  As the title of his book 
suggests, Durkheim specifically explores the extreme example of suicide.  Rather than examining 
individual cases of suicide in order to determine their immediate and proximate causes, Durkheim 
looks at the phenomenon of suicide more generally.  He finds that different societies have 
different aptitudes for suicide at different periods in history.667  And while populations may 
fluctuate (thus varying the number of suicides that occur in a community over time), Durkheim 
shows that suicide rates remain relatively constant within a given society.668 
 In order to explain both the differing suicide rates across societies and also the relative 
consistency within them, Durkheim believes that suicide must be the result of a social 
phenomenon.  He claims that suicide is not simply an individual problem—as it had previously 
been understood to be—but rather, a community’s suicide rate is contingent upon social 
factors.669  Specifically, where the norms of a community encourage individuals to feel like they 
are integrated into a strong, coherent group, those individuals are likely to be more resilient 
against suicidal tendencies.  On the other hand, societies that do not inspire such feelings of 
belonging tend to breed members that are more vulnerable to suicide.   
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This relationship is due to the fact that feelings of community and camaraderie tend to 
breed a more communal, and less individualistic, personal ethos, Durkheim claims.  The less that 
an individual feels connected to her community and “the less he depends on them, the more he 
consequently depends only on himself and recognizes no other rules of conduct than what are 
founded on his private interests.”670  In other words, a person with an entirely individualistic 
worldview may feel she has “no reason to endure life’s sufferings patiently,” and may choose to 
take self-interested action; on the other hand, an individual who feels emotionally connected to 
her community may “cling to life more resolutely… so as not to betray interests they put before 
their own.”671  Thus, Durkheim finds that predominantly Catholic societies tend to exhibit lower 
suicide rates than predominantly Protestant societies672; married people tend to commit suicide 
less often than single people673; and those in the midst of political turmoil are less likely to commit 
suicide than those in a stable political system.674 
Although Durkheim’s theory has been amended over the years, its main points still 
remain the standard for the study of sociology:  People who feel like they belong to a community 
are more likely to equate their personal good with the good of all.  These people then not only 
make choices in consideration of the good of all but they also, tend to find themselves more 
personally fulfilled.  As Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 Ibid., pp. 209. 
671 Ibid., pp. 209-210. 
672 Durkheim claims that Protestants are especially vulnerable to suicide because their religion is 
less cohesive and structured—and therefore, develops less of a sense of community—than other 
religions (e.g. Catholicism).  Ibid., pp. 158-170. 
673 Ibid., pp. 175. 
674 Durkheim suggests that this is because social turmoil may cause individuals to recognize join 
interests and thereby strengthen community bonds: “These facts are therefore susceptible of only 
one interpretation; namely, that great social disturbances and great popular wars rouse collective 
sentiments, stimulate partisan spirit and patriotism, political and national faith, alike, and 
concentrating activity toward a single end, at least temporarily cause a stronger integration of 
society.  The salutatory influences which we have just shown to exist is due not to the crisis but to 
the struggle it occasions.  As they force men to close ranks and confront the common danger, the 
individual thinks less of himself and more of the common cause.  Besides, it is comprehensible 
that this integration may not be purely momentary but may sometimes outlive its immediate 
causes, especially when it is intense” (Ibid., pp. 208). 
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Steven M. Tipton discover in their study of middle-class American life, the “quest for purely 
private fulfillment is illusory: it often ends in emptiness instead.”675  Those who equate their 
private interests with the public good, on the other hand, “evince an individualism that is not 
empty but is full of content drawn from an active identification with communities and traditions.”676 
Durkheim’s theory has significant implications for political theory as well.  If those who 
feel disconnected from their communities are less likely to consider the interests of others when 
making decisions regarding their lives, it stands to reason that those same individuals would be 
less likely to consider the wants and needs of others when making decisions about their political 
lives.  And the corollary is also probable.  If individuals who feel like true members of a 
community are more likely to act in terms of the good of the whole, then they are also more likely 
to consider group interests when acting in a political capacity. 
In practice, this means that individuals who, through social speech, have come to identify 
with a particular community are more likely to not only participate in democratic political action, 
but those within the community are also more likely to pursue liberal, egalitarian ends when they 
do so.  Laboratory studies of social communication have shown that participants who come to 
associate their individual interests with those of their group are significantly more likely to engage 
in cooperative actions.677  Caroline Kelly and Sara Breinlinger, for example, have found this to be 
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the case with women.678  The more that an individual female was able to self-identify as a 
member of the community “women,” the more likely she was to be politically engaged.679  
Similarly, in “Opinion-based group membership as a predictor of commitment to political action,” 
Ana-Maria Bliuc, Craig McGarthy, Katherine Reynolds and Daniela Muntele show that 
identification with a group is a good predictor of political behavioral intentions.680  Although their 
study looks specifically at the relationship between political action and feelings of membership in 
an opinion-based group, the authors do present several finding that can be applied to group 
membership, more generally.681  Namely, they find that the more that an individual sees herself 
as a member of particular groups, the more likely it is that she will be willing to act “in line with the 
norms of these groups.”682 
In other words, not only do Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds and Muntele find that individuals are 
more likely to engage in political action when they feel an emotional connection to their particular 
communities, but they also suggest that these individuals are more likely to act in ways that 
reflect their groups’ needs and preferences when they do perform politically.  If one feels both 
personally connected to and invested in the fate of a certain people, it makes sense that she 
would want to pursue that group’s interests to the best of her ability. 
Similarly, Jane J. Mansbridge has found that, when members of a defined community feel 
a positive affective connection to other members of their group, the result is often favorable to 
democratic political outcomes.  In her study of “Selby,” Vermont, Mansbridge explores the unitary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
678 Caroline Kelly and Sara Breinlinger, “Identity and Injustice: Exploring Women’s Participation in 
Collective Action,” in Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 5 (1995), pp. 41-
57. 
679 In their study of multiple factors affecting political involvement, their measure of identification 
with the female community had the greatest link to political action.).  See ibid. 
680 Ana-Maria Bliuc, Craig McGarty, Katherine Reynolds and Daniela Muntele, “Opinion-based 
group membership as a predictor of commitment to political action,” in European Journal of Social 
Psychology, Vol. 37 (2007), pp. 19-37. 
681 These findings, the authors warn, apply to non-opinion-based groups as well, although the 
links between general group membership and political action are weaker. 
682 Ibid., pp. 20. 
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democracy/consensus model, finding that such a model only successfully exists where the 
community is founded on the idea of friendship (i.e. equality, mutual enjoyment and a sense of 
shared good).683  When community members feel like they are not merely compatriots, but actual 
friends who share a positive emotional bond, they tend to be more excited and eager to work 
together amicably and with a common goal in mind.  As Mansbridge explains,  
Friends are equals.  They choose to spend their time together.  They share common 
values.  They expand in each other’s company.  So, too, in a democracy based on 
friendship, participants are equal in status; the costs of participation, of which some make 
so much, do not feel heavy.  Citizens “fly to the assemblies” as if to meet their friends.  
They value the time they spend on common affairs.  They share a common good, and 
are able, as a consequence, to make their decisions unanimously.684 
Essentially, when individuals feel a positive personal connection to members of their political 
community, politics becomes easier.  By clearly defining the “us”—but only in a positively, friendly 
manner—social interactions not only make citizens more excited about participating in local 
politics, but they also encourage them to pursue cooperative measures and democratic 
outcomes.  
 Indeed, this is exactly what Mansbridge witnesses in the town of Selby – friendship being 
used as a conduit to good democratic governance.  As she explains, much of the amiability she 
observed at town meetings was the result of preexisting personal relationships, built up in social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
683 Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
pp. 1983, pp. 8.  Selby, VT is not, however, a perfect example of unitary democracy.  As 
Mansbridge explains, “Selby is small, and its citizens govern themselves by coming together once 
or more a year in a face-to-face assembly—the town meeting.  These two facts lead Selby’s 
citizens in a unitary direction.  But Selby’s citizens are not all alike.  They have differing interests.  
As Americans, moreover, they have inherited a primarily adversary tradition.  Selby thus throws 
into visible relief the struggle in any democracy between unitary and adversary forces” (Ibid., pp. 
39). 
684 Ibid., pp. 9. 
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settings.685  The residents of Selby all spent significant amounts of time informally and 
spontaneously socializing with one another, at places like the general store, before entering the 
political arena.686  After a while, these informal interactions made it easier for the diverse 
townspeople to locate common interests.  And through their common interests, the residents of 
Selby were able to establish a sense of “us” (also, necessarily, creating a “them”), complete with 
a kind of private vocabulary, which they then carried over into the political realm.  There were 
unspoken understandings based on traditional behaviors.  There were private jokes that relieve 
tensions.  There was the casual use of nicknames and teasing that puts people at ease, even 
when acting in their political capacities.687  All of these elements served to amplify feelings of 
unity and friendliness.  
Thus, because of their positive social and intimate relationships, many of the residents of 
Selby seemed to want to try to get along and work together when they entered a political context.  
Although they could not abandon their adversarial tendencies completely, the citizens of Selby 
worked hard not to be at odds with one another in their town meetings.  As a result, town 
meetings tended to produce more unitary political outcomes.  As Mansbridge explains, the 
residents of Selby “want to be friends, and can sometimes find policies that approach a common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 “The face-to-face character of the town meeting deepens the ties that bind members of the 
town together.  Citizens who see one another at a meeting realize that their opponents are 
human” (Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, pp. 74). 
686 “At the register [of Tyson’s general store], someone passes a few words to the storekeeper’s 
wife.  A couple of men gather at the gas pump as one fills his pickup.  At the store’s lunch counter 
in the morning, at noon, or after work, the men stop in for coffee, hoping to see someone they 
know” (Ibid., pp. 41). 
687 “The informality in Selby’s town meeting includes using first names and joking.  Wallace Tyson 
makes a sally about his wife’s ‘huge’ salary, calls out a comment on Harvey Simonds (‘If his 
figures aren’t right, I’ll get him later!’), or, in another town meeting, jokes about the three women 
who had been town auditors for years (‘I nominate Leona Bussiere because if Leona didn’t do it, 
Ethel Quimby would be out in the cold!’).  These witticisms, not very funny to an outsider, relieve 
the tension and remind the townspeople that they are all friends, all in on the joke” (Ibid., pp. 66). 
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interest.”688  The more that they are in regular social contact with one another, the greater “their 
desire to settle things unanimously.”689 
 Not only does friendship appear to facilitate political action and unanimous outcomes, as 
Mansbridge claims, but it may also contribute to liberal democratic policymaking in another way 
as well – by promoting authenticity.  It is possible that, when members of a community feel like 
they are friends, they become more willing to express themselves openly and honestly than they 
otherwise might be.  As a result of this more authentic expression of wants and interests, the 
state becomes more capable of representing its citizen’s true needs.  As Nina Eliasoph claims, for 
many Americans, it is only when they are among friends that they feel like they freely express 
personal opinions of political value.  “Most of the time,” she explains of her study of social speech, 
“intimate, late night, moonlit conversations were the only places other than interviews where that 
kind of discussion [about political discontent] could happen.”690  When Eliasoph’s subjects were 
around others with whom they did not feel a close, positive affective connection, however, “such 
discussion was almost always considered inappropriate and out of place.”691 
 According to Eliasoph’s studies, the cocoon of friendship is one of the few communicative 
spaces within which individuals are willing to let their rhetorical guards down and open up.  Noting 
that her subjects often “sounded better backstage than frontstage,” Eliasoph theorizes that 
individuals may not feel as if they have to perform as much when they are with a private group of 
friends as when they are speaking in a more formal, public capacity.692  Thus, they can admit 
what they do not know, remain receptive to new ideas and stray from orthodoxy.  As Eliasoph 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688 Ibid., pp. 46. 
689 Ibid. 
690 Eliasoph, Avoiding politics, pp. 7. 
691 Ibid. 
692 In this case, “better” refers to an inclusiveness and wideness of ideas.  “In a strange process 
of political evaporation, every group fell into this strictly patterned shift in discourse: what was 
announced aloud was less open to debate, less aimed at expressing connection to the wider 
world, less public-spirited, more insistently selfish, than what was whispered” (Ibid.).  See also 
Nina Eliasoph, “Making a Fragile Public: A Talk-Centered Study of Citizenship and Power,” in 
Sociological Theory, Vol. 14, No. 3 (November, 1996), pp. 263. 
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writes, “[a] person freely spouting ideas in a bar can argue both sides at once just for the sake of 
making a good argument, try out half-baked ideas on an audience that is not poised for 
immediate action, write the mental rough draft before the idea congeals into a platform.”693  In 
these friendly, playful spaces, there may, indeed, be less risk in experimenting with controversial 
or half-baked ideas.  Thus, individuals become freer to explore—and eventually express—their 
true feelings. 
Unfortunately, despite these potential advantages—greater participation in politics, more 
community-minded decision making, a focus on attaining unanimous political outcomes and a 
propensity towards authenticity—it is important to note that the relationship between an 
individual’s ties to a defined community and her political choices is not always positive.  Many of 
the studies cited above presuppose that, to the extent that a connection to one’s community 
exists, it must be a positive connection.  Affective attachment, however, is not necessarily the 
same as affection.  Through conversation, individuals may get to know and understand one 
another as compatriots, but that does not mean that they will necessarily like what they know and 
understand.  And it is only when one’s connection to her community is characterized by positive 
feelings of attachment that the boundary forging mechanism of social speech is likely to breed 
useful results for democratic citizenship and political outcomes.  The rest of the time, an 
individual’s personal connection to her community may lead to significantly more disappointing 
results.   
For the remainder of this section, I examine the negative potentialities of boundary 
forging.  First, I look at the ways in which a well-defined community modeled on friendship is 
necessarily exclusionary.  The focus on in-group friendship only draws attention to the fact that 
some people are not friends.  This may be because they are either: 1) members of an out-group 
or 2) outsiders within their in-group.  In either case, those who fall outside the boundaries of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics, pp. 88. 
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friendship often find their interests poorly represented.  This leads to my second democratic 
critique of a friendship model, which is that, it may not actually increase authenticity.  In contrast 
to Eliasoph’s theory, I argue that individuals are perhaps just as likely to feel the need to perform 
when they are among friends as they are when they are among strangers (although the content 
of that performance may differ).  Thus, it is difficult to claim that a friendship model makes 
individuals more likely to share their true interests with the political body.   
To begin, it is important to remember that the creation of an in-group necessarily implies 
the existence of an out-group.  One cannot have an “us” without also having a distinct “them.”  
And although drawing a sharp line between in-groups and out-groups can go a long way in 
establishing cohesion, love and solidarity among members of the in-groups, it is also likely to 
breed negative feelings towards members of out-groups.  As Walsh explains, this dark side of 
community building comes hand-in-hand with its more positive functions: 
Whether in the corner store, the craft guild, or other settings that allow people to talk 
informally, Americans work out who they will include in the psychological communities 
that they use to make sense of politics.  Part of this is the ‘good stuff’ of maintaining 
friendships and a sense of place.  But part of it is the less-than-honorable thoughts and 
actions that Americans—regardless of ideological stripe—create and perpetuate through 
making connections to some groups while actively distancing themselves from others.694 
Indeed, it is not enough for there to be a clear “us” and “them.”  To the extent that an individual 
feels an emotional connection to the “us,” she is often likely to demonize the “them.”695   
 These antagonisms, unfortunately, compromise the democratic value of inclusiveness.  In 
an increasingly global world, in which the consequences of one community’s actions cannot be 
completely divorced from the circumstances of other communities, it would be to the advantage of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
694 Walsh, Talking about Politics, pp. 169. 
695 This may happen in the other direction as well.  The more that one demonizes the out-group, 
the more likely that the will recognize and take pride in her in-group. 
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all to take into account the wants of needs of as wide a political network as possible.  As long as 
the divisions between in-groups and out-groups remain strong, however, such political 
consideration remains unlikely. 
 Still, it is not just members of out-groups who face exclusion when social speech is used 
to create powerful, enduring bonds of community.  Oftentimes, those on the inside of an in-group 
will find themselves unrepresented within the political process as well.  This is perhaps even more 
likely when an in-group is brought together in the model of friendship.  Although friendship may 
empower some individuals to participate more honestly and more actively in politics, many, 
motivated by the desire to achieve unanimity, may feel pressured into repressing their opinions 
and ideas.  Still others may find themselves less likely to participate out of the fear of negative 
social reprisals.  And unfortunately, there may be a correlation between one’s socioeconomic 
status and the likelihood that she will be silenced by her community in some way, with those 
individuals who are less well off feeling greater social pressures than those who are more 
advantaged. 
As Mansbridge explains, even in Selby, not everyone is well represented at all times.  
Friendship-based communities tend to encourage members to resist adversarial actions and 
pursue unanimity.  The problem with unanimity, however, is that unless everyone truly is of one 
mind, some individuals must be silenced in order to achieve it.  This silencing may take place 
voluntarily or involuntarily, but in either case, the preferences of certain community members are 
necessarily going to be excluded. 
The desire for unanimity is not the only cause for silencing within a friendship-based 
community, however.  Often, as Mansbridge describes, the residents of Selby were too afraid to 
speak up amongst their “friends.”  There was a common fear among many town meeting 
participants that they would be laughed at or treated with disrespect were they to voice their 
opinions.  Take Mansbridge’s interview with Selby native, Edith Hurley, as an example.  Hurley 
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explained how the intimidation that she experienced in town hall meetings came out of a fear of 
feeling marginalized and belittled.  “They all sit there, and they listen while you’re talking,” she 
said, “but the minute you leave the room or something, they laugh behind your back and poke fun 
at it because you did open your mouth.”696  Whether this fear of mockery was justifiable or not, it 
did have enough salience to Hurley to keep her from participating in town affairs. 
When Hurley explained her experiences to Mansbridge, she was hardly new to Selby, 
having been a resident for years.  Like many others in Selby, she felt like her marginalization was 
based primarily on her lower socioeconomic status.  As Hurley explained to Mansbridge, the 
social division in Selby was primarily based upon differences in wealth and social class, with the 
more well off members of the community feeling included and the less well off members of the 
community feeling excluded.697  In other words, those in a more privileged socioeconomic 
position were more likely to feel like insiders, and were, therefore, more comfortable participating 
in town meetings.  Lower income individuals, on the other hand, were more likely to feel like 
outsiders.  This meant that they more often harbored a fear of public ridicule, which encouraged 
them to stay relatively quiet.698  The disparity between the social comfort level experienced by 
more advantaged members of the community and that, which was felt by the less advantaged 
members of the community, meant that the latter ended up with only minimal input into village 
politics. 
Mansbridge’s findings are, of course, not entirely specific to the town of Selby.  It is 
common for those in a relatively poor socioeconomic position to have a more difficult time being 
absorbed into their in-groups as their more advantaged neighbors.  As outsiders within their in-
groups, the former individuals not only risk having their needs discounted by their wider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696 Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, pp. 62. 
697 See ibid., pp. 100-102 and pp. 107-110. 
698 “In speaking at meetings,” Mansbridge explains, people in lower socioeconomic classes “feel 
more subject to ridicule (remember the comments, ‘They’ll say ‘She’s a fool!’’; ‘I haven’t got the 
education to decide on that stuff’; ‘If you go there and speak up, they make fun of you’) and are 
less likely to convince anyone” (Ibid., pp. 109). 
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communities, but they may also choose to silence themselves when they may have otherwise 
spoken up. 
This points to a second way in which social speech—by encouraging the forging of 
community boundaries based on friendship—may jeopardize the liberal democratic desire to 
ensure full and accurate representation of a populace.  While some individuals may feel like they 
are able to fully express their most authentic selves when they are among friends, the majority of 
people would probably admit that there is a performative element to these social interactions as 
well.  Even Eliasoph notes this phenomenon in her analysis of “The Buffalo Club.”  Members of 
this friendship-based group were “haunted by an overwhelming sense of social inequality and 
political powerlessness,” she explains.699  This meant that, when they were together, Buffalo Club 
members often had try to appear as irreverent and separate from the wider world as possible.  
Being that the exclusion of political topics from this group was not always the result of a natural 
inclination, but rather, it was done actively and self-consciously, suggests that members were not 
necessarily being as authentic among their friends and the rest of Eliasoph’s research would 
suggest.  It also casts some doubt on the accuracy with which the other social groups that she 
studies actually represent the true beliefs of their members. 
  Thus, while it is clear that there is an inherent democratic value to the kind of boundary 
forming that social speech encourages, it is important to note that there are also several negative 
aspects to this process.  Social speech that makes some people feel included but makes others 
feel excluded hardly contributes to the democratic goals of inclusiveness and equality.  To the 
extent that these groups are often divided along socioeconomic lines, boundary forging potentially 
poses a significant problem for democratic governance. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
699 Eliasoph, “Making a Fragile Public,” pp. 279. 
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III. Advantages of a theory of social speech – Increasing inclusiveness and 
addressing inequality: 
Taken together, these four aspects of social speech—1) Character development; 2) 
Social capital formation; 3) Cultural and political training; and 4) Boundary forging—provide ample 
justification for including them in a political theory of speech.  By addressing and incorporating 
these functions of informal, everyday conversation, the theory of social speech that I have 
presented is able to capture a wide range of political action and consequences that is missing 
from deliberative democratic and American legal theories of speech.  In the final sections of this 
chapter, however, I suggest two additional advantages of my theory of social speech over the 
contemporary models I discussed in Chapters Two and Three: 1) It is relatively inclusive; and 2) It 
better addresses the problem of inequality.   
The first and most obvious advantage of a theory of social speech is that it is able to 
address the realities of communication.  While it is a valuable endeavor to create perfect models 
of speech that people should follow, throughout this project, I have been more interested in 
looking at how individuals actually do interact.  And when one examines the ways in which people 
truly are communicating with one another, it appears that they do not tend to behave according to 
the ideals described by deliberative and legal theorists.  Individuals may incorporate reason into 
their arguments and behave with some decorum, but they are also likely to utilize more emotions 
appeals as well.  This “emotional speech” may incorporate any number of techniques for evoking 
a response, including rhetoric, testimony and narrative.  Unfortunately, because it does not strictly 
adhere to the values of impartiality, publicity and autonomy that characterize ideal deliberation, 
“emotional” speech is frequently omitted from contemporary models of speech, even when it 
takes occurs in more traditional political communication.  The theory of social speech, on the 
other hand, embraces these oft-utilized forms of communication.   
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A second advantage of including the intimate, private and social in a theory of speech is 
that it addresses the problem of inequality that plagues deliberative and jurisprudential models.  
Despite best wishes, all citizens are not born with absolute natural equality.  Differences in 
educational opportunities, lifestyles and economic means further exacerbate any preexisting 
natural inequalities along socioeconomic and gendered lines.  Specifically, whereas wealthy, 
white males are more likely to receive a lifelong training that makes them relatively well-suited to 
rational deliberation, those who are less well off, less white and less male are more likely to rely 
on other, less traditionally political forms of communication.  Deliberative democratic and 
American legal theorists, by favoring rational, reasoned, political dialogue, further elevate the 
social standing of those who already most advantaged in society.  What is worse, because these 
theorists tend to work with ideal, abstract theories, they are often unable to acknowledge or 
account for their implicit favoritism.  The theory of social speech, on the other hand, by beginning 
from an empirical observation of speech, is able to underscore inequalities where they occur. 
 
A. Increasing inclusiveness: 
Very little of everyday communication actually takes the form of formal political 
deliberation, characterized by rational, considered dialogue.  Rather, for the most part, when 
individuals speak to one another, they are generally engaging in social speech.  And as I have 
described throughout this chapter, social speech tends to employ more informal, affective 
communicative devices – or, what I have called, “emotional speech.”  Individuals not only find that 
this type of communication tends to come more naturally to them, but they also quickly learn that 
it is one of the most effective tools for expressing themselves and relating their ideas to others.  
Sympathetic appeals enable individuals to communicate their experiences, opinions and 
arguments to others in instances where rational, dispassionate discourse would be inappropriate 
or insufficient.  For example, in social settings—where a formal debate might seem out of place—
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individuals are likely to communicate using emotional speech.  And when an individual is 
grappling with a subject that cannot adequately be expressed through a mere telling of facts and 
figures (e.g. racism), emotional appeals often present a better option for relating a full picture of 
the phenomenon. 
But the social sphere is not the only appropriate venue for emotional speech.  In the 
political sphere, public actors also often find themselves utilizing less formally rational discursive 
tools in order to persuade an audience, share an insight or relate an experience.  Indeed, in 
practice, the same emotional speech that is so indicative of social speech often find expression 
through more traditionally political speech as well.  However, despite its prevalence in both social 
and political interactions, emotional speech is often absented from contemporary deliberative 
democratic and jurisprudential theories of speech.  As a result, not only do such theories fail to 
address the realities of everyday communication, but they also omit a large portion of political 
speech as well.   
In this section, I discuss the functionality of emotional speech.  Building off of Lynn 
Sanders’ essay, “Against Deliberation,” I have identified three forms of emotional speech that play 
a central role in both everyday communication and also more traditional political speech, but are, 
nevertheless, frequently disregarded in contemporary theories of speech: 1) rhetoric, 2) testimony 
and 3) story-telling.700  I argue that each of these types of emotional speech contribute towards 
liberal political outcomes and democratic goals in different ways – from expressing respect for 
difference and individuality, to honoring unorthodox ideas, to uniting communities in empathy.  
Given these functions, I believe that it is necessary for any comprehensive political theory of 
speech to at least address emotional speech.  And because the theory of social speech 
presented in this project necessarily incorporates and validates emotional speech, I would argue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700 See Lynn M. Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” in Political Theory, Vol. 25, No. 3 (June, 1997), 
pp. 347-376. 
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that this gives it a significant advantage over other, more restrictive contemporary theories of 
speech. 
First, despite its negative connotations, rhetoric has served a useful purpose in 
communication, dating at least as far back as Aristotle.701  In essence, rhetoric is a tool of 
persuasion.  As Henry Richardson defines it, “[p]ersuasive rhetoric is the art of employing 
language so as to bring about changes in one’s audience’s practical commitments, especially by 
making appeal to their emotions.”702  More concretely, rhetoric enables a speaker to acknowledge 
personal differences in her audience, tailoring her arguments and appeals to the passions and 
partialities of each individual.703    
This represents a significant deviation from a more formal, deliberative approach.  
Whereas reason-based appeals assume sameness—requiring a speaker to appeal to some 
abstract rational actor—rhetoric respects difference.  As Bryan Garsten explains, when 
individuals reason, they appeal to all audiences the same way; with rhetoric, on the other hand, 
they appeal to people’s particularities.  “When we try to persuade,” he writes, “we use the 
arguments, images, and emotions most likely to appeal to the particular audience in front of us.  
Rhetoricians who teach the art of persuasion have always instructed their students to treat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701 In modern and contemporary political theory and practice, rhetoric has often been conflated 
with manipulation, deception and pandering.  See Bryan Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defense 
of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).  As Garsten 
explains, “[p]olitical theorists tend to focus on reasonable dialogues of justification rather than 
passionate exchanges of rhetoric.  While actual politicians have no abandoned persuasion (how 
could they?), they prefer not to acknowledge their art.  They understand that when they hear an 
argument described as ‘rhetorical,’ it is being either decried as manipulative or dismissed as 
superficial” (Ibid., pp. 3). 
702 Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 90. 
703 It is through this respect for others that rhetoric serves as not only a useful communicative 
tool, but also as a means for uniting communities and (potentially) breaking down class barriers.  
See Jay Fliegelman, Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language, and the Culture of 
Performance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
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different audiences differently, to study their distinctive and peculiar passions and their particular 
commitments, sentiments, and beliefs.”704   
This individualized approach is not only normatively appealing—in that it forces the 
speaker “to display a certain respect” for different perspectives and judgments—but it is also 
relatively effective in terms of persuading one’s audience to modify its beliefs.705  Indeed, rhetoric 
is a practical tool, one that begins from the assumption that most people look very little like the 
ideal deliberative citizen, and then addresses them as they are (i.e. “opinionated, self-interested, 
sentimental, partial to their friends and family, and often unreasonable”).706  As Garsten explains, 
rhetoricians “engage with others wherever they stand and… begin [their] argument there, as 
opposed to simply asserting that they would adopt [the rhetoricians’] opinion if they were more 
reasonable.”707  This more realistic approach tends to have a greater resonance with audiences 
than the more “one size fits all” attitude of rational deliberation. 
Second, testimony also has a long history in politics, especially within Black churches in 
the United States.708  Like rhetoric, testimony embraces difference.  However, testimony goes 
beyond merely acknowledging and validating difference – it also gives a voice to minority 
viewpoints.  The goal of testimony is not to reach a consensus, but to ensure that all segments of 
the population are heard and “to include and represent a fuller range of critical voices.”709  As a 
result of this inclusiveness, “perspectives not obviously rooted in common ground and not 
necessarily voiced in a calmly rational way” receive an audience through testimony that they may 
not have been able to attain in a more formal deliberative model.710  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704 Garsten, Saving Persuasion, pp. 5. 
705 Ibid., pp. .3. 
706 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
707 Ibid., pp. 3. 
708 Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” pp. 370. 
709 Ibid., pp. 371. 
710 Ibid., pp. 372. 
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Finally, much like testimony, story-telling (i.e. narrative) offers a pathway for less 
orthodox viewpoints and perspectives to enter the political sphere.  Individuals often use story-
telling in situations where deliberate, factual or rational arguments would not adequately express 
the issue at hand.  Specifically, when one’s topic is especially grave, sometimes, a speaker will 
find that she must rely less on data and more on emotional, personal appeals.  And in doing so, 
she may often find that she is able to establish a deeper connection to her audience than if she 
were to have used a more data-driven approach.  
For example, Kimberly K. Smith’s work on slave narratives shows how rational speech 
may not always be the best method for getting one’s point across.711  In this case, Smith explains, 
by straying from a factual account and offering more a narrative presentation, slaves were 
actually able to provide a more truthful representation of slavery – a morally truthful 
representation of slavery.712  Furthermore, the story-telling model offered slaves the opportunity, 
not only to share their individual experiences (thus establishing a common body of facts from 
which to argue), but also to appeal to the emotions of the general public in ways that would not be 
possible through rational speech alone, thereby accomplishing moral reform.713  This is because, 
according to Smith, story-telling tended to breed sympathy and empathy among non-slaves – and 
those feelings of understanding had powerful public policy results.  “[B]ecause sympathy allows 
one person to share in the experiences of another,” she explains, “it has the power to extend the 
feeling of the slave’s suffering among the public, and thus prompt general resistance to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
711 See Kimberly K. Smith, The Dominion of Voice: Riot, Reason, & Romance in Antebellum 
Politics (Lawrence, KS: The University of Kansas Press, 1999). 
712 As Smith explains, “even if the story had only a slight connection to its factual basis, it might 
still be true; romance novels claimed to deal in a different kind of truth than the factual, verifiable 
sort of truth that politics was supposed to be based on.  They purported to teach moral truths, 
general principles of right conduct and its consequences that transcended the actor’s specific 
circumstances” (Ibid., pp. 191). 
713 Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
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slavery.”714  In other words, by breeding sympathy, narratives were able to make slave interests 
more general. 
To summarize, rhetoric, testimony and story-telling are all useful and valuable 
communicative tools.  First, by enabling a speaker to respect difference and address individuals 
as they are (not how they ought to be), rhetoric not only validates the social existence of all 
people, but it is also highly persuasive.  Second, by facilitating the introduction of new and 
controversial viewpoints into the marketplace of ideas, testimony contributes to greater 
inclusiveness within both the political and social spheres.  Finally, by utilizing a more personal, 
emotional approach, story-telling not only helps individuals express moral truths but it also 
enables them to establish the kind of empathy that should ultimately result in greater unity within 
a community.   
Thus, all three forms of emotional speech have particular roles to play within liberal, 
democratic states.  And frequently—both in the political and the social arena—individuals really 
do utilize emotional speech.  Public and private persons use narratives, anecdotes and rhetoric 
every day in order to get their ideas across in ways that are more persuasive, more touching and 
less offensive to others.  And in light of both its democratic utility and also its prevalence, it would 
seem as if emotional speech should have earned a place in all democratic political speech 
theories of speech.  Indeed, those are two of the main rationales for developing a theory of social 
speech that necessarily includes emotional speech.  And yet, rhetoric, testimony and story-telling 
still remain on the periphery of contemporary theories of speech.  By omitting emotional speech, 
many contemporary theories of speech not only fail to address the realities of everyday 
communication, but they also miss out on several substantial democratic functions of speech.   
 
B. Addressing inequality: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 Ibid., pp. 203. 
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A second advantage of a theory of social speech is that it addresses the problems of 
inequality that plague deliberative and jurisprudential models of speech.  As explained in 
Chapters Two and Three, the ability to express oneself well and effectively—according to formal, 
political standards—is not equally distributed among different demographic groups.  Specifically, 
those who are already relatively advantaged from a socioeconomic perspective (e.g. male, 
wealthy, white) are more likely to have developed the character traits, trust, skills and personal 
connections that facilitate traditionally political, public speech.  Those who begin from a less 
favorable socioeconomic position (e.g. female, low income, minority), on the other hand, are less 
likely to have acquired the tools for success in formal deliberation and political discourse.  
Unfortunately, by elevating this kind of speech above all others, deliberative democratic 
and American legal theorists reinforce and perpetuate these inequalities.  And by presenting ideal 
theoretical models that necessarily presuppose some equality of talent in and access to formal, 
rational, dispassionate discussion, deliberative democratic and American legal theorists are often 
forced to gloss over these inequalities.  The theory of social speech, on the other hand, by 
looking at how speech actually occurs, is able to account for the inequalities inherent in 
communication.  By drawing attention to social speech, which is practiced by all individuals in all 
socioeconomic circumstances, the theory of social speech acknowledges and validates the 
communicative experiences of those groups that have frequently been marginalized in 
deliberative democratic and American legal theories of speech.  It also provides a useful 
framework for devising methods to alleviate inequalities where they occur. 
  In this section, I briefly revisit the inequality critiques of both deliberative democratic 
theory and American legal theory that I presented in Chapters Two and Three, respectively.  I 
then summarize and highlight the ways in which the four mechanisms presented in this chapter 
address the issue of inequality. 
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To begin, political and legal theories that elevate rational, researched, dispassionate 
dialogue above all other forms of communication also implicitly privilege those who are more 
adept at such speech.  Certain individuals, after all, are simply better at engaging in reasoned, 
reasonable conversation than others.  As a result, they have an automatic advantage within 
deliberative democratic and American legal theories that favor such speech – not only do they 
perform better within these arenas, but the very fact that their style of speaking is held up as the 
ideal, also puts them in a superior position, symbolically.   
The fact that not all individuals are equally proficient in rational, reasoned speech does 
not necessarily pose a significant problem from the perspective of inequality, however.  The 
problem only arises when certain groups systematically find themselves without an equal 
opportunity to develop a capacity and fondness for this kind of speech.  And unfortunately, while 
a proficiency in formal, political deliberation may, in some cases, be the result of a natural gift, it 
more commonly comes about as the result of an individual’s fortuitous socioeconomic positioning.  
For a multitude of reasons, those who are male, white and higher income tend to become more 
adept at this type of communication than those who are female, minority and lower income.  As 
Sanders writes, those “who are already underrepresented in formal political institutions and who 
are systematically materially disadvantaged, namely women; racial minorities, especially Blacks; 
and poorer people,” are especially likely to present their arguments in ways that are less 
characteristically deliberative.715  And as a result, members of these less fortunate groups 
disproportionately find themselves overwhelmed or out-argued in formal, political deliberation.  
Indeed, many may choose to exclude themselves from speech venues that valorize only this 
narrow type of communication (thus, implicitly, devaluing all others kinds).  In this way, large 
segments of the population are systematically silenced by a preference for formal, political 
speech. 
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Unfortunately, not only do deliberative democratic and American legal theorists reinforce 
and establish inequality by valorizing that speech, which is both characteristic of those who are 
most advantaged in society and also difficult to attain for the least advantaged, but they are also 
ill equipped to account for inequality where it occurs.  As theories of speech that rely too heavily 
on the “ideal”—at the expense of descriptiveness—both schools of thought are likely to overlook 
(or push aside) the power imbalances that inform actual communication.  As a result, both 
deliberative democrats and American legal theorists often inadvertently minimize or discount the 
experiences of those who are systematically disadvantaged by their communicative schemes. 
 First, deliberative democratic theorists, because they tend to be more concerned with 
developing abstractions than describing the way that speech actually occurs between real people, 
have a tendency to gloss over the unequal distribution of resources and power that influences 
speech.  As Joshua Cohen explains in “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” for ideal 
deliberation to function, it requires two forms of equality: formal and substantive.716  While formal 
equality refers to equality of opportunity to initiate proposals, criticize and support measures, 
substantive equality demands that individuals not be constricted by a society’s unequal 
distribution of power, resources and norms.717  In other words, in order for deliberative democratic 
theories to work, the authors must assume that participants in deliberation are free from social 
influences.  They create ideal speech scenarios that only function in a world that is perfectly equal 
and fair.  But in the real world, it is impossible to create an instance of speech that is fully 
removed from that community’s power dynamics.  To ignore that fact is to create theories that 
may be abstractly appealing, but also fail to capture the full extent of inequality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
716 Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: 
Selected Essays” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 16-37. 
717 “The participants [in ideal deliberation] are substantively equal in that the existing distribution 
of power and resources does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does that 
distribution play an authoritative role in the deliberation.  The participants in the deliberative 
procedure do not regard themselves as bound by the existing system of rights, except insofar as 
that system establishes the framework of free deliberation among equals” (Ibid., pp. 24). 
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Second, many American legal theorists are also hindered by their attachment to ideal 
theory and the assumption of a mythical free and open marketplace of ideas, in which all 
interested parties are able to participate.  To the extent that socioeconomic inequalities exist, they 
should be eclipsed by the quality of an individual’s arguments.  In practice, however, it is not 
always the better or truer argument that triumphs in the marketplace of ideas.  While truth may 
ultimately prevail in the long term, in each individual instance, it is the most persuasive individual 
that tends to win out.  And in a forum that values rational, reasoned opinions, expressed in a 
calm, dispassionate manner, those who are most capable of expressing themselves along these 
lines (i.e. male, white, wealthy, etc.) are in a better relative position to have their positions 
accepted.718  In order to maintain the illusion of a fair and equal marketplace of ideas, however, 
American legal theorists must pretend that this advantage does not exist.  And again, in doing so, 
they ultimately harm those who are less competitive contributors to the marketplace of ideas.   
One of the most significant advantages of a theory of social speech, on the other hand, is 
that it is able to confront issues of inequality.  As a theory that begins by taking an empirical look 
at communication, it is able to identify and emphasize the ways in which unequal distributions of 
power influence communicative acts.  This is not to say, however, that the theory of social speech 
is a solution to the problems of inequality that plague all communication.  Indeed, throughout this 
chapter, I have highlighted at least four ways in which social speech—by reinforcing a 
community’s preexisting inegalitarian tendencies—may actually exacerbate preexisting power 
imbalances and inequalities.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
718 The more often an idea is expressed, the greater the chance it will reach a wide audience, and 
the deeper it will sink into the consciousness of those who hear it.  Thus, those with the resources 
to make their opinions widely heard (e.g. by buying airtime, putting up advertisements, etc.) have 
a distinct advantage over those with fewer resources.  In other words, those who can afford to 
spend the time and money it takes to keep up the fight often end up the winners.  See John 
Stockley, “All the Free Speech That Money Can Buy? The Supreme Court Constricts Finance 
Reform,” in Judging the Constitution: Critical Essays on Judicial Lawmaking, Michael McCann 
and Gerald Houseman (eds.) (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989). 
257	  
	  
	  
First, I acknowledged that an individual’s social circumstances are instrumental in her 
character development.  In environments where social speech is positive, encouraging and 
inspirational, individuals are likely to develop the kinds of virtuous and active character traits that 
are conducive to good democratic citizenship.  Where social speech is negative, hurtful and 
exclusionary, however, individuals are more likely to grow aggressive, isolated and/or insecure.  
Thus, the quality of one’s social circle (by influencing the quality of discussion) comes to 
fundamentally influence her character in either positive of negative ways.  In other words, an 
individual may find herself more or less competitive in a liberal democratic state based largely on 
her initial social placement. 
Second, I showed how social capital (i.e. the facilitator of political productivity) might not 
necessarily extend across demographic groups very well.  Where there is physical segregation 
and, therefore, diminished contact within a community—whether intentional or inadvertent—social 
speech cannot be expected to lead to wide-ranging social capital.  And to the extent that social 
capital exists only within smaller, more homogenous communities, it cannot be assumed that all 
social capital is equal.  In particular, studies have shown that women and minorities often find 
themselves building up social capital that may be helpful in their day-to-day lives, but carries little 
influences within the larger political sphere.  
Third, I have argued that, where there are significant differences between socioeconomic 
groups, it is likely that some will receive, through social speech, a cultural and political training 
that is less conducive to full and equal democratic citizenship than others.  Those who find 
themselves subject to racism, sexism, etc. in the social sphere, for example, are likely to develop 
a more narrow view of what is possible and desirable in their given societies.  These limitations to 
an individual’s democratic imagination profoundly influence the political choices that she makes 
throughout her life.  Furthermore, one’s socioeconomic position also determines the structure of 
that social speech, which she is likely to encounter in life, with not all structures being equal in 
terms of their likelihood of providing democratic training.  Those who are more advantaged are 
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likely to live within social spheres that are relatively democratic and egalitarian, thus preparing 
them for life in a participatory, democratic political system; those who are less advantaged, on the 
other hand, are likely to have had a more authoritarian personal and professional life, which 
provides a less complete training in democratic citizenship. 
Finally, in this chapter, I have recognized the ways in which social speech’s boundary 
forging function may not only reflect preexisting inequalities, but may also actually exacerbate 
them.  Any time that an in-group is formed, an out-group is also created.  This distinction is not 
neutral, however.  When, through social speech, an individual comes to identify her community, 
she is simultaneously building an emotional attachment for this “one singular we,” of which she is 
a part, and a distaste for the “them,” from which she is separate.  Those negative sentiments 
towards the “them” may result in serious geopolitical conflicts.  On a more micro level, however, 
the creation of an in-group inevitably leads to internal hierarchies that leave some members 
feelings like outsiders.  An all too often, it is minorities and those who are in some way 
disadvantaged that find themselves feeling like outsiders.     
These kinds of inequalities—resulting from or being magnified by social communication—
are inevitable in an unequal society.  What is important here is not that the theory of social 
speech remedies all inequalities, but that it is able to identify and address inegalitarian issues and 
limitations to speech.  It does not hide them under abstractions or minimize them for the sake of 
articulating an ideal theory.  Rather, it acknowledges these problems head on and brings them to 
the forefront of theoretical discussion.  This is necessary for strengthening the liberal democratic 
ideals of equality and inclusiveness in two ways.  First, an honest and open account of social 
inequality validates the experiences of wide segments of the population, who may have felt 
themselves unrepresented and devalued by other democratic theories of speech.  Second, it is 
only by recognizing inequalities where they exist that researchers can even begin to develop 
plans for how to diminish them.  And indeed, as I show in Chapter Seven, the knowledge 
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garnered through a theory of social speech is instrumental in designing programs to help diminish 
the implications of socioeconomic inequality. 
 
IV. Conclusion: 
As stated above, the theory of social speech presented in these pages is not meant to 
replace more traditional theories of speech.  Rather, the purpose of an explicitly social theory of 
speech is to supplement and improve upon deliberative democratic and American legal theories 
of speech, which have often been limited in both their inclusiveness and also their ability to 
handle inequality.  By incorporating the kind of communication that defines the lived experience of 
the vast majority of the general public, I have sought to develop a fuller picture of the role that 
speech plays in defining liberal democratic citizens and communities. 
To summarize, in this chapter, I argued that when people engage with one another in a 
social manner, there are four separate mechanisms at work, linking that communication to liberal 
democratic citizenship and political action.  First, individuals are developing their potential to be 
virtuous, active citizens.  Second, they are establishing the generalized trust, respect and 
empathy that are necessary for the healthy functioning of a liberal democratic state.  Third, they 
are determining not only what is possible, important right and feasible within their unique political 
cultures, but also developing the skills necessary for political participation.  And finally, when 
individuals are engaging in social speech, they are also drawing the imaginary lines between 
what is their community and what is not. 
 Throughout this chapter, I have shown that none of these mechanisms are neutral.  
Depending on the content and form of social speech, each mechanism may result in positive or 
negative consequences from the perspective of liberal democratic citizenship and political 
outcomes.  And depending on one’s socioeconomic position, the social speech that she is 
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exposed to may skew in one direction or the other.  That is why it is so important that all 
individuals maximize their experience with that social speech, which is kind, thoughtful and 
inclusive, and minimize their exposure to mean, derogatory and discriminatory social 
communication.   
And while it is both impossible and undesirable to police all instances of social speech 
from above, once the mechanisms are understood, there is much that can be done to positively 
influence the nature of social speech.  Thus, in the final two chapters of this project, I explore real 
world applications of the theory of social speech.  In Chapter Six, I look at three examples of 
social speech—Internet speak, safe spaces and hate speech—to illustrate how the four 
mechanisms function in practice.  Then, in Chapter Seven, I use that knowledge to develop a 
series of recommendations for influencing the nature of social speech in ways that are consistent 
with liberal democratic goals. 
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CHAPTER 6 
	  
SOCIAL SPEECH IN PRACTICE: THREE UNTRADITIONAL SPHERES OF POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATION 
 
In the preceding chapter, I identified four mechanisms that link social speech to 
democratic citizenship and political outcomes, both positive and negative.  These mechanisms 
can be summed up as follows: 1) Informal communication is an instrument for creating the kind of 
character traits that make both better and worse democratic citizens; 2) Social communication 
builds social capital and trust (based on mutual interests, hopes and objectives), which facilitates 
collective action; 3) Private and social interactions train people for their political culture, teaching 
them the expectations of citizenship particular to their communities; and 4) Social speech ties 
citizens to one another emotionally, and helps them define the cognitive borders of their 
communities, including some and excluding others.  Chapter Five explained, theoretically, that 
communication and discussion in civil society, even when it involves seemingly apolitical topics, 
holds the potential to affect distinct political ends both positively and negatively.  Depending on 
the content and style of social speech, participants may eventually develop into engaged, 
invested, community-minded members of a common public or they might become disconnected, 
insecure and isolated creatures.  The varying qualities (and quantity) of social speech may lead 
some individuals to associate their own best interest with that of the wider public; others may 
connect with a smaller subgroup; and some may withdraw from community life entirely.  
One of the strengths of the theory of social speech is that it is grounded in empirical 
observation and, therefore, reflects liberal democratic life as citizens actually experience it.  
Instead of focusing on how people would deliberate in an ideal world under perfect conditions of 
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equality, rationality and respect, the theory of social speech is able to tell us something about the 
way people actually do communicate.  As Nancy Fraser has explained, the tendency of many 
deliberative democratic (and, I would add, legal) theorists to assume ideal speech conditions has 
meant that their theories fail to fully incorporate the complexities of human interactions and power 
relationships.719  The theory of social speech, however, is designed to take into account the 
varying ways in which formal institutions and social structures influence democratic citizenship 
and political outcomes.  It does so by building from empirical analyses of how people really do 
interact with one another in everyday life. 
Unfortunately for research purposes, real life communication between ordinary citizens 
often bears little resemblance to the ideals found in Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin’s 
“Deliberation Day” model720 or Alexander Meiklejohn’s standard of democratic self-governance.721  
That is not to say that quotidian speech never adheres to the ideal speech situations described by 
deliberative democratic or legal theorists; under rare circumstance (e.g. market research groups, 
small college seminars, etc.) near-perfect deliberation may actually exist.  However, in the vast 
majority of instances, while everyday communication between citizens may include politeness, 
reason and research, it is more likely to incorporate elements of passion, humor, emotional bias, 
personal history, bargaining, anger, vitriol, sarcasm, etc.  Instead of functioning like a formal, 
public, impartial debate, most everyday speech is rich with rhetoric, testimony and narratives.  It 
is casual, unstudied and (on the face of it) apolitical. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719 Looking specifically at Jürgen Habermas’ “bourgeois masculinist” conception of the public 
sphere, Fraser points to four assumptions that are both central to the theory and also limit its 
applicability to real life: 1) It is possible for interlocutors in a public sphere to bracket their social 
status and to deliberate ‘as if’ they were equals; 2) A single, inclusive public sphere is always 
better than a “nexus of multiple publics”; 3) Public spheres should only address the common 
good, and not private interests; and 4) There must be a sharp separation between civil society 
and the state for a public sphere to function properly. See Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public 
Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Social Text, No. 25/26 
(1999), pp. 62-63. 
720 See Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin, “Deliberation Day,” in Deliberating Deliberative 
Democracy, James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett (eds.) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003). 
721 See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech And Its Relation to Self-Government (New York: 
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1948). 
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These observations are nothing new.  It has always been the case that social speech has 
dominated the everyday conversations of ordinary people.  Even within the eighteenth century 
bourgeois public sphere that Jürgen Habermas idealizes, the majority of the population eschewed 
formal, political deliberation in favor of more intimate and social interactions.722  Thus, one might 
wonder why it is currently so important to develop a theory of speech that explicitly incorporates 
the social, when the world has survived so long without one.  I believe that there are two reasons 
why social speech merits a second look at this point in history: 1) the increase in informal, 
anonymous, private speech due to growing use of the Internet and social networking websites; 
and 2) growing concerns for political and social equality. 
First, like the printing press, the post, radio and television before it, the Internet has 
revolutionized the way people communicate and receive information.  Knowledge can now be 
transported around the world at the very instant it is demanded.  But the digital revolution has not 
just been a development in speed and efficiency.  For the first time, and in contrast to the top-
down models that came before, the Internet has made it possible for the average citizen of the 
liberal, democratic West to simultaneously act as both a producer and a consumer of 
information.723  This development has changed both the form and the content of speech, 
increasing the likelihood that when people are communicating, they will be discussing seemingly 
apolitical topics and doing so in an informal style.  As policymakers and private citizens evaluate 
and regulate the new and increasingly dominant Internet speak, it is especially important that 
political theorists develop models that can incorporate this kind of communication. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
722 See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991). 
723 See David Beers, “The Public Sphere and Online, Independent Journalism,” in Canadian 
Journal of Education / Revue canadienne de l’education, Vol. 29, No. 1, The Popular Media, 
Education, and Resistance / Les mass-media populaires, l’education et la resistance (2006), pp. 
109-130:  “The culture of citizenry modeled online… is one where news is not passively received, 
but is challenged, corrected, embroidered and, through individual agency, rippled outwards into 
the society.  At the same moment, the Internet is fast eroding assumptions about who may 
publish and report news… [A] burgeoning new breed of ‘citizen journalists’ populating blogs and 
open publishing sites are shifting assumptions about authority and influence in news media 
culture” (pp. 119). 
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Second, as concerns for equality between the sexes, races, classes, etc. have 
progressed, social speech has taken on a more visible role.  Growing norms of inclusiveness and 
fairness would seem to dictate that all citizens of liberal democratic states have at least the same 
opportunities for equal participation and representation in the political sphere.  However, as 
contemporary political and legal theories of free speech have tended to privilege public speech 
about purely political topics, they have also neglected both that informal speech which takes 
place outside of the public arena (e.g. in homes, coffee shops, schools) as well as those who are 
most commonly associated with those spaces.  The neglect of social speech may mean that 
democratic states and their citizens have failed to attend to discourses that contribute to the 
marginalization of the least advantaged in society, even as they insist on equality in official and 
overtly political discourse.  By idealizing the narrowly construed vision of formal, rational speech 
favored by those already in relative positions of relative power, contemporary speech theories 
imply to those who do not conform to (and thrive within) these deliberative ideals that they will be 
relegated to the background of politics.724  Women and minorities, in particular, must either adopt 
this highly structured approach to discourse or risk being left out or ignored.  While 
communication theory is hardly the only sphere in which women and minorities have been 
marginalized, the fact that the veneration of rational, informed, unbiased deliberation 
disproportionately silences groups that are already likely to be disempowered, makes the offense 
all the more severe.  
What is needed is a theory of speech that illuminates and validates the social speech 
most associated with these groups.  While social speech may not always appear political on the 
surface, it has significant political consequences. Not only does it represent a legitimate form of 
political action in its own right, but it also serves as a vital step towards more traditional political 
behaviors.  For many individuals, social speech provides a necessary outlet – a way to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
724 See Iris Marion Young, “Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication,” in 
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, James Bohman and William Rehg 
(eds.) (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere.” 
265	  
	  
	  
understand how they fit into society at large, and also a space to build the autonomy and self-
worth necessary for full participation in their political community.  And as wealth has become 
more unequally distributed in recent years, the proportion of society choosing to retreat away 
from political life and into the social sphere is likely to increase, making the need for a theory that 
represents these groups all the more obvious.725 
Taken together, these two concerns—the rise of new forms of communication and 
growing egalitarian norms—justify the search for a theory of social speech that addresses the 
lived experiences of everyday citizens.  In this chapter, I connect the theory of Chapter Five with 
empirical observation by examining three distinct spheres of social communication: Internet 
speak, safe spaces and hate speech.  At first glance, these three types of speech may not seem 
to have much in common.  From their typical practitioners to the public opinion about them to their 
historical context, Internet speak, safe spaces and hate speech are all very different.  However, 
as venues for social speech, they all serve a similar function: depending on their style and 
content, they all have the capacity to significantly influence democratic citizenship and political 
outcomes in both positive and negative ways (although in the case of hate speech, I only address 
its clearly predominant negative potentialities).  By focusing on three very dissimilar—but still 
widely practiced—kinds of social communication, I am able to show just how diverse and 
prevalent social speech really is, thus highlighting its political impact.    
First, I address Internet speak and social networking in terms of both their positive and 
negative potential impacts on democratic citizenship and political participation.  On the positive 
side, I demonstrate how participation in online social networking sites leads to greater political 
participation offline and stronger feelings of political efficacy and connectedness.  On the negative 
side, I show how communication on the Internet has led to the new phenomenon of cyberbullying, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725 For more on the growing income disparity in the United States, see Chad Stone, Danilo Trisi 
and Arloc Sherman, “A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality,” Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities (Sept. 11, 2013). Available at: http://www.cbpp.org/files/11-28-
11pov.pdf.  
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which causes victims to lose agency and to feel like outsiders in their communities.  Anonymity is 
often the key to this process, as the victim often does not know the identities of her attackers. 
Second, I look at “safe spaces” in Black feminist literature to show how time spent in 
intimate or civil settings (e.g. homes, churches, Black community organizations) and with 
extended families and friends offers members of marginalized groups the opportunity to not only 
have their voices heard and their opinions respected, but also to challenge oppression and affirm 
one another’s humanity.  The self-respect that these processes breed serves as a necessary 
condition for fair and equal participation in the political realm.  On the other hand, these kinds of 
interaction may further cement differences, defining boundaries along lines of race, sex or class, 
and breed suspicion between the resulting “us” and “them.”   
Third, I consider the unique case of hate speech.  Deviating from the structure of both the 
Internet speak and safe spaces sections, in this section, I address only the negative potential 
effects of hate speech on democratic citizenship and political outcomes.  While hate speech may 
serve some possibly cathartic functions in liberal democratic societies (discussed in Chapter 
Seven), unlike my previous examples of social speech, its content and its emotional impact on its 
targets are unquestionably so negative from the standpoint of democratic citizenship, that they 
must be my main concern.  Hate speech differs from Internet speak and safe space speech in 
another way as well:  Because hate speech necessarily addresses issues of public importance 
(e.g. racist, sexist, homophobic, etc. ideologies), it is one of the few examples of social speech 
that is already generally considered political.  But while hate speech may be widely accepted as 
political in terms of its content, it is also political in terms of its implications.  Hate speech is an 
intimate and personal form of aggression, cutting to the core of how a person defines herself.  
When it takes place in the social sphere, this messaging may be impossible to ignore.  Thus, 
social hate speech, more than any other kind, can lead to psychological distress and feelings of 
alienation that significantly affect the democratic character traits of its targets.  Victims of hate 
speech often internalize the negative messaging about them, becoming fearful, unsure and 
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insecure individuals who are unwilling and unable to engage in democratic politics.  And as a 
mode of speech designed to draw hostile boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, social 
hate speech also decreases social capital and trust on the part of both its targets and majority 
society, making compromise and collective action more difficult. 
In Chapter Seven, I will return to all three of these loci of social speech in order to 
suggest several legal and social approaches for harnessing the positive democratic potential of 
social speech while also limiting its negative outcomes.   
 
I. Internet speak: 
The Internet, in general, and social networking sites, in particular, are at the frontier of 
social speech theory.726  In a matter of only a couple decades, these communicative arenas have 
grown immensely in size and reach, becoming both nearly ubiquitous and also deeply integrated 
into the everyday lives of western, democratic citizens.  As the technology to go online has 
become more affordable, accessible and portable, people from all demographic and 
socioeconomic backgrounds have begun to supplement face-to-face contact with communication 
through their computers and mobile devices.   
To provide just a sense of the prevalence of virtual speech, according to recent consumer 
surveys, Facebook, the world’s most popular social networking site, had an audience of nearly 
153.9 million users in 2010 in the U.S. alone.  This represents an increase of 38 percent from the 
previous year.727  Of those, 69 percent were daily users, averaging 25 minutes per day on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
726 By social networking sites, I am referring to large websites like Facebook and MySpace, as 
well as the blogosphere, twitter, chatrooms, message boards and massively multiplayer online 
role-playing games (MMORPG’s).  To put it broadly, I am considering all those spaces in the 
virtual world where individuals can come together voluntarily to interact with one another, and not 
simply absorb content from above. 
727 See Sarah Radwanick, “U.S. Digital Year in Review: A Recap of the Year in Digital Media,” 
comScore (February 2011). Available at: 
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site.728  And that is just one website.  If one were to add the next three most popular sites—
MySpace (50 million users), LinkedIn (26.6 million users) and Twitter.com (23.6 million users)—
she would have the image of a world that is tied together through virtual links.  Many Internet 
observers speculate that these high growth rates will only continue as mobile devices become 
cheaper and fifth generation wireless (5G) capabilities improve.   
While the rapid growth of Internet usage is an interesting field of study in its own right, it 
might not merit particular attention for the theory of social speech if Internet users followed the 
same speech patterns online as they do in person.  For the average user, however, online 
speech looks significantly different from face-to-face conversation.  Specifically, the Internet 
fosters a style of speech that is notably private and casual.729  The sense of anonymity online 
often encourages users to contribute largely personal or intimate information (as evidenced in 
blogs, tweets, status updates), and to do so in a less formal style (e.g. abbreviations, emoticons, 
photographs).730  Such a degree of openness and informality may be less common in offline 
spheres of interaction, where people are more cautious of offending others and being judged.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Presentations_Whitepapers/2011/2010_US_Digital_Yea
r_in_Review. 
728 Ibid. 
729 For more information, see James P. Zappen, Laura J. Gurak and Stephen Doheny-Farina’s 
experiment comparing real life and Internet rhetoric.  In this study, the authors designed a 
colloquium that took place at Diversity University Multi-User Dimension, Object-Oriented (MOO), 
an electronic space where graduate students could meet and chat in real time.  The authors 
describe their findings as follows:  “Our colloquium revealed to us a kind of rhetoric and a kind of 
community that seems quite unlike anything that we have seen before—seventeen ‘voices’ from 
different places all ‘speaking’ at once in the same ‘place’ and ‘speaking’ in fragments rather than 
complete discourses” (Ibid., pp. 400). 
730 The anonymous nature of the Internet, while often regarded as a hallmark of online 
communication, may be waning, however.  See Brian Stelter, “Upending Anonymity, These Days 
the Web Unmasks Everyone,” in The New York Times (June 20, 2011):  “The collective 
intelligence of the Internet’s two billion users, and the digital fingerprints that so many users leave 
on Web sites, combine to make it more and more likely that every embarrassing video, every 
intimate photo, and every indelicate e-mail is attributed to its source, whether that source wants it 
to be or not.  This intelligence makes the public sphere more public than ever before and 
sometimes forces personal lives into public view.”  Stelter cites the Vancouver riots of 2011, after 
which locals combed through social media in order to identify some of the people involved, as 
well as more quotidian examples of public shaming and exposure. 
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In recent years, the tendency toward brevity and informality in Internet communication 
has been amplified as many users have opted to forgo text altogether.  Written language has 
rapidly decreased in prominence online, as Internet users have moved from expressing 
themselves to others via blogs (mostly words) to social networking sites (large spaces for both 
words and visuals) to Twitter (140 character maximum) to the sites du jour, such as Instagram 
and Tumblr (entirely image-based).731  The trend toward visual means expression online has 
been substantial.  For example, users of Instagram, an industry leader, currently post about 45 
million photos a day.  Between 2013 and its founding in 2010, users have posted 16 billion total 
pictures to their Instagram sites.732  Facebook users have joined in on the trend, posting about 
300 million images per day, or 100 billion per year.733  And in an ode to the ephemeral, Snapchat 
has emerged as a popular mobile application that allows users to take and send a picture or 
video, while controlling the length of its visibility to the recipient (but with a set maximum viewing 
time of 10 sec.).  After the photo is viewed, it is supposed to disappear forever.734  As Robin 
Kelsey, a professor of photography at Harvard University explains: “You have images now that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 It is important to note that the rise in visual communication does not merely represent the rise 
in Internet users; the relationship is actually inversely proportional.  As the use of images rises, 
textual speaks falls:  In 2012, 2.19 trillion text messages were sent and received in 2012, about 
5% less than one year earlier.  During that same period, MMS (multimedia messages that include 
photos and videos) grew by 41 percent to 74.5 billion.  See Stephen Lawson, “US mobile data 
growing while SMS falls, CTIA reports,” in PC 
World (May 2, 2013). Available at: http://www.pcworld.com/article/2037138/us-mobile-data-
growing-while-sms-falls-ctia-reports.html.  In other words, as Internet users move towards visual 
communications, they become less likely to utilize online text communications. 
732 Nick Bilton, “Disruptions: Social Media Images Form a New Language Online,” In The New 
York Times: Bits (June 30, 2013). Available at: 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/disruptions-social-media-images-form-a-new-language-
online/?_r=0  
733 Ibid. 
734 Despite initial assurances from Snapchat’s founders that the images sent via the application 
are quickly deleted, it has been revealed that this data actually does remain available.  See 
Richard Hickman, “Snapchat Unveiled: An Examination of Snapchat on Android Devices” 
(January 23, 2014). Available at: http://www.decipherforensics.com/snapchat/.  Furthermore, it 
has always been possible for users to take a screenshot of Snapchats in order to save them to 
their mobile devices.  However, since Snapchat is still generally utilized under the assumption 
that images are only temporary, these revelations do not affect my argument that communication 
is growing increasingly nonverbal and ephemeral. 
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have no possible afterlife… They are simply communicative.”735  This model clearly appeals to 
Internet users.  As Nick Bilton writes for The New York Times: “The cutting-edge crowd is 
learning that communicating with a simple image, be it a picture of what’s for dinner or a street 
sign that slyly indicates to a friend, ‘Hey, I’m waiting for you,’ is easier than bothering with words, 
even in a world of hyper-abbreviated Twitter posts and texts.”  Thus, demand for social websites 
that feature entirely visual means of communication does appear to be growing.  Although the site 
was only two years old in June 2013, Snapchat users sent 200 million images a day during that 
month.  This number represents a 400% increase from only six months prior.  Similarly, Vine, 
Twitter’s six-second video sharing app has signed up more than 13 million people between 
January and June of 2013.736 
An evolution in the form of Internet speak towards the nonverbal has affected its content 
and its effects on “speakers.”  This new dialogue has served to magnify the tendencies towards 
informality and succinctness that have characterized Internet communication from the start.  The 
emphasis on visual means of communication has also meant that users are more able to connect 
across language barriers.  Bilton goes on to write, “As the world grows smaller, thanks to 
technology, people from all over the globe can chat with images that translate into a universal 
tongue.  Do you speak only Mandarin?  No problem, you can now communicate with someone 
who speaks only English.  Take a picture and reply.”737  In fact, Instagram reports that more than 
50 percent of people using their service reside outside of North America. 
Unfortunately, none of this has meant that Internet communicators are likely to engage in 
traditional political conversations online.  Studies of Internet usage have repeatedly shown that, 
when given a plethora of choice of sites to frequent and topics to discuss, Internet users 
consistently opt to talk about the latest gossip, rather than world events and philosophical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735 Bilton, Disruptions.” 
736 Ibid. 
737 Ibid. 
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treatises.  While the Internet contains countless sources for political information and arenas for 
political discussion, the communication that occurs via the Web is only rarely in clear pursuit of 
political purposes.  In The Myth of Digital Democracy, Matthew Hindman studies Web usage 
patterns and shows that the vast majority of Internet traffic concerns intimate and social topics:  
“Overall, about 10.5 percent of Web traffic goes to adult or pornographic Web sites.  A slightly 
smaller portion (9.6 percent) goes to Web-mail services such as Yahoo! Mail or Hotmail, 7.2 
percent of traffic goes to search engines, while only 2.9 percent of Web traffic goes to news and 
media sites.  These facts alone tell us much about citizens’ priorities in cyberspace… [only] 0.12 
percent of traffic… goes to political Web sites.”738  Primarily political websites hardly even register 
on the average citizen’s radar.  Hindman finds that, among the top one hundred most visited sites 
on the Web, not a single political website is featured.739      
The tendency for the average individual to shy away from traditionally political topics in a 
social setting is not unique to the Internet.  But while people also may prefer to veer away from 
discussions of public policy, economics, etc. when they engage in offline social spheres, there is 
data to suggest that the Internet is constructed in a way that makes it especially conducive to 
discussions of the personal, the intimate and the social.  Even researchers who are optimistic 
about the possibilities of citizens engaging in meaningful political discussions online admit that 
this is still a relatively rare phenomenon, and one that might be limited by the very structure of the 
Internet, which tends toward the superficial.  For example, in “Citizens Deliberating Online: 
Theory and Some Evidence,” Vincent Price writes: “While growing at a fairly rapid rate, however, 
political ‘conversation’ online remains a rare phenomenon.”740  Price continues to report that, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
738 Matthew Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2009), pp. 60-61. 
739 “For April 2007, HuffingtonPost.com and FreeRepublic.com were the most popular political 
Web sites.  The Huffington Post ranked 796th among all nonadult Web sites; Free Republic was 
ranked 871st” (Ibid., pp. 63). 
740 Vincent Price, “Citizens Deliberating Online: Theory and Some Evidence,” in Online 
Deliberation: Design, Research, and Practice, Todd Davies and Seeta Pena Gangadharan (eds.) 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 41. 
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according to a 2005 Pew Research Center study, only about 10 percent of respondents could 
report having taken part in any online discussions regarding the United States presidential 
election from the previous year.741 
Within the small subset of the population that actually does use the Internet for political 
purposes, we find that people are not demographically representative of Internet users in general.  
While women represent more than half of all Internet users in the United States, men are 
considerably more likely to visit political and news sites – the gender gap is 18 and 12 percentage 
points, respectively.742  And although the Web over-represents younger citizens, they are less 
likely to engage in online politics than older Internet users.  While eighteen to thirty-four year olds 
account for 43 percent of all Web traffic, they amount to only 32 percent of visits to news sites 
and 22 percent to political sites.743 
Even in the best-case scenario (from the perspective of hopeful deliberative democrats), 
in which Internet users are actively engaging in political discourse, the resulting conversations 
tend not to contain rich, meaningful discussion.  Overtly political users are not, for the most part, 
seeking out opposing opinions, diverse audiences and new perspectives.  Instead, these 
communicators tend to use the Internet as a tool to reinforce their own preexisting beliefs.  While 
it may be only natural for people to prefer to organize with and receive information from those 
who already share their viewpoints in real life (or “IRL,” as Internet speakers might say), the 
Internet poses a new set of challenges by making it so easy for likeminded people to find one 
another and to exclude conflicting opinions.744  
Unfortunately, this means that many Internet speakers are likely to fall victim to 
radicalism and the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein describes as “echo chambers.”  This means 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
741 Ibid. 
742 Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy, pp. 67-68. 
743 Ibid., pp. 68. 
744 See Diana C. Mutz and Jeffrey J. Mondak, “The Workplace as a Context for Cross Cutting 
Political Discourse,” in Journal of Politics, Vol. 68 (2006), pp. 140-155. 
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that Internet speakers may use discussion to not only reinforce their preexisting viewpoints 
without much reflection, but by seeking out only likeminded speech partners, members of 
communicative groups also tend to unwittingly polarize themselves.  Sunstein shows that, due to 
social influences on behavior (i.e. people trying to maintain their sense of identity and reputation) 
and the limited argument pools that exists within any group, members of a deliberating body tend 
to move toward a more extreme point in the direction of the members’ preexisting tendencies.  
This is true even in perfect conditions of fairness and equality.745  And because the Internet 
makes it so much easier than ever before for individuals to find likeminded others, it also makes it 
all that much more probable that users will go to extremes.  Sunstein writes: “With the Internet, it 
is exceedingly easy for each of us to find like-minded types.  Views that would ordinarily dissolve, 
simply because of an absence of social support, can be found in large numbers on the Internet, 
even if they are understood to be exotic, indefensible, or bizarre in most communities.”746  Even 
Jürgen Habermas agrees that, when left to their own devices, the Internet actually fragments 
users “into a huge number of isolated issue publics.”747 
To the extent that the Internet provides users with the option to personalize their 
preferences, “polarization is all the more probable, as like-minded people sort themselves into 
virtual communities that seem comfortable and comforting.  Instead of good information 
aggregation, bad polarization is the outcome.”748  Hindman shows empirically that this is the case, 
finding that “only 2.6 percent of the traffic from one top fifty political Web site to another crosses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
745 “But group polarization is likely to occur even in the face of equality and of entirely 
conscientious efforts at reaching both truth and understanding. The existence of a limited 
argument pool, strengthening the existing tendency within the group, will operate in favor of group 
polarization even if no individual behaves strategically. By itself, this will produce group 
polarization, whether or not social influence is operating” (Sunstein, “Deliberative Trouble?” pp. 
107). 
746 Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009, pp. 81. 
747 Jürgen Habermas, “Political Communication and Mass Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy 
an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research,” in 
Communication Theory, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2006), pp. 422. 
748 Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), pp. 97. 
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ideological lines.”749  Even more alarming, Sunstein points out that this ideological polarization 
might be coming about, not through the users themselves, but automatically, through their 
increasing dependence on search engines.750  As websites like Google and Amazon develop 
increasingly sophisticated algorithms to filter information for their users, this sorting becomes 
practically invisible.751  The resulting distance between polarized ideological groups makes it 
unlikely that participants will reach out across the aisle when it comes time for political decision-
making, and when they do, they will be less able to communicate effectively. 
All of these factors—the brevity and informality of Internet speech, the rarity of online 
political discussion and the tendency towards polarization through the Web—seem to present a 
discouraging prospect for the effects on Internet usage on political outcomes.  Indeed, many 
critics now argue that online activity is, at best, completely separate from politics; at worst, it may 
actually be having a negative effect.  One of the more salient concerns is that individuals are now 
replacing the time and energy they would have expended on traditional political activity with 
politically ineffectual online activity.  As Zizi Papcharissi explains, “political expression online 
might leave people with a false sense of empowerment, which misrepresents the true impact of 
their opinions.  Individuals may leave political newsgroups with the content feeling that they are 
part of a well-oiled democracy – does this feeling represent reality or substitute for genuine civic 
engagement?”752  Posting online may be an easy, accessible way to express one’s political 
viewpoints, but it is unlikely to have an effect equivalent to traditional political activities, such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749 Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy, pp. 66. 
750 “Indeed, personalized searches, which are now possible, ensure that Google can give you the 
kinds of things in which you, in particular, have previously shown an interest.  It follows that with 
personalized searches, different people with different histories will automatically receive different 
answers to exactly the same searches.  In terms of convenience and usefulness, this is a great 
benefit.  But in terms of information aggregation, it has an unfortunate side” (Sunstein, Infotopia, 
pp. 97-98). 
751 For more information, see Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web is 
Changing What We Read and How We Think (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011). 
752 Zizi Papacharissi, “The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere,” in New Media & 
Society, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2002), pp. 16-17. 
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voting or writing one’s congressman.753  To the extent that people consider “liking” a Facebook 
page or posting on a message board to be forms of legitimate political action, they may be falling 
into the traps of “clicktivism” or “slacktivism.”754 While lawmakers may have grown increasingly 
attuned to public opinion as represented through benign online actions, as Karpf explains, a 
“Facebook group ‘100,000 in support of gay marriage’ is not going to convince any senators to 
vote for the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act.  An auto-tuned remix poking fun at Democratic 
spending priorities will not affect entitlement spending.”755  The distance between these 
seemingly political actions and measurable political outcomes may lead Internet users to feel 
politically powerless, thus breeding resentment, apathy and increased levels of government 
distrust.756 
While it may be true that the Internet poses certain threats to the political process, these 
sorts of critiques do not address the full relationship between Internet communication and 
democratic citizenship.  Just because people are not talking about the right things in the right way 
when they log on, it does not follow that their actions are having no effects on politics.  The key to 
recognizing the impact of Internet speech on political outcomes is to dispel oneself of the notion 
that the effects will necessarily be immediate and acute.  Internet speech is not necessarily 
analogous to protesting or voting; there may not be a clear cause-and-effect relationship between 
engaging in online communication and creating traditional political outcomes.  What is likely, 
however, is that Internet speak—regardless of its content and style—changes the way people 
think about their communities and their relationships to political life.  And by influencing these 
relationships, Internet communication (like all examples of social speech) plays an essential role 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 As Malcolm Gladwell writes in a now infamous article for The New York Times, “the revolution 
will not be tweeted” (“Small Change,” pp. 42). 
754 By lowering the cost of citizen input, the Internet promotes large waves of low-cost symbolic 
action, which has minimal political impact.  See Evgeny Morozov, The New Delusion: How Not to 
Liberate the World (New York, Penguin Press, 2011). 
755 David Karpf, The MoveOn Effect: The Unexpected Transformation of American Political 
Advocacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 166. 
756 “When all that clicking produces no change, they reason, citizens will turn bitter or tune out” 
(Ibid., pp. 8). 
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in shaping the development of democratic citizenship.  Depending on the content and style of that 
speech, those effects may be positive or negative from the perspective of liberal democratic 
ideals.  It is this argument that I will explore in the remainder of this section. 
But before transitioning to a closer study of the potential positive and negative effects of 
Internet speech on democratic citizenship, it is important to note a key limitation to these findings.  
One of the most challenging aspects of any study that attempts to look at online communication is 
the fact that the landscape and norms are constantly evolving.  While it is safe to say that Internet 
speech looks and functions differently than face-to-face communication, it is difficult to predict the 
form that those differences will take in the future.  As Karpf highlights in his study of the 
transformative effects of the Internet on political advocacy organizations, “YouTube did not exist 
during the 2004 election, yet it was a fixture by 2008.  The microblogging service Twitter was still 
in its infancy in 2008.  It is a fixture of the media landscape today.  Now that mobile web devices 
like the iPhone and Android phones are rapidly gaining market penetration, new social 
experiment with geolocational data are being devised.”757  As these transformations continue to 
take root and new modes and styles of Internet communication emerge, more research will be 
needed to see how the Internet affects political communication and what can be done to 
encourage its positive democratic impact.  
 
A. Positive effects of social speech: social networking -> facilitating coordination and 
increasing the likelihood of political action 
Growing Internet usage, despite—and owing to—its informal style and traditionally 
apolitical content, has had a tremendous impact on the political world.  Recent events such as the 
Arab Spring have proven the power inherent in these communicative mediums and their potential 
to function as conduits to political action.  In Iran, for example, young people have been rapidly 
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expanding their use of the Internet and social networking sites as a means of political 
communication.  Online communication has enabled Iranian young people to speak outside the 
cultural restrictions of their nation, and to connect with a wider audience.  In his article, 
“Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran,” Babak Rahimi explains how the Internet has 
become an important tool in the destabilizing of the authoritarian rule of Iran, and in its potential 
journey towards democracy.758  Pro-reformist groups in Iran have found ways to use the Internet 
as an alternative platform from which they can mobilize support and increase political 
conversations.  This mobilization has also moved offline as well.  Grassroots democracy 
advocates have embraced the Internet; sometimes, using chat rooms, discussion forums and 
other online communications when the state closes down physical meeting locations; at other 
times, organizing street protests.  
The 2006 Kenyan election represents another example of the potential democratic power 
of social networking and informal Internet communication.  Websites such as Facebook, YouTube 
and Twitter were instrumental in mobilizing citizens to vote, sharing information and raising 
money under time constraints.  In nations like Kenya, where the population worries that 
mainstream media has been coopted by the government, the Internet offers an alternative 
method of getting involved in the political process.759  And when information channels have been 
blocked or restricted by government, the Internet can sometimes be the only way of sharing 
informational materials.760  For example, during the post-2006 election crisis, the Kenyan people 
mobilized a website called “Ushahidi” so that the citizenry could collaboratively report where 
violent clashes had occurred.761  Online commentary and criticism, because they represented a 
safe method of reacting against an unfair and unjust system of governance, were much more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758 Babak Rahimi, “Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran,” in Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sept. 2003). 
759 See Maarit Makinen and Mary Wangu Kuira, “Social Media and Postelection Crisis in Kenya,” 
in The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3 (July, 2008), pp. 328-335. 
760 Unfortunately, many states are now growing increasingly adept at restricting Internet 
communication and blocking certain websites. 
761 Makinsen and Kuira, “Social Media and Postelection Crisis in Kenya.” 
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diverse (and in some cases, extreme) than what was found in the mainstream media.762  Internet 
users were also able to respond more quickly to political events than the traditional media.  As 
Maarit Makinen and Mary Wangu Kuira write in “Social Media and Postelection Crisis in Kenya,” 
“Social media offered swifter, more subjective, and more detailed coverage during a fast moving 
and changing situation”763  
The United States has also been home to political action that was spurred on and made 
easier with the use of Internet communication.  In his book The MoveOn Effect, Karpf describes 
the labor protests that erupted in Madison, Wisconsin, after newly elected Republican Governor 
Scott Walker unveiled a budget repair proposal that would curtail the collective bargaining rights 
of public employee unions on February 15th, 2011.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, thousands of 
members of local unions and the national labor movement (i.e. AFL-CIO and SEIU) decamped 
within and around the capital building to protest the bill.  What was more surprising, however, was 
the speed and efficiency with which bloggers and netroots groups, such as MoveOn.org, 
DailyKos, Democracy for America (DFA) and Progressive Change Campaign Committee (PCCC), 
joined the effort by launching fundraisers, organizing solidarity rallies across the U.S., generating 
national press coverage and sending organizers to the Wisconsin state capital, where they 
helped “coordinate logistics, organize pressure tactics, and cover the details of the struggle.”764  
These efforts by netroots organizations, spurring everyday citizens to action, were ultimately 
unable to stop the passage of governor’s bill, but they did have significant effects on public 
opinion and political outcomes.  In the wake of these protests, the Wisconsin governor’s approval 
ratings fell significantly and a neighboring Republican governor chose to dismiss a similar bill out 
of fear of public disapproval.   
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These three examples (as well as others) show how social networking sites and other 
informal means of online communication have acted as effective transmitters of information and 
energy across populations, shaping the decisions and actions of everyday citizens and traditional 
political actors.  As a low-cost medium that does not respect the borders of nation states, this is 
true for both more and less developed countries.  And while a number of national governments 
(e.g. China) have sought to issue controls to monitor (or shut down) websites that they deem 
unacceptable and punish rebellious users, the World Wide Web has proven itself extremely 
durable and persistent – even under the most extreme circumstances of political unrest and state 
censorship, Internet users have found ways to circumvent official policies and make their voices 
heard.765  Thus, through 140-character tweets, blog posts and Facebook links, people around the 
world are now able to coordinate, educate and gain the support they need to excite real political 
change.   
While the Internet’s ability to provide information and coordinate action in these instances 
is extremely important, it seems unlikely that coordination is the only thing going on here.766  
Indeed, the very act of engaging in social speech online can be seen as a political action.  As I 
discuss below, the energy of these virtual movements tends to trickle down to even the most 
apolitical users.767  Recent studies have shown that just being online makes an individual more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765 See Yu Hua, “The Censorship Pendulum,” in The New York Times (February 5, 2014).  
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and accounts are cancelled,” writes Hua, “new ones spring up” (Ibid.). 
766 While it is not the subject of this project, the organizational potential of online communications 
should not be underemphasized.  As Karpf explains, online communications can spiral into 
political actions:  “Online groups can form through Facebook.  Offline meetings can be organized 
cheaply through Meetup.com.  Political campaign commercials can be remixed and posted to 
YouTube, garnering millions of views.  Media content is now spread through Twitter and the 
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political speech have become infinitesimal, particularly in a stable democracy like the United 
States, where citizens do not face the looming threat of government reprisal” (Karpf, The MoveOn 
Effect, pp. 7). 
767 See Kevin Gillian and Jenny Pickerill, “Transnational anti-war activism: solidarity, diversity and 
the internet in Australia, Britain and the United States after 9/11,” in Australian Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2008), pp. 59-157. 
280	  
	  
	  
likely to engage in political action, regardless of whether or not she is communicating about 
traditional political topics.768  In other words, an Internet user does not need to be engaging with 
organizations like MoveOn.org or chatting about elections in order for her online presence to 
increase the likelihood that she will engage in politics; even social communication online appears 
to be having these effects.  Thus, the question becomes:  What are the mechanisms underlying 
the positive relationship between Internet speak and political action? 
There have been several recent empirical analyses that identify positive relationships 
between Internet usage and political involvement, covering a range of possible forms of political 
action.  Until now, most of these studies have focused specifically on the relationship between 
online political information seeking and offline political action; however, because these same 
analyses also include general measures of Internet use, many of their findings can be extended 
to include Internet activities of all kinds.   
In a 2001 study, Lori M. Weber and James Bergan show that engaging in online 
communicative activities—such as e-mail and chatrooms—is positively correlated with a variety of 
political activities, including attending political rallies, signing petitions and writing to political 
actors.769  And in an especially thorough treatment of the subject, M. Kent Jennings and Vicki 
Zeitner examine the effects of Internet usage on fourteen measures of civic engagement 
(grouped into four clusters: media attentiveness, political involvement, volunteerism and trust 
orientations).  Taking into account pre-Internet levels of civic engagement and key socio-
economic characteristics, Jennings and Zeitner find that Internet access is “significantly related” 
to all forms of media attentiveness, all measures of political involvement, volunteerism and social 
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769 Lori M. Weber and James Bergman, “Who Participates and How? A Comparison of Citizens 
‘Online’ and the Mass Public,” presented as the Anural Meeting of the Western Political Science 
Association (March 15-17, 2001, Las Vegas NV). 
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trust.770  And while the correlations may not always be strong, they are always positive and 
statistically significant.  In other words, Internet users are more likely than non-Internet users to 
engage in a number of civic activities, including: following public affairs through the traditional 
media, making political donations, volunteering within the community and experiencing social 
trust. 
Many other, more focused attempts at capturing the relationship between Internet 
communication and political action have been equally encouraging.  For example, several 
researchers have noted a positive connection between Internet usage and voter turnout.  In their 
essay, “Unraveling the Effects of the Internet on Political Participation,” Caroline J. Tolbert and 
Ramona S. McNeal find that respondents with access to the Internet and online election news 
were significantly more likely to report voting in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, 
respectively, even after controlling for “socioeconomic conditions, partisanship, race, ethnicity, 
gender, age, traditional media use, political interest, political efficacy and state environmental 
factors.”771  Their simulations showed that, for the 2000 election, access to the Internet and online 
election news increased the probability of voting by an average of 12 percent and 7.5 percent, 
respectively.  And although this study was designed to look specifically at the effects of political 
information garnered from Internet use, the authors do point out that mere access to the Internet 
made respondents significantly more likely to vote than those who did not have Internet 
access.772 
Another traditional measure of political involvement, campaign contributions, also 
appears to be positively correlated with general Internet use.  Although his early findings were 
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mixed, in a 2001 study, Bruce Bimber shows that access to the Internet, generally, and online 
political information, specifically, do statistically increase the probability of a respondent 
contributing money to political campaigns.773  Bimber also finds a connection between Internet 
use and citizen-initiated contact with government.  In a separate study, he uses the results of one 
online survey and two phone surveys to show that, in much the same way as more traditional 
means of communication, Internet interaction encourages citizen contact with elected officials.774  
In 2002, Dhavan Shah, Nojin Kwak and Lance Holbert were able to further parse out these 
results by accounting for generational differences in Internet use.  In their article, “’Connecting’ 
and ‘Disconnecting’ with Civic Life,” the authors explain that older individuals, who came of age 
before the advent of the Internet, may already have developed more traditional patterns of civic 
engagement.  Therefore, in terms of their political involvement, the Internet tends to function in 
the same ways as any other media usage would.  Those who have grown up with the Internet, 
however, are still discovering its potentialities and may find it to be a stronger predictor of political 
action than more traditional media usage.775 
While there is still room for more empirical research that looks specifically at the effects of 
online social speech on political behavior, it does seem like people who even just casually chat 
online are becoming more political at the same time.776  This may simply be an extension of the 
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general phenomenon that talking to others promotes civic involvement.777  However, it seems 
likely that there is also something unique about Internet social communication that makes it 
particularly likely to positively affect one’s relationship to the political sphere.  In their book, Digital 
Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation, Karen Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal 
suggest that there are certain intrinsic characteristics of the Internet that make it more likely that 
users will participate in politics offline.  They write:  
The Internet’s interactivity, diversity, flexibility, speed, convenience, low cost, and 
information capacity potentially allow the public to become more knowledgeable about 
politics and government—a first step towards greater participation.  Interpersonal and 
small group communities are also possible online, in contrast to the passive consumption 
of news offered by other media.  There may also be unique advantages to online political 
discussion that are important for civic engagement.  Research has shown that online 
discussions are more frank and egalitarian that face-to-face meetings.  Women, for 
example, are less likely to be interrupted in cyberspace discussions.778 
When this statement is unpacked, Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal seem to be arguing that there 
are three processes at work when people communicate online that increase the likelihood that 
they will engage in offline political action: gaining information, building social trust and defining 
communities.  While Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal limit their discussion to Internet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
still be more likely to engage in politics that those who use it for social communication.  See 
Jennings and Zeitner, “Internet Use and Civic Engagement.” 
777 Casey A. Klofstad illustrates this phenomenon in a study that looks at the relationship between 
civic discussion and civic involvement.  Klofstad finds that “civically relevant discussions with 
peers promote civic activity by subsidizing the costs and increasing the benefits associated with 
participating.  Peers go about this in three ways: by providing individuals with information on how 
to become active in civic activities, by increasing individuals’ engagement with politics and current 
events, and by explicitly asking individuals to participate in civic activities” (“Talk Leads to 
Recruitment,” pp. 180). 
778 Karen Mossberger, Caroline J. Tolbert and Ramona S. McNeal, Digital Citizenship:  The 
Internet, Society, and Participation (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 2008), pp. 52. 
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communications, all three of the processes they point out can be related back to the mechanisms 
I identify in Chapter Five, connecting social speech, generally, to political outcomes.   
First, the authors argue that Internet communication has proven itself to be a quick, easy 
and efficient method for obtaining and disseminating information.  Information does not 
necessarily refer only to facts and figures, however (although the Internet has plenty of that).  
Much of what is going on when people engage in conversation online is that they are learning the 
norms and expectations of the political communities to which they belong.  They are also 
practicing at the kind of civic engagement that trains an individual for participation in democratic 
politics.  As a medium that encourages users to interact and provide user-generated content, the 
Internet enforces the value of community involvement.  It also teaches Internet speakers the 
logistical information that makes such action possible.  Over time, participation in Internet 
communication makes users more skilled and confident in their ability to make judgments.  For 
example, Karpf suggests that sites like Yelp (which relies on user reviews) have become 
instrumental for more traditional political organizations because they familiarize everyday citizens 
with the steps needed to engage in political action:  “As Americans-as-consumers become 
accustomed to using the Mobile Web to rate offline organizations and events, the learning curve 
required for Americans-as-citizens to take equivalent actions in the public sphere is sharply 
reduced.”779  This kind of socially learned understanding—just as much as knowing how to vote 
and who to vote for—affects political choices and increases the likeliness of political action. 
It is also important to note that the easier the process of obtaining this information 
becomes, the more Internet use would seem to have a positive effect on political participation.  In 
their article, “Surfing the Net: A Pathway for Participation for the Politically Uninterested?” Rosa 
Borge and Ana Cardenal suggest that, by facilitating the process of connecting with others, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
779 Karpf, The MoveOn Effect, pp. 94. 
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Internet use reduces the costs of political participation.780  This ultimately leads more frequent 
and skilled Internet users to participate in politics without the need for much (if any) political 
motivation.781  
Second, Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal suggest that, because the Internet both makes 
small group discussion more available and encourages participants to be active and engaged, it 
is likely to promote social trust or social capital.  As I explain in Chapter Five, trust is an essential 
element of any well-functioning democratic community.  It is only when people recognize mutual 
hopes, interests and objectives that they become willing to make sacrifices for one another.  And 
despite initial concerns about the Internet’s capacity to forge emotional connections (see below), 
recent research suggests that the Internet may actually be an especially effective venue for 
building social skills, generally, and bridging social capital between different demographic groups 
in particular.782   
Finally, Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal argue that the typical style of Internet 
communication may make it appealing to members of marginalized groups who might be too 
intimidated to engage in other forms of discussion.  Recent research suggests that it is likely that 
the Internet has mobilized groups that have traditionally participated in politics less frequently, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
780 “The ease of contact and communication through the Internet enables traditional participation 
activities which were previously relatively costly, such as contact politicians, working with 
organizations, joining a party, working on campaigns, and/or participating in forums and 
discussion groups, to be carried out at an extremely low cost.  In fact, to receive information or 
subscribe to a bulletin, contact a politician, make a donation, complain or protest against the 
government via email, contact and association, work on a campaign, participate in a discussion 
forum, etc., all you need to do is be online and, without having to move from your armchair, tap 
on the keyboard of the computer” (Borge and Cardenal, “Surfing the Net,” pp. 9).  
781 Borge and Cardenal found that the Internet was breeding a possible new generation of 
political actor – one that did not care about politics, but engaged in online political action out of a 
desire to participation in Internet activities:  “Our data shows evidence of a possible new type of 
participant—skilled Internet users with no political motivation—who is starting to take part in 
online activities” (Ibid., pp. 1). 
782 See Nicole B. Ellison, Charles Steinfeld and Cliff Lampe, “The Benefits of Facebook ‘Friends:’ 
Social Capital and College Students’ Use on Online Social Networking Sites,” in Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1143-1168. 
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not at all.783  While this is the result of many factors, key among them is the Internet’s capacity for 
equalizing communication and increasing feelings of empowerment.784  Either because Internet 
users are more likely to speak up when they feel a sense of anonymity and privacy, or because 
discrimination is harder to translate online, those with socioeconomic disadvantages have a 
greater potential to engage in free and equal discussion when they log on than when they are 
offline.785  While this does not mean that these new participants are communicating as much or 
as effectively as others, once they actually are online, members of marginalized groups are able 
to compete more fairly in discussions.   
As I explained in Chapters Two and Five, when deliberation norms require formal, polite, 
rational dialogue, those who were not schooled or socialized into that kind of speech are at a 
distinct disadvantage.  Internet speech, however, more strongly resembles the kind of natural, 
informal communication that occurs between friends, acquaintances and families in civil society 
(i.e. social speech) than the reasoned, informed, political deliberation of ideal theory.  In this way, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
783 See Michael X. Delli Carpini, “Gen.com: Youth, Civic Engagement, and the New Information 
Environment,” in Political Communication, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2000), pp. 341-349; Stephen Ward, 
Rachel K. Gibson and Wainer Lusoli, “Participation and Mobilization Online: Hype, Hope and 
Reality,” in Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 56 (2003), pp. 652-668; Ellen Quintelier and Sarah Vissers, 
“The Effect of Internet Use on Political Participation.  An Analysis of Survey Results for 16-Year-
Olds in Belgium,” in Social Science Computer Review, Vol. 26 (2008) pp. 411-427; Corinna di 
Gennaro and William Dutton, “The Internet and the Public: Online and Offline Political 
Participation in the UK,” in Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 59 (2006), pp. 299-313; and Mossberger, 
Tolbert and McNeal, Digital Citizenship.  Alternatively, there have been several studies that 
suggest that the Internet may only be reinforcing the involvement of people who were already 
likely to participate in politics.  For more information, see Bimber, “Information and Political 
Engagement in America”; Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty 
and the Internet Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
784 For example, see Lars Fuglsang’s Danish experiments on IT and “active citizenship,” based 
on empowerment properties, for senior citizens: Lars Fuglsang, “IT and Senior Citizens: Using the 
Internet for Empowering Active Citizenship,” in Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 30, 
No. 4 (Autumn, 2005), pp. 468-495. 
785 See Michael Cornfield, “Adding in the Net: Making citizenship count in the digital age,” in The 
Civic Web: Online Politics and Democratic Values, David M. Anderson and Michael Cornfield 
(eds.) (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).  Cornfield suggests that the anonymous nature 
of the Internet may make it easier to ask questions and participate for those who are afraid of 
being embarrassed by their lack of political knowledge:  “The Internet can nourish a personal 
sense of efficacy indirectly, in that the anonymity it offers may assuage the fear of public 
embarrassment.  Many people recoil at the prospect of entering the public square, afraid of 
reprisals and doubtful of the adequacy of their skills” (Ibid., pp. 106). 
287	  
	  
	  
it levels the playing field.  The Internet’s tendency towards social speech means that members of 
traditionally marginalized groups can express themselves in a form that feels more comfortable.  
By speaking to one another in a colloquial style, it is also easier for Internet communicators to 
connect with one another and form the borders of their imaginary communities.  To the extent that 
broader participation in Internet discussion is able to widen these boundaries to include people 
who are female, low income and racial minorities, the liberal democratic value of inclusiveness is 
strengthened. 
This is true, not only intra-nationally, but internationally as well.  By facilitating 
communication across local and national boundaries, the Internet enables people to connect with 
an array of disparate others, finding similarities and building new communities.  Modern social 
media have the potential to greatly expand the opportunities for interactions with people outside 
one’s immediate physical neighborhood.  When this happens and individuals discover 
commonalities and shared interests with distant strangers, they are able to build a sense of global 
community.  While, in many cases, this may only result in geographically far-flung but still small 
cyber-circles of the likeminded, the very act of associating a voice and a personality with others 
who look, act and live differently from oneself is still likely to have a positive effect on establishing 
cosmopolitan values and an expansive view of human rights.  The ability of speech to expand 
empathy is perhaps its most important function.786   
As I mentioned above, critics of the Internet as a tool for political participation have often 
contended that online communications are less able to foster social capital and build genuine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
786 As John Stuart Mill writes in Considerations on Representative Government, “It is by political 
discussion that the manual labourer, whose employment is a routine, and whose way of life 
brings him in contact with no variety of impressions, circumstances, or ideas, is taught that 
remote causes, and even events which take place far off, have a most sensible effect on his 
personal interests; and it is from political discussion, and collective political action, that one 
whose daily occupations concentrate his interests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for 
and with his fellow-citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community” (Ibid., pp. 
328).  What is important here is that Mill notes the power that sharing different perspectives has 
in terms of making people better members of the community. 
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communities to as high a degree as face-to-face contact.787  (Note that the ability of the Internet 
to disseminate all kinds of information has not been called into question.)  Robert Putnam, for 
example, proposes four challenges to the assertion that Internet usage builds communities.  First, 
he points to the persistent digital divide, which reflects the power inequalities already in existence 
in society.788  Second, Putnam worries that Internet speech is too focused on entertainment to 
address the larger issues that bond members of a community together.  Third, Putnam worries 
about the lack of non-verbal cues in Internet communication, suggesting that people are less able 
to connect psychological and create good will when they cannot rely on body language and facial 
expression.789  Finally, Putnam argues that Internet speech, by enabling people to choose their 
communities based on their preexisting values and opinions, will lead to more polarization and 
specialization.  In real life, on the other hand, people are often forced to interact with people who 
hold different viewpoints.790   
Each of these concerns can be easily addressed.  Although Putnam is correct in stating 
that the digital divide presents a problem for building fair and equal democratic communities, he is 
also right in pointing out that the digital divide is merely a reflection of preexisting power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
787 See, for example, Barney Warf and John Grimes, “Counterhegemonic Discourses and the 
Internet,” in Geographical Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, Cyberspace and Geographical Space (Apr. 
1997), pp. 259-274: “Communicating across distance with individuals is no replacement for 
interacting with others in our daily, nonvirtual lives” (pp. 267). 
788 “This specter of a kind of cyberapartheid, in which bridging social capital is diminished as elite 
networks become less accessible to the have-nots, is indeed frightening.  For that very reason, 
however, it is widely recognized as a key challenge that must be addressed” (Putnam, Bowling 
Alone, pp. 175). 
789 “Computer-mediated communication, now and for the foreseeable future, masks the enormous 
amount of nonverbal communication that takes place during even the most casual face-to-face 
encounter.  (Emoticons in e-mail, like ☺, implicitly acknowledge this fact, but provide only the 
faintest trace of the information in actual facial expression.)  Eye contact, gestures (both 
intentional and unintentional), nods, a faint furrow of the brow, body language, seating 
arrangements, even hesitation measured in milliseconds—none of this mass of information that 
we ordinarily process without thinking in face-to-face encounters is captured in text” (Ibid., pp. 
175). 
790 “Real-world interactions often force us to deal with diversity, whereas the virtual world may be 
more homogenous, not in demographic terms, but in terms of interest and outlook” (Ibid., pp. 
178). 
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structures that favor some and disadvantage others.791  To the extent that people are able to 
develop social networks via face-to-face contact, despite these imbalances, they should also be 
able to do so online.  The same argument holds true for his concerns about the Internet being 
used primarily for entertainment.  Most voluntary communication, whether that be online or in 
person, is based on a desire for personal pleasure and amusement.  If that does not hinder 
traditional forms of speech from forging personal connections—and a theory of social speech 
suggests that it does not—it should not negatively affect online speech either.        
As for Putnam’s third concern that there is something lost when people cannot rely on 
nonverbal cues to inform discussion, I believe that this problem has been largely overblown.  As 
Internet speak has become an increasingly pronounced feature of modern life, the lines between 
what happens online and what happens offline are beginning to blur.  It is no longer valid to say 
that online personal ties are weak and shallow; in fact, Internet users are increasingly likely to use 
online spaces to sustain and strengthen preexisting relationships with friends and family.792  
Internet communication is both resilient and innovative.  People have responded to a lack of 
physical cues by developing a new code of communication that approximates tone.  This is 
especially true, as newer forms of online messaging have favored the visual over the purely 
textual.  Through emoticons, picture texts, capitalizations and strategic punctuation, people are 
increasingly capable of capturing the intangible elements of physical communication.  And as the 
political landscape is increasingly populated by a younger generation that grew up learning to 
read the tone of texts and emoticons, these concerns should become even less pressing.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
791 Despite optimistic hopes that new technologies would limit the gap between the “have’s” and 
the have-not’s,” the Internet has created its own sphere of elites.  While most people in the United 
States now have access to the Internet, a digital divide has developed. Disadvantaged groups still 
have more limited access than traditionally empowered groups.  And they are also less effective 
at using these new technologies.  See Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy, pp. 9. 
792 Keith Hampton, “Networked Sociability Online, Off-line. The Networked Society: A Cross-
Cultural Perspective,” in The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, M. Castells (ed.) 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), pp. 217-232. 
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Finally, as I explain above, Putnam is right to worry about the polarizing nature of Internet 
communication.  Like speakers in traditional forums, Internet communicators tend to seek out 
others who share their own opinions.  What makes the Internet especially worrisome in this 
regard is that it not only makes this sorting process extremely easy for the average user, but it 
also often takes place automatically and invisibly through sorting algorithms.  The effect of these 
“echo chambers” is to polarize the population, discouraging personal reflection and intergroup 
compromise.   
This phenomenon may have obvious negative implications for democratic politics in a 
heterogeneous society.  And yet, this threat may also be overestimated.  The same underlying 
mechanism that makes polarization possible in the short term (the ease of assembling likeminded 
individuals), also makes it possible that Internet users will be able to build connections to diverse 
others in the long term.  Even Sunstein admits that, for many curious and motivated people, the 
Internet provides opportunities to confront new and varied viewpoints that the physical world 
cannot offer.  He explains that many people “may live in an information cocoon—their workplace, 
their school, their neighborhood—and the Internet can greatly broaden their horizons.  Cocoons 
and echo chambers, emerging from simple geography, are easy to escape with just a few 
seconds on a few Web sites…  Many citizens, in isolated areas or isolated nations, escape their 
confines, and learn an extraordinary amount, simply by virtue of the Internet.”793  Even for those 
uncurious users who choose only to associate with those who share their opinions online, it is 
hard to imagine that they can avoid some degree of heterogeneity.  While Internet speakers may 
come together based on specific interests and ideas, they are unlikely to find people who are 
exactly like them in all respects.  Any prolonged communication with individuals who are different 
in terms of their race, ethnicity, sex, income level or physical location is likely to ultimately 
increase empathy and build a sense of global humanity.  That long-term benefit may very well 
overwhelm any negativity associated with polarization in the short term. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
793 Sunstein, Infotopia, pp. 97. 
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B. Negative effects of social speech: cyberbullying -> alienation, eroding social trust and 
weak community ties 
Along with the positive political outcomes associated with online communication, it is 
important to remember that Internet speak can also potentially result in negative effects on 
democratic citizenship.  Like all forms of social speech, Internet speak is not neutral.  The form 
and content of Internet speech colors the effects that it will have on individual participants.  The 
previous discussion focused primarily on online social speech that aims to discover 
commonalities and provide valuable information about what it means to act as a good democratic 
citizen.  The result of this “good” social speech online is to encourage political activity by 
providing cultural and political training, building social trust and defining communities.  But not all 
Internet speech contains such positive values.  Much of the communication that takes place 
online seeks to identify differences and devalue individuals.  Just as the anonymity of the Internet 
makes it more likely that users will share personal information and opinions, it also makes it 
easier for them to harass others.  And just as the interactive nature of the Internet teaches users 
that their opinions matter and ought to be shared, it also serves to empower potential bullies.  
This “bad” social speech online tends to have negative effects on both its victims and its 
perpetrators from the standpoint of liberal democratic values, contributing to feelings of alienation 
and hopelessness for both.  The results are a citizenry lacking in the character traits necessary 
for democratic citizenship (such as courage and initiative), low levels of social trust and weak 
community ties.  In this section, I will focus specifically on one form of negative online social 
speech: cyberbullying. 
There is no one commonly accepted legal definition of cyberbullying in the United States, 
but several government agencies have put forth helpful guidelines.  The Centers for Disease 
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Control and Prevention refer to it as “electronic aggression.”794  More specifically, the Centers’ 
website defines cyberbullying as any one of five activities: 1) disclosing someone else’s personal 
information in a public area (e.g., website) in order to cause embarrassment; 2) posting rumors or 
lies about someone in a public area (e.g., discussion board); 3) distributing embarrassing pictures 
of someone by posting them in a public area (e.g., website) or sending them via email; 4) 
assuming another person’s electronic identity to post or send messages about others with the 
intent of causing the other person harm; and 5) sending mean, embarrassing, or threatening text 
messages, instant messages, or e-mails.795  The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 
on the other hand, promotes a more inclusive understanding of cyberbullying:   
Cyberbullying is bullying that takes place using electronic technology.  Electronic 
technology includes devices and equipment such as cell phones, computers, and tablets 
as well as communication tools including social media sites, text messages, chat, and 
websites.  Examples of cyberbullying include mean text messages or emails, rumors sent 
by email or posted on social networking sites, and embarrassing pictures, videos, 
websites, or fake profiles.796   
In other words, in the case of cyberbullying, individuals exploit the ease and publicity of 
communication online to engage in aggressive, long-lasting bullying.  Victims and perpetrators 
can be male or female, young or old; however, much of the current research on cyberbullying 
focuses on school-age children.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
794 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Technology and Youth: Protecting your 
Child from Electronic Aggression.” Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/EA-
TipSheet-a.pdf.  
795 Ibid. 
796 stopbullying.gov, “What is Cyberbullying,” U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. 
Available at: http://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/what-is-it/index.html.  
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While bullying has always existed, several aspects of the Internet make it both more likely 
to occur and also (potentially) more damaging: anonymity, pervasiveness and permanence.797  In 
her book on cyberbullying, Sticks and Stones: Defeating the Culture of Bullying and 
Rediscovering the Power of Character and Empathy, Emily Bazelon identifies and discusses 
these three characteristics of cyberbullying.  First, she points to the effects of anonymity on the 
experience of cyberbullying for both the bully and the bullied.  As discussed above, the nature of 
the Internet enables users to connect with one another without revealing who they are in real life.  
While this anonymity may lead to freer, more open, more diverse conversation in some contexts, 
it may also embolden potential bullies.798  Because the cyberbully can choose to act 
anonymously, she may also feel more able to pursue a more hostile, nastier stance than she 
might in person.799  As Bazelon explains, this is largely because it is harder to feel empathy when 
one is attacking another from behind the shield of a computer screen:  “Sitting at the keyboard 
alone instead of talking face-to-face, often shrouded in anonymity, teenagers (and adults) 
sometimes strike a pose and write in a kind of text-speak that’s harsher than what they would 
dare say out loud.”800  Not only is the content of cyberbullying perhaps meaner than its real life 
counterpart, but it is also experienced more painfully by the bullied.  Bazelon continues: “Stripped 
of tone of voice or eye contact, the meanness often hits harder than intended.  Here again, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
797 See Michele L. Ybarra and Kimberly J. Mitchell, “Youth Engaging in Online Harassment: 
Associations with Caregiver-Child Relationships, Internet Use, and Personal Characteristics,” in 
Journal of Adolescence, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004), pp. 319-336. 
798 As Tom Postes and Russell Spears write in their 1998 article, anonymity is likely to lead to 
heightened aggression and inappropriate behavior.  See Tom Postes and Russell Spears, 
“Deindividuation and anti-normative behavior: A meta-analysis,” in Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 
123, pp. 238-259. 
799 It is important to note that not all cyberbullies choose to act anonymously.  As the experience 
of the now-defunct website Formspring proved, many cyberbullies wear their real names as a 
badge of pride when harassing others online.   
800 Emily Bazelon, Sticks and Stones: Defeating the Culture of Bullying and Rediscovering the 
Power of Character and Empathy (New York: Random House, 2013), pp. 9. 
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electronic trail only increases the blow’s impact.  Read again and again by the target, a tossed-off 
insult can become exponentially more painful.”801  
A second essential feature of cyberbullying is that it is nearly impossible to escape.  
Because the Internet is everywhere, cyberbullying, too, is omnipresent.  Cyberbullying can take 
place 24 hours a day, seven days a week; it can reach its victims whether they are alone or with 
others, in public or in private.  So even though traditional face-to-face bullying is still a more 
common occurrence than cyberbullying, it may not feel that way to the person being bullied.  As 
Bazelon writes, with the advent of cyberbullying, “Coming home from school was no longer a 
refuge from torment: you could always check Facebook or Twitter to see what other kids were 
saying about you, and a bully could find you on IM if he missed you that day in the hall.”802  The 
potential for incessant, inescapable negative messaging makes cyberbullying an especially 
powerful tool for breaking down the psyche. 
Finally, cyberbullying creates a permanent digital footprint. Once inappropriate or 
harassing messages and pictures are posted, they become impossible to completely destroy.  In 
practice, this means that nasty comments and pictures can follow an individual around for the rest 
of her life.  Even when individuals try to erase the evidence of bullying, Bazelon explains, it often 
lives on through digital printouts and screen shots: “This makes bullying more lasting, more 
visible, more viral.  The consequences have infinitely expanded.  It’s not just the kids on the 
playground who see it—it’s any of hundreds of thousands of Facebook friends.”803  So not only is 
this harassment permanent, but it has a wider audience than bullies of yesteryear could ever 
have imagined. 
Bazelon softens these findings by repeatedly assuring readers that cyberbullying is not 
actually more prevalent than traditional bullying.  Traditional bullying exists without cyberbullying, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
801 Ibid. 
802 Ibid. 
803 Ibid. 
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but cyberbullying hardly ever exists without traditional bullying.  Nevertheless, cyberbullying has 
become a common and persistent phenomenon.  In a 2000 study by the Crimes Against Children 
Research Center, six percent of youths who used the Internet over the previous year reported 
having been harassed online.  Of that group, 31 percent described feeling “very” or “extremely” 
upset as a result of cyberbullying.804  And according to a separate 2008-2012 study, those 
numbers have remained fairly constant.  In 2009 (the most recent year for which data was 
available), six percent of students in grades 6-12 had experienced cyberbullying.805  The situation 
seems to worsen as children get older, however.  According to a 2011 Youth Risk Behavior 
Surveillance Survey, by high school (grades 9-12), the number of children reporting experiences 
of cyberbullying spikes to 16 percent.806  And these numbers might reflect underreporting. The 
study warns that because technology changes so rapidly, it is hard to design surveys that 
accurately capture these trends.  Nevertheless, it is clear that cyberbullying is on the rise in the 
United States. 
Regardless of the exact size of the problem, may critics will argue that bullying—whether 
it takes place online or offline—is an essential part of growing up.  In order to become high 
functioning adults in a heterogeneous society, children must learn early on how to cope with 
others who disagree or behave hurtfully towards them.  Adults, too, will often find that they must 
learn to cope and cooperate with people who harass them.  Criticism and provocation are 
inescapable aspects of one’s personal life, as well as one’s political life.  While this argument is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804 David Finkelhor, Kimberly J. Mitchell and Janis Wolak, “Online Victimization: A Report on the 
Nation’s Youth,” National Center for Missing & Exploited Children  (2000). Available at: 
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/Victimization_Online_Survey.pdf. 
805 See Jill Fleury DeVoe, Lynn Bauer and Monica Hill, “Student Victimization in U.S. Schools: 
Results From the 2009 School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey,” 
National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences (ies), U.S. Department of 
Education (November 2011). Available at: http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012314.pdf. 
806 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance – United 
States, 2011,” in Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Vol. 61, No. SS 4 (June 8, 2012), pp. 1-
162. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6104.pdf. 
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certainly true, it fails to consider the long-term harms of cyberbullying and its effects on the wider 
democratic community.  Indeed, these effects can be severe, both for the individual and society.   
The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services points to several possible harms.  It 
finds that children who are cyberbullied are more likely to use alcohol and drugs, skip school, 
experience in-person bullying, be unwilling to attend school, receive poor grades, have lower self-
esteem and have more health problems.807  Congress has also addressed the real, measurable 
harms that result from cyberbullying.  In 2009, Congress introduced a bill (H.R. 1966) that set a 
federal definition for the term “cyberbullying.”  Although the proposal was criticized for being 
overbroad and did not advance, the bill did provide some valuable claims about the potential 
damage caused by cyberbullying, and thus, the national interest in preventing it.  The bill 
describes the harms as such: “Cyberbullying can cause psychological harm, including 
depression; negatively impact academic performance, safety, and the well-being of children in 
school; force children to change schools; and in some cases lead to extreme violent behavior, 
including murder and suicide.”808 
The correlation between cyberbullying and negative psychological symptoms are not 
limited to those being bullied.  Using data from the largest, most-detailed U.S.-based survey of 
young regular Internet users, the Youth Internet Safety Survey (YISS), Michele L. Ybarra and 
Kimberly J. Mitchell examine the effects of cyberbullying on the bullies, themselves.  Interestingly, 
they find that bullies also report experiencing elevated health problems.809  Thirty-two percent of 
online harassers reported frequent substance abuse (versus ten percent of non-harassers).  
Youth-reported delinquency, depressive symptomology, poor parent-child relationships and a 
history of receiving at least one failing grade in school were also more common among those who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807 stopbullying.gov, “What is Cyberbullying.” 
808 H.R. 1966. Available at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.1966. 
809 Ybarra and Mitchell, “Youth Engaging in Online Harassment,” pp. 330. 
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reported having harassed other students than those who did not report engaging in such 
behavior.810   
Because it is a relatively new phenomenon, there is still a need for a great deal more 
empirical and theoretical research into the effects of cyberbullying.  In particular, the findings of 
cyberbullying researchers and agencies will need to be parsed out to determine the actual causal 
links between cyberbullying and negative psychological symptoms.  While there is a clear positive 
correlation between the two variables, it will not be until the current victims and perpetrators of 
cyberbullying grow up (and researchers are able to chart how these experiences affected their 
relationships to their political communities over time) that I can draw any definitive conclusions 
regarding causation.  For now, any examination of the long-term effects of cyberbullying will have 
to remain speculative.   
Still, there is reason to suspect that this kind of widespread harassment will result in 
significant political consequences.  As I explain in Chapter Five, informal social interactions are 
instrumental in forming the character traits that determine the kinds of citizens that individuals will 
become.  When people are rewarded and encouraged for speaking up, they are likely to become 
brave, active democratic citizens.  On the other hand, when, as in the case of cyberbullying, 
individuals are mocked and taught to think of themselves as unworthy, they will tend to grow into 
depressed, timid citizens, unwilling to reach out and question authority.  The disinclination to 
engage in the democratic process harms not only the individual (in her capacity as an 
autonomous being), but also the greater political community, which is unable to fully reflect all of 
its citizens. 
Cyberbullying also diminishes the capacity of an individual to form the bonds of social 
capital and trust (based on mutual hopes, interests and objectives) that make politics run 
smoothly.  As the above studies suggest, cyberbullying often leads both victims and perpetrators 
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into other anti-social behaviors, such as drug use, delinquency and poor familial relations.  These 
kinds of activities isolate the individual from the community, leading her to become distrustful and 
hopeless, all of which reduces feelings of political efficacy. 
Finally, at its root, cyberbullying is a process of identifying difference and distancing the 
other.  In other words, cyberbullying is a way of forming in-groups and out-groups.  Those who 
find themselves in the out-groups are unlikely to feel connected to the greater society that has 
excluded them.  The boundaries of their communities are decidedly small.  This reduces the 
likelihood that they will care to participate in any political activities, from civic organizations to 
voting.  There is also evidence to suggest that people involved in cyberbullying are less capable 
of empathizing with the wider community.  Ybarra and Mitchell find that cyberbullies are four 
times more likely to report having previously been victims of cyberbullying than respondents who 
did not admit to engaging in the practice.811  And over 50 percent of online harassers reported 
being the subject of traditional bullying, as opposed to only 30 percent of non-harassers.812  
These numbers imply that the experience of having been cyberbullied may negatively affect an 
individual’s ability to understand and relate to others.  Over time, victims of cyberbullying may 
grow to feel marginalized and alone, making it difficult for them to identify their own wellbeing with 
that of the greater community.  They may also lack the self-esteem necessary to feel like they can 
or should have an impact on democratic self-governance.  At the extreme, cyberbullying has even 
been linked to several high-profile suicides.813   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
811 Ibid., pp. 334. 
812 Ibid., pp. 330. 
813 The Annenberg Public Policy Center reports that the rate of suicidal ideation among teenage 
and young adult victims of cyberbullying is about four times higher than those who have not 
experienced cyberbullying (27.4% v. 7.5%).  See The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the 
University of Pennsylvania, “Adolescent and young adult victims of cyberbullying at increased risk 
of suicide: Female youth especially at risk” (December 22, 2010). Available at: 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/downloads/releases/aci/cyberbullying%20release.pdf
.  See also Sameer Hinduja and Justin W. Patchin, “Bullying, cyberbullying, and suicide,” in Arch 
Suicide Res., Vol. 14, No. 3 (2010), pp. 206-221. 
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One famous criminal trial in Middlesex County, New Jersey, The State of New Jersey v. 
Dharun Ravi (2012) received national and international attention as an example of the kind of 
extreme psychological and community harm that can result from cyberbullying (or what Dharun 
Ravi’s supporters referred to as a “youthful prank”).  On September 19th, 2010, Ravi and his 
friend, Molly Wei, used a webcam to spy on a private romantic encounter between Ravi’s then-
roommate, Tyler Clementi, and another man, identified only as “M.B.”  Two days later, Ravi urged 
several of his friends and Twitter followers to view a second tryst between Clementi and “M.B.” 
via a secret webcam.  (This second viewing did not actually take place.)  The next day, after 
learning of Ravi’s plan, Clementi committed suicide.       
Ravi was tried and convicted on fifteen counts of crimes involving invasion of privacy, 
attempted invasion of privacy, bias intimidation, tampering with evidence, witness tampering and 
hindering apprehension or prosecution.  He was sentenced to 30 days in jail, three years 
probation, 300 hours of community service, a $10,000 fine and counseling on cyberbullying and 
alternative lifestyles.  While it is impossible to know for certain to what extent Ravi’s actions 
contributed towards Clementi’s suicide (Clementi’s family suggests that he was tormented by 
shame and embarrassment in his final days; Ravi’s supporters point to underlying psychological 
conditions), the trial provided the country with an opportunity to discuss the new and troubling 
issue of cyberbullying.814   
 
II. Safe spaces: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
814 In an interview for Rock Center, Clementi’s mother, Jane Clementi, explicitly linked her son’s 
suicide to the cyberbullying that he experienced:  It was the humiliation that his roommates and 
his dorm-mates were watching him in a very intimate act.  And that they were laughing behind his 
back…  The last thing that Tyler looked at before he left the dorm room for the bridge (he jumped 
from) was the Twitter page, where (his roommate) was announcing Tyler’s activities.”  His older 
brother, James Clementi, while granting that mental illness may have played a part in Clementi’s 
death, referred to the cyberbullying as the “straw that broke the camel’s back and… the thing that 
pushed him to the breaking point” (“Parents of Rutgers student who committed suicide change 
view of homosexuality”).   
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While it is difficult to speculate regarding the particularities of the Ravi case, it may be fair 
to say that Clementi—like countless victims of harassment based on ascriptive characteristics—
would have benefitted from having had access to a safe space in which he could speak openly 
with his peers who have experienced similar intolerance and repression.  Within such a discursive 
group, he might have grown to feel less isolated, different and hopeless.  He might have learned 
that there are many others whose personal experiences mirror his own, and through their stories 
and support, discover the tools to combat oppression and powerlessness.  Over time, he might 
have come to think of himself as a useful, efficacious member of a community whose input would 
benefit the entire political body.   
Throughout history, members of oppressed and marginalized groups have often found 
solace in forming small counter-publics where they can “speak among friends,” discussing 
everything from politics to their home lives.  In fact, safe spaces have always existed; wherever 
and whenever mainstream political dialogue has systematically excluded or devalued members of 
particular demographic groups, space spaces have arisen to cater to those politically, 
economically and socially marginalized persons.815  They are places in which disenfranchised 
people can meet, as equals, to discuss anything from the very mundane to the overtly political.  
What ties these spaces together is that they are outside of and apart from the traditional political 
establishment.  Instead, safe space speech may take place, not only around the traditional 
kitchen table, but also in the myriad other spaces that populate civil society, such as the church, 
community organizations, sporting events, etc.  As Lisa Dodson writes in “At the Kitchen Table: 
Poor Women Making Public Policy,” “table thinking has spread beyond the private kitchens of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815 Safe spaces are also likely to arise spontaneously where there isn’t a clear state in which to 
participate.  As Julie Mertus explains, “State structures are not the single, defining space when it 
comes to promoting transformative social change.  Social-change movements like the ‘kitchen 
tablers’ often care little about participating in state structures, especially when, as in the case of 
Serbia, participation would entail acquiescence in the methods of a morally bankrupt regime.  
Instead, social-change movements work with others in the space known as transitional civil-
society, that complex network of associational life that exists below the state and across national 
borders” (“Kitchen Table Lessons,” pp. 307-308). 
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poor America and has crept into public places wherever parents congregate.  Tales, critiques, 
and strategies are exchanged where mothers rock babies, where parents line up at food pantries, 
at health clinics, and in schoolyards.”816  The safe spaces literature has often been associated 
with the Black—and especially the Black female—community, but it can apply to any number of 
subjugated minorities as well.  Most recently, the LGBT community has adopted the vocabulary to 
describe communicative groups that help people to understand their sexuality and to carve out a 
place for themselves in a heteronormative world. 
The kind of speech that occurs within safe spaces differs substantially from ideal 
deliberation.  In terms of its content and its style, typical safe space speech represents an 
excellent example of what I have called “social speech.”  Much like the informal, abbreviated, 
colloquial style of speech that is so often criticized online, safe space speech incorporates 
passion, humor and shared narratives.  It is a way of expressing feelings and experiences, not 
just facts and figures.  Communication in safe spaces can be defined by three essential tenets:817 
1) back-and-forth conversation,818 2) an ethics of caring819 and 3) personal responsibility.820  It is 
partly these qualities that relegate social speech to safe spaces.  It is not just the participants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
816 Lisa Dodson, “At the Kitchen Table: Poor Women Making Public Policy,” in Women and 
Welfare: Theory and Practice in the United State and Europe, Nancy Hirschmann and Ulrike 
Liebert (eds.) (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001), pp. 186-187. 
817 See Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (New York: Routledge Classics, 2009). 
818 “Not to be confused with adversarial debate, the use of dialogue has deep roots in African-
based oral traditions and in African-American culture… The widespread use of the call-and-
response discourse mode among African-Americans illustrates the importance placed on 
dialogue.  Composed of spontaneous and nonverbal interaction between speaker and listener in 
which all of the speaker’s statements, or ‘calls,’ are punctuated by expression, ‘or responses,’ 
from the listener, this Black discourse mode pervades African-American culture.  The 
fundamental requirement of this interactive network is active participation of all individuals…” 
(Ibid., pp. 279-280). 
819 This may consist of three components: value placed on individual expressiveness, the 
appropriateness of emotions and the capacity for empathy (Ibid., pp. 281-285). 
820 “Assessments of an individual’s knowledge claims simultaneously evaluate an individual’s 
character, values, and ethics.  Within this logic, many African-American reject prevailing beliefs 
that probing into an individual’s personal viewpoint is outside the boundaries of discussion” (Ibid., 
pp. 284). 
302	  
	  
	  
themselves, but also their way of examining the world and relating it to others that is unwelcome 
in the dominant political culture.   
As with all other examples of social speech, safe space speech carries the potential to 
significantly affect democratic citizenship and political outcomes.  Through the process of building 
and maintaining communities of social speech, safe space participants learn to find their own 
voices, both as private individuals and public citizens.821  However, it is important to keep in mind 
that, depending in the style and content of safe space speech, its political effects can manifest in 
either positive or negative ways.  Through many of the same processes as Internet speak—
information dissemination, mutual empowerment and community building—safe space 
discussions can either unite a democratic community or it can divide it.  
On the one hand, safe spaces appear to have had a positive influence on liberal 
democratic politics in two ways.  First, through secure, open, nonjudgmental discourses between 
peers, members of groups, which have traditionally been either ignored or viewed as inferior by 
the wider community, are able to develop the kind of character traits that are a prerequisite for 
democratic participation, such as confidence and eagerness to participate in community affairs.  
By engaging with one another, speakers validate their peers even as they, themselves, are being 
validated.  And by gaining practice refining their opinions and discussing the issues that matter 
most to them—all within an insulated environment within which they are not intimidated into 
silence—safe space speakers gain confidence in themselves as individuals and in their abilities 
as members of a community.  The dual sense of self worth and efficacy that can develop through 
these processes makes participants more likely to actively engage in the political arena that has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821 As Fraser explains in regard to the bourgeois conception, “public spheres are not only arenas 
for the formation of discursive opinion; in addition, they are arenas for the formation and 
enactment of social identities.  This means that participation is not simply a matter of being able 
to state propositional contents that are neutral with respect to form of expression.  Rather… 
participation means being able to speak ‘in one’s own voice,’ thereby simultaneously constructing 
and expressing one’s cultural identity through idiom and style” (“Rethinking the Public Sphere,” 
pp. 68-69). 
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traditionally excluded them.  Second, through participation in safe space communities, members 
of subjugated groups are able to engage in cultural and political training that helps them learn 
what it means to be a good citizen in the context of their communities.  In other words, safe space 
speakers are, collectively, through informal discussion, developing a language of right and wrong.  
The ideologies and policies that develop and tested as a result of this process are often exported 
(and sometimes adopted by) the larger political community.  In this way, safe spaces function 
similarly to any other issue group, with its members going on to share what they’ve learned with 
the wider community.   
On the other hand, this process of building a community of participation, self-actualization 
and ideological development is not always positive from the perspective of liberal democratic 
values.  While safe space speech establishes and enforces community ties among participants, 
to the extent that those speakers identify with their safe space peers to the exclusion of society at 
large, they are actually undermining the wider democratic political community and its goals of 
inclusion and equality.  If members of safe spaces only feel connected to others who are 
demographically similar to them, they are unlikely to engage with the larger political sphere, 
regardless of the skills, information and understanding they may have acquired through their 
social speech activities.  If they are not willing to engage in democratic politics, safe space 
participants are also unable to share their perspectives, experiences, and ideologies with the rest 
of the political community.  Thus, when the community boundaries that are forged through social 
speech divide the political community, this negatively affects the latter’s capacity to accurately 
reflect all of its members’ wants and needs.   
The creation of in-groups and out-groups within the wider political community can also 
make democratic compromise especially difficult—even when members of safe spaces are 
involved in political action—because safe spaces tend to exacerbate polarization between 
minority groups and the majority.  As Cass Sunstein explains, “[g]roups go to extremes.  More 
precisely, members of a deliberating group usually end up at a more extreme position in the same 
304	  
	  
	  
general direction as their inclinations before deliberation began.”822  By contributing to the 
development of a sub-community that does not identify with the wider political community and 
also finds itself ideologically polarized from the democratic majority, safe spaces can worsen 
democratic political outcomes, not only for the minority groups that remain underrepresented, but 
also for the majority that is robbed of the benefits of engaging with those minority groups. 
 
A. Positive effects of social speech: safe spaces -> character development and 
ideological advancements 
Throughout American political history, safe spaces have played an essential (if often 
invisible) role in furthering the liberal democratic goals of equality and inclusion.  In the case of 
women’s rights, for example, formal political institutions such as the National Women’s Rights 
Conventions (1850-1856; 1858-1860), the National American Woman Suffrage Association 
(NAWSA) and the National Organization for Women (NOW) have received much of the credit for 
extending equal rights to women.  However, none of these organizations would have been 
possible without the preexisting and concurrent informal, social networks that enabled average 
citizens to meet, discuss their shared experiences, build a collective consciousness and train for 
political action.  As women’s social positioning has evolved, these unofficial discursive groups 
continue to provide spaces within which individuals can push for progress by continuously 
reevaluating and reimagining their political and social positions.  And even now, safe space social 
speech has prompted deep changes that legislation alone could not achieve.  Where would the 
Feminist Movement be today, for example, if it weren’t for the “variegated array of journals, 
bookstores, publishing companies, film and video distribution, networks, lecture series, research 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
822 Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 3.  This happens because individuals who communicate as part of a 
like-minded community are prone to influence from several group dynamics—introduction of new 
information, corroboration and reputational concerns—all of which push opinions to a more 
extreme iteration.   
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centers, academic programs, conferences, conventions, festival, and local meetings places” that 
Nancy Fraser describes as the late-twentieth century “subaltern counterpublic”?823  These zones 
of free and open communication eventually led to the creation of a new vocabulary to talk about 
female experiences (i.e. “sexism,” “sexual harassment,” and “marital, date, and acquaintance 
rape”), thus making it possible for women to represent their needs and identities—not only to 
themselves, but to society at large—in a way that has permanently altered the position of women 
in western society.824 
While safe spaces offer a refuge and platform to the disadvantaged in society, their 
democratic appeal has also received some mainstream political recognition.  For example, on 
June 17th, 2012, the mayor of Newark, NJ, Cory Booker, gave the Stanford University 
Commencement Address, in which he encouraged students to expand their ideas of what it 
means to make a difference in one’s political community: 
I worked with this woman, this tenant leader, and I would sit at her kitchen table and 
watch these other African-American women sit around that table in these projects being 
run by a slumlord and they would sit there and strategize about how to take care of the 
kids in the community, how to keep a family in their housing when they missed a rental 
payment. I stood there and I watched them thinking about how to support that community 
and I found it, I found conspirators.825 
Politics, Booker explained, is more than what happens in a mayor’s office or on Capitol Hill; it isn’t 
just a matter of wealthy white men deliberating with one another in a government setting.  For the 
average citizen, political activity actually takes place in social arenas; it consists of friends and 
neighbors coming together casually to talk, and it concerns ideas that may feel personal or close-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
823 Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” pp. 67. 
824 Ibid. 
825 Cory Booker, “Transcript of Newark, N.J., Mayor Cory Booker’s remarks for Stanford’s 
Commencement 2012,” Stanford Report (June 19, 2012). Available at: 
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/june/transcript-cory-booker-061912.html.   
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to-home.  This is especially true for those who have been systematically excluded from the formal 
political machine.  For members of these groups, much of the political action they will engage in 
over their lifetimes takes place within a particular social speech location: safe spaces.  In their 
democratic ideal, these counter-communities provides two benefits for democratic political 
communities: 1) educating and encouraging contributors to engage with the wider political 
community; and 2) enabling them to develop the ideologies that will go on to influence political 
outcomes. 
First, it is important to remember that social communication is essential, not just for 
personal enjoyment, but for personal and political growth as well.  As social animals, people are 
only capable of fully realizing their potential as individuals when they can do so in conjunction 
with others.  In other words, we are only able to identify a complete sense of our selves through 
our relationships with our communities.  And as verbal creatures, much of the human experience 
of engaging with a community takes place through conversation.  This is true regardless of 
whether or not the content of that conversation would fall under the category of traditionally 
political.  All speech—but especially social speech—helps people develop a sense of themselves 
as individuals and as valuable parts of a larger whole.   
While the process of self-realization through social speech is essential for all members of 
democratic societies, in the United States, it is especially important for those whose personal 
narratives may not correspond to the orthodoxy of the “American Dream.”  Members of these 
groups are often provided fewer opportunities to engage in traditional political action.  As a result 
of both internal and external factors, they are also less likely to think of traditional avenues of 
political expression as worthwhile uses of time of and resources.  When the distance between the 
ideal and the speaker’s lived experience is great, the result can be alienation.  Worse, it can also 
include such negative connotations that the individual feels not only different, but less than.  After 
generations of being neglected by the political process and being told (implicitly or explicitly) that 
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they are unwelcome, minority citizens can begin to internalize the message of inferiority.826  This 
causes many people to retreat away from politics and into the private and social sphere.827  
Fortunately, participation in safe spaces can work to counteract this messaging (to an extent) and 
socialize members of subjugated minorities into the character traits that facilitate political action.   
The ideal character traits for liberal democratic citizenship do not arise in a vacuum; 
rather, they must be learned through regular participation and positive reinforcement.  Through 
the process of communicating freely with others, individuals learn skills, such as cooperation, 
openness and empathy.  They are also more likely to develop corresponding character traits, 
such as confidence and republican virtue.   
Safe spaces contribute to these goals by offering venues where participants not only can 
speak, but also places where they are likely to speak.  As discussed above, what makes safe 
spaces unique from other loci of social speech is that they offer members of marginalized groups 
places where they can socialize and relax among peers, who share their experiences of 
alienation and belittlement, in a relatively non-judgmental atmosphere.  At the very least, these 
spaces are separate and somewhat insulated from the messaging of mainstream society that 
may denigrate and devalue their participants.  (Those dominant ideologies still exist, but safe 
spaces allow members room to openly question the status quo as it relates to them.)  As a result 
of the insulation, equality and protection that safe spaces provide, individuals may feel free to 
speak up in ways and to a degree that is not necessarily possible in the wider society.828  Rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826 Linda R. Tropp finds that exposure to prejudice from the majority tends to provoke more 
negative intergroup attitudes among members of minority groups.  See Linda R. Tropp, “The 
Psychological Impact of Prejudice: Implications for Intergroup Contact,” in Group Processes and 
Intergroup Relations, Vol. 6 (2003), pp. 131-149. 
827 See Beverly Daniel Tatum, Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria? And 
Other Conversations About Race (New York: Basic Books, 1997): “When feelings, rational or 
irrational, are invalidated, most people disengage.  They not only choose to discontinue the 
conversation, but are more likely to turn to someone who will understand their perspective” (pp. 
59-60). 
828 Traditional communicative arenas do not necessarily provide an encouraging atmosphere for 
minorities to assert themselves.  For example, Christopher F. Karpowitz, Tali Mendelberg and 
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than quietly observing from the sidelines, members of subjugated groups often become more 
likely to share their stories, feelings and opinions when they are within the walls of a safe space. 
This practice is of the upmost importance for democratic citizenship.  Within these 
relatively closed, homogenous communicative spaces, individuals communicate socially with 
others who share their experiences of alienation and belittlement.  Through this process, 
participants learn that they are not alone.  By sharing their experiences with a willing, receptive, 
understanding audience, safe space speakers also learn that their opinions and arguments are 
worthy of expression.  The exchange of personal narratives allows safe space participants to 
reaffirm one another’s value as individuals and members of a group.  This is, perhaps, the most 
important political role that safe spaces play in the lives of minority citizens.  As Patricia Hill 
Collins writes in her analysis of black female safe spaces, “In the comfort of daily conversations, 
through serious conversation and humor, African-American women as sisters and friends affirm 
one another’s humanity, specialness, and right to exist.”829  The affirmation that takes place in 
safe spaces helps to counteract the negative effects of a societal message that one is inferior by 
challenging conventional imagery and fashioning an alternative group image that can then be 
applied to individuals.  In other words, safe space speech helps participants develop the 
confidence in themselves and their opinions that is necessary for them to participate in a world 
outside of their safe space.   
Safe spaces offer members of subjugated minority groups the opportunity to 
communicate in ways that allow them to not only share and validate their experiences among 
peers, but also to reflect communally upon the dominant culture that excludes them.  This further 
increases their personal pride and assurance of their value as a community member.  Collins 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lee Shaker find that women are 75 percent less likely to voice their opinions in a group setting 
when men substantially outnumber them.  See Christopher F. Karpowitz, Tali Mendelberg and 
Less Shaker, “Gender Inequality in Deliberative Participation,” in The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 106, No. 3 (August 2012), pp. 533-547. 
829 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, pp. 113. 
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explains how African-American women utilize the protection and insulation of family and 
community networks to present an alternative to “the controlling images of Black womanhood,” 
which are propagated by the media, legal institutions, schools, etc.  Instead of simply accepting 
the established image of a black American woman, these informal and formal safe spaces enable 
black women to resist and reconstruct the ideal that better fits their lived experiences. 
The process of self-definition represents a vital step toward political action.  As Collins 
explains, “[i]dentity is not the goal, but rather the point of departure in the process of self-
definition.”830  Recent research suggests that when minority individuals grow to strongly identify 
as members of a group (based on their minority status), they are more likely to engage in political 
action.  Identification with the female community, in particular, makes a person more likely to 
engage in political action than almost any other group.  In “Identity and Injustice: Exploring 
Women’s Participation in Collective Action,” Caroline Kelly and Sara Breinlinger find that the more 
an individual identifies as a woman, the more likely she is to engage in politics.  The only group 
identifier that showed a stronger correlation was “activist.”831  To the extent that participation in a 
safe space makes an individual more likely to identify with her peers, it also seems to make it 
likelier that she will engage with the wider community. 
One theory to explain this correlation is that perhaps membership in one group prepares 
and trains individuals for membership in ever-larger communities.  Fraser points to this possibility 
when she discusses the dual nature of “subaltern counterpublics,” or safe spaces; not only do 
they serves as a space for retreat, she argues, but also they also act as places where members 
can be armed for political battle:  “On the one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
830 Ibid., pp. 125.  Collins cites Mary Helen Washington, who argues for the political significance 
of self-definition.  See Mary Helen Washington, Black-Eyed Susans and Midnight Birds: Stories 
by and about Black Women (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1980).  Washington writes that Black 
women who work to “forge an identity larger than the one society would force upon them… are 
aware and conscious, and that very consciousness is potent.”   
831 Caroline Kelly and Sara Breinlinger, “Identity and Injustice: Exploring Women’s Participation in 
Collective Action,” in Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 5 (1995), pp. 41-
57. 
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regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and training groups for agitational 
activities directed toward wider publics.”832  Members of Fraser’s subaltern counterpublics are 
always aware that they also simultaneously belong to a wider “public-at-large.”  So when they are 
communicating in the smaller groups, they are preparing themselves with the perspectives and 
the vigor that they will need to confront the larger community. 
Another promising hypothesis for the cause underlying the relationship between group 
identification and political action is that participation in small discursive groups—such as safe 
spaces—increases feelings of empowerment.  When an individual feels validated and efficacious 
in one sphere of her life, those feelings are likely to cross over into other areas of her life as well.  
Marc A. Zimmerman and Julian Rappaport’s study, “Citizen Participation, Perceived Control, and 
Psychological Empowerment” shows this to be the case, finding that the feeling of empowerment 
in any area of one’s life makes civic and political participation, specifically, more probable.833  The 
authors propose a potential link between safe space speech and political action, specifically, 
when they suggest that becoming involved in decisions that affect one’s local community life is an 
especially promising option for developing a sense of psychological empowerment.834  Any 
experience in organizing people and developing strategies for achieving one’s goals can 
contribute towards stronger feelings of empowerment; and for those whose formal options are 
limited in this regard, safe spaces provide an excellent opportunity to engage with a community.  
And as the messages they receive within safe spaces develop a more positive tone of 
empowerment, participants are more likely to view themselves as strong political actors with 
voices that ought to be heard.  This attitudinal shift makes it more likely that participants in safe 
spaces will (and will want to) engage in the wider political community.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
832 Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” pp. 68. 
833 Zimmerman and Rappaport describe empowerment thusly: “Empowerment is a construct that 
links individual strengths and competencies, natural helping systems, and proactive behaviors to 
matters of social policy and social change.  It is thought to be a process by which individuals gain 
mastery or control over their own lives and democratic participation in the life of their community” 
(“Citizen Participation, Perceived Control, and Psychological Empowerment, pp. 726). 
834 Ibid. 
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 The second way that safe space speech influences political action is tonally, acting as the 
locus for the creation of group-specific moral codes.  As speakers begin to understand 
themselves in a social context, they are also determining where they fit into the larger political 
community.  Through interactions with others who share histories, perspectives, etc., 
marginalized citizens struggle to reconcile the discrepancy between their lives and the American 
ideal.  To the extent that black women, for example, see themselves as poorly represented in the 
“American Dream,” they are also likely to use safe spaces to question prevailing norms and 
ethical standards.  As Dodson explains, it is through social speech, around the kitchen table, that 
members of oppressed groups feel free to develop their own moral codes.  Conversations that 
may look like the simple sharing of “stories of terrible hardship, despair, and loss,” are also likely 
to include “ethical guidance, the obligations of kin, community, and of decent behavior.”835  As an 
example, Dodson looks at the case of Adrienne, a white woman in her thirties who was previously 
on welfare.  As a child, Adrienne’s mother used the kitchen table as podium from which to stress 
the liberal value of “individual responsibility for survival,” as well as to teach the republican “idea 
of responsibility for others as well as one’s own.”836  It was through these informal lessons that 
Adrienne learned the ideologies that would follow her throughout her personal and political life. 
Dodson finds that these philosophies tend not to be so black-and white, however.  
Because they are founded more on lived experience than formal theoretical learning, kitchen 
table philosophies tend to be more realistic and, thus, greyer:  “Kitchen-table policy assumes 
choices are not clear cut, no black and white, gray is all that is real.  Raising families on poverty 
wages; transcending stigma; managing complex households that have a high rate of health 
problems, disruptions, and stresses—none of this labor can be crammed into crisp and polished 
work schedules.”837  The kitchen table philosophies and moral codes that develop out of hardship 
and oppression contain answers to questions of justice, fairness, liberty, etc.  But when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
835 Dodson, “At the Kitchen Table,” pp. 189. 
836 Ibid., pp. 186. 
837 Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
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individuals grow up hearing tales of how the state isn’t always fair or just, and when all they’ve 
ever seen is the difference between their reality and the ideal society, they eventually learn to be 
distrustful (and maybe even resentful) of government.  This was certainly the case for Dodson’s 
Adrienne, who “grew into a person who believes that government is morally bankrupt—that the 
only justice a poor person will ever find is of her own creation.”838  
The beliefs about right and wrong, good and bad, which are realized and honed through 
social speech in safe spaces, can contribute towards the development and reconstruction (over 
time) of political ideologies that may look very different from what prevails in mainstream society.  
These unique ideologies often find their way into mainstream politics through the safe space 
participants who adopt them, by serving as the lens through which they see the political.  Melissa 
Victoria Harris-Lacewell explains: 
For both the individual and the group, ideology interprets truth, reduces complexity, links 
individual experiences to group narratives, identifies friends and foes, defines what is 
desirable, and provides a range of possible strategies for achieving desired outcomes…  
Ideology is the sort of story we tell ourselves and others about how the world works.  The 
narrative encompasses historical events, personal experiences and collective realities.  
This narrative then directs interpretation of the political world and structures expressions 
of political attitudes.839  
Safe space speech, by coloring the ideologies of its participants, affects the way they view the 
political world and their place within it.  These revised interpretations and languages go on to 
influence others, as safe space speakers move outside of their communities and engage with the 
wider population. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
838 Ibid., pp. 186.  Still, despite the negativity, Dodson points to an overarching theme of kitchen 
table philosophies: survival.  As she writes, “one clarion imperative emerges: If you are a healthy 
and self-respecting woman, your family will survive” (Ibid., pp. 189). 
839 Melissa Victoria Harris-Lacewell, Barbershops, Bibles, and BET: Everyday Talk and Black 
Political Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 19. 
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 Despite the potential democratic advantages of safe space social speech—development 
of democratic character traits and the refinement of ideologies—critics may argue that safe 
spaces are no longer necessary in a society with formal, legal equality.  If all individuals are 
technically free to compete in the marketplace of ideas, then why should some be granted 
additional, exclusionary arenas of discussion?  Doesn’t it belittle a group to argue that they need 
additional spaces of training, education and involvement in order to compete politically with the 
rest of the community?  To these critiques, I offer two rebuttals.  First, the very existence of safe 
spaces proves their necessity.  Safe spaces are rarely formal institutions, granted to a specific 
group; instead, they tend to arise organically wherever people who have traditionally been left out 
of formal politics find one another.  This may not always be the case (as I will discuss in Chapter 
Seven), but for now, I want to stress the legitimate point that where safe spaces do exist, it is 
often because there are still groups that do not have other social outlets. 
Second, formal equality of speech does not necessarily equate to equality in practice.  
Many liberal theories of free speech begin with the assumption of a level playing field.  If 
everyone would just participate and accept the same standards, the truth will eventually win out.  
This is meant to be a neutral, objective process, with the social standing of the participants 
playing no role in determining which ideas are accepted and which are rejected.  But just because 
the general public sphere is technically open to everyone, it does not follow that all will equally 
join the public debate.840  As this section has shown, consistent negative messaging (both implicit 
and explicit) is likely to affect an individual’s interest in and willingness to engage with a political 
community that has seemingly rejected her.  Even when she does choose to take part in 
traditional political debate, she may find herself less well prepared than those who have not had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
840 Catherine A. MacKinnon explains: “The most basic assumption underlying First Amendment 
adjudication is that, socially, speech is free.  The First Amendment says, ‘Congress shall not 
abridge the freedom of speech.’  Free speech exists.  The problem for government is to avoid 
constraining that which, if unconstrained by government, is free.  This tends to presuppose that 
whole segments of the population are not systematically silenced socially, prior to government 
action” (“Not a Moral Issue,” pp. 157-158). 
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to struggle with exclusion and prejudice.  When she is communicating with the wider public, she 
may feel too intimidated to speak her mind or feel too insecure in her beliefs—which likely do not 
perfectly align with the ideal—to fight for them.  This lack of preparedness makes it more difficult 
for her opinions and perspectives to gain footing in the wider political community. 
Safe spaces present a potential solution to this imbalance.  Not only do they provide an 
alternative form of political action, but they also offer individuals the opportunity to enhance their 
positions in traditional politics.  Through safe space social speech, participants are able to 
practice communicating their wants and needs while also building confidence and a sense of self 
worth.  And, working as a unit, safe space speakers can define a self-image that better reflects 
their lived experiences and their relationship to the larger world.  In these ways, safe spaces 
actually do help to level out the democratic playing field, making it both more likely that 
participants will transfer their skills and knowledge to the political world, and also that they will 
have a meaningful influence when they get there. 
 
B. Negative effects of social speech: safe spaces -> isolation and polarization 
Safe space social communication provides speakers with many of the skills and 
capabilities necessary for political action in the larger community.  The processes of self-
affirmation, self-definition and empowerment that occur during these “kitchen table discussions” 
(regardless of where they actually take place) enable participants to not only question the world 
around them, but also to develop the confidence and republican virtue that they can then carry 
into increasingly wider social and political circles.  And by serving as a discursive space in which 
people can identify and discuss group-specific moral codes, safe space social speech also 
influences the form that that political participation will take.  Unfortunately, despite the positive 
political potential of safe space speech, depending on its style and content, it can also result in 
significant negative consequences for the liberal democratic goals of equality and inclusiveness.  
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While this highly insider communication helps to build trust, cohesiveness and a sense of 
belonging among members, through that process, it may also serve to further solidify the lines 
between in-groups and out-groups, villainizing the latter and leading to increased feelings of 
estrangement and polarization. 
Experiences in safe spaces teach individuals what it means to be and act as a valuable, 
contributing member of a community.  It is through building ideas with others and sharing 
personal opinions that safe space participants learn to understand the boundaries of their 
communities as well as their places within them.  It is also how they learn to identify who is not a 
part of those communities.  In her essay, “In Praise of Gossip,” Patricia Meyer Spacks suggests 
that a primary function of one form of social speech, gossip, is to equalize the social position of 
participants.  “People discourse to one another;” she writes, “they gossip with…  One discourses 
from a height, gossips around the kitchen table.”841  Gossip, much like the myriad other forms of 
social speech, ensures that participants feel like they are among peers – friends, even.  To 
gossip—or even just chat—with another implies a degree of trust, mutual understanding and 
camaraderie.  Through its practice, casual conversation truly does lead to closer affective bonds: 
For the two or three discussers, it [gossip] supports comradeship, connection; it enables 
them to distance, even to deny, their own competitive impulses. They declare their 
closeness by sharing their secrets, and by investing those secrets with meaning. The 
sharing involves more than exchange of information. It implies self-revelation as well as 
exposure of other people's affairs because responses to news matter more than news 
itself in intimate gossip. By gossiping people know one another.”842 
In other words, the two-way process of self-exposure and receptivity towards others that takes 
place through social speech helps individuals to establish ties of community and social trust.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
841 Patricia Meyer Spacks, “In Praise of Gossip,” in The Hudson Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring, 
1982), pp. 24. 
842 Ibid., pp. 28. 
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They are not only drawing the boundaries around their communities – they are also learning to 
care about the people within those imaginary lines and to identify their good with the good of that 
group.  Thus, social speech and the connections it forges are instrumental for democratic bodies 
that require sacrifices from some citizens in order to benefit others.   
The unfortunate side effect of this community building is that, although it brings some 
people together, it also “directs competitive feelings outward, toward the absent other, the subject 
of discussion."843  In-groups, after all, can only exist by virtue of there being an out-group.  In 
establishing connections to some people, social speakers are also discovering who they do not 
need to care about.  In the case of safe spaces, in which participation is based on membership in 
a marginalized ascriptive group, the resulting lines between in-groups and out-groups can be 
particularly stark and impenetrable.  
Safe space speech establishes a distance between the “us” who are welcome in the safe 
space, and the “them” that can never truly understand the dynamics of those relationships.  
Several black feminist theorists have argued that, in order to be effective, safe spaces must be 
highly exclusionary. As Beverly Daniel Tatum explains in her book, Why Are All the Black Kids 
Sitting Together in the Cafeteria? And Other Conversations About Race, it is much easier to 
understand our own experiences when we are in conversation with others who can personally 
relate to us.844  Drawing from her life as a black woman, Tatum argues that even well-meaning 
white Americans are unable to fill that need for underrepresented minorities:  “Even when White 
friends are willing and able to listen and bear witness to one’s struggles, they cannot really share 
the experience.”845  This is especially true, Tatum argues, in the identity-forming phase of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843 Ibid. 
844 “As one’s awareness of the daily challenges of living in a racist society increase, it is 
immensely helpful to be able to share one’s experiences with others who have lived it” (Tatum, 
Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria? pp. 70). 
845 Ibid. 
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adolescence.  But it is also true throughout life; in order to fully know ourselves, we must be able 
to identify with others who are like us. 
Not only do outsiders fail to truly understand and relate to the experiences of safe space 
participants, but their mere presence compromises the goals of those spaces.  As Collins argues, 
the very idea of a safe space requires homogeneity:  “Historically, safe spaces were ‘safe’ 
because they represented places where Black women could freely examine issues that 
concerned us.  By definition, such spaces became less ‘safe’ if shared with those who were not 
Black and female.“846  If the purpose of a safe space is to provide opportunities for members of a 
marginalized group to communicate freely and apart from (or with limited exposure to) external 
power imbalances, the presence of an outsider negates that function.  Black women, Collins 
writes, because they do not find themselves or their struggles accurately represented in popular 
or political culture, need opportunities to fully and openly express themselves if they are to 
develop understandings of their own realities.  And they need to be able to do that with as few 
stifling outside influences as possible. 
Finally, in her book, Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism, bell hooks uses the 
example of the black feminist movement to show just how important it is for counter-hegemonic 
movements to be carefully defined and to maintain internal homogeneity.  As hooks explains, 
when feminist groups included both white and black female members, the latter became less 
willing and able to participate.  Not only were they influenced by preexisting racial power 
imbalances that limited their opportunities for full engagement, but they were also, in a sense, 
oppressed by white feminists who insisted on particular agendas that did not adequately reflect 
the lives of black women.  Hooks writes:  “We were unable to usurp leadership positions within 
the movement…  We could not even get a hearing at women’s groups because they were 
organized and controlled by white women…  We dropped out of groups, weary of hearing talk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
846 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, pp. 121. 
318	  
	  
	  
about women as a force that could change the world when we had not changed ourselves.”847  By 
insisting that black women take part in a feminist struggle that did not express their perspectives, 
white women were effectually silencing them. 
Thus, many black women were compelled to further segregate themselves away from 
feminist groups and into black feminist groups.  According to hooks, this was ultimately a positive 
development for black female empowerment:  “Many black women found an affirmation and 
support of their concern with feminism in all-black groups that they had not experienced in 
women’s groups dominated by white women; this has been one of the positive features of black 
women’s groups.”848  The more narrowly counter-publics—or safe spaces—are defined, the more 
they are able to reduce unequal power relationships, and thus, decrease the chances for 
silencing and lack of representation.   In other words, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness, 
safe spaces must be fairly homogenous and closed.   
It is important to note that the segregation imposed by safe spaces is only meant to be 
temporary.  Ideally, these spaces exist to prepare, encourage and coach participants for life in a 
wider, heterogeneous society.  As Collins explains for the case of black women, “safe spaces 
were never meant to be a way of life.  Instead, they constitute one mechanism among many 
designed to foster Black women’s empowerment and enhance our ability to participate in social 
justice projects.  As strategies, safe spaces rely on exclusionary practices, but their overall 
purpose most certainly aims for a more inclusionary, just society.”849  It is not the purpose of most 
safe spaces to form a fortress that closes participants off from the world; rather it is to find a 
group of people who share common experiences and can provide the advice, comfort and 
reassurance that makes political action possible.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847 bell hooks, Ain’t I a Woman? Black Women and Feminism (Boston, MA: South End Press, 
1981), pp. 189. 
848 Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
849 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, pp. 121. 
319	  
	  
	  
Problems begin to arise, however, when members of safe spaces become enmeshed in 
their specific groups and their particular discourses, and begin to distance themselves from the 
rest of the public, turning the in-group into the priority and the out-group into the enemy.  For 
members of groups that have traditionally been marginalized by the “them,” such distancing and 
isolation might initially seem appealing.  When one feels like she has been rejected by 
mainstream society, it may be a natural instinct to reject them right back, especially when she has 
the benefit of support within her safe space community.  The resulting “us vs. them” mentality 
may inadvertently lead to radicalized attitudes and a demonization of the majority.  This, in turn, 
may decrease the likelihood that minority members will participate actively (if at all) in mainstream 
politics.   
From the outset, it seems likely that the ideas and opinions that characterize safe spaces 
tend to differ from majority public opinion.  As Harris-Lacewell writes, “Once we allow that the 
African American counterpublic is operating beyond the reach of powerful whites, we must allow 
for the possibility that the ideological work being done in that counterpublic is distinct from the 
hegemonic work of elite discourse.”850  And although there may be some Black men and women 
whose political attitudes reflect aspects of American ideology—“such as meritocracy, 
individualism, and uncritical patriotism”—the vast majority of black discourse is critical of these 
ideas.  This is not, in and of itself, a problem.  Diversity of opinions and perspectives is one of the 
democratic benefits of a society that encourages safe space speech.  Unfortunately, when that 
critical attitude focuses less on democratic, inclusive solutions and more on isolationism, if safe 
space participants are not vigilant, those attitudes may radicalize in ways that further separate 
minority and majority groups, making political compromise extremely difficult. 
As Sunstein explains, ideological differences, when insulated within like-minded, 
discursive groups, have a tendency to go to extremes.  As discussed in the previous section on 
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Internet speak, this occurs in three ways.  First, Sunstein suggests that new information inevitably 
leans in the direction of the predominant group norms and ideologies.  This appears almost 
commonsense: the greater the number of members of a group that hold a particular belief, the 
more information will be provided supporting that belief.851  Second, like-minded deliberative 
groups, simply by bringing together people with similar opinions, are apt to provide psychological 
reinforcement to their participants, thus diminishing uncertainty and strengthening/radicalizing 
viewpoints.852  It is important to note that this process may be taking place for many group 
members at once – the more people in my group seem to agree with me, the more confident and 
firm I will be in my opinion, and the more I will be offering that same reinforcement to others in my 
group.  Finally, reputation plays an important role in radicalizing group opinions.  As Sunstein 
explains, whether an individual consciously desires approval or not, it is difficult to avoid adjusting 
her positions (at least slightly), when she learns what other members of her group believe.853   
All three of these processes that lead towards radicalization are enhanced when the like-
minded discursive group is tied together through social and affective bonds, as in the case of safe 
spaces.  The greater the sense of shared identity and solidarity among group members, Sunstein 
claims, the higher the likelihood of polarization.  This may be because people who feel united by 
some personal connection—“family, politics, or religious convictions”—are highly influenced in 
their decision-making by social dynamics and are likely to dampen dissent.  The more “individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
851 “Happily, people tend to respond to the arguments made by other people—and the pool of 
arguments, in a group with a predisposition in a particular direction, will inevitably be skewed in 
the direction of the original predisposition” (Sunstein, Going to Extremes, pp. 22). 
852 “Those who lack confidence and who are unsure what they should think tend to moderate their 
views.  Suppose that you are asked what you think about some question on which you lack 
information.  You are likely to avoid extremes.  It is for this reason that cautious people, not 
knowing what to do, tend to choose some midpoint between the extremes.  But if other people 
seem to share their views, people become more confident that they are correct.  As a result, they 
will probably move in a more extreme direction” (Ibid., pp. 23). 
853 “Sometimes our views are, to a greater or lesser extent, a function of how we want to present 
ourselves.  Of course, some people are more concerned than others with their self-presentation.  
But once we hear what others believe, some of us will adjust our positions at least slightly in the 
direction of the dominant position, to hold onto our preserved self-presentation.  We might 
constrain our opposition; we might voice somewhat more enthusiasm for the majority view than 
we really feel” (Ibid., pp. 27). 
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members tend to perceive others as friendly, likable, and similar to them,” the more that the 
diversity of arguments will be reduced.”854  So when the initial messages in safe spaces tend 
towards segregation, it is very possible that, over time, they will become increasingly radicalized 
and more separatist.   
But such separatism is not an effective long-term political strategy in democratic, 
heterogeneous states.  When prolonged participation in radicalized safe spaces makes 
individuals less able to identify with the wider community, it compromises their willingness to 
engage in mainstream politics.  To the extent that these extremist safe space participants are 
willing to engage in traditional politics, the very ideologies they developed within those 
communicative arenas distance them from the majority, making compromise especially difficult.  
And yet, in order to influence political outcomes, marginalized citizens must be willing to move 
beyond their safe spaces and into the wider community.  That is why, from the perspective of 
liberal democratic values, it is so important that safe space discourse focus, not on creating 
distance and differences, but on discovering commonalities.  In order to avoid negative 
democratic outcomes, safe space participants must always keep in mind that these discursive 
groups represent just one example of political involvement; if they are to act as full and equal 
democratic citizens, safe space participants must always keep an eye towards the larger 
community.  
 
III. Hate speech: 
Unlike both Internet speak and safe space speech, it is difficult to find instances in which 
hate speech contributes positively to democratic citizenship and political outcomes according to 
the model I have presented.  Arguments in favor of protecting hate speech tend to fall into two 
categories.  First, there is the school of thought that, since we cannot know what is true and what 
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is not (or at least, the state is not in a position to judge), no speech should be prohibited on the 
basis of content.  Since hate speech regulations hinge on what is being said, they ought to be 
abandoned.855  Hate speech, according to this view, as an example of political speech, merits the 
same legal protections as any other form of political speech.  The fact that the political opinions 
that underlie hate speech may be unpopular is just further proof that they need to be 
constitutionally protected.  The second school of thought posits that hate speech serves an 
important social function, acting as a safety valve by allowing individuals to vent their feelings 
before they boil over into harmful actions.  By suppressing hate speech, negative feelings may 
not only intensify, but they may even find new grounds of resentment.856  Perpetrators of hate 
speech may also appear more legitimate in a regime that silences them, as they can charge their 
censors with tyrannical oppression.  
Thus, many legal and political scholars argue that there is value in the free expression of 
hate speech – if not in its message, at least in its ability to expose important political ideas about 
racism, sexism, etc.  This openness is the first step to finding a solution, they argue.857  When 
individuals are allowed to share their hateful beliefs and thoughts, the recipients of that hate at 
the same time receive “valuable information” regarding their social status.  They are afforded the 
opportunity to publically respond to the charges against them and establish an open dialogue (in 
which, ideally, the truth will win out). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
855 See Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377 (1992), discussed below:  “St. Paul’s brief asserts that a general ‘fighting words’ law would 
not meet the city’s needs, because only a content-specific measure can communicate to minority 
groups that the ‘group hatred’ aspect of such speech ‘is not condoned by the majority.’…  The 
point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion 
other an silencing speech on the basis of its content.” 
856 See Thomas I Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (New York: Random House 
Books, 1970).  Also see Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), in which he argues that “it is hazardous to discourage thought, 
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate 
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely 
supposed grievances and proposed remedies, and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is 
good ones.” 
857 As Nadine Strossen writes, “hate speech highlights “issues that can be addressed in other 
ways, for example through education” (“Interview with Nadine Strossen,” pp. 384).   
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While it is not the goal of this project to test the validity of the individual arguments in 
favor of the legality of hate speech—proponents from both schools of thought make strong points, 
but they do so not in terms of the relationship of hate speech (as social speech) to democratic 
citizenship—I will challenge the claim that hate speech typically brings communities together 
through free and open dialogue.858  Hate speech is a tool for dividing communities, not uniting 
them.  It is used to make certain segments of society feel unwelcome and unworthy, rather than 
to teach all citizens what it means to be a full and equal member of a community.  In the following 
sections, I will focus entirely on these potential negative effects of hate speech from the 
perspective of the liberal democratic values of human dignity, equality and inclusiveness. 
Any study of hate speech is subject to certain challenges, as the concept, itself, has not 
been clearly or universally defined.  Still, there are some useful guidelines for understanding the 
topic.  In his 2012 essay, “Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?,” for example, Bhikhu 
Parekh proposes three essential features of hate speech, which distinguish it from legal offensive 
speech.  First, hate speech must be “directed against a specified or easily identifiable individual 
or, more commonly, a group of individuals based on an arbitrary and normatively irrelevant 
feature.”859  Second, the tone and content of hate speech must be decidedly negative.  In other 
words, it must stigmatize “by implicitly or explicitly ascribing to [the target group] qualities widely 
regarded as undesirable.”860  Finally, Parekh defines hate speech by its consequences; in order 
for speech to be considered hate speech, it must diminish the victim’s standing within the wider 
community.  Targets of hate speech eventually come to be seen as undeserving and 
untrustworthy members of society.  This denigration leads the wider community to feel like they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
858 As Charles R. Lawrence, III, explains, hate speech often serves the opposite purpose, shutting 
down communication.  “Assaultive speech functions as a preemptive strike,” Lawrence writes.  
“The racial invective is experienced as a blow, not a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it 
is unlikely that dialogue will follow” (Lawrence, “If He Hollers Let Him Go,” pp. 67-68). 
859 Bhikhu Parekh, “Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?” in The Content and Context of 
Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 40. 
860 Ibid., pp. 41. 
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can “legitimately exterminate or expel the target group.  And if that should prove impossible, it 
may rightly discriminate against and tolerate it as an unavoidable evil confined to a shadowy 
existence on the margins of society.861 
In The Harm of Hate Speech, Jeremy Waldron identifies several international examples 
of hate speech definitions.862  In Denmark, for instance, hate speech includes “statements ‘by 
which a group of people are threatened, derided or degraded because of their race, colour of 
skin, national or ethnic background.’”863  In Germany, it involves any “attacks on ‘the human 
dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning or defaming segments of the population.’”864  
And in New Zealand, hate speech is “threatening, abusive, or insulting… words likely to excite 
hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons… on the ground of the colour, race, 
or ethnic or national or ethnic [sic.] origins of that group of persons.”865  As Waldron suggests, 
these several international understandings of hate speech prove that it is widely regarded as a 
real harm (both individual and public), one that merits legal action and prohibition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
861 Ibid. 
862 Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 
8. 
863 Section 266b of the Danish Penal Code: "(1) Any person who publicly or with the intention of 
dissemination to a wide circle of people makes a statement or imparts other information 
threatening, insulting or degrading a group of persons on account of their race, colour, national or 
ethnic origin, belief or sexual orientation, shall be liable to a fine, simple detention or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. (2) When handing down the punishment, it is to 
be considered as an aggravating circumstance that the statement is in the nature of propaganda." 
864 German Penal Code, section 130(1): “Whoever, in a manner that is capable of disturbing the 
public peace: 1) incites hatred against segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary 
measures against them; or 2) assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously 
maligning, or defaming segments of the population, shall be punished with imprisonment from 
three months to five years.” 
865 New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993, section 61(1): “It shall be unlawful for any person—(a) 
to publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, or to broadcast by 
means of radio or television words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or (b) to use in 
any public place as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981, or within the 
hearing of persons in any such public place, or at any meeting to which the public are invited or 
have access, words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or (c) to use in any place words 
which are threatening, abusive, or insulting if the person using the words knew or ought to have 
known that the words were reasonably likely to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or 
periodical or broadcast by means of radio or television,—being matter or words likely to excite 
hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons in or who may be coming to New 
Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons.” 
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For the purposes of this project, I define hate speech as harassment on the basis of 
ascriptive characteristics, which compromises the victim’s ability and/or willingness to participate 
in society as a free and equal member.866  Hate speech is more than mere nastiness or 
disrespect; it implies actual hatred with a wish to destroy or harm.867  It aggressively attempts to 
take particular forms of “otherness” and solidify them into justifications for unequal social and 
political standing.  Examples of hate speech can be found in all spheres of human interaction, 
from the highly public to the deeply intimate. 
But regardless of whether hate speech takes place in the political, social or private realm, 
it is necessarily a public act.  As Waldron warns, “[w]e must not be misled into regarding hate 
speech and group defamation as essentially private acts with which governments are perversely 
trying to interfere in the spirit of mind control.  Hate speech and group defamation are actions 
performed in public, with a public orientation, aimed at undermining public goods.”868  Even when 
these ideas are informally addressed at private individuals, they are, in essence, political 
statements.  As the United States Supreme Court ruled in Snyder v. Phelps, the opinions 
reflected in hate speech—in this case, ranging from “Fags Doom Nations” and “Thank God for 
IEDs,” to “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You”—while they may be directed at an 
individuals and fail to rise to the standards of refined, formal political commentary, “the issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
866 I choose to focus on ascriptive characteristics—such as sex, race and sexuality—because it 
seems that hate speech based on those traits is particularly psychologically harmful for the 
victims.  See Richard Delgado, “Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, 
and Name Calling,” in Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First 
Amendment, Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado and Kimberlè Williams 
Crenshaw (eds.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), pp. 89-110:  “The psychological 
harms caused by racial stigmatization are often much more severe than those created by other 
stereotyping actions.  Unlike many characteristics upon which stigmatization may be based, 
membership in a racial minority can be considered neither self-induced not alterable” (pp. 90). 
867 The Canadian Supreme Court described “hatred” well for these purposes.  In Keegstra, the 
Court wrote: “Hatred is predicated on destruction, and hatred against identifiable groups and 
therefore thrives on insensitivity, bigotry and destruction of both the target groups and the values 
of our society.  Hatred in this sense is a most extreme emotion that belies reason; an emotion 
that, if exercised against members of an identifiable group, implies that those individuals are to be 
despised, scorned, denied respect and made subject to ill-treatment on the basis of group 
affiliation” Keegstra, supra note 24, Part VII(D)(iii)(a) (Dickson, C.J.). 
868 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, pp. 100. 
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they highlight… are matters of public import.”869  Not only is the content of hate speech 
necessarily political, but the act of expressing hatred, not towards an individual, but towards the 
ascriptive characteristics of the group to which that individual belongs, can lead to significant 
negative consequences for liberal democratic society, in general.  These undesirable outcomes 
include: 1) diminishing positive democratic character traits for target groups (e.g. initiative, 
resolution and courage), and replacing them insecurity and self-doubt; and 2) dividing 
communities and breeding distrust on both sides. 
All of this is especially true for hate speech practiced by private individuals in the social 
sphere.  As discussed in both the Internet speak and safe space speech sections, social speech 
does not just refer to the sphere in which communication occurs, but also to its “socializing” 
effects.  As Orville Lee explains, “[s]ocially manifest forms of symbolic power comprise the most 
explicit or manifest instances of social risk in speech, and are most easily recognized as such.  
They are historically connected to systems of political, legal, economic, and cultural domination in 
which words construct particular individuals as biologically or mental inferior, as immoral, and as 
objects of social derision.”870  The social sphere is where negative messaging based on 
systematic power imbalances often enters the private lives of ordinary citizens.  Thus, this kind of 
speech has a particularly deleterious effect on an individual’s development as a democratic 
citizen.  When people are forced to exist in a community in which they are subject to denigration 
and hatred on the basis of their ascriptive characteristics, they can absorb the message and may 
become socialized to think of themselves as less than.  As Gordon W. Allport writes, “[o]ne’s 
reputation, whether false or true, cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered, into one’s head 
without it doing something to one’s character.”871   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
869 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
870 Orville Lee, “Legal Weapons for the Weak? Democratizing the Force of Words in an Uncivil 
Society,” in Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 26, No, 4 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 871. 
871 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1979), pp. 142.  
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Negative socializing effects are particularly pronounced in the case of groups that already 
traditionally carry a social stigma.  “In the case of members of these racial, ethnic, religious, etc. 
groups, defamatory attacks all too frequently ‘stick as truth.’  Members of such groups are easily 
stereotyped, which enables a degrading description or depiction of the group to lead to 
diminished respect for all its members.” 872  In these cases, even a strong will may not be enough 
to assert a positive opinion of oneself and one’s capacities amidst all the negative voices.  
Certainly, it is even harder to prove to the rest of the population that you are not what others say 
you are.  And where this kind of hate speech is not punishable by law—thus receiving the state’s 
implicit sanction—these hurdles are even harder to overcome. 
Thus, whatever preexisting tensions existed between ascriptive minority groups and the 
majority community are likely to be enhanced through social hate speech.  Clearly, targets will 
tend to grow distrustful and resentful of not only the individuals who express hate speech, but 
also of the mainstream community that accepts it.  They may retreat into isolated, homogenous 
counter-publics, resisting any opportunities to try to work with the larger public.  And whether or 
not members of the majority community personally condone the viewpoints expressed through 
hate speech, the self-fulfilling prophecy of hate speech—which encourages victims to become 
what they are accused of being—may serve to lower their expectations and evaluations of others 
over time.  This dual process of increasing distrust may lead to significant societal fracturing and 
diminished public morale.        
As noted above, much of the western world has acknowledged the potential public harms 
of social hate speech, and has deemed them adequately substantial to merit legal action.  In the 
following section, I present several international approaches towards social hate speech in order 
to elucidate and emphasize the seriousness of the threat it poses to liberal democratic values.  I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
872 See Susan J. Brison, “Relational Autonomy and Freedom of Expression,” in Relational 
Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, Catriona Mackenzie 
and Natalie Stoljar (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 291. 
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then contrast these understandings with the American example, in which hate speech has been 
more narrowly defined and (generally) constitutionally protected.  While the potential of hate 
speech to cause both personal and widespread public harm is conceded in the United States, 
these risks are not considered significant enough to curb the freedom of political hate speech.  (I 
return to the American philosophical and legal understandings of hate speech in Chapter Seven, 
in order to evaluate this approach and suggest several initiatives to limit the negative effects of 
social hate speech on democratic citizenship and political outcomes.) 
Having examined several international frameworks for understanding hate speech, I then 
move on to more closely examine the harms themselves.  In particular, I address two sets of 
democratic harms.  First, I look at the tendency of social hate speech to affect character 
development in ways that compromise the target’s ability and willingness to engage in 
participatory politics.  Specifically, I argue that hate speech increases feelings of worthlessness 
and powerlessness in its victims, as opposed to the determined, assertive, enterprising nature 
required of democratic citizens.  Second, I show how hateful messaging from within the social 
sphere is likely to solidify community divisions and breed distrust on both sides.  This not only 
undermines the liberal democratic goals of inclusiveness and equality, but it also compromises 
the functionings of the state. 
 
A. Assessing the power of hate speech: International and American historical 
perspectives 
Because hate speech legislation is so contingent on historical particularities and legal 
traditions, particular hate speech codes represent considerable variation.  In Canada, for 
example, the courts have come out against protecting hate speech, legally defined as any 
statements that incite “hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead 
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to a breach of the peace.”873  In Regina v. Keegstra (1990), Chief Justice of the Canadian 
Supreme Court Brian Dickson refers to three concerns as providing support for freedom of 
expression under the Canadian Charter: “(1) seeking and attaining truth is an inherently good 
activity; (2) participation in social and political decision-making is to be fostered and encouraged; 
and (3) diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated 
in a tolerant and welcoming environment for the sake of both those who convey a meaning and 
those to whom meaning is conveyed.”874  In other words, Dickson claims that freedom of speech 
in the Canadian context is justified on the basis of democracy, the pursuit of truth and autonomy.  
Hate speech, which does not meet any of these goals and actually has a negative effect on 
autonomy, is, therefore, not considered protected speech.  Dickson continues: 
The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate propaganda… have a severely 
negative impact on the individual’s sense of self-worth and acceptance.  This impact may 
cause target group members to take drastic measures in reaction, perhaps avoiding 
activities which bring them in contact with non-group members or adopting attitudes and 
postures directed towards blending in with the majority.  Such consequences bear heavily 
in a nation that prides itself on tolerance and the fostering of human dignity through, 
among other things, respect for the many racial, religious, and cultural groups in our 
society.875 
  Similarly, English common law has repeatedly distinguished hate speech from legal 
protected expression based on the challenges it presents for equality and human dignity.  
Although Great Britain has no written constitution recognizing a right to freedom of expression 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
873 Canadian Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46), Section 319(1): “Every one who, by 
communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable group where 
such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and 
is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence punishable on 
summary conviction.” 
874 Regina v. Keegstra, (1990) 3 S.C.R. 697. 
875 Ibid. 
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and its caveats, the nation does have an explicit legal tradition of criminalizing hate speech, which 
dates back to the 17th Century laws on seditious libel.  Seditious libel is defined as the utterance 
or publication of statements with “an intention to bring into hatred or contempt, or excite 
disaffection against the person of Her Majesty… or to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility 
between different classes… [of her] subjects.”876  And while “seditious libel was primarily used to 
punish those perceived to pose a threat to the monarchy,” as Michael Rosenfeld explains, 
“occasionally, it was used in the context of what today is called ‘hate speech.’”877  In the 1905 
case of Regina v. Osborne, the Court extended the crime of seditious libel to apply to the 
publishers of a pamphlet who had asserted that certain Jews had murdered a woman and her 
child because the child had a Christian father.  As a result of this propaganda, several English 
Jews were beaten and killed.  In this case, the speech (and not just the actions of the murders) 
was deemed illegal because the Court found its hateful content to be a clear incitement to 
violence. 
 However, over time, seditious libel laws in Great Britain grew insufficient for the purposes 
of hate speech prosecution, in that convictions required proof of direct incitement to violence.  
Thus, in 1936, Parliament instituted The Public Order Act in order to more closely address the 
content of hateful speech.  This act relaxed the standards for seditious libel in two respects.  First, 
it enabled the state to punish speech that was “likely” to lead to violence, even if no violence had 
actually occurred.  Second, it allowed for the punishment of a mere intent to provoke violence.  
Thus, the British courts moved further away from punishing speech based on its direct negative 
outcomes, and closer toward a modern day European conception of hate speech legislation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
876 As Michel Rosenfeld explains, seditious libel, by allowing for the punishment of political 
criticism of the government, “contravenes a core function of modern freedom-of-expression 
rights” (“Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence,” pp. 263).   
877 Ibid.  See also Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman, Race and Law in Great Britain 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
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 These standards for what constituted illegal hate speech in England only became more 
expansive after World War II.  In 1965, Parliament enacted the Race Relations Act.  Section 6 of 
that Act made it a crime to utter in public or publish words “which are threatening, abusive, or 
insulting,” and are meant to incite hatred on the basis of race, color or national origin.878  In 1986, 
Parliament amended The Public Order Act to include Section 5, which made hate speech 
punishable if it amounted to harassment of a target group or individual.  And in 1997, Parliament 
enacted the Protection from Harassment Act.  Finally, in 2006, the United Kingdom adopted the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act, which prohibits threats that incite to religious hatred, but 
explicitly exempts religious criticism even if it involves “antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse 
of particular religions of the beliefs or practices of their adherent.”879 
 In each instance that the English legislature and judiciary have addressed the legality of 
hate (and hateful) speech, they have moved in a less tolerant direction.  Great Britain has also 
expressed a commitment to anti-hate speech legislation through its adherence to international 
covenants, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (discussed below).  Many other 
European nations have signed onto this and similar international covenants as well.  Germany 
and France, for example, have led the continent in developing restrictions on hate speech.  In 
both nations, although they boast long traditions valuing freedom of speech, that liberty is 
balanced against their historical record of hate propaganda and discrimination, which culminated 
in the widespread harms of the Holocaust and WWII.  Under the contemporary German and 
French legal approaches, freedom of speech remains esteemed, but it must also be interpreted in 
its relationship to other fundamental values, such as equality and human dignity.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
878 While these statutes were enacted to protect minority groups from the kind of harassment and 
propaganda that culminated in World War II, problems with enforcement meant that many people 
who were meant to be protected were actually prosecuted under Section 6. In particular, many of 
the convictions were obtained against leaders of the Black Liberation Movement of the 1960’s.  
See: Regina v. Malik, (2008) All ER (D) 201 (Jun). 
879 “Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006,” amendment to the “Public Order Act of 1986,” Part 
3A, Section 29J.  
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 This approach can be seen in the German decision for the Holocaust Denial Case of 
1994.880  As Parekh observes, banning Holocaust denial is “part of reparative justice, a public 
statement of the country’s acknowledgement of and apology for its past, a way of fighting neo-
Nazi trends in German society.”881  This particular case involved David Irving, a revisionist British 
historian who argued that the mass extermination of the Jews under the Third Reich never took 
place.  Irving was invited to speak at a public meeting of a far-right political party in Germany, and 
although the government approved the meeting, it did so on the condition that it would include no 
Holocaust denial.  Any instance of Holocaust denial, the government concluded, would amount to 
“denigration of the memory of the dead, criminal agitation, and, most important, criminal insult, all 
of which are prohibited by the Criminal Code.”882  The political party brought complaint against the 
government, alleging that these restrictions amounted to an infringement of its right to freedom of 
expression.  The Constitutional Court upheld a lower court’s rejection of this complaint, citing the 
state’s legitimate interest in protecting human dignity, a central aspect of the German 
understanding of hate speech. 
 Similarly, the French legal system has taken an intolerant stance towards Holocaust 
denial and racist speech, categorizing the former as a criminal act (un délit) rather than a civil 
liability.  The post-WWII French governments have made explicit efforts to distance themselves 
from the atrocities of Nazism and official French anti-Semitic propaganda.  In 1946, when the 
regime converted from Nazi-dominated Vichy France to the free French Republic, for example, 
that transition included the reestablishment of a 1939 French law banning racist and anti-Semitic 
speech, known as the Marchandeau law.  This decree amended the 1881 Freedom of the Press 
law to ban “defamation and insults against a group of persons belonging by their origin to a 
particular race or religion, which have for their purpose to incite hatred against citizens or 
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881 Parekh, “Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?” pp. 37-56. 
882 Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 363. 
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residents.”883  As Julie C. Suk explains in “Denying Experience: Holocaust Denial and the Free-
Speech Theory of the State,” the reintroduction of this decree in the post-WWII era came out of a 
public recognition that “hateful speech had the effect of dividing citizens and weakening the 
morale of the nation.”884  Since then, the French legal discourse on racism and discrimination has 
revolved around the Marchandeau law, with legislators evoking it in both 1979 and 1990, when 
new, more restrictive hate speech laws were introduced. 
French and German laws were designed after WWII to face their responsibility for the 
Holocaust.  Similar histories of discrimination and genocide appear to be behind anti-hate speech 
regulations in other parts of the world as well.  For example, in his study of Indian hate speech 
laws, Floyd Abrams draws a link between the more than 600,000 deaths due to the communal 
violence that occurred during the period after the subcontinent was divided into India and 
Pakistan, and Section 153A of the Indian penal code, which criminalizes speech that promotes 
“enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, language, etc.” as 
well as “acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony.”885 
While there is clearly variation in what constitutes illegal hate speech and how it should 
be handled, international laws regarding hate speech do share some commonalities.  First, in all 
of the cases discussed above, speech (both verbal and nonverbal) ceases to be legal “offensive 
speech” and becomes illegal “hate speech” when it is powerful enough to incite hatred, violence 
or prejudicial action against a protected individual or group.  As Waldron writes, all of these 
national laws “are concerned with the use of words which are deliberately abusive and/or insulting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
883 Décret modifiant les articles 32, 33, et 60 de la loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, 
21 avril 1939, [decree modifying articles 32, 33 and 60 of the law of July 29, 1881 on the 
Freedom of the Press, April 21, 1939], J.O.R.F., April 25, 1939, at 5295. 
884 Julie C. Suk, “Denying Experience: Holocaust Denial and the Free-Speech Theory of the 
State,” in The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, 
Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 155. 
885 Floyd Abrams, “On American Hate Speech Law,” in The Content and Context of Hate Speech: 
Rethinking Regulation and Responses, Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New York: 
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and/or threatening and/or demeaning directed at members of vulnerable minorities, calculated to 
stir up hatred against them.”886  Second, each of these national regulations regarding hate 
speech was founded on the belief that hate speech represents a public—not merely individual—
harm.  The environment of offense and denigration created by hate speech not only diminishes 
the autonomy and human dignity of its targets, but in doing so, it also decreases inclusiveness, 
divides political communities and weakens public morale.  Thus, there is not just a personal 
interest in protecting citizens from hate speech, but a public interest as well. 
It is for these reasons that so many nation states not only write their own hate speech 
legislation, but have also taken it a step further and signed on to international pledges and 
treatises restricting hate speech within their borders.  Consider, for example, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which set out to provide a reasonable set of 
uniform standards for prohibitions on hate speech.  As of April 2010, ICCPR had been ratified by 
165 states around the world, representing 75 percent of the world’s nations.  Article 19 of this 
covenant guarantees the right to freedom of expression, but adds that it is not an absolute right.  
Restrictions may be permitted, but only if they are proscribed by law and are deemed necessary 
to protect the public and private interests listed within the Article (e.g. public order and the rights 
of others).887  The corresponding Article 20(2) “requires” States Parties to prohibit “the advocacy 
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence.”888   
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) is another widely supported international treatise limiting hate speech.  Article 4 of CERD 
reads: 
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887 United Nations Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
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888 Ibid. 
335	  
	  
	  
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas 
or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or 
which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and 
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement 
to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth 
in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: 
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or 
incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic 
origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing 
thereof; 
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize 
participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; 
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or 
incite racial discrimination.889 
CERD was signed by eighty-one nations states, and became effective on January 4th, 1969.   
Such strong positions against hate speech represent more than just lofty political rhetoric.  
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considers Art. 4 to be an essential 
obligation of all parties to the Convention and has repeatedly cited those states that have not 
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Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 660, p. 195. 
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done enough to criminalize hate speech.890  The Committee understands Art. 4 as “the prohibition 
of the dissemination of all ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred,” and is thus, “compatible 
with the right to freedom of opinion and expression.”891  While Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights does grant freedom of expression, the Committee admits that the 
“the citizen’s exercise of this right carries special duties and responsibilities… among which the 
obligation not to disseminate racist ideas is of particular importance.”892  While the effects of 
ICCPR have been limited until now—the international courts have not yet provided a clear 
interpretation of hate speech rules—the fact that so many nations have signed on to these two 
treatises proves just how seriously the international community views the public harms inherent to 
hate speech. 
Despite these norms and guidelines, hate speech remains a uniquely contested topic in 
the United States.  While recent historical events have caused many government officials in 
Europe and Asia to resort to legislation and jurisprudence in order to acknowledge and protect 
against the potential societal harms created by hate speech, many in the United States believe 
that these rationales do not apply to them.893  Thus, the United States was one of the last parties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
890 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Recommendation No. 1: States’ 
parties’ obligations (Art. 4): )2/25/1972.  Available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/09bca82e6dab7b8fc12563ee0039c575?Opendocume
nt; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Recommendation No. 07: 
Legislation to eradicate racial discrimination (Art. 4): 08/23/1985. Available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/c5a2e04b85557870c12563ee003e883f?Opendocume
nt. 
891 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Recommendation No. 15: 
Organized violence based on ethnic origin (Art. 4): 03/23/1993. Available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/e51277010496eb2cc12563ee004b9768?Opendocum
ent. 
892 Ibid.  Referring to Art. 29, Para. 2. 
893 “It is a truism of comparative constitutional law that the United States takes an absolutist 
position against the criminalization of hate speech, and that it is alone among the constitutional 
democracies in taking this position” (Jacobson and Schlink, “Hate Speech and Self-Restraint,” pp. 
217).  However, there are some that argue that America is not, in fact, as exceptional as it may 
first appear.  See, for example, C. Edwin Baker, “Hate Speech,” in The Content and Context of 
Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 57-80.  Baker points out that “many, if not most, 
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to the Convention to sign CERD (in 1994), and American lawmakers have consistently flouted 
Art. 4.  The United States maintains that Art. 4 is irrelevant to itself because any efforts to forbid 
such a broad concept of hate speech would unconstitutionally infringe upon the First Amendment 
freedom of speech.894 
Within their own nation, American legislators have typically refused to even provide a 
single, precise, legally consistent definition of hate speech.  Instead, the United States has relied 
on a patchwork of legal decisions to develop an understanding of what constitutes hate speech 
and to determine how it should be treated.  In general, speech counts as illegal hate speech in 
the United States only when it is used to directly incite violence or display intent to incite violence 
against a specific person or group (although, in practice, the courts have moved closer to 
requiring proof of the former).895  Thus, relative to international criteria (which tend to incorporate 
the “potential” to cause harm, hatred, etc.), the standards for what should be considered hate 
speech are decidedly narrow in the United States.   
This narrowness stems from a rights tradition that values freedom of speech and 
expression, and is skeptical of any censorship or restrictions on that liberty.  The First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech, the argument goes, is fundamental.  Or as some have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
American First Amendment scholars and jurists favor a ‘balancing’ that is quite like what is 
portrayed as the European approach” (Ibid., pp. 59). 
894 The United States is not alone in this regard.  Several other nations are also choosing not to 
fully implement Art. 4.  Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, Monaco, 
Switzerland and Tonga all claim that the treaty doesn’t require measures that threaten freedoms 
of speech, thought or association.  Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Fiji, Nepal, 
Papua New Guinea, Thailand and United Kingdom, on the other hand, assert that the treaty 
creates an obligation to enact measures against hate speech only when a need arises. 
895 However, as Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink point out, in these cases, the words and 
ideas are instrumental to an “incipient assault,” and it is the assault, not the speech, that is 
criminalized.  See Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink. “Hate Speech and Self-Restraint,” In 
The Context and Content of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, Michael Herz 
and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 218.  For illustration 
of this point, also see Seventh Circuit Appeals Court Judge Richard Posner’s lead opinion in 
Nelson v. Streeter, in which he argues that the harm from speech comes not from the speaker, 
but from the audience who took that speech as a call to action: “The rioters are the culpable 
parties, not the [speaker] whose work unintentionally provoked them to violence” Nos. 92-2991, 
92-3177 (1994).  
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said, the First Amendment is first.896  As one of the most cherished and vital constitutionally 
protected civil liberties, freedom of speech has therefore often been read quite broadly.  It may be 
balanced against other interests (e.g. human dignity and autonomy), but only when those 
interests are so powerful and obvious as to overwhelm the bias in favor of protecting speech.897  
And yet, the First Amendment does not protect all speech.  As C. Edwin Baker argues in his 
essay, “Hate Speech,” if one were to examine the whole of the American legal tradition of free 
speech, one would find a great deal more European-style restrictions than she might expect.898  
As Chapter Three explained, the Supreme Court has actually allowed for the restriction and 
punishment of many kinds of speech, including: speech favoring socialism, communism, and 
anarchism;899 sexually explicit speech;900 obscenity or child pornography;901 the publication and 
sale of great novels;902 labor picketing;903 and speech that poses an imminent breach of peace.904  
Hateful speech, however, unless it can be shown to directly incite violence, has generally been 
spared legal sanction.  Any harms created by hate speech, either to the individual or society, are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
896 This phrasing was first coined by Edmond Cahn during the McCarthy Era.  See Edmond 
Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 65, No. 464 (1956). 
897 Note that in the 2010 case, United States v. Stevens, Supreme Court Chief Justice John 
Roberts disagrees with the notion of “balancing.”  Writing for the majority, he argues that it is 
history and tradition, rather than Congressional “ad hoc” balancing of interests that determines 
whether a category of speech is unprotected.  Thus, the Court rejected an explicit test to 
determine whether “a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection [depending] 
upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs”:  “The First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive 
an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.  The First Amendment itself reflects a 
judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh 
the costs.  Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis 
that some speech is not worth it” 559 U.S. 460, 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010). 
898 Baker, “Hate Speech,” pp. 59-60. 
899 See Zachariah Chaffee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), pp. 36-107. 
900 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) 
901 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
902 See Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, pp. 468-470.  
903 Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 
(1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
904 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 310 (1940); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, U.S. 444 (1969). 
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overshadowed by the potential harm in allowing the state to censor political opinions on the basis 
of its content.   
This was not always the case.  In 1952, the Supreme Court initially appeared amenable 
to arguments in favor of restricting hate speech.  In Beauharnais v. Illinois, a majority upheld a 
conviction for hate speech, labeling it “group libel” and equating it to individual defamation, which 
has traditionally been excluded from free speech protections.905  In the decades since that ruling, 
however, the majority opinion has been mostly overturned.  Already in the dissenting opinions of 
the case, the other justices attacked the majority’s use of the term “group libel.”906  Both the libel 
and the “fighting words” exceptions to the First Amendment, the multiple dissenters concluded, 
concerned statements addressed to particular individuals.  Because such statements were 
localized, their prohibition would not have a significant impact on the public good of free and open 
debate.  Group libel, on the other hand, is not localized.  It is a political statement.  To exclude 
such statements would inhibit public debate, thus infringing on the very values that the First 
Amendment was designed to uphold. 
The claim that any harms created by hate speech, either to the individual or society, are 
overshadowed by the potential harm of stifling political debate has been taken up and expounded 
upon by subsequent Courts.  And the standards for what counts as illegal hate speech have been 
narrowed – not only must speech advocate violence in order to be considered hate speech, but it 
must actually be shown to have incited such violence.  In Brandenburg v. Ohio, for example, the 
Court overturned a hate speech conviction, arguing that, although the Klu Klux Klan may have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
905 See Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter’s majority opinion: “But if an utterance directed at 
an individual may be the object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish 
the same utterance directed at a defined group unless we can say that this a willful and 
purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and wellbeing of the State” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 
343 US 250 (1952). 
906 In his dissenting opinion, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black questions the majority’s decision 
to condone “this expansive state censorship by painstakingly analogizing it to the law of criminal 
libel.  As a result of this refined analysis, the Illinois statute emerges labeled a ‘group libel law.’  
This label may make the Court’s holding more palatable for those who sustain it, but the sugar-
coating for not make the censorship less deadly” (Ibid.).  
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encouraged violence, they did not rouse it.907  If there was no proof that the Klan’s speech 
actually caused violence—even if violence could have been anticipated—then there was no basis 
for censorship.  In 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court followed the same logic in deciding Nationalist 
Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie.  Although the Court recognized the intensity and likelihood of 
the hurt felt by Holocaust survivors in response to the Klan’s march on Skokie, they concluded 
that such a demonstration did not merit hate speech because it did not meet the “incitement to 
violence requirement.”908  In other words, the use of swastikas and anti-Semitic propaganda did 
not constitute “fighting words.”  Again, the hurt and degradation of the victims were not enough to 
justify the censorship of Klan members’ freedom of speech.   
Finally, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court responded to a local Minnesota criminal 
ordinance that stated: “Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object… but not 
limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows… arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly 
conduct...”909  In a unanimous decision (with multiple concurring opinions), the Court found this 
ordinance unconstitutional.  In his majority opinion, Antonin Scalia cites two rationales for the 
court’s ruling.  First, the speech in question did not meet the Court’s own “incitement to violence” 
standard.  Second, even if a burning cross did qualify as unprotected “fighting words,” by singling 
out some expressions for criminalization and omitting others, the writers of the ordinance had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
907 The majority decision, written per curiam, explains that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act 
under discussion could not be sustained because it “punishes persons who ‘advocate or teach 
the duty, necessity, or propriety’ of violence ‘as a means of accomplishing industrial or political 
reform’; or who publish or circulate or display any book or paper containing such advocacy; or 
who ‘justify’ the commission of violent acts ‘with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the 
propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism’; or who ‘voluntarily assemble’ with a group 
formed ‘to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.’ Neither the indictment nor the 
trial judge's instructions to the jury in any way refined the statute's bald definition of the crime in 
terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action” 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
908 National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). 
909 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 77 (1992). 
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engaged in illegal “viewpoint discrimination.”910  Because the text was written to explicitly prohibit 
speech that hurt and upset members of protected groups, but seemed to exclude “displays 
containing ‘fighting words’ that do not invoke the disfavored groups,” Scalia argues that it 
amounted to an unconstitutional use of censorship.911 
In addition to the powerful role the judiciary has played in determining the scope and 
consequences of illegal hate speech, legislators and diplomats have also made considerable 
contributions to the American hate speech discourse.  For example, American legal attitudes 
regarding hate speech have been reflected in the international treatises that the United States 
actually has accepted and helped craft.  Earlier in this section, I examined the relatively socially 
progressive, European-style ICCPR and CERD, which the American government has mostly 
deemed irrelevant.  For the sake of comparison, it is also useful to look at the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), in which the United States has played an active role.   
ACHR serves two functions.  First, it enumerates 23 rights and freedoms to be protected 
by States Parties.  Second, it defines the functions and procedures of two organs with respect to 
these international obligations: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (est. 1959 and 
located in Washington, D.C.) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (est. 1979 and 
located in San Jose, Costa Rica).  When individual citizens of the States Parties have exhausted 
their options in their home states, they can appeal to the Inter-American Commission.  And where 
a friendly settlement cannot be reached, individual citizens may submit a case to the Inter-
American Court, comprised of seven justices who are elected by the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States (OAS). 
Like the international treatises previously discussed, ACHR, although it begins by 
securing fairly broad protection for freedom of speech, also introduces several caveats.  Section 2 
protects freedom of speech from prior restraint, but allows that speech “shall be subject to 
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911 Ibid. 
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subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent 
necessary to ensure: (a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; (b) the protection of 
national security, public order, or public health or morals.”912  Section 5 seems to pull back on 
those provisions, echoing the American perspective that hateful speech should only be punished 
when it “constitute[s] incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar illegal action against 
any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, 
or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.”913  
So far, neither the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights nor the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has reviewed any restrictions on hate speech; however, the 
Commission’s Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression did perform a study of 
the topic for its 2004 Annual Report.  This report highlights ACHR’s more limited restrictions on 
hate speech as compared to ICCPR and CERD.914  As quoted above, Article 13(5), for example, 
requires prohibition of speech only with proof of its actual incitement of “lawless violence” or “any 
other similar action.”  ICCPR, on the other hand, demands that states outlaw speech inciting 
“discrimination, hostility or violence,” which implies that it covers a wider range of speech 
prohibitions.915  Similarly, CERD requires States Parties to criminalize “all dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority or hatred,” regardless of whether or not that speech amounts to an 
incitement to racial discrimination or violence.916 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
912 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, 
Costa Rica” (B-32). Available at: http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf.  
913 Ibid. 
914 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, “Annual Report 2004,” OEA/Ser.L/V/II.222. Doc. 
5 rev. 23 February 2005, chapters II, V and VII. Available 
at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artID=459&lID=1. 
915 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights; United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
916 United Nations General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination. 
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ACHR clearly provides a stricter, more limited understanding of hate speech than the 
treatises previously considered in this section.  As Eduardo Bertoni and Julio Rivera, Jr. explain in 
their essay, “The American Convention on Human Rights: Regulation of Hate Speech and Similar 
Expression,” the relatively narrow scope of Article 13(5), in comparison to ICCPR and CERD, can 
be directly attributed to the influence of the United States delegation in the negotiations.  
According to the authors, the Americans fought to avoid any inconsistency between the 
Convention and the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.”917  This view is supported by the obvious similarities between the texts of 
Article 13(5) and Brandenburg.  As discussed above, in Brandenburg, the Court decided that the 
First Amendment disallows “a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to produce such action.”918  Article 13(5) of ACHR reproduces the Brandenburg test, 
forbidding any war propaganda and “any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that 
constitute incitements to lawless violence or any other similar action…” (emphasis added).919   
Not only does Article 13(5) strongly resemble the American jurisprudential view towards 
hate speech, but the entirety of the document also seems to reflect the more limited hate speech 
provisions favored by the United States.  Despite providing for some restrictions on freedom of 
speech, ACHR’s hate speech provisions may be even more limited than they first appear.  
Bertoni and Rivera suggest that, first, following the UN Human Rights Committee’s standards, it 
could be concluded that Article 13(5)’s narrow definition of proscribed hate speech only applies to 
speech occurring in the public discourse.”920  For speech taking place in the workplace, schools 
or any other area of civil society, it is not clear that ACHR even applies.  Second, the authors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
917 Eduardo Bertoni and Julio Rivera Jr., “The American Convention on Human Rights: 
Regulation of Hate Speech and Similar Expression,” in The Content and Context of Hate Speech: 
Rethinking Regulation and Responses, Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 504. 
918 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444. 
919 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights. 
920 Bertoni and Rivera, “The American Convention on Human Rights,” pp. 505. 
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explain that Article 13(5) only applies to broad political statements, and not “insulting, degrading, 
or threatening speech directed against a specific individual.”921 
Taken together—the American influence on ACHR, as well as Brandenburg, Skokie and 
R.A.V.—two common themes emerge in the American hate speech tradition: 1) Hate speech 
must be directed at groups, and not individuals; and 2) Hate speech must be shown to actually 
incite violence, and not just have the potential to incite violence or hatred.  This limited reading of 
hate speech does not imply that the United States views social hate speech as insignificant or 
apolitical, however.  Rather, hate speech is thought to be of the utmost political importance.  
Regardless of its location—public, social or private—hate speech is understood as concerning 
issues of public interest.  As the dissenters in Beauharnais argue, it is largely because hate 
speech is necessarily political (contributing to the public debate) that any kind of content-based 
censorship is so problematic.   
In the American context, whether or not certain speech is constitutionally protected often 
hinges on its value as public or private, with speech of purely private significance more easily and 
frequently being subject to regulation.  As described in Chapter Three, this is because, when 
entirely private speech is limited, “there is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; 
there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas.”922  Speech of public value, 
on the other hand, as Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell writes in his decision for Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., “is at the heart of the First Amendment’s 
protection.”923  Similarly, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court explained that the First 
Amendment reflects "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."924  That is because "speech concerning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
921 Ibid., pp. 506. 
922 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
923 Ibid. (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellatti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).   
924 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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public affairs is more than self-expression; rather, it is the essence of self-government."925  
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, in general, "speech on public issues occupies the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection."926  
While the Court conceded in San Diego v. Roe that “the boundaries of the public concern 
test are not well defined,” it has established some guiding principles for determining what 
constitutes public speech through its case law.927  First, when speech can “be fairly considered as 
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” it is public speech, 
falling under the protection of the First Amendment.928  Second, speech contains matters of public 
concern when it is of “legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value 
and concern to the public.”929  The possibly “inappropriate or controversial character of a 
statement”; however, “is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public 
concern.”930 
Using this framework, hate speech constitutes political speech from an American legal 
point of view, regardless of whether it takes place in the public, social or intimate sphere.931  The 
ideas and values expressed through hate speech are of public interest, and that it why they merit 
First Amendment protection.  The American insistence on the political nature of hate speech 
actually fits in nicely with the theory of social speech, which explains a connection between 
informal, everyday communications and democratic outcomes:  Even when average citizens are 
sharing hate speech through social interactions, it constitutes political action.  This attitude is also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
925 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
926 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
927 San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004).  Note that, as I explained in Chapter Three, the 
Supreme Court has not provided similar guidelines for what it considers private speech. 
928 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
929 San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004).  See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
930 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
931 This says very little, however, about other kinds of social speech that I argue have political 
value.  
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consistent with the international community, which emphasizes the political nature of all hateful 
speech. 
  While the American consensus that social hate speech should be constitutionally 
protected on the basis of its political status may be correct, it is also important to examine all of 
the ways in which social hate speech affects political life, including its negative effects on 
democratic citizenship.  To the extent that United States imagines the negative effects of hate 
speech primarily in terms of their immediate threat to public safety and order, they lose sight of 
the wider harms—such as, decreased participation, limited inclusiveness and weak social ties—
that are emphasized in the European context. 
 
B. Negative effects of hate speech: hate speech -> weak participatory democratic 
character, fractured communities and decreased social trust 
Hate speech in the social sphere contributes negatively to democratic citizenship and 
political outcomes in two ways.932  First, much like cyberbullying and the kind of long-term 
denigration that drives minority individuals into safe spaces, hate speech in the social sphere 
contributes to the development of character traits that make participation in democratic politics 
especially difficult.  Individuals become who they are through their social interactions.  When 
one’s social milieu is littered with hate speech, rather than developing into a powerful, confident 
and engaged democratic citizen, targets tend to become dejected and doubtful about their ability 
to control the direction of their own lives, much less the life of their community.  If they are not 
deemed worthy of being treated with equal respect and dignity by their fellow citizens, how can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
932 While this section focuses on the damage social hate speech inflicts on its targets, it is 
important to note that social hate speech can harm the speaker as well.  See Anthony Cortese, 
Opposing Hate Speech (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006):  “Bigotry harms the people 
who harbor it by reinforcing rigid thinking, thereby dulling their moral and social senses” (pp. 50).   
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they believe themselves to have the right (much less the power) to try to determine political 
outcomes?  Thus, victims of hate speech find themselves disengaged from the political process.   
Second, by diminishing the victim’s standing (both in their own eyes and within the wider 
community), social hate speech solidifies boundaries between in-groups and out-groups.  Not 
only does each instance of hate speech add new fuel to the fires of discriminatory ideologies 
(potentially breeding new adherents), but as targets come to absorb the negative messaging 
about them, they may also begin to distance themselves from the wider society.  Individuals and 
groups who feel socially isolated are likely to become politically isolated as well.  Why trust those 
who think so little of me, much less the community that condones the expression of those beliefs?  
And to the extent that victims internalize and reproduce the negative messaging about them, 
even those majority members who do not personally endorse the messages of hate speech may 
begin to separate themselves as well.  Thus, even when victims of social hate speech do 
participate in the larger political sphere, the lack of trust on both sides makes cooperation difficult. 
To begin, hate speech affects the personal and political development of its victims more 
than most other kinds of harassment or nastiness.  Attacks on one’s race, ethnicity, religion or 
gender, regardless of the location of those assaults, are necessarily intimate in nature.  They 
strike to the core of how an individual defines herself.  As Mari Matsuda explains in, “Public 
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story,” “[r]acist hate messages, threats, 
slurs, epithets, and disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group.”933  That is what 
makes hate speech so potentially painful and powerful, often resulting in extreme psychological 
and emotional distress for its victims (e.g. humiliation, self-hatred and isolation).  While victims of 
hate speech may experience its harms to differing degrees, it is often felt as an assault on one’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
933 Mari J. Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story,” in 
Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, Mari J. 
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw (eds.) 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), pp. 23. 
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very being.934  Charles R. Lawrence, III, for example, equates the personal harm of hate speech 
to the sting of “being struck in the face,” suggesting that “it is often more severe.”935  He 
elaborates: “Racial epithets and harassment often cause deep emotional scarring and feelings of 
anxiety and fear that pervade every aspect of a victim’s life.”936 
These feelings of distress and anxiety are often so severe that they are accompanied by 
physiological symptoms as well.  Matsuda explains how, for “victims of vicious hate propaganda,” 
psychic discomfort can manifest itself in any number of short- and long-term physical symptoms, 
“ranging from fear in the gut to rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-
traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide.”937  Richard Delgado makes a 
similar claim, arguing that such long-term emotional distress can transform into the kind of mental 
illnesses that lead sufferers to resort to drugs, alcohol and other anti-social behaviors.938  
Delgado also points to evidence that the “inhibited, constrained or restricted anger” brought on as 
a common response to hate speech has been linked to high blood pressure.  Given the higher 
incidence of hypertension, hypertensive disease and stroke in the black community, Delgado 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
934 Throughout this section, it is important to keep in mind that the negative psychological effects 
of hate speech do not affect all equally.  As Strossen writes, “to suggest that there is inevitably a 
direct negative impact on the person who is insulted, I think, is insulting.  It suggests that the 
person doesn’t have enough critical capacity.  We are not somehow automatically diminished just 
because some bigot says something negative about us” (“Interview with Nadine Strossen, pp. 
378).  In her discussion of the effects of pornography, Catherine A. MacKinnon claims, instead, 
that while the level of personal hurt experienced by each woman may be somewhat 
unpredictable, what matters is that this kind of hateful speech affects women, as a group:  
“Pornography does hurt individuals, not as individuals in a one-at-a-time sense, but as members 
of the group ‘women.’  Harm is caused to one individual woman rather than another essentially by 
the way one number rather than another is caused in roulette.  But on a group basis, as women, 
the selection process is absolutely selective and systematic.  Its causality is essentially collective 
and totalistic and contextual” (“Not a Moral Issue, pp. 156-157). 
935 Lawrence, “If He Hollers Let Him Go,” pp. 74. 
936Ibid. 
937 Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech,” pp. 24. 
938 Delgado points out that the rates of narcotic use and admission to public psychiatric hospitals 
are both much higher within the minority community than in the rest of the United States. See 
“Words that Wound,” pp. 91. 
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suggests that there might be something other than genetics at work – hate speech and other 
forms of discrimination may actually be contributing to lower life spans among minority groups.939   
Not only are the negative personal harms of hate speech—both physical and 
psychological—potentially severe in the short-term, but their potential to “deeply scar” victims 
means that they can be extremely difficult to shake in the long-term.  The negative effects of hate 
speech may follow an individual throughout life, forever affecting her sense of self-worth and her 
ability to connect with her communities.  In fact, the permanence of the damage caused by 
messages of racial hatred played a key role in Brown v. Board of Education decision to abolish 
segregation in schools.  The Court explained that it was not just segregation, per se, that causes 
harm.  Rather, the symbolic message of segregation affects “the hearts and minds,” of black 
children “in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”940  As Lawrence explains in his examination of the 
Brown decision, the Court actually conceded the fact that “[r]acial epithets and harassment often 
cause deep emotional scarring, and feelings of anxiety and fear that pervade every aspect of a 
victim’s life.”941 
All of this is to say that hate speech, for the individual victims, is more than mere 
harassment – it is not just a matter of hurt feelings.  (That is, in fact, an essential part of what 
makes speech hate speech, and not harassment.)  While Delgado may be going a little too far 
with his claim that hate speech leads to premature death by literally destroying the hearts of its 
victims (and thus limiting their opportunities for community engagement), it is clear that hate 
speech harms its victims at a fundamental, personal level.  This is particularly true of hate speech 
within the social sphere.  While there are obvious dangers to public or state-sponsored messages 
of hate (e.g. Nazi Germany, the pre-Civil Rights Era South), it is especially difficult for individuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
939 Ibid., pp. 92.  See also Ernest Harburg, John C. Erfurt, Louise S. Hauenstein, Catherine 
Chape, William J. Schull and M.A. Schork, “Socio-Economical Stress, Suppressed Hostility, Skin 
Color, and Black-White Male Blood Pressure: Detroit,” in Psychosomatic Medicine, Vol. 35, No. 
276 (July 1 1973), pp. 276-296. 
940 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. 
941 Lawrence, “If He Hollers Let Him Go,” pp. 334. 
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to avoid or ignore messages of worthlessness when they come from within one’s own 
neighborhood, school or community.  When it takes place in the social sphere, hate speech 
becomes more than abstract political rhetoric – it is an expression of personalized hatred and 
disgust directed at real individuals. 
Thus, hate speech in the social sphere attacks the very human dignity of its targets.  As 
Waldron explains, dignity is established and protected through our everyday interactions.  “The 
primary habitat of human dignity,” he writes, “is the mundane.”942  While the Kantian conception of 
dignity (Würde) may be noumenal, legally, dignity is a question of “one’s status as an ordinary 
member of society in good standing, entitled to the same liberties, protections, and powers that 
everyone else has… [It] is what enables a person to walk down the street without fear of insult or 
humiliation, to find the shops and exchanges open to him, and to proceed with an implicit 
assurance of being able to interact with others without being treated as a pariah.”943  Some 
degree of social equality is a necessary condition of human dignity.  When, as in the case of 
social hate speech, individuals are not afforded a level of decency and respect equal to that of 
other members of their community, that abuse is likely to eat away at their own assessment of 
self-worth.  As Delgado explains, no matter how hard a person may “try to resist a piece of hate 
propaganda, the effect on [her] self-esteem and sense of personal security is devastating.  To be 
hated, despised, and alone is the ultimate fear of all human being.”944 
Social speech not only damages its victims’ individual senses of self-worth, but it also 
compromises their personal autonomy.  As Brison explains, individual autonomy does not 
develop in a vacuum; rather, it is dependent on one’s relationships with other people.945  She 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
942 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, pp. 219. 
943 Ibid., pp. 219-220. 
944 Delgado, “Words that Wound,” pp. 25. 
945 “We develop the capacity for autonomy only after considerable interaction with others 
(parents, teachers, etc.) and socialization into the language, norms, and other aspects of a 
culture.  As second persons, we also require for autonomous personhood the right sorts of 
ongoing relations with others.  Since some form of conditioning, socialization, and ongoing 
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argues that this is true in three respects.  First, individuals develop and sustain the 
“competencies” needed for autonomy through social interactions.  Second, in order to make 
autonomous choices, individuals must possess a range of “significant” options from which to 
choose.  Finally, in order to understand those options and consider them personally relevant, an 
individual must exist in a society that also recognizes their applicability to her, specifically.946  It is 
through the socializations of everyday life, including (and especially) speech interactions that 
people can grow into these independent, self-governing beings.  However, when those social 
interactions are compromised, as in the example of hate speech, so too is the victim’s capacity 
for autonomy diminished.  As Brison explains, if “one has been socialized, in large part as a result 
of others’ speech, to expect very little of herself or to defer to others, she is hardly in a position to 
make autonomous choices.”947  Specifically, the hostile environment created by social hate 
speech damages its victims’ self-worth, their thoughts about which options are available (and 
feasible) for them, their confidence in their abilities and the very formation of their preferences – 
all of which negatively affects the ability to think and act as an autonomous agent.948 
Each of these factors—the psychological (e.g. depression, anxiety) and physiological 
(e.g. drug addiction, hypertension) responses to social hate speech, as well as the effects of its 
symbolic attacks on human dignity and autonomy—negatively influences the sort of democratic 
citizens that victims of social hate speech will become.  Again, this is largely due to the socializing 
influences of social speech.  The victims of social hate speech, far from being isolated from 
society, have no choice but to develop their individual identities within the very communities that 
condemn them.  Victims internalize the same norms and standards as everyone else, only with 
the awareness that they are not expected to live up to them.  This is true whether they react 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interactions with others are autonomy undermining, whereas others are autonomy enhancing, the 
degree to which one is able to be autonomous depends upon one’s past and present relations to 
others” (Brison, “Relational Autonomy and Freedom of Expression,” pp. 285). 
946 Ibid., pp. 283-284. 
947 Ibid., pp. 284. 
948 Ibid., pp. 286. 
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against these social norms or conform to them.  It is therefore not unusual for victims of social 
hate speech to become ambivalent about their own value and identity.  Over time, this negative 
messaging in the social sphere can lead to persistent feelings of inferiority and depression, or 
what Patricia J. Williams has called “spirit murder.”949  Thus, social hate speech becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  As Martin Deutsch, Irwin Katz and Arthur Robert Jensen write, racist speech 
“tends to create in the victim those very traits of ‘inferiority’ that it ascribes to him.”950 
These socially constructed “traits of ‘inferiority’” are not just problematic for the individuals 
who adopt them; more importantly, they harm the whole of societies that purport to value 
participation, inclusiveness and equality.  When groups of citizens feel inferior and isolated, they 
are less likely to engage in democratic politics than if they feel that they are valued members of 
their communities.  The psychological, physical and symbolic damage resulting from social hate 
speech is also likely to translate into democratic character traits of fear, weakness and insecurity.  
Victims of social hate speech are more likely to grow into either self-doubting/timid or 
angry/hostile adults, rather than the confident, robust, engaged citizens that a well-functioning 
democracy requires.   
As discussed above (in both the cyberbullying and safe space sections), these kinds of 
character traits would seem to make it less likely that victims of hate speech will engage in the 
political process during their lifetimes, whether that be through voting, contributing to campaigns, 
contacting government officials, etc.  One precondition of both the desire and the aptitude for 
political participation is maintaining a sense of oneself as an efficacious, powerful, worthy 
member of society.  Individuals must feel like they have some value and agency in their own lives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
949 See Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1991).  Williams explains that racism is only one form of spirit murder—“cultural 
obliteration, prostitution, abandonment of the elderly and the homeless, and genocide are some 
of its other guises” (Ibid., pp. 73). 
950 Martin Deutsch, Irwin Katz and Arthur Robert Jensen, Social Class, Race, and Psychological 
Development (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), pp. 175.  
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before they take on community affairs.  Thus, to the extent that social hate speech diminishes 
these qualities in its victims, it also keeps them out of the political process.   
Theoretical research into the political effects of hate speech tends to support the 
connection between fearful, insecure characters and diminished community involvement.  For 
example, as Parekhu explains, in its extreme, the kind of character traits that are bred from social 
hate speech can lead victims into hiding and complete isolation.  In fact, the fear of how they will 
be received may preclude them from interacting with others at all: 
Targets of hate speech understandably feel nervous in public spaces lest they should be 
humiliated.  They are afraid to speak their minds and behave normally, and they worry 
constantly about how the negative stereotypes that others hold of them will lead them to 
interpret their words and actions.  As a result, they are likely to feel alienated from the 
wider society, to lead shadowy lives, and to feel trapped in a cramped mode of being.951   
Victims may feel—perhaps rightly so—that their voices will not be heard or respected even if they 
do speak up; so instead, they silence themselves.952  
This tendency towards inaction and isolation is unsurprising, as victims cannot help but 
observe the negative opinions about them that are advocated through social hate speech.  They 
may find solace in their peer groups (as discussed above, in the safe spaces section), but they 
are also likely to emotionally disconnect from the majority society that has rejected them.  This 
isolation is not limited to those individuals who actually espouse hateful views, however.  The fact 
that one’s community might legally protect hate speech makes the entire majority group complicit 
in its harms.  By condoning the expression of hate speech (if not necessarily its content), the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
951 Parekh, “Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?” pp. 44. 
952 See Owen Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).  
Fiss explains how, even if these beaten-down persons do try to voice their opinions, those 
argument lack the force necessary to make themselves heard: “It is asserted that hate speech 
tends to diminish the victims’ sense of worth, thus impeding their full participation in many of the 
activities of civil society, including public debate.  Even when these victims speak, their words 
lack authority; it is as though they said nothing” (Ibid., pp. 16). 
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state and general social structures send a message that its victims are not as welcome in the 
wider community as others.953  This is especially true where victims witness active governmental 
efforts to protect hate speech.  Matsuda explains: “When hundreds of police officers are called 
out to protect racist marchers, when the courts refuse redress for racial insult, and when racist 
attacks are often dismissed as pranks, the victim becomes a stateless person.  Target-group 
members must either identify with a community that promotes racist speech or admit that the 
community does not include them.”954 
Many (although not all) victims of social hate speech choose the latter option, accepting 
that they are not truly members of their political communities and removing themselves as much 
as possible.  As a result, the lines between out-groups (those targeted by hate speech) and in-
groups (members of majority society) become bolder and less penetrable.  Such distancing 
presents challenges for the entire political community.  After all, social hate speech does not 
target all demographics equally; it is disproportionately directed at those who have traditionally 
been excluded and looked down upon by the majority community.  To the extent that social hate 
speech diminishes participation in public dialogue and/or political action only for those groups that 
have already been marginalized and disenfranchised, it reproduces preexisting power imbalances 
and increases systematic inequality.  It also decreases social trust between in-groups and out-
groups, handicapping democratic decision-making. 
When members of particular groups are made to feel like outsiders in the political 
community based on uncontrollable, ascriptive factors, even if they do participate in politics, there 
is likely be enough antagonism and distrust on both sides to make cooperation difficult, if not 
impossible.  As Allport, Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp have famously shown, higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
953 As Parekh writes, this reinforces and strengthens the message of inferiority for victims of hate 
speech: “When hate speech is allowed uninhibited expression, its targets rightly conclude that the 
state either shares the implied sentiments or does not consider their dignity, self-respect, and 
well-being important enough to warrant action” (Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?” pp. 
44).   
954 Ibid., pp. 25. 
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levels of intergroup contact tend to result in lower levels of intergroup prejudice, especially under 
conditions of relative equality.955  The reverse tends to hold true as well: limited intergroup contact 
is generally associated with higher levels of intergroup prejudice.  The more separated and 
isolated that out-groups become, the more that individuals on both sides of the divide will come to 
think negatively of one another.956 
First, as discussed in the section on safe space, members of victimized groups are likely 
to isolate themselves, and adopt radicalized opinions and ideologies that further distance them 
from majority society.  As the Canadian Supreme Court explains in Regina v. Keegstra, the 
impact of hate speech “may cause target group members to take drastic measures in reaction, 
perhaps avoiding activities which bring them in contact with non-group members or adopting 
attitudes and postures directed towards blending in with the majority.”957  This becomes a vicious 
cycle.  As members of the out-groups distance themselves from the in-group, they tend to take on 
more radical positions, thus distancing themselves even further and making cooperation and 
compromise more difficult. 
Not only do victims of social hate speech find themselves alone and apart from the larger 
community, but they also have good reason not to trust it.  Racism is a violation of the principle of 
social equality that all liberal, western democracies supposedly embrace.  The decision of state 
actors and institutions not to intercede in these harms sends the message that social equality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
955 See Allport, The Nature of Prejudice; Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp, “A Meta-
Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory,” in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 
90, No. 5 (2006), pp. 751-783.  Pettigrew and Tropp amends Allport by suggesting that the 
positive relationship between intergroup contact and lower levels of intergroup prejudice can be 
attributed to four activities: learning about the group, changing behavior, generating affective ties 
and intergroup reappraisal.  See Pettigrew, “Intergroup Contact Theory,” in Annual Review of 
Psychology, Vol. 49 (1998), pp. 65-85.  
956 While it is true that intergroup contact affects prejudice levels for both the majority and 
minorities groups, in a 2005 study, Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp found that these relationships 
were generally weaker for minority group members.  See Tropp and Pettigrew, “Relationships 
between Intergroup Contact and Prejudice among Minority and Majority Status Groups,” in 
Psychological Science, Vol. 16, No. 12 (December, 2005), pp. 951-957. 
957 Regina v. Keegstra, (1990) 3 S.C.R. 697 
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might not be a priority after all.  Open violations of the democratic ideal are likely to dishearten 
and discourage those who could most benefit from a more equal society.  They also likely to 
reduce the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of those who are victimized by hate speech and yet 
still called upon for their loyalty. 
Second, social hate speech is designed to build distrust and distaste on the part of 
majority society as well.  Members of the majority community may respond to hate speech in 
varying ways.  These can range anywhere from acceptance of the hate speech propaganda to 
discomfort to pity.  As Matsuda explains, in-group reactions to hate speech are similar to their 
responses toward any other human tragedy.  (He cites natural disease and a plane crash as 
examples.)  Even those who feel sympathy for the victims tend to do so from a distance, making 
note of the differences between the “us” and the “them,” and therefore “making it harder to 
achieve a sense of common humanity.”958  One experiences pity from a position of privilege, not 
of equal footing.   
And as Parekh’s definition of hate speech (cited above) makes clear, hate speech is 
more malignant than a national tragedy – in fact, it is the very essence of hate speech to highlight 
differences and paint targets of hate speech as “undeserving and untrustworthy members of 
society.“959  Whether or not individual members of the majority community actually endorse the 
derogatory ideologies underlying hate speech, the messages are difficult to completely ignore.  
Just as targets of hate speech must develop personally and politically amidst the influence of hate 
speech, so too do members of majority society become who they are as individuals in this hateful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
958 “Just as when we confront human tragedy—a natural disease, a plane crash—we feel the 
blessing of the fortunate that distances us from the victims, the presence of racist hate 
propaganda distance right-thinking dominant-group members from the victims, making it harder to 
achieve a sense of common humanity.  Similarly, racist propaganda forces victim-group members 
to view all dominant-group members with suspicion.  It forces well-meaning dominant-group 
members to use kid-glove care in dealing with outsiders.  This is one reason why social relations 
across racial lines are so rare in the United States” (Matsuda, “Public Response to Hate Speech,” 
pp. 25). 
959 Parekh, “Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?” pp. 41. 
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context.  And the tendency of social hate speech to function as a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
encouraging its targets to develop as meek, fearful and unsure of their own self-worth and 
autonomy, may ultimately lower in-group expectations and evaluations.  Over time, social hate 
speech may come to corrupt all intergroup interactions, handicapping efforts to build egalitarian, 
trusting relationships between its victims and the majority citizens. 
The increasing distrust on the parts of both in-groups and out-groups as a result of social 
hate speech leads to less egalitarian and representative political institutions as well as poorer 
economic results for all.  As discussed in Chapter Five, social capital and trust are necessary 
elements for all well functioning representative democracies.  In The Civic Culture: Political 
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba explain how 
interpersonal trust at the social level gets translated into “politically relevant trust,” which 
ultimately has a favorable effect on the flourishing of democratic institutions.960  There is a strong 
connection, the authors argue, between having faith in one’s fellow man and engaging in political 
activity.961  In cases such as hate speech, however, where such intergroup faith and trust does 
not exist, both the willingness and the ability of all citizens to identify and work towards common 
goals is compromised.  Where different demographic groups are incapable of cooperating, 
coordinating and compromising together, the result is significant societal fracturing and 
diminished public morale.962  Thus, social hate speech, even when it may be directed at particular 
individuals, actually disadvantages the entire liberal democratic community. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
960 See Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 19653).  See also Ronald 
Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
82, No. 4 (December, 1988), pp. 1203-1230. 
961 “Belief in the benignity of one’s fellow citizen is directly related to one’s propensity to join with 
others in political activity” (Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 228). 
962 See Eric M. Uslander, “Producing and Consuming Trust,” in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
115, No. 4 (Winter, 2000-2001):  “Trusters also realize that it is important for society to be able to 
reach collective decisions, so they place a high value on compromise and legislative productivity, 
rather than ideological purity and stalemate” (pp. 570). 
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These larger, more dispersed harms seem to be behind European-style efforts to limit 
and punish hate speech.  To the extent that a nation state or an international body emphasize the 
significant public harms created by hate speech—undermining democratic values and 
compromising political outcomes (in terms of both their representativeness and their efficiency)—
they seem more willing to take proactive steps toward limiting it.  On the other hand, nation states 
that tend to focus more on the individual harms that hate speech can produce, such as the United 
States, often choose to be more legally tolerant and leave the “policing” up to social pressures.  In 
Chapter Seven, I will evaluate these different approaches towards managing hate speech.   
 
IV. Conclusion: 
The preceding sections show how, as venues for social speech, Internet speak, safe 
spaces and hate speech actually function quite similarly as mechanisms for influencing 
democratic citizenship and political outcomes.  In keeping with the four mechanisms described in 
Chapter Five, participation in each of the three communicative arenas discussed above: 1) 
contributes to the development of character traits that are either conducive or detrimental towards 
full, participatory democratic citizenship; 2) influences the growth of social capital and trust, 
whether constructively or destructively, inclusively or exclusively; 3) provides individuals with 
training for their unique political cultures, teaching them about the expectations of citizenship; and 
4) establishes the affective and cognitive borders between in-groups and out-groups.  It is 
important to note that each of these mechanisms can function in ways that, to varying degrees, 
have both positive and negative implications for democratic political outcomes. 
 In the case of Internet speak, for example, the content and style of social communication 
significantly affects the impact it will have on democratic character development, social capital 
formation, dissemination of civic information and community building.  While the Internet has 
often been deemed a disappointment from the perspective of those who hoped it would lead to a 
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resurgence of the bourgeois public sphere and/or a boost in traditional political action, more 
generally, looking at it through the lens of the four mechanisms of social speech reveals what a 
significant impression such informal, unstructured communication truly is making on liberal 
democratic politics.  Social speech on the Internet is an excellent example of the premise that one 
does not always need to be talking about the right things in the right way in order to have an 
effect on politics.  Where positive online social speech is used to reveal commonalities, provide 
cultural and political training and share necessary information about what it means to be a good 
democratic citizen, Internet speak actually promotes political activity aimed at inclusiveness.  
However, when certain kinds of Internet speak, such as cyberbullying, seeks only to identify 
differences and devalue individuals, it leads to a community (or both victims and perpetrators) 
lacking in the character traits necessary for democratic citizenship, low levels of social trust and 
weak community ties.   
 Similarly, safe space speech has the potential to significantly affect democratic 
citizenship and political outcomes in both positive and negative ways.  Through many of the same 
processes as positive Internet speak (i.e. information dissemination, mutual empowerment and 
community building) safe space discussions teach participants to build confidence and find their 
own voices.  By engaging in safe, open discourse among peers, members of marginalized groups 
provide validation for themselves and others and counteract mainstream negative messaging, 
thus developing the kind of character traits that are a prerequisite for democratic participation.  
Practice in a deliberative arena (even if that deliberation does not rise to the level of theoretical 
ideals), also provides the skills that make political action more effective.  Finally, safe space 
participation leads to the creation of unique ideological frameworks of right and wrong, that can 
be carried into the wider political community.  However, despite these potential benefits, when 
safe space speech aims at separating and insulating the group from mainstream society, rather 
than building bridges, it serves to undermine the wider democratic political community and its 
goals of inclusion and equality.  The creation (or cementation) of meaningful in-groups and out-
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groups may reduce the political involvement of the latter and make democratic compromise 
especially difficult.  
Finally, the example of hate speech affords an opportunity to look exclusively at the 
divisive potential of social speech.  It also provides an especially illustrative example of the theory 
of social speech in that much of the western world has already publicly acknowledged the harms 
the hate speech poses for liberal democratic values.  Even the United States, which tends to 
define hate speech and its harms relatively narrowly, concedes that hate speech is not only a 
political action, but it has political consequences as well.  (But as we have seen, it is important to 
note that the United States veers away from the international community in its conclusion that the 
potential benefits of protecting hate speech, unless it can be shown to be an incitement to 
violence, generally outweigh the costs incurred for society.)  First, hate speech, especially in the 
social sphere, tends to increase feelings of worthlessness and powerlessness in its targets, thus 
compromising their ability and willingness to engage in participatory politics.  Second, by 
diminishing the victim’s social standing, social hate speech hardens boundaries between in-
groups and out-groups, diminishing social capital and trust on both sides.  Thus, even when 
victims of social hate speech do participate in the larger political sphere, the lack of trust 
compromises the democratic functionings of the states. 
All three venues of social speech discussed in this chapter—Internet speak, safe spaces 
and hate speech—illustrate the democratic potential of everyday, informal conversation from the 
perspective of the theory of social speech.  It should also be clear from the preceding analyses, 
however, that the four mechanisms of social speech, while they explain a great deal of this 
connection, do not represent a completely exhaustive list of the ways in which social speech can 
and does influence democratic citizenship and political outcomes.  The theory of social speech is 
just a beginning towards understanding how social interactions constitute meaningful political 
action; there are likely to be many additional mechanisms that are currently unexplained by one 
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of this theory.  One of the benefits of an empirically grounded political theory, however, is that is 
able to evolve to incorporate new observations and reflections. 
As new and unregulated social interactions continue to dominate human life, the need for 
such theories, based on lived experience, grows.  Before decisions regarding the appropriateness 
and effectiveness of particular legal strategies and social attitudes towards social speech can be 
made, policymakers must have theories that enable them to at least begin to understand the 
democratic implications of those choices.  In other words, the various ways in which different 
types of social speech actually do affect democratic citizenship must be parsed out in order to 
determine how best to encourage those positive effects and discourage the negative ones.  I turn 
to these more practical considerations in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER 7 
	  
PUBLIC POLICY PROPOSALS FOR PROMOTING BETTER DEMOCRATIC 
CITIZENSHIP THROUGH SOCIAL SPEECH 
 
“When the circumstances of an individual or of a nation are in any considerable degree under our 
control, we may, by our knowledge of tendencies, be enabled to shape those circumstances in a 
manner much more favorable to the ends we desire, than the shape which they would of 
themselves assume.  This is the limit of our power; but within this limit the power is a most 
important one.” 
-­‐ John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic963 
 
As the preceding chapters made clear, social speech carries the potential to significantly 
affect democratic citizenship and political outcomes in both positive and negative ways.  Thus, 
when designing schemes for harnessing the inherent political power of social speech, one must 
consider two complementary policy goals: 1) the promotion of social speech that will have a 
positive outcome on democratic citizenship; and 2) the restriction of social speech that will lead to 
negative effects on democratic citizenship.  While interrelated, these two goals often require two 
separate sets of policy suggestions, each of which may include several options: formal, legal 
measures; voluntary, private actions; and/or long-term shifts in public opinion.  In this chapter, I 
describe various circumstances under which all three of these policy options may be appropriate, 
I also place particular emphasize on the vital role that social pressures play in the long-term 
regulation of social speech. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
963 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of 
the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, 8th Ed (New York: Harper 
& Brothers, Publishers, 1882), pp. 1055. Available at: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/27942/27942-pdf.pdf  
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As John Dewey succinctly explains, “[o]ur conduct is socially conditioned whether we 
perceive the fact or not.”964  Human beings who live in shared communities can expect that others 
will take account of their actions.  They can also expect their choice of actions to be influenced by 
the social reaction that they receive.  When an individual’s community responds negatively to her 
behaviors—through mockery or shunning, for example—she is likely to modify her conduct, rather 
than risk further ostracism.  Positive social reactions, on the other hand—such as group 
acceptance and integration into the community—are likely to lead to the continuance of those 
actions, which garnered such feedback.  Once communal norms and expectations have been 
established, an individual does not even have to wait to see how her community judges her actual 
behaviors; rather, she should be able to predict her community’s response ahead of time and 
determine a course of action that presupposes public opinion.  This may be a deliberate process, 
but it may also take place entirely unconsciously.  In either case, social pressures are able to get 
ahead of unpopular actions, stopping them before they even occur.  
In The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion—Our Social Skin, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann 
provides empirical evidence to prove Dewey’s point that social pressures really do lead 
individuals to conform to the majority’s expectations and norms.965  This is particularly true in 
times of crisis, she argues, when demands for conformity tend to increase and public opinion 
functions as “the guardian of public morality.”966  But it is also the case under more benign 
circumstances as well.  Civil society is highly adept at identifying views that diverge from the 
majority opinion, and then punishing deviant individuals with social isolation.967  Many (if not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
964 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: 
Modern Library, 1930), pp. 316. 
965 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion—Our Social Skin, 2nd Ed. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993).  This is (Ibid., pp. 136). 
966 Ibid., pp. 136. 
967 The coercive quality of public opinion is built into its very definition:  “Public opinion is an 
understanding on the part of people in an ongoing community concerning some affect- or value-
laden question which individuals as well as government have to respect at least by compromise 
in their overt behavior under the threat of being excluded or losing one’s standing in society” 
(Ibid., pp. 179). 
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most) would rather conform to public opinion than risk such seclusion.  While the tendency of 
social pressures to reduce individuality may initially appear troubling, as Noelle-Neumann 
explains, there are also important communal benefits to conformity.  Public opinion may threaten 
an individual’s “social skins” (i.e. social standing and respect) by issuing sanctions if she should 
happen to express a viewpoint that strays from the majority, but it also acts as the “social skin” 
that binds a community together.  The more that citizens are able to embrace majority opinion, 
the better integrated they are, as individuals, and the more unified the community can become, as 
a whole. 
Thus, social pressures can be used to not only guide individual actions in ways that suit 
community norms and standards, but they also serve to unite peoples.  This explains why, as 
John Stuart Mill writes in the opening quotation to this chapter, the power of social censure “is a 
most important one.”  It is especially important, he explains, in regards to actions that take place 
in the social sphere.  While public opinion—and the social pressures that enforce it—is highly 
influential in determining human behavior under all circumstances, it is an especially potent 
means of control in cases that involve harmful or antisocial acts that fall outside the purview of the 
law.  “The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their 
welfare, without going to the length of violating any of their constituted rights,” Mill explains in “On 
Liberty.”968  In these cases, “[t]he offender may be justly punished by opinion, though not by 
law.”969  In other words, when wrongs occur between private persons in the social sphere (where 
it is often inappropriate for the state to intervene), it falls to the community to enforce its own 
norms and standards. 
This can be accomplished in one of two ways.  First, the community may choose to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
968 John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty,” in On Liberty and Other Essays (John Gray, ed.) (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 83. 
969 Ibid. 
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punish the unacceptable actions of its members directly.970  For example, if an individual were 
known to have produced and spread petty rumors about her peers, she might find herself 
excluded from social gatherings.  Similarly, if a person tended to renege on her promises, other 
members of the community might cease doing business with her.  Thus, individuals learn that 
they can engage in antisocial behavior only at the risk of social punishment – a strong deterrent.  
Second, social censure can be used to influence the development of individual characters traits in 
order to ensure that the population tends towards positive, community-minded behaviors.  As Mill 
explains, in terms of social control, society is not limited to punishing poor conduct after the fact.  
Rather, “[s]ociety has absolute power over them [its weaker members] during all the early portion 
of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it 
could make them capable of rational conduct in life.”971 
These social influences on character development do not end at “childhood and nonage,” 
however; but they extend into adulthood as well.  Indeed, while Mill frequently claims that rational 
adults ought to be sovereign over their own self-regarding actions, he also suggests that it is each 
rational individual’s duty to enforce public morality upon her peers.  As social beings, he argues, 
humans are obligated to help one another “distinguish the better from the worse, and [to offer] 
encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter.”972  For Mill, this means that the 
community is responsible for ensuring that its members grow into the kind of people who have 
“wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations,” and it does 
so through the threat of social censure.973  And while he insists that this power is neither absolute 
nor exact (i.e. as imperfect beings, humans are incapable of breeding perfection), Mill does argue 
that social influences, when used correctly, can contribute substantially to the positive intellectual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
970 Not only are individual actions “rightfully subject to moral reprobation,” Mill writes, but so too 
are the mere “dispositions underlying these actions (e.g. cruelty, malice, envy)” (Ibid., pp. 87). 
971 Ibid., pp. 91. 
972 Ibid., pp. 84. 
973 Ibid., pp. 84. 
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and moral development of the citizenry.  In so doing, they can go a long way in ensuring that 
individuals behave in accordance with liberal democratic norms and standards. 
The philosophies of Dewey and Mill—as well as the empirical evidence presented by 
Noelle-Neumann—suggest that naturally occurring, social pressures present an especially 
efficacious option for managing social speech.  To the extent that the community is willing to exert 
its influence upon individuals in order to promote that speech, which serves democratic ends, and 
also restrain that speech, which leads to isolation and inaction, it is likely to have a more profound 
positive impact on the content of social speech than top-down action ever could.  The challenge, 
however, is to ensure that society not only chooses to enforce liberal democratic norms, but also 
that it takes its self-regulatory responsibilities seriously in the case of social speech.   
As I explain throughout this project, while social speech can be as important an element 
of public life as more traditional political activities (e.g. protesting, voting, letter-writing), it is often 
seen as mundane, trivial or even idle chatter.  Therefore, if social pressures are to be expected to 
mold citizen speak in a democratically responsible fashion, first, I argue that efforts must be made 
to inform the public about the political implications of everyday communication.  My hope is that, 
once private citizens recognize what is truly at stake when they engage in social speech, they will 
self-consciously work to ensure that civil society is populated with communication that serves 
liberal democratic interests. 
Where it is possible to shift attitudes towards social speech informally, I would argue that 
this approach is generally preferable to legal action.  Society's dual interests in both maintaining 
First Amendment liberties and also protecting all citizens' capacities to engage equally in 
democratic life are often best served when public opinion is free to develop organically and at its 
own pace.  But there are also many instances when such an informal approach will not be 
sufficient to exact the necessary positive change; in these cases, more organized, proactive 
efforts must also be made to shift public attitudes regarding social speech.  In this chapter, I 
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explore several such examples in which natural shifts in public opinion must be combined with 
state, nonprofit and private agents efforts in order to ensure both that positive social speech is 
encouraged, and also that negative social speech is discouraged.  Referring back to the three 
forms of social speech that I discussed in Chapter Six—Internet speak, safe spaces and hate 
speech—I offer a wide range of suggestions on how to structure communication within those 
three spheres in order to best serve democratic needs.  
First, in the case of Internet speak, I show how a mixture of legal measures, industry 
safeguards and efforts to transform public opinion can reconstruct the Internet into a place where 
people are free to connect with distant others without the fear of the persistent, enduring and 
anonymous harassment that too commonly leads to feelings of isolation and alienation.  My first 
suggestion involves encouraging schools and community centers to provide, not just access to 
the Internet, but also training on how it may be used effectively and towards positive ends.  I 
expect online social networking sites to adopt a proactive role as well, both by structuring their 
websites in such a way that makes it easy for users to police themselves for harmful practices 
and content, and also by introducing more formal measures to restrict negative social speech.  
The latter approach can be accomplished through several simple changes, including: 1) 
modifying the Terms of Use agreements to reflect the public interest in restricting cyberbullying; 
2) monitoring sites for harmful speech; 3) ensuring easy reporting mechanisms for abuse; and 4) 
restricting access for repeat offenders.  For these efforts to be fully effective, however, lawmakers 
must also streamline legislation regarding virtual harassment by pushing forward a federal 
definition for what constitutes unacceptable harassment, both online and off.  These official 
measures could then be cemented through public awareness campaigns that encourage Internet 
use for its positive effects (e.g. political mobilization, discussion with distant others) and 
discourage online harassment.   
 Next, I suggest a more private, informal approach to the regulation of social speech in 
safe spaces.  Safe spaces are what they are—a location for members of politically marginalized 
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groups to freely express themselves among their peers—precisely because they are relatively 
insulated from external pressures.  To use legal or commercial reforms to attempt to structure 
safe space social speech in any particular way would, therefore, be impractical and ineffective, 
and would also compromise the very purpose of a safe space.   Instead, I argue that the best 
option for lawmakers, in terms of both promoting that safe space speech, which encourages 
democratic ends (e.g. building a sense of community, developing a willingness to question 
authority), and also discouraging safe space speech that goes against these purposes (e.g. 
isolationism), is to sit back as academic and popular influences naturally continue to shift 
attitudes about the public value of safe space speech.  Over time, members of safe spaces will 
come to see their communication as politically meaningful, which will make them more likely to 
adopt self-regulatory norms that foster good social speech and discourage bad social speech.  
Thus, I argue that internal social forces should be a sufficient enforcement mechanism in the 
case of preexisting, organic safe spaces.  For those marginalized groups that do not yet have 
adequate access to safe spaces, however, I show how the state and nonprofit organizations can 
work together to foster the creation of new safe spaces that are self-consciously designed to 
support democratic goals. 
 Third, I discuss the example of social hate speech, which poses a unique set of 
regulatory challenges.  While there is a clear public interest in protecting American citizens 
against hate speech—regardless of whether it takes place in the public or social sphere—
government attempts to censor such communication have been met with general consternation.  
In this section, I describe the arguments for and against state censorship of social hate speech, 
ultimately concluding that, at least in the United States, anti-hate speech bans ought to be 
avoided.  Instead, I offer three suggestions of ways in which the state can effectively and 
constitutionally contribute towards the diminishment of social hate speech.  First, I argue that the 
state should take a symbolic stance against hate speech by finally offering an official, consistent 
definition for the moral wrong, one which still stops short of making hate speech illegal.  Any such 
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definition must emphasize three essential traits of hate speech: 1) It is more than mere “fighting 
words”; 2) It is likely to result in widespread, enduring harms; and 3) It is at least equally potent 
when it takes place in the social sphere as when it takes place in the public sphere.  Second, I 
suggest that, by putting forth a public policy agenda that stresses the values of inclusiveness and 
egalitarianism, the state will be able to send a clear message about the unacceptability of 
discriminatory ideologies without addressing hate speech directly.  Third, I argue that the problem 
of social hate speech would be greatly reduced if American politicians and lawmakers addressed 
the socioeconomic imbalances that breed hateful ideologies in the first place.  These three sets of 
political actions, taken together, should be enough to increase public awareness about the harms 
of social hate speech, while also helping to produce social norms that are less tolerant of hate.  
These anti-hate speech social mores will, in turn, serve as the most effective possible means of 
restricting hate speech.  
 In the final portion of this chapter, I consider some final thoughts on the theory of social 
speech.  I suggest that such a theory could have significant implications for the understanding of 
transnational and supranational models of citizenship, and I encourage future research into the 
ways that everyday, social interactions affect liberal democratic politics.   
 
I. Internet speak:   
As Chapter Six demonstrated, Internet communication affects the quality of democratic 
citizenship and political outcomes, in both positive and negative ways.  By providing information 
about what it means to be a good citizen, increasing opportunities for building social capital and 
helping to define the borders of affective communities, positive Internet speak not only facilitates 
political coordination, but it also increases the likelihood of an individual engaging in meaningful 
political action.  When Internet speak is aimed at highlighting difference and stratifying groups, 
however, it can result in the opposite outcomes—alienation, eroding social trust and weak 
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community bonds—all of which compromise the effectiveness and representativeness of 
democratic governance. 
Given the growing prevalence of online communication and its potential to significantly 
impact democratic society, there is a public interest in increasing not only equality of access, but 
also equality of usage.  The effects of social speech online may currently be experienced to a 
greater or less degree depending on one’s social standing because, while the Internet is nearly 
ubiquitous in the United States—and in that sense, the digital divide has shrunk—different 
demographic groups still do not use the Internet equally effectively.974  As Zizi Papacharissi 
explains, although the Internet provides unprecedented access to information, access alone 
“does not automatically render us better informed and more active citizens.”975  Individuals require 
more than just a computer and an Internet router to experience the democratic potential of the 
Web; they also need the experience, understanding and technical savvy to sort through and 
appreciate the information available to them.   
Unfortunately, in the United States, Internet literacy is not equally distributed among 
demographic groups.  Those who are male, young, white, wealthy and college-educated have 
proven themselves especially capable of navigating the Internet in ways that enhance their 
individual capacities for democratic citizenship.  In other words, those who are politically active 
online tend to be the same individuals that are already more likely to be involved in traditional 
political action offline.976  To the extent that Internet activity increases the ability and willingness to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
974 See Eszter Hargittai, “Second-Level Digital Divide: Differences in People’s Online Skills,” in 
First Monday, Vol. 7, No. 4 (April 2002). Available at: 
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_4/hargittai/index.html; Paul DiMaggio, Eszter Hargittai, Coral 
Ceste and Steven Shafer, “Digital Inequality: From Unequal Access to Differential Use,” in Social 
Inequality, Kathryn Neckerman (ed.) (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), pp. 355-400; 
Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Jan A.G.M. van Dijk, The Deepening Divide: 
Inequality in the Information Society (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2005). 
975 Zizi Papacharissi, “The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere,” in New Media & 
Society, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2002), pp. 14-15. 
976 See Norris, Digital Divide. 
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participate in democratic politics of those who are already best represented in American political 
institutions, that group is doubly advantaged.  The corollary is also true:  To the extent that 
women, racial minorities and lower income Americans are less likely to effectively engage in 
Internet speak, they are doubly disadvantaged.  Thus, any proposals to regulate online 
communication in ways that enhance democratic outcomes for all must begin with an attempt to 
create more equal access and usage patterns across demographic groups. 
The public school system serves as an ideal starting point.977  Many primary and 
secondary schools already have computer education classes in place in order to establish 
baseline Internet proficiency at a young age.  States should mandate that these courses be 
available to all students (either by making it part of the required course load, or by allowing 
students who do not have these services in their own schools to access them in schools that do 
provide them), and that their curricula should include information about how to best navigate 
online communication.  These curricula would have to be updated regularly in order to account for 
the rapidly changing landscapes in Internet communication—especially social networking sites—
but it is feasible for such efforts to begin to equalize Internet skill levels across demographic 
groups. 
Comparable efforts may extend outside of the official school system as well.  In many 
disadvantaged neighborhoods where schools have not been able to provide sufficient computer 
education, community centers and nonprofit workforce development programs have stepped in to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
977 As Marc G. Yudof explains, mandatory public education is a particularly effective way of 
influencing students.  Even when the state is not actively pursuing a particular ideology, the 
school system enables it to deeply affect the way that citizens perceive the options with which 
they are presented.  First, students are required to pay attention to the lessons and have not yet 
established methods for critical evaluation of the information they receive.  Second, the 
arguments put forth by educators are not thought of or perceived of as advertisements.  Third, 
young students are unlikely to question a teacher’s knowledgability.  Fourth, students are 
punished or rewarded based on how well they absorb their lessons, not on their willingness to 
doubt accepted doctrines.  See Marc G. Yudof, “When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of 
Government Expression and the First Amendment 57,” in Texas Law Review, Vol. 863, No. 875 
(1979). 
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fill the void (either as replacements or supplements to public school efforts).978  Formal mentoring 
programs have also emerged to assist recent immigrants and young people from poorer areas—
who may not have the formal education necessary to compete in a skilled job market—by 
providing them with a technology-mediated learning environment.979  Additional funding could be 
granted to these and similar organizations so that they can continue to perform these services 
and bring new programs to even more communities.   
Currently, much of the funding for nonprofit computer literacy programs comes from 
corporate grants.  Most notably, many media conglomerates have taken it upon themselves to 
promote and support programs that provide broader access to Internet education.  For example, 
in 2012, Advance Publications’ NOLA Media Group (which encompasses NOLA.com and The 
Times-Picayune) launched its NOLA Access Initiative in an effort in increase digital literacy in the 
New Orleans area.980  The initiative began as a partnership between the Greater New Orleans 
Foundation and the NOLA Media Group, which has established a $500,000 fund for the express 
purpose of supporting programs that increase access to the Internet and teach online skills to 
those who might not otherwise have had these educational opportunities.981  In a statement 
released by Ricky Mathews, the president and publisher of the NOLA Media Group explained that 
these efforts stem from the belief that a “digitally connected and engaged community is an 
empowered community.”982 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
978 See Karen Chapple, From Promising Practices to Promising Futures: Job Training in 
Information Technology for Disadvantaged Adults (San Francisco: Bay Area Video Coalition, 
2000), pp. 2-5. 
979 See Mitchel Resnick and Natalie Rusk, “Computer Clubhouses in the Inner City: Access Is Not 
Enough,” in The American Prospect, Vol. 27 (July-August, 1996), pp. 60-68. 
980 See NOLA Media Group, “About Us.” Available at: http://www.nolamediagroup.com/about/.   
981 To that end, in 2012 and 2013, the NOLA Access Initiative awarded grants to several nonprofit 
organizations aimed at increasing online literacy, including the Youth Empowerment Project, the 
Bayou District Foundation; the Boys & Girls Clubs of Southeast Louisiana; the Community Center 
of St. Bernard; the New Orleans Public Library Foundation and the Youth Service Bureau.   
982 See NOLA.com, “NOLA Media Group launches $500,000 effort to boost community access to 
digital technology, information” (September 24, 2012). Available at: 
http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2012/09/nola_media_group_launches_5000.html.  
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Like Mathews, many members of the television and news media believe that they have a 
civic responsibility to educate and inform their communities.  Even though the information 
industries have often failed to live up to their own ideals, they have always seen themselves as 
having been endowed with a public trust.983  Thus, it is reasonable to expect that they will 
continue to privately support efforts to edify the public.  In the coming years, Americans should 
also expect the new online media to follow suit, with digital giants (e.g. Google, Amazon, Yahoo) 
recognizing that they have a duty to not only provide entertainment and increase shareholder 
profits, but also to contribute towards social progress and equality.  To the extent that the new 
media promotes programs that increase access to and proper usage of the Internet, they may 
even be able to simultaneously contribute to both goals – contributing towards democratic 
citizenship while also creating new potential users for their sites.  Thus, these massive 
conglomerates ought to willingly place themselves at the forefront of Internet education, 
developing and funding programs to provide more equal usage of the Internet.    
Private efforts to increase Internet literacy will not be enough to erase the digital divide, 
however.  Given that online inequality is a public problem, additional funding for schools and 
nonprofits—most likely, at the federal, state and local levels—ought to come from government 
sources as well.  Fortunately, it should not be prohibitively challenging to attain these allocations 
through the political process.  As explained throughout this project, the United States prides itself 
on the supreme value it places on freedom of expression.  American lawmakers and politicians 
frequently point to the fundamental role that free and open communication plays in the functioning 
of its democratic institutions – the imagery of the marketplace of ideas represents the backbone 
of American democracy.  However, as Internet speech has not been equally distributed in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
983 In the case of the broadcast media, legislators have traditionally shared this perspective, 
formalizing the relationship between private organizations and the public interest.  For example, 
the Radio Act of 1927 established an exclusionary licensing arrangement on the condition that 
broadcasters act as public fiduciaries whose primary interest is to serve “the public interest, 
convenience and necessity.”  See Radio Act of 1927, Public Law No. 632, February 23, 1927, 
69th Congress. An Act for the regulation of radio communications, and for other purposes. 
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United States, certain ideas and perspectives have not been able to compete freely in the 
marketplace of ideas.  By silencing particular demographic groups, these imbalances have 
compromised egalitarian, democratic governance.   
Considering the rhetorical emphasis American lawmakers and politicians have placed on 
freedom of speech for all, it would seem to be of the utmost importance that they seek to remedy 
this state of affairs.  One potential policy option might be for the United States to create 
endowments for Internet education from the assets on the sale, transfer, and auctioning of media 
companies and of the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum earmarked for telecommunications 
services.  But there are also innumerable ways through which Congress and state legislatures 
could raise the funding necessary for these programs.  
Public and private efforts must not stop there, however.  Just as important as establishing 
equal access to and proficiency in Internet speak is ensuring that the resulting speech be of a 
character that is conducive to democratic citizenship and positive political outcomes.  
Policymakers must keep in mind that Internet speech is neither inherently positive nor negative, 
but is essentially neutral from the perspective of liberal democratic values.  It is what individuals 
do with these spheres of communication that decides how it will affect them and their 
communities.  Therefore, governments, corporations and private citizens must aim to both 
encourage positive, community-building Internet speak and also discourage negative, divisive 
online communication.  In the following sections, I suggest several approaches that call upon all 
three actors to influence the form and content of online social speech in ways that will prove 
advantageous to democracy. 
 
A. Proposals for encouraging positive Internet speak 
As explained in Chapter Six, while the Internet may not provide a panacea for weak 
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democratic citizenship, the interactive, democratic and informative nature of online social 
communication has meant that virtual discussion forums, when they are focused on empowering 
users, building connections and discovering commonalities, may actually increase the probability 
of an individual engaging in meaningful political action offline.  This positive relationship is defined 
by three of the mechanisms discussed in Chapter Five.  First, online social communication 
teaches users about the norms and expectations of their particular communities, while also 
providing them with the logistical information that makes political action possible.  Through 
repeated practice in Internet discussions, users acquire the skills, confidence and desire to 
engage in more traditional political participation.  Second, the Internet, as an inherently intimate 
medium, encourages many users to openly share their hopes, interests and goals with one 
another, thus increasing the potential for stronger affective connections and increased social 
trust.  This social trust is a necessity for liberal democratic states, which require citizens to make 
personal sacrifices for the greater community.  Finally, because Internet communication tends to 
resemble the kind of organic, informal exchanges that take place between friends, acquaintances 
and families in civil society (i.e. social speech), it is often more accessible to members of 
traditionally disenfranchised groups.  Thus, Internet speak has the potential to be more inclusive 
than other forms of communication.  Members of demographic groups that have been excluded 
from formal political dialogue are more likely to not only contribute to online discussion, but also 
to really be heard within these virtual forums.  The diversity of Internet discussions helps 
participants develop empathy for disparate others and to connect their personal well being with 
ever larger, more inclusive imaginary communities.   
The three processes that occur when individuals engage in positive social speech 
online—providing information, building social trust and helping to define broader affective 
communities—all result in participants experiencing stronger feelings of political efficacy and 
connectedness.  In these ways, online social speech serves as an important tool for ensuring an 
engaged, active, egalitarian democratic citizenry.  Thus, communities that value liberal 
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democratic principles have a strong interest in not only protecting positive Internet speak, but also 
in promoting it. 
Fortunately, the nature of Internet speak means that much of this work is already done 
automatically.  The challenge from a policy perspective is neither to encourage more people to 
engage in social speech online, nor to ensure that those who already take advantage of informal 
Internet forums do so more often.  One of the advantages of social speech online is that it comes 
naturally for most users.  While it may be difficult to design measures that actively pull Internet 
users' attention towards overtly political or news sites, most people already actively choose to 
engage in social speech when they log on.  People are constantly creating their own Internet 
forums for casual, social discussion.  But while official efforts may not be necessary in order to 
increase the availability of online spaces for social speech, there is still room to influence the 
quality of Internet speak in positive ways. 
Much of this work may be best accomplished outside of the political establishment, 
through the use of informal community enforcement.  As stated above, social pressures are often 
the most effective way of promoting particular speech patterns without unduly infringing upon 
citizens’ First Amendment rights.  Where certain attitudes and perspectives are met with respect 
by the community, they are likely to be widely (if often unconsciously) replicated.  In the case of 
Internet speak, participants can only be expected to willingly engage in positive, inclusive, 
affirming social communication where online community norms and expectations have been 
structured to prize such behaviors.  To that end, many websites have already implemented 
strategies for encouraging their populations to value speech that is conducive to liberal 
democratic outcomes (i.e. respectful, egalitarian deliberation and thoughtful, community-minded 
information dissemination).   
In this section, I examine two online communities that have instituted practices, which 
have successfully established norms in favor of good democratic speech.  In the first example, 
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Reddit, website designers initially employed a ranking system to establish positive norms and 
standards, which encourage users to self-regulate in favor of speech that advances democratic 
goals.  In the second example, League of Legends, a group of software engineers sought to do 
the same, except this time, within a society that was already characterized by hateful, vulgar 
harassment.  The success of these sites not only proves that it is possible to raise the level of 
discourse online through relatively minor structural changes, but they also offer a transferable 
model for other online communicative spheres.   
To begin, Reddit, one of the most popular anonymous communicative sites online, acts 
as a self-correcting, un-commercialized marketplace of ideas, where users (“Redditors”) 
encourage one another to contribute thoughtful content that promotes and furthers discussion.984  
Reddit is essentially a message board, wherein users can submit links and post comments that 
are shared with a wide audience of official users and visitors.  The community is constantly 
curating this content, determining what is of value and what is not.  Posts that are considered 
worthy are “upvoted” and those that are deemed unworthy are “downvoted,” thus establishing 
their positioning on the site.985  Consequently, in order to determine the norms and expectations 
of the Reddit community, one may simply look to see what kinds of posts make it to the Front 
Page or the top of a discussion thread, and which do not. 
Upon examination, one finds that, as a rule, the value of a Reddit post is determined by 
its ability to contribute to the good of the entire community, either by offering new information, 
opening up a lively discussion or providing a clever perspective.  These standards are what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
984 In October, 2013, Reddit boasted 85,901,746 unique visitors, hailing from over 186 different 
countries.  See Reddit, “about reddit.” Available at: http://www.reddit.com/about/.  Even President 
Barack Obama has taken note of Reddit’s influence, becoming the first active American president 
to host an “AMA” (i.e. an informal Q&A segment) on August, 2012.  For a transcript of the event, 
see: Reddit, “I am Barack Obama, President of the United States – AMA.” Available at:  
http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/z1c9z/i_am_barack_obama_president_of_the_united_st
ates/.   
985 Posts that make it to the “Front Page” are often seen and assessed by hundred of thousands 
of visitors. 
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differentiate Reddit from many other online information networks.  The general Reddit population 
is committed to explicitly encouraging positive, community-minded speech, and this shows in its 
content – top rated comments usually either enlighten (through clarification or edits for accuracy) 
or instigate debate.  Where disagreements occur, nastiness and disrespect are often met with 
calls for civility and downvotes.986   
It is important to note that these norms in favor of courteous, inclusive, educational 
discussion are enforced by the Reddit community itself.  As a group that self-consciously leans 
libertarian, top-down censorship is generally frowned upon on the site.  Redditors tend to prefer to 
self-regulate according to their own democratic values, and they pride themselves in their 
demonstrated history of promoting speech that is in line with those principles.987  However, these 
norms and expectations did not spring up entirely organically.  The site creators have played an 
essential role in determining the tone of community standards.   
One of Reddit’s most notable initiatives aimed at achieving democratic social norms is its 
“karma” ranking system.988  Karma is defined as a reflection of goodwill, or a measure of “how 
much good the user has done for the Reddit community.”989  Redditors earn karma by submitting 
links that other members of the community like and are willing to vote for, according to the 
parameters discussed above.  On the other hand, users can lose karma by contributing rude, 
divisive or spamming content to the site.  A numerical marker of karma is displayed prominently 
next to each Redditor’s username.  Karma does not provide users with any formal influence, nor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
986 This does not mean that Reddit is entirely without divisive, hateful content, however.  If one 
were to search for it, she would certainly find examples of racism, pornography, misogyny, 
pedophilia, etc. on the site.  These comments and posts tend to be downvoted by the wider 
Reddit community, but they often find a home in more specific, subreddits. 
987 Beyond simply voting on content, Redditors are also called upon to volunteer as moderators 
for particular subreddits.  Moderators are given several responsibilities, including configuring the 
parameters for the community, removing links they find objectionable and banning abusive users.  
See Reddit, “Frequently Asked Questions.” Available at: http://www.reddit.com/wiki/faq. 
988 There are two types of karma—link and comment—both of which are prominently displayed on 
a user’s profile.  Link karma refers to the benefit the community has gleaned from posts, whereas 
comment karma only takes into account discussion threads within posts. See ibid. 
989 See ibid.  
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can it be redeemed for anything, even on the website.  Nevertheless, many Redditors take pride 
in achieving a high karma score.  A high karma score is equated with respect and good social 
standing, alerting users that an individual adds value to the community and merits consideration.  
Thus, informally, Redditors with higher karma ratings are likely to exert significant influence on 
others.  As demonstrated community leaders, their tone and the style of their comments and 
posts are likely to be duplicated by others in search of peer recognition. 
By introducing karma as a way of measuring value added to the community, the Reddit 
designers clearly set the tone for a site that attaches importance to speech, which advances 
democratic ends.  With these norms firmly established, Redditors are now able to police their own 
site in accordance with these standards.  However, since karma has always been an element of 
Reddit, it is impossible to judge for certain exactly what its influence has been and how social 
norms might have developed without it.  It is reasonable to draw a connection between karma 
rankings, which highlight community achievements, and Reddit’s generally positive content, but it 
is difficult to definitively determine the degree of causation.  In order to measure the full potential 
impact of website design on the nature of online communication, it is also useful to look at 
examples in which initiatives were added after communication had already deteriorated into 
divisive, hateful discord.   
  One such example comes from Riot Games’ massively multiplayer online role-playing 
game (MMORPG or MMO), League of Legends.990  Like many MMOs, League of Legends initially 
struggled with developing strategies to combat the online harassment being experienced by its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
990 MMOs are especially well placed to experiment with methods for establishing and maintaining 
social norms.  As Caroline Bradley and Michael Froomkin explain in their article, “Virtual Worlds, 
Real Rules,” the virtual worlds that characterize MMOs may permit experimentation without any 
of the real world costs of “bad rules.”  See “Virtual Worlds, Real Rules,” in New York Law School 
Law Review, Vol. 49, December 8, 2004, pp. 103-104.  Role playing games tend to be structured 
similarly to the real world, in everything from their internal market regulations to their family 
structures.  And because it is not uncommon for players to invest hundreds of hours and (often) 
large sums of money into developing their characters, avatars tend to behave similarly to their 
real life counterparts.  Thus, the results of behavior modification experiments within these 
controlled environments tend to have widespread applicability. 
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members.  While the game had procedures in place for lodging complaints (after enough 
complaints were filed against an individual user, she would be banned from the game), the 
developers did not feel like those efforts were adequate for curtailing “toxic” behavior (e.g. 
negative chats, offensive language and verbal abuse) and improving the virtual atmosphere.  So 
in 2012, Riot Games established Team Player Behavior (a.k.a. “Team PB&J”), a group of experts 
in psychology, neuroscience and statistics, in order to develop new policies towards interpersonal 
communications.  Headed by Jeffrey “Dr. Lyte” Lin, the lead designer of social systems at Riot, 
Team PB&J sought to shift its focus away from simply punishing bad behavior and towards 
actively rewarding interactions that represented good citizenship values.991  This involved a two-
part process: 1) alerting players when they have engaged in socially unacceptable online 
behaviors (and doling out punishment where necessary) and 2) creating a system for quantifying 
behaviors that contribute positively to the online community. 
First, Team PB&J established a Tribunal system, which fields reports of negative player 
conduct, and metes out warnings and bans.  The Tribunal provides feedback regarding negative 
community behavior through the use of Reform Cards that document chatlogs and team scores 
from player reports.  Many, including Lin, believe that by simply informing players when they have 
misbehaved in ways that damage the community, the Tribunal goes a long way towards 
discouraging such behavior in the future.  Lin tells a story from when Reform Cards first went live, 
in which he “actually got an email from a 10-year-old boy who said ‘Dr. Lyte, this is the first time 
somebody has told me that I can’t say that word online.  I’m really sorry and I’ll never do it 
again.’”992  Lin describes how he showed this letter to the entire team, proudly proclaiming, “Can 
you guys see the difference you’re making in peoples’ lives? This is not about games anymore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
991 “Toxic players” would, however, continue to be subject to a community peer review system, 
the League of Legends Tribunal, which asks players to vote on how to handle bad behavior 
perpetrated by other players. 
992 See Michael McWhertor, “The League of Legends team of scientists trying to cure ‘toxic 
behavior’ online,” in Polygon (October 13, 2012). Accessed at: 
http://www.polygon.com/2012/10/17/3515178/the-league-of-legends-team-of-scientists-trying-to-
cure-toxic. 
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you guys are impacting these players.”993 
While the Tribunal system may be making a significant difference in the lives of individual 
gamers, the more radical policy proposed by Team PB&J was its Honour Initiative.  Instead of 
merely censuring bad behavior and speech, users were encouraged to report positive qualities in 
others, such as helpfulness, friendliness, teamwork and good sportsmanship.994  In other words, 
players were called upon to recognize the same positive, inclusive, affirmative, community-
minded interactions that are likely to result in a more active, egalitarian democratic citizenry (as 
explained in Chapter Six).  This was called “honoring” a player.995  After receiving enough of 
these positive reviews, a user’s name would be highlighted online so that it became easy to spot 
“good” gamers before others ever had to interact with them.   
 The results of this initiative were swift and dramatic.  Just one week after the launch of 
the Honour Initiative, the makers of the game noted that Negative Attitude reports saw a 39% 
decrease in normal and 11% in ranked games; Offensive Language reports saw a 35% decrease 
in normal and 20% in ranked; and Verbal Abuse reports saw a 41% decreased in normals and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
993 Ibid. 
994 Helpfulness is described thusly: “There are those summoners who have the know-how to help 
you step up your game and are always willing to share.  If one of your teammates makes you feel 
like you’re attending a master class on League of Legends, be sure to recognize him for being a 
helpful teammate.”  Friendliness: “Ever meet one of those summoners who – win or lose – is just 
a pleasure to play with?  This acknowledgement goes out to those unsung heroes of the Fields of 
Justice whose friendly demeanor keeps everyone having a good time even when the chips are 
down.” Teamwork: “Some players really put the needs of the team over their personal interests.  
These players lead the way on the Fields of Justice, support struggling teammates, and are 
always the first to step up and select a role the team needs.  This acknowledgement is for all 
those players who understand that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.” Good 
sportsmanship: “Sometimes you run into an opponent who is humble in victory and graceful in 
defeat.  Be sure to acknowledge those adversaries who embody the spirit of sportsmanship as 
Honorable Opponents.” See Riot Games, Inc., “Honor.” Available at: 
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/honor  
995 From the company’s own website: “Through Honor, you can acknowledge summoners who 
helped make your game awesome by clicking on the ‘thumbs up’ icon next to the summoner 
name at the post-game lobby.  You’ll also receive Honor of your own when you impress your 
fellow summoners with your sportsmanship in the game” (Ibid.).   
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17% in ranked matches.996  Almost immediately, bloggers noted that League of Legends “has 
become a completely different game.”997  By February 2013, Negative Attitude reports saw a 40% 
combined decrease in both normal and ranked matches; Offensive Language reports saw a 55% 
combined decrease in both normal and ranked matches; and Verbal Abuse report saw a 58% 
combined decrease in both normal and ranked matches.998 
 Team PB&J also tracked the behavior of its players and found some encouraging results.  
As it turned out, the users whose names were highlighted in recognition of their good speech 
were actually more successful in the game than their meaner, foulmouthed peers.  Not only that, 
but users actually seemed to be enjoying the new standards of decency.  Representative 
postings on the game’s message board in response to the program included: “I’ll be the nicest 
son of a b ever” (sic); “This has been something asked for by the community for a long time;” 
“Hmmm…I guess that’ll be more effective than my current ‘shut up and stop fighting’ strategy.”999  
 By instituting these simple measures the design team behind League of Legends was 
able to dramatically modify the tenor of its online discussion, resulting in a shift towards speech 
that promotes democratic values and outcomes.  As it became clear that the community valued 
more democratic, community-minded speech, individual users began to self-regulate and police 
themselves in ways that created a less hostile environment.  It is important to note that the 
makers of League of Legends and Reddit are not forcing these institutional policies on their 
users.  Rather, they are creating an environment conducive to the flourishing of positive 
democratic speech, thus tapping into what seems to be a preexisting desire of their users to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
996 Riot Games, Inc., “Initial Honor Results” (October 9, 2012). Available at: 
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/news/initial-honor-results.  Ranked and normal games are 
essentially identical.  The only difference is that ranked matches contribute to a player’s overall 
ranking.  As players improve in their rankings, they are pitted against stronger opponents. 
997 Blaine Smith, “How’s that League of Legends Honor Initiative working out?” MMO 
Attack (February 11, 2013). Available at: http://blog.games.com/2013/02/11/league-of-legends-
honor/  
998 Ibid. 
999 Riot Games, Inc., “League of Legends Community: Introducing Honor!” Available at: 
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/board/showthread.php?p=29448823 
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part of a cordial, accepting, democratic community. 
The lesson to be learned from these examples is that, while policymakers may not be 
able to force private citizens into adopting social norms that encourage positive democratic 
speech using a top-down approach, website creators and game developers can take proactive 
steps to shape the framework within which community standards develop.  And as these 
examples show, it often takes very little effort to achieve the desired norms and expectations.  A 
simple ranking system that emphasizes democratic contributions to the community (even when 
rankings do not confer any external benefits upon users) may go a long way in ensuring that the 
majority of (or at least the most visible) speech on a given site be informative, inclusive and 
respectful.  This is a measure that could be adopted by any number of games and websites.   
Already, many sites (including industry leaders, like Facebook) have incorporated some 
mechanism for rating content.  Through three low cost modifications to a general rating system, 
nearly any online community could replicate the results achieved by Reddit and League of 
Legends.  First, sites would need to express clear expectations for what constitutes a high rating.  
Second, those expectations would need to emphasize speech that serves community interests.  
Finally, by using content ratings to determine a visible ranking of individual users, websites could 
expect to see people become more accountable for their speech.  To the extent that good 
democratic speech becomes associated with high social standing online, most responsible users 
will choose to engage in interactions that are in line with those values.   
 
B. Proposals for discouraging negative Internet speak 
While the encouragement of positive social speech online ought to improve democratic 
citizenship and political outcomes for all, this approach needs to be combined with efforts to 
discourage that Internet communication, which actively seeks to divide communities and isolate 
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individuals, such as cyberbullying.  As described in Chapter Six, the anonymous nature of 
Internet communication leads many users to address one another more harshly than they might 
do in person.  For evidence, witness the rise of a new kind of virtual bully and heckler – the 
Internet troll, who exists entirely to “intentionally [disrupt] online communities.”1000  For many 
Internet users, cyberbullying is a part of daily life, experienced either as perpetrator or victim (or 
both).  The long arm of the Internet and the permanence of the messages contained within tend 
to amplify the negative effects of cyberbullying, resulting in deeper psychological scarring than 
that which generally stems from most other forms of harassment.  This emotional scarring goes 
on to limit those affected by cyberbullying in terms of both their democratic character 
development and their relationships to their political communities. 
Not only does cyberbullying lead to significant individual and societal harms, but it has 
also proven itself to be challenging to control.  The same anonymity that breeds cyberbullies also 
makes them difficult to find and hold accountable for their actions.  Furthermore, the organic, 
informal and (often) amorphous nature of the social speech forums that arise online has meant 
that policing them necessarily presents challenges from the standpoints of both practicality and 
legality.  Because the widespread harms of cyberbullying and other forms of online harassment 
are only beginning to be understood and officially recognized, the rules concerning the regulation 
of such offensive, harmful speech are still in their formative stages, and thus, remain unclear.  In 
the United States, for example, laws concerning cyberbullying have been developed piecemeal, 
differing widely from state to state.1001  In 2009, a bill was introduced in Congress [H.R. 1966] to 
at least establish a unified, federal definition for the term "cyberbullying," but the proposal was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1000 See Mattathias Schwartz, “The Trolls Among Us,” in The New York Times (August 3, 2008).  
1001 More than twenty states have enacted some form of legislation in order to address 
cyberbullying, but these laws vary considerably, including: statutes that mandate that school 
boards adopt policies to address cyberbullying; statutes that criminalize the act of harassing 
minors online; and statutes aimed at providing education about cyberbullying.  For a full list of 
state legislation on cyberbullying, see: National Coalition Against Censorship (NCAC), 
“Cyberbullying: Statutes and Policies.” Available at: http://www.ncac.org/List-of-Cyberbullying-
Statutes-and-Policies 
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criticized for being too broad and did not advance.1002  As of now, there are no federal laws 
prohibiting cyberbullying or establishing accountability.   
As a result of this lack of federal legislation, Americans have looked to the judiciary to 
define online abuse and to determine which bodies ought to be held responsible for policing the 
Internet.1003  Thus far, the courts have evaluated two distinct strategies for establishing liability.  
First, they have analyzed efforts from the school system to control cyberbullying.  The results 
have been mixed, with the higher courts arguing that student speech is generally protected under 
the First Amendment unless it poses a real threat, but that schools do not always have the 
authority to punish student speech on the basis of content even if they find it to be harmful.  
Second, the courts have evaluated attempts to hold Internet service providers accountable for 
monitoring cyberbullying and online harassment on their sites.  While the American judiciary has 
not always been receptive to this approach, it is proving successful in other western nations. 
In this section, I describe the American judiciary’s reaction to these two strategies, 
highlighting their advantages and disadvantages.  Ultimately, I conclude that, despite limited 
popular support for approaches that require Internet service providers to manage the speech on 
their websites, this option is both more feasible and less constitutionally problematic than relying 
on the school system to control cyberbullying.  That is not to say, however, that private regulation 
is sufficient to discourage cyberbullying and other forms of online harassment.  Rather, any plan 
to eradicate cyberbullying must involve a comprehensive approach that includes Internet service 
providers, state officials and private citizens.  At the end of this section, I offer several policy 
suggestions for all three actors. 
To begin, the idea of using the school system as a potential alternative (or supplement) to 
federal legislative action challenging cyberbullying has gained significant public traction in recent 
years.  Focusing on the prevalence of this phenomenon among children and teenagers, several 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1002 H.R. 1966. Available at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.1966 
1003 See Chapter Six for a more in depth discussion of the attempts to define cyberbullying. 
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states have recently been experimenting with laws that require school districts to punish students 
for their online activity if they believe it constitutes a “threat,” either to specific individuals (i.e. 
“fighting words”) or to school operations more generally.  For example, in 2011, propelled by the 
Clementi suicide (discussed in Chapter Six), the New Jersey state legislature unanimously 
approved an extension to its 2002 anti-bullying law (N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13) in order to incorporate 
cyberbullying, using the educational system as its enforcement mechanism.  The new law 
established an Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, demanding that all public schools: 1) adopt 
comprehensive anti-bullying policies (incorporating eighteen pages of “required components”); 2) 
increase staff training; and 3) adhere to strict deadlines for reporting all bullying episodes.1004  
The New Jersey law presents a layered educational approach to managing cyberbullying, 
involving individuals, schools, school districts and state agencies.  Each New Jersey school must 
establish a “safety team” (comprised of teachers, staff and parents), as well designate an anti-
bullying specialist to review and investigate complaints.  Each school district, in turn, must keep 
an anti-bullying coordinator on staff, and superintendents are required to provide biannual reports 
to the state capital detailing every episode of bullying in schools under their purview.  The State 
Education Department then evaluates these efforts, grading the schools and districts based on 
their records.  Educators who fail to comply with these regulations face the loss of their licenses. 
While the New Jersey efforts have received widespread public support, many educators 
are concerned about their feasibility, especially given that cyberbullying regulations often extend 
to speech that takes place off campus.  “I think this had gone way overboard,” explains Richard 
G. Bozza, executive director of the New Jersey Association of School Administrators.  “Now we 
have to police the community 24 hours a day.  Where are the people and the resources to do 
this?”1005  Cyberbullying is a widespread problem that may take place at any time and in any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1004 New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, P.L.2010, Chapter 122, approved January 5, 
2011, Assembly, no. 3466. Available at: http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/AL10/122_.PDF  
1005 Winnie Hu, “Bullying Law Puts New Jersey Schools on Spot,” in The New York Times (August 
30, 2011). 
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number of arenas.  Furthermore, it is not only students who engage in cyberbullying, but adults as 
well.  As of now, the American school system does not have the authority or the resources to 
handle such a massive societal undertaking.  To demand that the educational system be held 
responsible for its eradication saddles an already overburdened institution with a herculean 
(perhaps impossible) task.    
  Not only is it unrealistic for state and local laws to require schools to manage the 
extensive problem of cyberbullying, but these policies also raise free speech concerns.  After all, 
as several recent cases have shown, students do retain some First Amendment rights both on 
campus and off.  Schools do not have unlimited constitutional authority to limit the speech of their 
students, even when that speech clearly constitutes cyberbullying.  In the 2001 case, Killion v. 
Franklin Regional School District, for example, a high school student, Zachariah Paul, sued his 
school after administrators suspended him for "abusive, lewd, and vulgar" comments made online 
about the school's athletic director.1006  These comments were presented in the form of a “top ten” 
list, and were created on Paul’s home computer before emailing a copy to his friends.  Within a 
few weeks, copies of the list were distributed school-wide.  A federal district court ruled against 
Paul’s suspension, stating that the website, while in poor taste, did not constitute a substantial 
threat to school operations and that the student's actions were not punishable by the school 
because the website was created off school grounds on the student's personal computer.1007   
The following year, in Justin Swidler v. Bethlehem Area School District, the courts 
changed course when a fourteen year-old student was accused of creating a website that 
included violent, malicious images and texts directed at his principal and algebra teacher.1008  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1006 Paul reportedly posted these comments in anger, after being refused a student-parking permit 
due to new regulations that impacted the school’s track team.  See Killion v. Franklin Regional 
School District, 136 F.Supp.2d 446 (2001). 
1007 See ibid. 
1008 Among other things, the website featured a picture of Swidler’s teacher’s head dripping with 
blood and a caption that read, “Why should she die?” which was accompanied by several 
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teacher was so upset by this incident that she filed for medical leave to cope with her 
psychological distress.  Because the school board believed this website to have had a deleterious 
effect on the entire school community, they sought to expel Swidler.  Swidler challenged his 
expulsion in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which ruled partly in his favor, finding that the 
messages on his website did not constitute a true threat to the teacher.  The majority did, 
however, agree that his expulsion was not a violation of his First Amendment rights, as "the 
website created disorder and significantly adversely impacted the delivery of instruction."1009   
In 2005, in Ryan Dwyer v. Oceanport School District, an eight-grade student was 
suspended after creating a website on his home computer titled, “I Hate Maple Place.”1010  On this 
site, Dwyer and several other students posted inappropriate content about his school and several 
teachers.  School officials suspended Dwyer when they learned of his site.  Dwyer, with the help 
of the ACLU, sued the school district, claiming that his suspension violated his Fifth Amendment 
right to due process.  The court granted a partial summary judgment in his favor.  The parties 
settled, and the school district issued an apology and paid $117,500 in damages and lawyers' 
fees.   
Finally, in the 2007 case, State of Indiana v. A.B., the state of Indiana filed a delinquency 
petition against a Greencastle Middle School student after the school’s principle discovered a 
MySpace web page where the student posted “vulgar” criticism of the school’s anti-body-piercing 
policy, formed a publicly accessible group criticizing the school principal, Shawn Gobert, and 
created a fake user account in Gobert’s name.1011  The juvenile court ruled that, had an adult 
made these postings, they would indeed constitute criminal harassment.  The Court of Appeals of 
Indiana, however, found that these comments were political speech, protected by the First 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reasons why she deserved to be killed.  See J. S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 807 A.2d 
803 (Pa. 2002). 
1009 Ibid. 
1010 See Ryan Dwyer v. Oceanport School District, Civ. No. 03-6005 (SRC) (2005). 
1011 See A.B. v. State of Indiana, 67A01-0609-JV-372 (2007). 
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Amendment.  In 2008, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the appellate ruling but dismissed the 
Court of Appeals’ rationale.  The justices ruled that the state had not shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the student posted with the intent “to harass, annoy, or alarm,” the principal, and that 
she had “no intent of legitimate communication” because she posted on her personal MySpace 
page, to which Gobert did not have access. 
 These four representative cases demonstrate the American judiciary’s ambiguous 
response to the school system’s attempts to punish cyberbullying.  While the courts have found 
that cyberbullying, to the extent that it cannot be proved to constitute a real threat, either to an 
individual or to school operations, is generally protected under the First Amendment freedom of 
speech, they have also conceded that schools do not always have the authority to punish their 
students for the content of their speech, even if they find that harmful cyberbullying has taken 
place.  As this imprecise framework suggests, the myriad judicial reactions to schools’ attempts at 
regulating cyberbullying are not always consistent or predictable, but often appear to be decided 
on an ad hoc basis.   
 This case-by-case, court-by-court approach to determining what constitutes a real threat 
to school operations may stem from some uncertainty regarding the constitutional limitations 
placed on student speech by the landmark decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District.  As discussed in Chapter Three, this case considered the right of 
three Iowa students to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.  Ultimately, 
the majority observed that neither students nor teachers should be expected to “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gates.”1012  However, 
the court also conceded that the right to freedom of speech on campus is not absolute.  The 
majority opinion continued on to say that, in order for school officials to justify censoring speech, 
they “must be able to show that [their] action was caused by something more than a mere desire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1012 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”1013  
In other words, schools can ban expression that would “materially and substantially interfere with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in operation of the school.”1014 
While subsequent cases have attempted to clarify what would constitute a material and 
substantial interference with the operations of a school, Tinker’s application is still unclear.1015  
Justice Clarence Thomas admits as much in his concurring opinion in Morse v. Frederick (a.k.a. 
the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” case).  In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the free speech rights 
of a high school student, Joseph Frederick, were not violated when his Alaska high school 
suspended him for unveiling a 14-foot banner (reading, “Bong Hits 4 Jesus”) on a public sidewalk 
outside of the schoolhouse.  The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts, cites 
heavily from Tinker.  While agreeing with the majority in its decision, Thomas did not sign on to 
the broader free speech limitations it placed on students, calling for a more precise framework for 
judging the constitutionality of student speech.  “We continue to distance ourselves from Tinker, 
but we neither overrule it nor offer an explanation of when it operates and when it does not,” 
wrote Thomas.  “I am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak 
in schools except when they do not.”1016  Such an ad hoc approach is bound to result in 
inconsistencies and a lack of clarity concerning students’ rights – this is as true for cyberbullying 
as it is for more traditional forms of political speech.  
Thus, the educational system’s approach towards policing cyberbullying fails in two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1013 Ibid. 
1014 Ibid. 
1015 In Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld Tinker, 
but limited it scope by finding that a high school student’s sexual innuendo-laden speech at a 
student assembly did not merit free speech protections, despite the fact that such “indecent” 
speech may not undermine the educational process.  Two years later, in Hazelwood v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1966), the majority of the court further narrowed the decision in Tinker 
by allowing schools to regulate the content of “school sponsored publications, theatrical 
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public 
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,” “so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 
1016 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
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respects.  First, it is unrealistic to expect teachers and administrators to monitor the 
democratically disruptive speech of all its students, both on campus and off (to say nothing of all 
the cyberbullying victims and perpetrators who are no longer school-aged).  Second, the unclear 
constitutional status of student speech has meant that the rules are uncertain and punishments 
are unpredictable.  Internet speak defies traditional boundaries of organization.  It does not take 
place within one community, one school, one town, one state or one nation.  Online harassment 
may come from a classmate or a neighbor, or it may come from a stranger on the other side of 
the world.  When traditional political institutions, tied to a particular geographical locale (e.g. 
school districts and states) attempt to address cyberbullying, they are limited by the boundaries of 
their authority.  How do state courts handle online harassment that crosses state borders?  
National borders?  If Americans are to place responsibility for cyberbullying on the local 
community by insisting that the school system regulate online behaviors, how do they limit its 
power?  Does a school have the authority to regulate actions that take place entirely outside of 
school property, for example?  If so, how does it account for its limited access to students’ off-
campus lives?  And what if the cyberbully is an adult – do the schools still have the obligation and 
the authority to act?  To whom do adults appeal when they are the victims of online harassment? 
A more promising alternative to using schools as the enforcement mechanisms against 
cyberbullying, which takes into account all of these concerns, is to enable Internet service 
providers to police their own websites.  Not only does this approach not interfere unduly with the 
First Amendment right to freedom of expression, but it is also able to account for the fluid 
boundaries of Internet communication. 
Holding Internet service providers and individual websites accountable for the speech 
that occurs on their sites actually provides the least possible infringement upon the constitutional 
right to free expression, while still acknowledging the rights of individual users to be free from 
harmful online harassment.  By its own language, the First Amendment applies only to Congress 
(“Congress shall make no law…”).  Citing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment, the Supreme Court has also extended freedom of expression to state and local 
governments in Gitlow v New York, thus ensuring that limitations on speech by all levels of 
government must pass muster under the First Amendment.1017  These restrictions have been 
further expanded to corporations that work in concert with or on behalf of the government, such 
as government contractors.1018  Otherwise, the First Amendment does not apply to non-
governmental entities.  This has meant that private corporation and organization are entitled to 
restrict speech, as long as such censorship is not shown to be discriminatory.  This includes 
Internet service providers and websites.  These private corporations may be offering a public 
service by limiting harmful speech, and in doing so, since they are not acting as state oppressors, 
they are acting within the limits of the First Amendment. 
The first (semi) successful attempt to hold Internet service legally providers responsible 
for cyberbullying was evaluated in United States v. Lori Drew.1019  Drew was a Missouri mother 
who, in concert with two others, created and operated a MySpace account in the name of a 
fictitious teenage boy, “Josh Evans,” in order to manipulate and harass a thirteen year-old girl 
named Megan Meier.  (Meier was a neighbor and schoolmate of Drew’s daughter, who Drew 
suspected of spreading false rumors about her daughter.)  In fall 2006, “Evans” reportedly sent 
Meier a message to the effect that the world would be a better place without her.1020  This 
message set off a wave of communications from “Evan’s” MySpace connections, urging Meier to 
kill herself.  Shortly thereafter, Meier committed suicide. 
Drew was charged on four counts.  Most controversially, she was charged with 
conspiracy arising out of a charged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, namely that Drew and her co-
conspirators agreed to violate the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (CFAA) by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1017 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
1018 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Board of 
County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1995); and O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of 
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996). 
1019 United States v. Lori Drew, CR 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
1020 Ibid. 
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intentionally accessing a computer used in interstate commerce "without authorization" and in 
"excess of authorized use," and by using interstate communication to obtain information from the 
computer in order to inflict emotional distress in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).1021  Counts 
Two through Four alleged that Drew violated the CFAA by accessing MySpace servers to obtain 
information regarding Meier in breach of the MySpace’s Terms of Service agreement on two 
separate occasions.1022  The jury deadlocked on Count One, found not guilty on Counts Two 
through Four, and found Drew guilty of a misdemeanor violation of the CFAA. 
The following year, however, the verdict was thrown out by United States District Judge 
George H. Wu, who stated that allowing a violation of a website's Terms of Service to constitute 
an intentional access of a computer without authorization or exceeding authorization would "result 
in transforming section 1030(a)(2)(C) into an overwhelmingly overbroad enactment that would 
convert a multitude of otherwise innocent Internet users into misdemeanant criminals." For these 
reasons, Wu granted Drew's motion for acquittal. The government did not appeal. 
While this action was not immediately successful in establishing a legal avenue for 
prosecuting cyberbullying in the United States, it ultimately did lead to a positive outcome.  In 
response to the Drew case, on May 16th, 2008, Missouri legislators approved an amendment to 
the state’s harassment law to include penalties for bullying via computers, other electronic 
devices, or text messages.  Since then, other nations have also developed precedent for 
appealing to both the Internet service providers and individual websites in order to combat 
cyberbullying.   
For example, in the United Kingdom, in 2012, Nicola Brookes was granted a high court 
order to force Facebook to reveal the identities of cyberbullies who had been targeting her with 
abusive messages on the social media website.  Earlier that year, Brookes had been attacked 
with “vicious and depraved” abuse after she posted a comment in support of the former The X 
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1022 Ibid. 
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Factor contestant, Frankie Cocozza.  Cyberbullies set up fake profiles, through which they 
spuriously claimed that Brookes was a pedophile and a drug dealer.  Because the fake profiles 
created anonymity for the abusers, Brookes was unable to prosecute them.  Once Facebook was 
required to reveal the names, email and IP addresses of those behind the abusive messages, 
Brookes was able to sue them each, individually.  Unfortunately, these efforts may not amount to 
much in practice.  While there are laws in place in the United Kingdom to help people like 
Brookes, by compelling website providers to combat cyberbullying, the state does not yet 
possess the necessary enforcement mechanisms.  “This [harassment] is a criminal offence and 
we have the legislation to protect us, but what’s missing is the enforcement.  This is where the 
system is failing us,” explained Rupinder Bains, a partner at the law firm, Bains Cohen (which is 
representing Brookes).1023  “In the States people have committed suicide over this and that’s what 
will happen over here if things don’t change.”1024 
Despite these failings, the Drew and Brookes cases are particularly interesting in that 
they highlights two aspects of cyberbullying that may pose challenges for schools and states that 
try to regulate it, but that are relatively easily managed by private websites: 1) the diversity of 
victims and perpetrators1025 and 2) the lack of respect for physical boundaries.1026  As these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1023 Josh Halliday, “Facebook forced into revealing identities of cyberbullies: Woman wins high 
court backing after she received abusive messages about post on The X Factor’s Frankie 
Cocozza,” in The Guardian (June 8, 2012). 
1024 Ibid. 
1025 A second recent example of cyberbullying that affected individuals of all ages and all stations 
of life involved the controversy surrounding England’s 2013 decision to replace Charles Darwin 
with Jane Austen on the on the £10 note.  As the New York Times reported, this seemingly minor 
effort to accommodate a feminist campaign that called for the addition of a female image to the 
national currency (Queen Elizabeth II will soon be the only woman featured on an English 
banknote) was met with vitriolic messages online “including threats of rape and death, against 
several high-profile women.”  Caroline Criado-Perez, one the founders of this campaign, reported 
receiving tweets, such as “I’m going to pistol whip you over and over until you lose 
consciousness,” on the day the decision was announced.  Some cyberbullies offered still more 
specific threats; for example, Stella Creasy, a Labour Party legislator, was told “I will rape you 
tomorrow at 9pm.  Shall we meet near your house?” See Katrin Bennhold, “Bid to Honour Austen 
Is Not Universally Acknowledged,” in The New York Times (August 4, 2013). 
1026 According to a January 2012 Ipsos poll for Reuters News, all 24 countries surveyed reported 
parental awareness of cyberbullying taking place within their communities.  Although the rates of 
395	  
	  
	  
cases show, cyberbullying is not a problem reserved only for children and teens.  Brookes was in 
her mid-40’s at the time this harassment took place, and her harassers likely included people 
from various races, age groups and socioeconomic backgrounds.1027  And while Drew’s victim 
was a schoolchild, Drew, herself, was the mother of a teenage girl.  Brookes’ experiences also 
demonstrate just how difficult it is to capture cyberbullying; bullies followed her from Facebook all 
over the Internet, even to such innocuous websites as recipe forums. They did not harass her 
from one physical location, but from all over the world, under various legal jurisdictions.  Because 
Internet service providers are designed to exist beyond the confines of traditional political 
institutions and to manage all users, regardless of age or location, they are not bound by many of 
the same limitations plaguing state actors.  Thus, they are especially well placed to take on at 
least some of the responsibility for policing cyberbullying. 
Nevertheless, American public opinion has not been entirely favorable towards attempts 
to hold Internet service providers legally responsible for cyberbullying.  In the Drew case, for 
example, many legal commentators expressed the “slippery slope” concern that the prosecution 
was seeking to criminalize any violation of web site terms of service.  Andrew Grossman, a senior 
analyst for the Heritage Foundation, issued a statement against the lower court’s decision:  “If this 
verdict stands… it means that every site on the Internet gets to define the criminal law.  That’s a 
radical change.  What used to be small-stakes contracts become high-stakes criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
awareness ranged significantly (15 percent for France to 77 percent for India), the mean 
international awareness of cyberbullying was a significant 38 percent.  See Ipsos, “Three 
Quarters (77%) of World Citizens Say Cyberbullying Needs Special Attention and Cannot be 
Addressed Through Existing Anti-Bullying Measures” (January 9, 2012). Available at: 
http://www.ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=5462#.Tw6exyC2__s.twitter.  
1027 While adults are often victims and perpetrators of cyberbullying, research tends to focus only 
on children and adolescents, “due to their tenuous developmental stage.”  As Peter Vishton, a 
program director in the National Science Foundation’s Directorate for Social, Behavioral and 
Economic Sciences explains, although “adult cyberbullying is a problem, it’s not an emergency 
situation.”  See Jennifer L. Thornhill and Bobbie Mixon, “Recognizing a Cyberbully: Anonymous 
nature of digital aggression clouds identities of virtual bullies.” Available at: 
http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=122271. 
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prohibitions.”1028  Likewise, Jennifer Grankick, the civil liberties director at the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, an organization dedicated to protecting First Amendment rights online, claimed that 
“[t]his is a novel and extreme reading of what [the law] prohibits.  To say that you’re violating a 
criminal law by registering to speak under a false name is highly problematic.”1029 
While any legal obligations placed on website operators have drawn criticism in the 
United States, voluntary efforts on the part of individual websites have generally been met with 
public approval.  In terms of the latter, most criticism actually tends to argue that these sites are 
not choosing to do enough.  Thus, many Internet service providers have already voluntarily 
adopted policies that attempt to eradicate cyberbullying and punish perpetrators.  For example, 
Facebook decided to tackle its cyberbullying problem head on.1030  Facebook has a Family Safety 
Center on its site, which offers advice for parents, teachers, teens and law enforcement agents.  
While some of these suggestions may not appear terribly powerful—the first step that they advise 
is for cyberbullying victims to simply “unfriend” or “block” their attackers—Facebook also has 
policies in place to confidentially report abuse with the click of only a few buttons.  In November, 
2013, the social network unleashed its Bullying Prevention Hub, which enables users to 
anonymously report bullying incidents, and also provides information for victims on what they can 
do when they find harassing content, recommendations to parents who want to help and 
guidance to the bully so that she can better understand her actions.  Users are encouraged to 
report any abuse they come across, whether that be on their own page or someone else’s page, 
thus enabling them to police one another.  At least in theory, a member of the anti-bullying team 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1028 Brian Stelter, “Guilty Verdict in Cyberbullying Case Provokes Many Questions Over Online 
Identity,” in The New York Times (November 28, 2008). 
1029 See Kim Zetter, “Experts Say MySpace Suicide Indictment Sets ‘Scary’ Legal Precedent,” 
Wired (May 15, 2008). Available at: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/05/myspace-indictm/ 
1030 In 2011, Consumer Reports estimated that one million of Facebook’s twenty million teenage 
and pre-teenage users had experienced bullying, harassment or threatening language on its site 
in the previous year.  See Consumer Reports, “Online Exposure: Social networks, mobile phones, 
and scams can threaten your security” (June 2011). Available at: 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2011/june/electronics-computers/state-of-
the-net/online-exposure/index.htm. 
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reviews each of these reports so that appropriate actions can be taken.  
An Internet service provider does not need to be as large or well funded as Facebook, 
however, to implement measures to limit online harassment.  I suggest four options that nearly all 
Internet service providers and websites could adopt in order to address the problem of 
cyberbullying: 1) modify Terms of Service agreements to include clauses against harassment; 2) 
monitor their sites for harmful content; 3) ensure easy (and anonymous) reporting mechanisms 
for harassment; and 4) restrict access for those who have repeatedly infringed upon the rights of 
others.  The fact that many social networking sites already have similar mechanisms in place 
proves that they are both feasible and publicly desirable.  As smaller websites try to emulate 
industry leaders, like Facebook, the public should expect to see similar policies expand so that 
they exist universally. 
It is not enough, however, to rely solely on the efforts of Internet service providers and 
websites to solve the societal problem of negative online social speech.  After all, cyberbullying is 
not a problem that is entirely of the Internet’s making.  If there is any hope to stop cyberbullying 
and other forms of online harassment, there must be a joint effort between Internet service 
providers, state actors and private citizens.   
In terms of government action, legislators need to recognize that private policing will 
never be fully effective until the United States develops unified standards for what constitutes 
“cyberbullying.”  That is why I suggest that Americans begin by encouraging Congress to take a 
second look at H.R. 1966, and to develop a definition for cyberbullying that is no longer “too 
vague” to be effective.  Several federal organizations are already working towards this goal.  The 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, for example, has its own website dedicated to 
clarifying to concept of cyberbullying and spreading awareness: 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/.  This website contains a special section devoted to 
cyberbullying with advice and videos geared towards children.  It clarifies the distinction between 
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cyberbullying and traditional, face-to-face bullying, as well as offers suggestions to parents and 
children for how to prevent and report cyberbullying.1031  On this site, one can also find a list of all 
state rules regarding cyberbullying – the authors include a December 2010 study by the U.S. 
Department of Education, which reviews state laws and identifies eleven common, key 
components of cyberbulling regulations.1032  Efforts such as these, performed by administrative 
agencies, ought to make the legislative task of defining cyberbullying that much easier.     
 By opening up the discussion about cyberbullying, and by recognizing that there is a 
national interest in protecting citizens from harassing social speech, attitudes about what is 
acceptable to say online should begin to change.  The most powerful option for limiting exposure 
to negative social speech is for people not to want to engage in it.  This means changing people’s 
sensibilities and making them aware of the potentially far-reaching effects of their negative social 
speech online.  As Arturo Bejar, Facebook’s director of engineering (who is credited with 
developing the site’s custom-made system for addressing bullying and harassment) explained in 
an interview with Emily Bazelon, social networking sites are not distinct from the offline world.  
The way people treat one another online is just another expression of the community norms and 
values that they hold offline.  “Everyone I talk to has a big divider in their head, as if the way to 
resolve conflict is different if a kid is online versus sitting in a park… But our biggest insight, in the 
work we’re doing now, is that there isn’t a big separation between online life and real life in terms 
of social structures.  Facebook shouldn’t be in the business of dictating and enforcing community 
norms.  People should enforce their own norms.”1033  To be effective, social networking sites 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1031 Note that one of the suggestions for reporting cyberbullying is to appeal directly to online 
service providers.  The site reminds users that cyberbullying is often a violation of the terms of 
service established by social media sites and Internet providers.  See stopbullying.gov, “Prevent 
Cyberbulling,” United States Department of Health and Human Services. Available at: 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/prevention/index.html. 
1032 stopbullying.gov, “Key Components in State Anti-Bullying Laws,” United States Department of 
Health and Human Services. Available at: http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/key-
components/index.html 
1033 Emily Bazelon, Sticks and Stones: Defeating the Culture of Bullying and Rediscovering the 
Power of Character and Empathy (New York: Random House, 2013), pp. 260. 
399	  
	  
	  
cannot be the sole actors when it comes to policing behaviors.  The most important step is for 
people to work together to develop standards that encourage good democratic citizenship and 
discourage harassment.   
 The current “Be More Than a Bystander” campaign, organized by the Advertising 
Council, offers a model for how to go about increasing awareness and changing people’s 
attitudes towards harassment, generally, and cyberbullying in particular.1034  This campaign has 
its own website, and also puts forth a series of print and online ads that promote the idea that it is 
not enough simply not to bully others – spectators also need to speak up in the face of abuse, 
whatever the form and wherever the context.  The “Be More Than a Bystander” ideology is based 
on the premise that, if witnesses know what to do, they can take steps, as private individuals (e.g. 
removing the victim from the situation or reporting to an adult), to defuse bullying.  In other words, 
the key to combatting cyberbullying is to build awareness that cyberbullying is a problem, not just 
when it happens to you, but when it happens to anyone. 
“Be More Than a Bystander” is highly integrated with social networking website providers, 
government actors and private citizens.  The very approach of targeting spectators was inspired 
by studies of students done by Facebook, which found that half of all teens surveyed had either 
done little to help or had not seen someone else help in cases of bullying.1035  In addition to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1034 See the stopbullying.gov, “Be More Than a Bystander.” Available at: 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/respond/be-more-than-a-bystander/.   
1035 See DoSomething.org, “The Bully Report: Trends in Bullying Pulled from Student Facebook 
Interactions.” Available at: 
http://files.dosomething.org/files/campaigns/bullyreport/bully_report.pdf.  According to a PEW 
Internet Research Center Survey, 95 percent of social media-using teenagers who have 
witnessed cyberbullying say that they have seen others ignoring this behavior. Fifty-five percent 
witness this frequently.  Similarly, ninety percent of social media-using teenagers admit to 
personally ignoring cyberbullying when they witness it.  Thirty-five percent confess to doing this 
frequently.  See Amanda Lenhart, Mary Madden, Aaron Smith, Kristen Purcell, Kathryn Zickuhr 
and Lee Rainie, “Teens, Kindness and Cruelty on Social Networking Sites: How American teens 
navigate the new world of ‘digital citizenship,’” Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life 
Project. Available at: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2011/PIP_teens_Kindness_Cruelty_SNS_Rep
ort_Nov_2011_FINAL_110711.pdf 
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Facebook, the campaign is also working with groups like AOL; the federal education and health 
departments; and more established anti-bullying agencies, such as the Free to Be Foundation.  
By encouraging private citizens, social media websites, Internet service providers and 
government actors to work together to combat abusive social speech online, “Be More Than a 
Bystander” is especially well poised to change attitudes.  Through its ads, videos and celebrity 
public service announcements (featuring: Marlo Thomas, Alan Alda, Anderson Cooper, Brian 
Kenny, Sean Casey, Dan Plesac), has managed to get its message heard by a wide, bilingual 
audience.  (Univision has Spanish-language ads for television, radio and online.)  And it does 
seem to be increasing awareness.  Facebook has been promoting the campaign by hosting a 
“Stop Bullying: Speak Up” page, and it already has over 1.3 million “likes” and nearly 140,000 
pledges to stop bullying.   
By investing resources into expanding campaigns that educate the public about 
cyberbullying and developing a clear understanding of the problem, state and private actors 
should be able to go a long way towards preventing cyberbullying and other forms of negative 
social speech online.  The more that average individuals understand what cyberbullying is, how to 
prevent it and what is at stake when they are taking part in negative social speech online, the less 
likely they will be to engage in cyberbullying or condone such behavior in others.  To the extent 
that these problems continue to occur, empowering Internet service providers to police the 
communication on their sites offers a constitutional and effective option for reducing instances of 
cyberbullying.  By working together to eliminate cyberbullying, Internet service providers, state 
actors and individual citizens will also minimize the potential harms that such negative 
communication pose for democratic citizenship, such as alienation, eroding social trust and 
weakened community ties.  
 
II. Safe spaces: 
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While the previous sections identify several easily implementable policy suggestions for 
both encouraging online social speech that positively contributes to democratic citizenship and 
also discouraging online social speech that has a negative impact, safe spaces represent one 
area of social speech where external regulations on internal communication can often have a 
deleterious effect.  That is because safe spaces, by definition, exist outside of traditional, 
politicized structures that favor white, male, middle class values.  As Chapter Six described, safe 
spaces are places where those who have traditionally been marginalized and underrepresented 
by conventional political processes can feel at ease to express themselves openly among peers 
who share similar backgrounds and experiences of oppression.  Where communities have 
spontaneously developed safe spaces, they have already recognized the need for communal 
areas that are relatively insulated from mainstreams norms, values and judgments.  To 
paternalistically insert external regulations into these spaces might compromise the participants’ 
abilities to communicate freely and openly, thus defeating the very purpose of their existence.   
Thus, in this first part of this section, I argue that, where safe spaces already exist 
naturally, the strongest option for positively influencing the character of the safe space social 
speech is to allow members of these discussion groups to self-regulate.  In order to remain true to 
the objectives of safe space communication, most of the structuring of these forums should take 
place informally and through in-group social pressures.  However, since any internal enforcement 
mechanisms will be colored by external official and cultural influences, it is also important that 
efforts be made to teach the majority community to appreciate safe space speech for their 
potential impact on liberal democratic governance. 
On the other hand, there are certain safe spaces that may benefit from more formal 
regulation and external input.  Where subjugated groups have not seen a sufficient number of 
safe spaces spring up organically, actors may be called upon to purposefully build such 
discursive arenas and establish rules of conduct.  These safe space architects may be in-group 
members and potential participants, or they may be “allies” who come from the mainstream 
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community.  In either case, by influencing the institutional arrangements of their artificially 
constructed safe spaces, these actors are able to shape the nature of safe space social speech in 
ways that make it especially likely to contribute positively towards democratic citizenship.  While 
this may not be ideal for all communities (especially those that already have a long tradition of 
safe space communication), these purposefully constructed safe spaces have been found to be a 
useful tool in improving confidence in their participants, uniting marginalized communities, and 
building democratic values.  
In the latter portion of this section, I assess the example of a Massachusetts middle 
school that built and utilized safe spaces in order to successfully improve its achievement gap 
and unite the student body.  I also look to efforts at the university and professional level to create 
safe spaces and control the level of conversation that takes place within them.  Ultimately, I 
conclude that, to the extent that these programs are able to actively push for social speech that 
educates and unites participants while at the same time discouraging communication that might 
lead to increased isolation and polarization, they serve a useful purpose, not only for the 
community being addressed, but also for society as a whole.  Thus, these voluntary efforts to 
establish and regulate safe spaces should be encouraged, through additional funding and easy 
access to information. 
 
A. Proposals for improving traditional safe spaces 
Before examining consciously constructed safe spaces, it is important to consider how 
their naturally occurring counterparts should be structured in order to best develop positive 
democratic character traits (e.g. confidence and eagerness to participate), provide civic education 
and promote ideological advancement, while still avoiding the pitfalls of group polarization and 
alienation.  There are many different avenues to achieving these goals.  However, at a minimum, 
safe space institutions should maintain three characteristics: 1) internal freedom and equality, 2) 
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reflectivity and 3) an orientation towards social inclusiveness. 
First, in order to promote good liberal democratic citizenship, safe spaces must ensure 
that conversation is as free and egalitarian as possible.  Even within safe spaces, hierarchies and 
power imbalances still persist.  This may lead some participants to contribute less—in terms of 
both frequency and strength—than others.  Since safe spaces should ideally both demonstrate to 
members of marginalized groups that they and their opinions are of value, and also provide them 
with the opportunity to practice democratic citizenship activities, once they are a part of the group, 
it is important that everyone be supported and encouraged to contribute.   
Second, not only should safe space participants share their experiences with one 
another, but they also ought to be encouraged to make sense of them as a unit.  Safe space 
interactions enable participants to communally evaluate their life experiences and relative social 
positioning.  The ability to freely disclose personal anecdotes is important in itself, but so too is 
the opportunity to discuss what they mean in a wider context.  It is by promoting these kinds of 
evaluative group conversations that safe spaces make it possible for individuals to define 
themselves (in contrast to the majority culture) and develop group-specific moral codes. 
Finally, safe space communication should maintain the goals of bridging communities 
and getting members of subjugated ascriptive groups to become more active in wider political 
affairs.  After all, the idea is not for participants to live inside of safe spaces; rather, these 
communicative arenas are meant to act as islands of safety into which members of marginalized 
groups can retreat and regroup, but primarily in order to better arm themselves for their 
interactions with the majority community.  It is for that reason that safe space social speech that 
emphasizes difference and isolation, must be avoided.  Instead, safe space social speech should 
attempt to discover commonalities, not just within the in-group, but also within the entire political 
community.  Furthermore, participants should use safe space interactions to experiment with 
strategies and positions that might facilitate democratic cooperation.  In these ways, safe space 
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social speech is able to promote the liberal democratic values of inclusiveness and equality.  
These three characteristics—freedom/equality, reflectivity and inclusiveness—should not 
necessarily be imposed upon safe spaces from the outside, however.  As discussed above, often, 
the most effective and lasting tool for regulating human interaction is social pressure.  This is 
especially true in the case of safe spaces, where outside involvement may threaten the very 
purpose of these institutions.  Thus, rather than imposing external regulations, I believe that the 
best method for promoting the kind of safe space social speech that would be most likely to lead 
to positive democratic outcomes is to work to change the attitudes of those inside the group.  Too 
often, participants in safe spaces see their activities as something outside and apart from political 
action.  Speakers may actually trivialize their own achievements, thus making it less likely that 
they will thoughtfully consider the tone and content of safe space dialogues.  A primary reason for 
this attitude is that there has been limited mainstream recognition of the vital role that safe spaces 
play in building political skills, forging confidence and fostering a sense of community.   
It is in this area that the outside community can rightfully influence the nature of safe 
space social speech.  Studies such as this one, which aim to increase awareness of the role that 
social speech plays in democratic life, may eventually come to refine attitudes towards social 
speech more generally.  The more that people understand the functions of social speech and 
come to appreciate the potential democratic impact of everyday communication, the more likely 
that such discursive activities will receive official, formal recognition.  And through efforts by 
identity scholars—such as black feminist and LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans* and 
Questioning*) theorists—to elevate the status of safe spaces and include them in discussions 
about social speech, a more accepting attitude should, over time, come to apply to these spaces 
as well.   
The academic community need not act alone in order to transform the average 
American’s sensibilities regarding safe space social speech, however.  The media may also be 
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looked to in order to spread the idea that informal, everyday conversation can have real, lasting 
effects on liberal democratic citizenship.  Already, Hollywood has taken it upon itself to distribute 
several films that promote the value of safe space communication and validate the lives of safe 
space participants.  Tim Story’s Barbershop movie franchise, for instance, highlights the 
experience of everyday communication in a safe space, drawing attention to the ways by which 
these seemingly innocuous experiences add up to a lasting sense of community.1036  By painting 
these activities in a positive light, the Barbershop films—as well as other media efforts to portray 
the actual social experiences of so many minority Americans—have connected with a large 
audience and have proven themselves to be major box office draws.1037  Thus, these films not 
only validate the experiences of individuals who personally engage in safe space speech, but as 
a result of their popularity, they also develop awareness among members of the majority 
community, who might never have engaged in safe space social speech. 
Developing a general consciousness of the value of social speech in safe spaces and its 
potential political outcomes is an important step in both positively influencing the nature of such 
speech and also decreasing its potential negative effects.  Much as in the case of Internet speak 
(discussed above), more widespread acknowledgement that social speech is, itself, a political act, 
will likely encourage individuals to approach their social interactions more thoughtfully.  This 
should mean that participants choose their words and their tone more carefully from the 
perspective of liberal democratic values, adhering to the three qualifications described earlier in 
this section.  It should also mean that they utilize informal social enforcement to encourage other 
members of their discursive communities to do the same.  In other words, if there is a sense that 
what takes place in safe spaces matters for political outcomes, groups will be likely to take on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1036 The movie franchise includes: Barbershop (2002), Barbershop 2: Back in Business (2004) 
and Beauty Shop (2004).  The films also spurred a series on the Showtime cable network, titled 
Barbershop: The Series.  
1037 The first two Barbershop films, alone, raked in $142,924,054.00 in worldwide box office sales.  
See “Box Office History for Barbershop Movies,” The-Numbers.com. Available at: http://www.the-
numbers.com/movies/franchise/Barbershop. 
406	  
	  
	  
more active role in self-regulation.  Social pressures could be used to ensure that safe space 
speech be positive and affirming, and also to limit its exclusionary potential. 
Furthermore, if participants (and potential participants) in safe space social speech 
understand their communication to be, not just idle chatter, but part of a larger network of political 
action that will lead to their own empowerment, they are likely to feel less guilty about the time 
they spend in informal, social gatherings.  They might, therefore, also become more likely to 
increase the length and frequency of these gatherings.  As for the people who manage these 
spaces (i.e. homeowners, barbershop owners, etc.), awareness of the value of social speech 
should encourage them to make their safe spaces more available and conducive to 
communication.  This could mean anything from keeping longer business hours to encouraging 
patrons to stick around after services have been completed.  
 
B. Proposals for structuring artificial safe spaces 
  While the previous section considered informal, naturally occurring safe spaces, it is 
important to note that some safe spaces are developed more formally and deliberately.  As 
Patricia Hill Collins explains in Black Feminist Thought, safe spaces may present themselves in 
several different forms.  “In some cases,” Collins writes, “such as friendships and family 
interactions, these relationships are informal, private dealings among individuals.  In others, as 
was the case during slavery, in Black churches, or in Black women’s organizations, more formal 
organizational ties have nurtured Black women’s communities.”1038  But there is also a third option 
– a hybrid that incorporates the informal purpose and style of friendship and family interactions 
with the formal institutional arrangements of black churches and women’s organizations.  These 
safe spaces are the result of programs explicitly designed to establish communicative arenas—
either through members of the in-group or by outsiders—in order to provide members of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1038 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (New York: Routledge Classics, 2009), pp. 112. 
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marginalized groups with places where they can communicate casually and socially with one 
another.  Because of their more formal and institutionalized nature, these manmade safe spaces 
can be structured to encourage that communication that unites and discourage that, which 
divides. 
As safe spaces have begun to earn recognition for the role they play in determining 
democratic outcomes, it has become increasingly popular for state and nonprofit organizations to 
institute programs that build safe spaces where they have not already arisen organically.  Such 
programs are varied, but overall, the results appear to have been encouraging from the 
perspective of liberal democratic values.  For example, in her book, Why Are All the Black Kids 
Sitting Together in the Cafeteria? And Other Conversations About Race, Beverly Daniel Tatum 
positively evaluates safe space efforts at a Massachusetts middle school, which participated in 
the Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity (METCO) program.1039  Under the METCO 
program, suburban schools could opt to undergo voluntary desegregation by bussing students in 
from nearby Boston.  Unfortunately, as Tatum explains, METCO schools often found themselves 
with a large achievement gap between the (mostly black) students who were bussed in and the 
(mostly white) students who already belonged to the district.  In order to reduce this gap and 
increase academic achievement overall, the school under review introduced Student Efficacy 
Training (SET).  Under this program, Boston students (along with two staff members) were 
required to meet for one period each day to talk to one another, essentially creating a mandatory 
safe space.1040  As Tatum reports, within these supportive communities, students discussed their 
schoolwork, but even more importantly, they also talked about their experiences of racism, 
anxiety, feelings of isolation, etc. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1039 Beverly Daniel Tatum, Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria? And 
Other Conversations About Race (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 71-74. 
1040 These meetings took place instead of elective courses, such as physical education, home 
economics and study hall. 
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Despite initial skepticism, within only a short period of time, both students and faculty 
came to see the safe space program as a success.1041  In her book, Tatum points to school 
records, as well as student accounts of the program, in order to demonstrate SET’s significant 
positive impact on the grades of Boston students.  Such improvements are largely attributed to 
the rules and standards of SET safe spaces, which encourage students to engage in discussions 
that emphasize unity, strength through community and social success.   
As one of the SET students explains, the frank, open dialogues, which take place within 
the psychological safety and support of their own peer group, have enabled students to “become 
like one big family.”1042  The same student goes on to explain how, as with a family, SET students 
tend to look out for one another, even outside the insulation of their safe spaces:  “We always 
stay on top of each other ‘cause we know it’s hard with African American students to go to a 
predominantly White school and try to succeed with everyone else.”1043  Besides just encouraging 
affective bonds within the group, SET discussions are specifically directed so that they 
emphasize strategies for success within the wider community.  As a result, these safe space 
interactions have been able to actually change the peer culture from one that encouraged 
separatism and nonconformity to “one that supported academic performance.”1044  As one of the 
instructors of SET students describes, involvement in this program did ultimately result in greater 
participation of Boston students within the wider school community.  “My students are more 
engaged,” she explains.  “They aren’t battling out a lot of issues of their anger about… where do I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1041 When SET was first introduced, many of the Boston students were “resentful” at being 
separated and forced to miss class.  However, these attitudes quickly changed.  One student, in 
particular, attributed her improved feelings towards SET to the performance records:  “I know that 
last year out of all the students, sixth through eighth grade, there was, like, six who were actually 
good students.  Everyone else, it was just pathetic, I mean, like, they were getting like Ds and 
Fs… The eighth grade is going much better this year.  I mean, they went from Ds and Fs to Bs 
and Cs and occasionally As… And those seventh graders are doing really good, they have a lot 
of honor roll students in seventh grade, both guys and girls.  Yeah it’s been good.  It’s really 
good” (Tatum, Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria? pp. 72). 
1042 Ibid. 
1043 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
1044 Ibid., pp. 72.  
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fit, I don’t belong here…  I think [these issues] are being discussed in the SET room, [and thus] 
the kids feel more confidence.  The kids’ grades are higher, the homework response is greater, 
they’re not afraid to participate in class, and I don’t see them isolating themselves within class.  
They are willing to sit with other students happily.”1045   
While “[i]t might seem counterintuitive that a school involved in a voluntary desegregation 
program could improve both academic performance and social relationships among students by 
separating the Black students for one period every day,” as Tatum explains, “if we understand… 
the legitimate need they [adolescents of every color] have to feel supported in their identity 
development, it makes perfect sense.”1046  As discussed in Chapter Six, for many members of 
ascriptive groups that have traditionally been excluded from mainstream political and social 
recognition, before they can be expected to willingly and effectively engage in community life, 
they must be afforded the opportunity to develop a positive sense of their own group identities.  
When this process of self-identification takes place in an environment that also emphasizes 
empowerment, community participation and integration, safe space participants are especially 
likely to become engaged with the wider community. 
Thus, the SET framework appears to have been successful because, not only does it 
recognize a need for safe spaces, but it also established norms and standards that ensure 
democratically productive speech.  SET staff members (and later the students, themselves) 
actively encourage positive, supportive, community-minded communication, while stifling more 
divisive content and negative attitudes.  This teaches participants to identify with and support one 
another, while also focusing on integration and strategies for achievement within the wider 
community.  Thus, the example of programs like SET may alleviate some of the concerns that 
exclusionary safe spaces lead participants to isolate themselves from the wider society.  When 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1045 Ibid., pp. 73. 
1046 Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
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properly managed to encourage positive social speech and limit negative social speech, safe 
spaces can serve as a tool for social integration. 
The benefits of programs that are aimed at establishing safe spaces and populating them 
with positive, democratic social speech are not only applicable to middle school students, 
however.  As Tatum argues, racial development does not end at puberty.  This also applies to 
gender and sexuality development.  The process of defining one’s self-identity and her 
relationship to her community is an ongoing, life-long activity for many members of marginalized 
groups based on ascriptive characteristics.  In recognition of this fact, a number of organizations 
have recently sprung up, which introduce formal safe spaces into university and professional 
settings.   
The LGBTQ community has been notably proactive in instituting such programs.  The 
Safe Zone Movement, as it has been called, aims to introduce highly structured safe spaces to 
adult communities in order to provide LGBTQ individuals (and their allies) with zones of free and 
open communication.  Many universities now have their own safe zone programs; however, 
several nonprofit organizations have also recently emerged to provide more uniform training and 
guidelines for development of school and workplace safe spaces.1047 
For example, the Gay Alliance organization runs its SafeZone program, which is available 
to colleges, universities and private employers.  According to their website, this program is 
designed to “develop, enhance and maintain environments in workplaces, schools and other 
social settings that are culturally competent and supportive to LGBTQ individuals, as well as 
straight identified people who care about diversity, equality and inclusion.”1048  In order to achieve 
these goals, the Gay Alliance offers customizable SafeZone Training for those interested in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1047 For a representative example of a university safe zone program, see North Dakota State 
University, “Safe Zone Training: 2010,” Equity Diversity Global Outreach. Available at: 
http://www.fs.fed.us/cr/Safe_Zone_Training_PacketUpdated.pdf. 
1048 Gay Alliance, “SafeZone Training Programs.” Available at:  
http://www.gayalliance.org/safezonet.html. 
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bringing these safe spaces to their communities.  While this training might be somewhat 
minimal—ideally, taking the form a two to four hour workshop, which discusses “inclusive 
language, the process of coming out, the power of the straight ally, understanding sexual identity, 
how to respond to homophobic/transphobic incidents, where to go for help”—it is meant to ensure 
that the resulting safe spaces be in keeping with liberal values and that they maintain norms of 
equal respect and inclusion.1049  According to the Gay Alliance website, training is meant to “give 
participants the skills they need to provide support and to create environments that are safe, 
welcoming and inclusive.”1050  Divisive speech, while tolerated, is discouraged.  
 Similarly, the Safe Zone Project offers colleges and universities across the United States 
a free two-hour online curriculum for running their own workshops on how to build safe spaces 
and train facilitators.  These Safe Zone workshop are “meant to educate individuals about LGBTQ 
issues and help members of college communities (students, professors, administrators, and staff) 
become better allies to LGBTQ students and more aware of gender and sexuality issues.”1051  
According to the website, the program stresses three essential elements for creating a successful 
Safe Zone.1052  First, a safe space must be a place free of judgment, where people are at ease 
and willing to honestly communicate with one another.  Second, community members must be 
committed to educating one another, whether that be through sharing personal narratives or 
contributing thoughtful reflections on the group’s position in society.  Finally, the Safe Zone 
Project’s safe spaces must maintain an atmosphere that encourages individuals to ask any and 
all questions they might have.   
 Among these safe zone programs, there is some variation in the details of what 
constitutes an ideal safe space (e.g. some programs suggest designating certain physical spaces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1049 Ibid. 
1050 Ibid. 
1051 Safe Zone Project, “What are Safe Zones?” Available at: http://thesafezoneproject.com/what-
are-safe-zones/   
1052 Safe Zone Project, “Philosophies of Safe Zone Workshops.” Available at: 
http://thesafezoneproject.com/about/philosophies-of-safe-zone-workshops/. 
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as safe zone and others emphasize a mobile, fluid community); however, for the most part, all 
such programs abide by three governing principles, similar to those espoused by the Safe Zone 
project.  First, programs generally agree that safe spaces ought to focus on discussion and 
interpersonal activities in order to educate and facilitate discussion.  Second, while certain safe 
zone programs encourage the use of a group leader (others, by contrast, are entirely peer run), 
none of them tend to be overly hierarchical.  Everyone is encouraged to participate, and 
questions need not be directed at any one individual.  Third, safe zone programs are grounded in 
the belief that their discussion groups ought to make people think.  An explicit pillar of the Safe 
Zone Project, for example, is to “make participants uncomfortable.”1053  Group members are 
supposed to push themselves to question the world around them and evaluate the social 
positioning of marginalized groups.   
 In sum, safe zone programs aim to contribute to the establishment of safe spaces that 
teach good democratic citizenship traits (e.g. courage and confidence), enable members of 
subjugated groups to practice at civic participation and lead to the development of new ideologies 
– all of the characteristics that define positive safe space social speech.  As such, these 
programs ought to be encouraged and expanded.  Organizations that provide schools and 
workplaces with the tools and frameworks for instituting ideal safe spaces should receive public 
recognition and support for the work that they do.  Likewise, private and public institutions ought 
to be emboldened to experiment with various methods for establishing and managing ideal safe 
spaces.   
Given the relatively low cost of bringing well-structured safe spaces to a variety of 
settings—in many cases, materials are free, staff is redundant and there is no need for a set 
physical location—these measures should not pose an undue burden on America’s limited store 
of educational funding.  As school and workplace officials come to recognize the advancements 
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in equality and inclusiveness that result from artificial safe space programs, they will conceivably 
be willing to fund these programs on their own.  To the extent that the costs associated with the 
implementation of artificial safe spaces are too high for certain organizations, they could be 
subsidized through private grants from equal rights groups and minimal government assistance.  
(Schools that voluntarily institute safe space programs, for instance, might find themselves the 
recipients of various grants aimed at increasing educational equality.)  While such measures, 
which are inherently exclusionary, may initially appear politically controversial, there is also 
clearly a public interest in the liberal democratic values that safe spaces aim to promote.  To the 
extent that these values can be shown to have actually been furthered through artificial safe 
space programs, such minimally intrusive programs merit official support.  
 
III. Hate speech: 
Unlike both Internet speak and safe space speech, hate speech has only a limited 
potential to positively affect liberal democratic goals and political outcomes.  As I described in 
Chapter Six, hate speech is used as a tool for denigrating individuals and for forging social 
divisions.  It is the very essence of hate speech not only to distinguish “others,” but also to make 
them feel inferior.  “The wrong of this dignitary affront,” Richard Delgado explains, “consists of the 
expression of a judgment that the victim of the racial slur is entitled to less than that which all 
other citizens are entitled.”1054  By expressing the message to both victims and non-victims that 
members of targeted groups are unworthy of equal dignity and respect, I argue that hate 
speech—especially when it takes place in the social sphere—contributes negatively to 
democratic citizenship and political outcomes in two ways: 1) it promotes to development of poor 
democratic characters; and 2) it encourages the division and polarization of social groups.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1054 Richard Delgado, “Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and 
Name Calling,” in Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First 
Amendment, Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado and Kimberlè Williams 
Crenshaw (eds.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), pp. 94. 
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First, an environment that condones hate speech leads individual targets to develop 
weak democratic citizenship characteristics.  Especially when it is a part of the social milieu, hate 
speech contributes negatively to the socialization of its targets, resulting in the promotion of 
certain character traits that are likely to make democratic participation more challenging.  
Specifically, rather than develop into the kind of confident, powerful, engaged citizen that is 
required by liberal democratic states, an individual who is victimized by hate speech in the social 
sphere is likely to grow into a dejected adult, who is skeptical of her personal autonomy and 
political efficacy.  Such an individual is less likely to opt to expend the energy necessary to 
participate in democratic self-governance, and is also less likely to perform successfully if she 
ever does engage in the political process.   
Second, by belittling victims as a group, based on shared ascriptive characteristics, social 
hate speech solidifies (and then reinforces) any preexisting boundaries between in-groups and 
out-groups.  As victims of hate speech are exposed to negative messaging, they may respond by 
isolating themselves socially and politically.  Where the majority community accepts the existence 
of hate speech, many of its victims are likely to feel betrayed by their peers and unwelcome in 
society.  Thus, instead of participating in wider public affairs, they may choose to retreat into their 
own communities.  The division between in-groups and out-groups may be further exacerbated to 
the extent that targets of hate speech come to absorb and reproduce the negative messaging 
about them.  Over time, exposure to such behavior patterns may lead even those members of the 
majority community who do not condone the ideas being espoused through hate speech to begin 
to separate themselves.  Thus hate speech comes to reproduce its underlying ideologies over 
time.  Not only is this morally problematic, but the resulting weak social trust makes political 
cooperation more challenging for both sides of the divide.  
The dual harms that social hate speech inflicts upon liberal democratic citizenship and 
political outcomes—the development of weak democratic citizenship traits and the reinforcement 
of divisions between in-groups and out-groups—are nothing to be trifled with.  Social hate speech 
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compromises the ability of its victims to participate freely and effectively in democratic politics.  
This means that there is a national interest in preventing (or, at least, limiting the scope of) such 
speech.  As described in Chapter Six, much of the liberal, democratic West has already 
acknowledged the potential of social hate speech to produce such widespread negative effects, 
and has utilized legal and constitutional measures to curtail its influence.  In the United States, 
however, while the personal and public harms of hate speech are widely conceded in theory, in 
practice, these risks are not generally considered substantial enough to justify curbing the deeply 
cherished First Amendment freedom of speech (and the liberal tradition of individual rights from 
which it stems).1055  It is only when hate speech can be demonstrated to have served as a direct 
incitement to violence that it may be legally curtailed. 
In these sections, I review several possible approaches for combatting the negative 
effects of social hate speech in the United States.  I begin by addressing the legal option, 
ultimately concluding that the legal censorship hate speech legislation is an undesirable option.  
However, while the harms associated with inviting the law into the homes, schools and 
workplaces of everyday citizens in order to regulate the content of their speech generally 
outweigh the benefits incurred by censoring social hate speech, that does not mean that there is 
no appropriate role for the state to play.  In the second section, I explain how the state may 
rightfully combat hate speech in several ways: 1) by establishing clear, uniform standards for 
what constitutes hate speech; 2) by promoting anti-discriminatory ideologies; and 3) remedying 
the social imbalances that contribute to in-group/out-group hatred.  However, I argue that these 
efforts, alone, will be not sufficient to eliminate social hate speech – ultimately, it must be left up 
to private citizens to police themselves.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1055 As described in Chapter Six, even within the United States, there is some historical precedent 
for the regulation and prevention of hate speech as a matter of group libel.  See Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 US 250 (1952).  
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But first, it is important to note that these findings are only applicable in the American 
context.  I agree with Michel Rosenfeld, who, while he worries that “the trend toward globalization 
and the instant transnational reach of the Internet” may undermine the call for a purely contextual 
approach towards hate speech legislation, also concedes that an individual nation state’s 
particular historical context may present a stronger or weaker case for the institution of official, 
legal hate speech regulations.1056  Similarly, where formal hate speech regulations are deemed 
appropriate, I believe that the form that such policies should take ought to be born out of each 
individual nation’s historical traditions.1057  In the United States, a free speech tradition that stems 
from individualism, libertarianism and a belief in Lockean rights does not present a powerful case 
for the introduction of hate speech legislation.1058  This is not necessarily true for the rest of the 
world, however.  In Germany, for example, when understood “from the particular perspective of a 
rejection of the Nazi experience and an attempt to prevent its resurgence, the suppression of hate 
speech seems both obvious and commendable.”1059  So, while I argue that, given its own history 
and philosophical traditions, the United States may be less capable of utilizing the public values 
of dignity and equality to justify legal bans on social hate speech, other western, liberal nations 
may be able to present a better case for such censorship. 
 
A. An analysis of legal proposals for censoring hate speech 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1056 Michel Rosenfeld, “Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis,” in 
The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, Michael Herz 
and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 243. 
1057 For example, in Ethiopia, given the nation’s past experiences of ethnic conflict, hate speech 
legislation is designed to prohibit only speech that targets ethnic and national minority groups that 
have traditionally been excluded from mainstream political life.  See Yared Legesse Mengistu, 
“Shielding Marginalized Groups from Verbal Assaults Without Abusing Hate Speech Laws,” in 
The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, Michael Herz 
and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 345. 
1058 See Rosenfeld, “Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence,” pp. 247. 
1059 Ibid., pp. 244. 
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Because it holds the potential to inflict severe and permanent harms upon liberal 
democratic societies and their citizens, hate speech ought to be avoided and discouraged.  This 
is true regardless of where such communication takes place.  The more challenging question is 
whether it should be restrained through social pressures and moral approbation alone, or whether 
hate speech ought to be actively prohibited by law as well.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
American public opinion has tended to prefer the former option, believing that the risks associated 
with hate speech are not significant enough to merit infringements upon the First Amendment 
freedom of expression.  Certainly, these risks are almost never understood as justifying any legal 
infringement on social hate speech.1060  Nevertheless, there are many American legal and 
political theorists that do support government censorship and regulations limiting hate speech, 
even when it takes place in the social sphere.  Members of this ideological camp believe the 
harms of hate speech to be adequately deep and meaningful to justify challenging the liberties of 
those who wish to share hateful ideologies.  These theorists also argue that the only way to 
effectively prevent such harms is to utilize the authority of the state to offset the power 
imbalances that lay at the heart of social hate speech.   
In this section, I address arguments both for and against legal bans on hate speech.  I 
begin by briefly reviewing what the proponents of anti-hate speech legislation consider to be its 
major social harms.  I then explain why proponents of anti-hate speech legislation believe that the 
state is the only actor with adequate force to neutralize these harms.  Finally, I present eight key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1060 To the extent that the United States government has acted in ways conducive toward hate 
speech legislation, it has generally focused on more public, political forms of expression.  For 
example, when, in 1992, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 
reported to Congress about their findings regarding the potentially harmful effects of hate speech 
on public order, they focused entirely on highly public, widely distributed expressions of hate 
speech.  (No equivalent study was requested by Congress to examine the effects of more 
informal, casual hate speech.) While the study ultimately concluded that public hate speech may 
lead to harmful outcomes—thus potentially paving the way for anti-public hate speech 
regulations—the authors also contended that hate speech, as a relatively rare occurrence in 
mainstream media, did not pose a significant public threat.  See the United States Department of 
Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “Report to Congress: 
The Role of Telecommunications in Hate Crimes” (December 1993). Available at: 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/reports/1993/TelecomHateCrimes1993.pdf. 
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arguments against legal hate speech bans.  Ultimately, while I agree that some form of state 
action may be required in order to fully address the harms of social hate speech, I also conclude 
that the benefits of legal prohibitions against social hate speech do not outweigh their costs.  (In 
the following section, I suggest several alterative approaches that the state may take in order to 
more effectively and constitutionally minimize social hate speech.) 
However, before I may expound upon the disadvantages of the legal censorship of social 
hate speech, I must first explain why many theorists consider it to be a viable policy option.  As 
stated above, proponents of anti-hate speech legislation tend to focus on the significant harms 
associated with such expression.  Apart from the two harms that I discussed at length in Chapter 
Six (and summarize in the previous section)—the development of character traits that are not 
conducive to democratic citizenship and solidifying boundaries between in-groups and out-
groups—the harms posed by hate speech tend to fall into three general categories: 
psychological, physiological and symbolic.  First, proponents of anti-hate speech laws often point 
to the extreme psychological distress and emotional scarring caused by hate speech, which may 
lead to long-term feelings of anxiety and fear.  It may also lead victims to turn to anti-social 
behaviors, such as alcohol and drug abuse.  Second, many members of this school of thought 
look to the ways by which such psychological harms may translate into physiological symptoms, 
such as gastrointestinal distress, high blood pressure, shortness of breath, stress disorders and 
hypertension.  Some have even suggested that these physiological symptoms may shorten the 
life spans of hate speech victims.  Finally and most importantly, it is common for political and 
legal theorists who support anti-hate speech legislation to emphasize the symbolic attack that 
hate speech represents.  Hate speech diminishes the very human dignity of its targets—both in 
their own eyes and also in those of mainstream society—thereby limiting their potential for full 
social integration and political success.  
As discussed in Chapter Six, all three types of harms—psychological, physiological and 
symbolic—are especially likely to occur when hate speech takes place in the social sphere.  
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While there are clear harms associated with official, state-sanctioned hate speech, social hate 
speech owes its special negative influence to its personal nature and inescapability.  The very 
intimate, directed nature of social hate speech means that it is often felt more deeply than 
broader, public expressions of hate speech.  Furthermore, where social hate speech is allowed to 
exist, it tends to permeate all social interactions, and, as a result, it is impossible to hide from or 
ignore.   
In other words, one may think of social hate speech as an ideological lens that colors the 
ways in which victims, perpetrators and bystanders view the world.  Over time, those who live in 
an environment that condones social hate speech may forget that the lens exists, believing their 
slanted vision of the world to be all that there is.  Similarly, in The Harm in Hate Speech, Jeremy 
Waldron describes how hate speech comes to function like a background noise, informing 
everything else in society.1061  Much in the way that pornography is “imagery whose highly visible, 
more or less permanent, and apparently, ineradicable presence makes a massive difference to 
the environment in which women have to lead their lives,” he writes, racist or religious defamation 
“can become a world-defining activity.”1062  It is in this subtle and, yet, highly influential way that 
social hate speech manages to do so much damage. 
All of this suggests that something must be done to minimize the negative effects of 
social hate speech if liberal democratic communities are to uphold their self-proclaimed values of 
equality and inclusiveness.1063  The majority of Americans believe that this goal may be best 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1061 See Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2012).  Note that Waldron confines his study of hate speech to “attacks that are printed 
published, pasted up, or posted on the Internet—expressions that become a permanent or semi-
permanent part of the visible environment in which our lives, and the lives of vulnerable 
minorities, have to be lived” (Ibid., pp. 37).  While he excludes the kind of social hate speech 
discussed here, the arguments he uses to justify his position are still applicable, especially 
inasmuch as social hate speech creates lasting, visible scars on the targeted community. 
1062 Ibid., pp. 74. 
1063 Some may argue that nothing should be done to eliminate hate speech.  After all, in order for 
liberalism to function adequately, it may be important that all citizens develop a thick skin.  
However, it matters that these costs are being born disproportionately.  Regardless of the 
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achieved through a laissez-faire policy of introducing more speech.1064  The key to eliminating 
social hate speech, they argue, is to welcome such ideologies into the public forum, where they 
can be openly debated and (ideally) refuted.  Proponents of anti-hate speech legislation, 
however, claim that a hands-off approach is simply not enough to get at the underlying causes of 
social hate speech.  As the only body with adequate force and authority to counteract the power 
imbalances that lie at the heart of social hate speech, the state must take on a prohibiting 
position.   
In this assertion, proponents of anti-hate speech legislation appear to have the upper 
hand.  By definition, social hate speech does not exist in a power vacuum.  It is never an 
interaction between equals.  A statement constitutes social hate speech precisely because it is 
born from and reinforces a political system that systematically favors some and discriminates 
against others.  In fact, many argue that hate speech, as a term, can only rightfully be used to 
describe disparaging and harmful remarks aimed at a group that has a history of marginalization 
and objectification by the dominant community.  For members of these stigmatized groups, many 
of whom may still suffer the effects of previous state-sanctioned discrimination, both the 
reputational injury and the negative socialization resulting from social hate speech can be 
particularly powerful.   
As Waldron explains, the equal social and political standing of minority groups in the 
United States “is not something that anyone can take for granted.”1065  In the court of public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
advantages of living in an environment where uninhibited, robust and open debate are possible, 
such a public good ought not to be achieved entirely at the expense of the least advantaged 
citizens. 
1064 A 2013 Rasmussen Reports survey finds that 72 percent of American adults believe that 
“allowing free speech without government interference” is a better option than “letting government 
decide what types of hate speech should be banned.”  Only 12 percent of those polled state that 
they prefer government-regulated speech.  See Rasmussen Reports, “31% Favor Ban on Hate 
Speech,” in Politics (June 6, 2013). Available at: 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/june_2013/31_favor_ba
n_on_hate_speech.  
1065 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, pp. 31. 
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opinion, it may be one thing to be a public figure (and representative of the state), who has “taken 
the burden of office” and whose actions are subject to open questioning, and other to be an 
ordinary citizen, who may have assumed she “had a right to be protected from scattershot 
allegations.”1066  It is still another thing, according to Waldron, to be a private individual who is 
part of a precariously placed social group.  In this case, targets may not be “strong enough, thick-
skinned enough, well-enough armed, or sufficiently insinuated into every aspect of public life” to 
be able to combat libelous claims on their own.1067  Given the preexisting biases against them, 
any additional defamation is likely to be greeted with unreflective acceptance, resulting in 
increasingly diminished social standing and respect.  As Bhikhu Parekh explains, “[w]hen racist, 
anti-Semitic, and xenophobic beliefs are an integral part of a society’s culture, they appear self-
evident, commonsensical, and obvious, and therefore enjoy a built-in advantage over their 
opposites.”1068  This bias is true among the wider community, as well the members of 
marginalized groups, themselves, who are likely to lack the confidence and self worth to question 
the messages being aimed at them.  
To the extent that they do openly reject these notions, the already diminished social 
status of certain minority groups means that their words do not carry the same weight as the 
arguments that they are trying to confront.  Furthermore, preconceived notions about members of 
marginalized groups often mean that, when they do respond to hate speech, they are often 
condemned regardless of which tactics they choose – whether they utilize anger, rational 
argument or silence, minority individuals are likely to find themselves scrutinized.  Patricia J. 
Williams describes how, “if we respond to or open discussion about belligerent or offensive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1066 Ibid., pp. 28-29.  See also Justice Arthur Goldberg’s concurrence to New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in which he argues that it does not follow from the ruling “that the 
Constitution protects defamatory statements against the private conduct of a public official or 
private citizen.” 
1067 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, pp. 31. 
1068 Bhikhu Parekh, “Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?” In The Content and Context of 
Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses, Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 48. 
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remarks—that is, if we pursue the much-touted path of responding to hate speech with ‘more 
speech’—we are called ‘PC’ and accused of forcing our opinions down the throats of others.”1069  
On the other hand, “[i]f we respond with no matter what degree of clear, dignified control, we 
become militant ‘terrorists’ of the meek and moderate middle.”1070  Finally, “[i]f we follow the also-
prevalent advice to ‘just ignore it,’ then we are perceived as weak, humiliated, ineffectual 
doormats who ought to have told off our harassers on the spot.”1071  Members of historically 
marginalized groups simply have more limited means at their disposal to defend themselves 
against hate speech.   
Beginning from such unequal starting points, it is difficult to see how the problem of social 
hate speech could be solved through an economics-style, noninterventionist policy of more 
speech.  The social forces behind hate speech are simply too much for an individual (or even a 
disempowered group) to be expected to combat on her own.  In these cases, where power is so 
asymmetrically distributed, it seems reasonable that the state might be called upon to exert its 
influence and guidance in support of those groups that share a history of systematic 
discrimination – a history that government played no small part in forging.  What many 
proponents of anti-hate speech legislation hope, is that the state will utilize hate speech bans in 
order to achieve a more balanced social order. 
This approach does not necessarily equate to a rejection of the marketplace analogy for 
regulating speech, however.  Many proponents of anti-hate speech legislation argue that speech 
ought to be understood as existing in a marketplace, but that that market cannot represent 
negative liberties alone – governments must make positive efforts to facilitate more equal 
participation and dissemination of knowledge.  In other words, the unequal power relations within 
the marketplace of ideas must be accounted for by state actors, much in the way that such bodies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1069 Patricia J. Williams, The Rooster’s Egg: On the Persistence of Prejudice (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), pp. 39-40.  
1070 Ibid., pp. 40. 
1071 Ibid. 
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intervene to remedy more traditional market inequalities.  This means breaking up monopolies of 
information, introducing new avenues for participation and fostering social arrangements that 
promote equality. 
In their paper, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” Jack Snyder and Karen 
Ballentine represent this viewpoint, arguing that the marketplace of ideas directly parallels 
economic markets.1072  The authors’ thesis is that, as with traditional markets, marketplaces of 
ideas can only produce positive, socially advantageous goals if they are regulated and stable:  
“Just as economic competition produces socially beneficial results only in a well-institutionalized 
marketplace, where monopolies and false advertising are counteracted, so too increased debate 
in the political marketplace leads to better outcomes only when there are mechanisms to correct 
market imperfections.”1073  Marketplaces in ideas are inherently unequal, the authors explain.  Not 
all potential contributors are able to express their ideas with the same force—or, through the 
complicated and expensive mechanisms of mass media—resulting in a monopoly of speech, 
controlled by the privileged.  Furthermore, even those who gain access do not always have a fair 
chance to compete, given the vast inequalities between individuals’ skills and means.  When only 
a select group of people is able to contribute ideas to the marketplace—or, when a select few has 
vastly disproportionate influence—the marketplace is defective.  And in order for society to reap 
the benefits of freedom of speech, marketplaces must be regulated in order to account for its 
compromised competition.   
Although, in this paper, the authors specifically concern themselves with free speech and 
the effects of the mass media on newly democratizing societies, the implications of their analysis 
can be extended more generally to the issue of social hate speech in advanced free speech 
markets.  Yared Legesse Mengistu, for example, applies this market perspective to hate speech 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1072 See Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” in 
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 5-40.   
1073 Ibid., pp. 6. 
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in his paper, “Shielding Marginalized Groups from Verbal Assaults Without Abusing Hate Speech 
Laws.”  Because hate speech necessarily comes from the powerful and takes aim at the 
powerless, he argues, victims require the force of the state to protect them and provide a 
counterbalance to the voices of the more influential, privileged segments of society.  Mengistu 
claims that any American “calls for state ‘neutrality’ in the marketplace of ideas is tantamount to a 
myopic neglect of the fundamental reality of unequal distribution of power.”1074  Hate speech 
regulation, he argues, should not be seen as an undue infringement upon the freedom of speech 
of those who wish to express discriminatory viewpoints; rather, anti-hate speech laws must be 
understood as a way of acknowledging a history of social and political inequalities, while 
harnessing the power of the state to redefine these social relations.  If anything, such regulations 
would result in a more equal marketplace of ideas than that, which currently exists.  “The 
prohibition of hate speech is the equivalent of an antitrust law that removes from the marketplace 
a cartel and the resulting abuse of monopoly that squelches competition,” Mengistu writes.1075  
Once the monopoly is broken up, free speech can finally thrive in earnest.   
While Snyder, Ballentine and Mengistu are certainly correct that the state is in a 
formidable position to “even out the playing field” between those who espouse social hate speech 
and those who are victimized by it, they are incorrect in their prescription.  There are a number of 
ways in which government can justly exert its influence to minimize social hate (discussed below); 
however, an approach that includes legal censorship of hate speech is inherently problematic.  As 
stated above, any government restriction of social speech on the basis of content should be 
immediately suspect, as a potential violation of the constitutional right to freedom of speech.  
However, beyond that general complaint, there are a host of more specific concerns that cast 
doubt upon the prudence of anti-hate speech legislation in the United States.  For the remainder 
of this section, I explore the major concerns regarding hate speech bans.  I first review the six 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1074 Mengistu, “Shielding Marginalized Groups from Verbal Assaults Without Abusing Hate 
Speech Laws,” pp. 358. 
1075 Ibid. 
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arguments against anti-hate speech legislation that are presented by C. Edwin Baker, in his 
essay, “Hate Speech.”  While these critiques represent a fairly comprehensive list of the 
theoretical arguments against hate speech censorship, they are neither equally compelling nor 
exhaustive.  Thus, to Baker’s list, I suggest two additional contentions of my own.  Taken 
together, these eight arguments explain why legal censorship is neither a desirable nor an 
effective option for remedying social hate speech in the American context. 
First, Baker presents the claim that banning the expression of hate speech may actually 
weaken preexisting social enforcement mechanisms against hateful ideologies.  One of the 
strongest tools for fighting against hate speech, Baker argues, is the natural reaction of its 
opponents to its open expression:  “In any minimally decent society that legally permits hate 
speech, such expression of hate reflexively creates, for those who object to racism, a platform to 
explain and justify their objections.”1076  On the other hand, “legal repression [of hate speech] 
creates a platform for racists to claim victimhood and to appeal to the many who value liberty to 
oppose the suppression of their freedom, shearing off the energy of a significant group from the 
chorus that condemns the racist views.”1077  In other words, by silencing hate speech, the law is 
actually robbing the wider community of the opportunity to rise up against hateful ideologies and 
spread a countervailing message.1078  At the same time, because anti-hate speech legislation 
requires censorship on the basis of content, those who wish to express hateful ideas can find 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1076 C. Edwin Baker, “Hate Speech,” in The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking 
Regulation and Responses, Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds.) (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), pp. 73. 
1077 Ibid. 
1078 For an example of the argument that hate speech can only be fought with more speech, see 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927): 
“But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; 
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that 
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the 
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies, and that the fitting 
remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”  See also Justice Learned Hand: “[The First Amendment] 
presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, 
than through any kind of authoritative selection.  To many this is, and always will be folly; but we 
have staked our all on it” (Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). 
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natural allies among the majority community.  Even among those who may not share the opinions 
conveyed through hate speech, there are still plenty who are willing to fight against censorship.  
By focusing on the infringement of their First Amendment freedoms, hate speech proponents are 
able to shift the debate away from the content of their communications while simultaneously 
attracting a large, diverse group of supporters. 
Second, Baker worries that, even if hate speech legislation did manage to silence hateful 
viewpoints, far from eliminating these beliefs, it would merely drive them underground, where they 
will be more difficult to address.  When ideas are not allowed free and open expression, it is 
impossible to accurately judge “the extent of the problem and the location or the human or social 
carriers of the problem.”1079  By transforming hate from a visible obstacle to an invisible one, anti-
hate speech regulations may obscure the extent to which racism, sexism, etc. actually exists 
within the community.  This diminished understanding of the scope of the problem reduces the 
perceived need to combat hateful opinions.  And as Baker adds, it also compromises the 
effectiveness of any attempts at opposition.  Where hate speech bans are in effect, those who 
wish to fight against hateful ideologies miss out on “the advantage of ‘knowing the enemy,’” and 
are therefore less able to craft “meaningful rhetorical, strategic, political and legal responses” to 
hate speech.1080 
Third, it is likely that programs meant to silence only certain opinions, based on their 
content, will result in feelings of oppression and victimhood among those who hold hateful 
viewpoints.  Baker suggests that this may ultimately “increase their rage and belief that they must 
act” upon their ideologies.1081  Knowing that their perspectives are unwelcome, those who wish to 
practice hate speech may feel a moral obligation to martyr themselves in service of their 
principles – if only to ensure that their message is heard.  While he concedes that it is an 
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empirical matter whether forcing hate speech underground actually serves to diminish hateful 
ideas or whether it reinforces them, Baker does speculate that the latter option is more probable.  
He believes that the experience of being persecuted and denied fundamental liberties will put 
hate speakers at odds with the majority, which may be viewed as condoning discriminatory legal 
tactics.  Thus, these true believers may grow alienated from the legal order, which has singled 
them out and may appear to be “unequally coddling those whom they decide.”1082  This sense of 
estrangement is likely to lead to radicalization among hate speakers. 
Fourth, Baker worries that anti-hate speech legislation delegitimizes the liberal 
democratic state by diminishing the role that politics and political discourse play in resolving 
conflict.  “[P]rohibiting the expression of any values – even the most offensive views such as 
expression that denies democratic values or calls for violent or illegal actions – in the context of 
discourses where verbal responses are possible,” Baker explains, “is likely to reduce the 
democratic cultural self-understanding that conflicts are to be dealt as a political rather than a 
violent struggle.”1083  If it chooses to forestall conversation about certain viewpoints, the state 
would be implicitly expressing a lack of faith in the power of political discussion.  As a result, 
citizens may come feel that their only option for addressing such controversial issues is a violent 
struggle.1084 
Anti-hate speech legislation may delegitimize the liberal democratic state in another 
sense, as well.  Ronald Dworkin argues that, while laws that protect vulnerable minorities from 
discrimination, unfairness and inequality are certainly desirable, they can only rightfully be 
enacted through a fair democratic process.  This means that all eligible citizens must have the 
right to vote, and matters of public concern will be decided by majority rule.  But as Dworkin 
explains, “a majority decision is not fair unless everyone has had a fair opportunity to express his 
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1084 See Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1959). 
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or her attitudes or opinions or fears or tastes or presuppositions or prejudices or ideals, not just in 
the hope of influencing others… but also just to confirm his or her standing as a responsible 
agent in, rather than a passive victim of, collective action.”1085  In other words, all sides to an 
argument must be allowed expression before a truly democratic decision can be made.1086  In the 
case of antidiscrimination laws, the opposition must be given the same opportunity to freely 
contribute their perspectives to the public debate as those in favor.  If not, any legislation that is 
enacted against the preferences of the former must be considered unfair and illegitimate.  
Dworkin worries that, by limiting the ability of opponents to antidiscrimination laws to voice their 
opinions, anti-hate speech laws take away from the validity of any resulting legislation.  
Fifth, Baker claims that a focus on hate speech legislation may detract from efforts to 
combat the underlying causes of racism and discrimination.1087  He suggest three “obvious and 
arguably more valuable places” where energy could be better spent: 1) improving the material 
conditions of members of marginalized groups, who are targeted by hate speech; 2) putting forth 
public rejections of hate (i.e. “the more speech solution”); and 3) instituting modifications to the 
societal conditions that encourage hateful ideas among certain segments of society.1088  
However, while Baker is certainly correct that any efforts to eliminate hate speech ought to 
address these three areas, it is unclear from this paper why he does not think such efforts could 
go hand-in-hand with formal, legal prohibitions of hate speech.   
Finally, Baker presents the familiar “slippery slope” argument, which is divided into two 
parts.1089  First, there is the concern that anti-hate speech laws are likely to be abused to suit the 
needs of those in power.  In her article, “Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We Have to Choose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1085 Ronald Dworkin, “Foreword,” in Extreme Speech and Democracy, Ivan Hare and James 
Weinstein (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. vii. 
1086 “The majority has no right to impose its will on someone who is forbidden to raise a voice in 
protest… before the decision is taken” (Ibid.). 
1087 Baker, “Hate Speech,” pp. 75. 
1088 Ibid. 
1089 For a more thorough analysis of slippery slope arguments, see Frederick Schauer, “Slippery 
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Between Freedom of Speech and Equality?” Nadine Strossen explains how, even when hate 
speech regulations are explicitly drafted to protect a minority group, they are often coopted and 
used to defend dominant groups instead.  This results in outcomes contrary to the purpose of 
anti-hate speech legislation, including the persecution of minority group members and the 
suppression of their speech.1090   
It is easy enough to imagine practical instances in which state actors might be able to 
frame the speech of their political opponents as hate speech.  Baker offers several examples of 
potential justifications: “that labor agitation ferment class hatred and, potentially, class violence; 
lesbians ferment hatred of and violence against men; black nationalists make racist attacks on 
whites; Algerians insult the French… [and] many radical Muslims who, if not terrorists 
themselves, seem to be nurturing the hate that leads to terrorism.”1091  And, in fact, this has been 
the experience of many nations after instituting hate speech bans.  As discussed in Chapter Six, 
one of most significant challenges faced by England, after the adoption of Section 6 of the Race 
Relations Act in 1965, was biased enforcement.  While the new hate speech statute led a number 
of convictions, many of them were obtained against leaders of the Black Liberation Movement, 
rather than the white racists that the law was designed to address. 
Second, Baker applies the slippery slope problem to the use of the harm justification.  
“Any principle that allows restrictions on speech that preaches hate will be hard to contain,” he 
worries.  “Suppression of other ‘harmful’ speech to deal with other nasty problems will seem 
similar.”1092  Thus, opening up the door to censorship of hate speech, on the basis of the harm it 
produces, may inadvertently lead to the censorship of legitimate, worthwhile political and artistic 
expression.  And whereas anti-hate speech legislation is designed to protect the worse off in 
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(Winter 1996), pp. 465-470. 
1091 Baker, “Hate Speech,” pp. 76. 
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society, one danger of this approach is that it will lead to other forms of censorship and 
repression that result in “the net effect of further subordinating the disempowered.”1093  Even 
Waldron worries about this problem, warning that “campaigns against free speech tend to be 
motivated by public hysteria, and there is no telling what outbreaks of public hysteria would lead 
to if they had hate speech codes as one of the channels for their expression.”1094 
These two slippery slope concerns might be overstated, however.  In his paper, “Does 
International Law Provide for Consistent Rules on Hate speech?” Toby Mendel shows that there 
are no real world examples of well-written hate speech laws slowly leading to greater restrictions 
on free speech.  “Democracies around the world have been applying hate speech laws for 
decades,” he writes, “and, while the rate of persecutions may fluctuate in different countries and 
at different times, there has been no general trend toward greater and broader application of 
these laws.”1095  As for the accusation that anti-hate speech laws are likely to be abused, Mendel 
argues that, to the extent that this poses a real threat, the solution should not be to eliminate such 
legislation:  “The proper response to abuse of laws restricting freedom of expression, which 
address a legitimate social goal, is to address the cause of that abuse, not to remove protection 
for that social goal.”1096  If anti-hate speech legislation is written too vaguely to be applied in a 
consistent, productive manner, it should be rewritten to express a more focused goal.  Indeed, in 
the United States, individuals accept bans on various kinds of speech (e.g. defamation against 
individuals, obscenity) without too much reason to fear that such bans will necessarily grow to 
encompass everything.   
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Despite my objections to Baker’s fifth and sixth arguments against anti-hate speech 
legislation, the first four concerns that he raises (as well as the addendum from Dworkin) do cast 
severe doubt on the desirability and effectiveness of legal hate speech bans.  Far from 
eradicating social hate speech, state censorship seems to only split it in two.  Those who do not 
subscribe to discriminatory beliefs are free to exist apart from the nagging influence of hate 
speech.  And many of those who might have been only moderate sexists, racists, etc. may decide 
to remove themselves from discriminatory communities as well.  Many others, however—as well 
as the “true believers”—may prefer to move underground.  I agree that, not only does this division 
shut down conversation about important political issues, but once hate speech proponents are 
hidden from view and begin to see themselves as a persecuted minority, they are likely to 
become increasingly radicalized.  To the extent that they see themselves as outside of the state 
(especially a state that has already delegitimized itself), they are more prone to engaging in 
violent tactics in order to get their message across.  All of this presents a compelling case against 
legal hate speech bans.  There are, however, at least two additional arguments that could be 
used to further strengthen Baker’s case against legal bans on hate speech: one theoretical and 
one practical. 
One of the most common philosophical concerns regarding legal hate speech bans is 
that they are overly paternalistic and, therefore, have no place in a liberal democratic society that 
claims to treat all its adult members as responsible moral agents.  As Dworkin explains in 
Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, this requirement has two 
dimensions.1097  First, when the state presupposes that its citizens cannot be trusted to hear 
“dangerous or offensive convictions,” for fear that they might adopt these attitudes, it does them a 
grave personal insult.  Government must expect that “morally responsible people” will insist upon 
determining for themselves “what is good or bad in life or in politics, or what is true and false in 
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matters of justice or faith.”1098  Censorship, by assuming otherwise, offends the very dignity and 
autonomy of the citizenry.  Second, Dworkin argues that, as a morally responsible individual, 
each citizen has “a responsibility not only to form convictions of one’s own, but to express these 
to others.” 1099  This duty comes, not only out of respect for others, but also out of the natural 
human instinct to discover truth, seek justice served and secure the good for all.  When 
government prohibits certain individuals from exercising these responsibilities, based on the 
content of their beliefs, it also “frustrates and denies that aspect of moral personality.”1100   
Thus, the paternalism argument against hate speech censorship suggests that all 
individuals, as free and equal beings, ought to be able to explore and express any and all 
discriminatory perspectives.  This liberty is no less important an aspect of human dignity and 
autonomy than the freedom to exist in society without fear of verbal harassment.  Nevertheless, 
the objection could be raised that individuals are not actually perfectly autonomous, but are highly 
influenced by the conditions of their social development.  And if individuals are not truly 
autonomous, it might be reasonable for the state to adopt a more paternalistic role towards them, 
especially regarding the aftermath of systematic, state-sponsored discrimination.  Although I have 
argued throughout this project concerning the socially constructed nature of human development, 
I do not agree that the kind of paternalism inherent in hate speech bans is an appropriate 
response.  While the state can and should work to modify the social arrangements that lead to 
hate speech, it must do so in ways short of telling its citizens that they cannot be trusted to hear 
or express views that it deems offensive or hazardous.   
A more practical concern with anti-hate speech legislation is that it is neither the most 
effective nor the most direct method of limiting social hate speech.  The racist, sexist and classist 
attitudes that foment social hate speech are everywhere.  For a state-sponsored censorial 
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machinery to address all of these mindsets, it would have to be everywhere as well.  That is 
neither desirable nor feasible.  Social pressures, on the other hand, are well placed to influence 
the behaviors and, more importantly, the belief systems of all community members.  They can go 
where the state cannot.1101  And, as discussed throughout this chapter, they can also affect core 
values more deeply and to greater effect than nearly any other form of coercion.  If, after all, the 
purpose of making hate speech illegal is not simply to enhance the voices of victims and punish 
offenders, but to push the community norms and beliefs that inform hate speech in a more 
tolerant, I argue that it would be more productive to address public opinion directly.1102  It is this 
approach that I will emphasize in the following section. 
 
B. Proposals for managing hate speech 
There is only one way to completely eradicate social hate speech, and that is to censor it 
before the fact.  “Just as the only way to keep your fist from breaking my nose is to restrain your 
fist,” Andrew Koppelman writes, “the only way to prevent this speech from wounding its victims is 
to restrain it.”1103  Once the words have been uttered, there is no taking them back.  However, as I 
describe in the previous section, any legal system that attempts to censor speech a priori and 
absolutely is both unrealistic and undesirable in the United States.  Instead, in this section, I 
propose several alternative policy options designed to rein in social hate speech and diminish its 
potency wherever it does remain.   
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1102 The state begins by establishes laws, and then hopes that attitudes will fall in line: 
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1103 Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law & Social Equity (New Haven: Yale University 
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I begin by building upon the previous discussion of anti-hate speech legislation by 
suggesting three potential avenues by which the state could rightfully aid in limiting social hate 
speech without unduly infringing upon individual liberties: 1) establishing official, uniform 
standards for what constitutes hate speech; 2) promoting an egalitarian agenda; and 3) rectifying 
the inequalities at the heart of intergroup hatred.  These three actions, while falling far short of 
legal censorship, enable government to play an active role—symbolically and practically—in the 
defeat of social hate speech.  However, beyond these steps, law should only be used as a last a 
resort, applicable in just the most unambiguous and egregious cases of hate speech resulting in 
measurable harm.  Ultimately, as in the cases of cyberbullying and negative safe space speech, I 
argue that social hate speech is best managed through moral approbation and social pressures.  
To begin, while social hate speech may not merit legal censorship, there are certain 
steps that the American government should take to minimize its negative influence on democratic 
citizenship and political outcomes.  The law, after all, serves as an important tool for determining 
the social norms and principles that make hate speech more or less acceptable.  “Being a 
collective and public statement of the community’s moral identity and guiding values,” Parekh 
explains, “the law affirms and enforces these values, has a symbolic and educational 
significance, and helps shape the collective ethos.”1104  In other words, the law not only expresses 
community ethics (by punishing those who offend them), but it also plays a major role in shaping 
the form of those “norms of civility” in the first place.  Through its enforcement, language and 
agenda-setting powers, the law establishes expectations regarding what are and are not 
acceptable ways for community members to treat one another.  
In the case of social hate speech, it is possible for the state to simultaneously utilize its 
influence to condemn discriminatory practices and beliefs while also protecting freedom of 
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speech.1105  One relatively low-cost policy option would be for Congress to finally provide an 
unambiguous, authoritative definition of what constitutes hate speech, while still stopping short of 
making such expression illegal.  While the exact contours are better left to be decided by elected 
officials, I would argue that any productive characterization of hate speech must contain the 
following three elements.   
First, any definitive statements regarding hate speech must recognize it as something 
beyond mere “fighting words.”  As discussed in Chapter Six, hate speech is more than an 
expression of simple meanness or disrespect; it implies actual hatred of a marginalized group 
(based on ascriptive characteristics), with a wish to destroy.  This aspect of hate speech helps to 
distinguish it from other, feebler forms of criticism and harassment.  Second, hate speech should 
include only that harassment, which both leads to deep social divisions, and is also significant 
enough to compromise the ability of its targets to freely and equally participate in political life.  By 
highlighting the threat that hate speech poses to the liberal democratic values of equality and 
inclusiveness, the state would be able to frame the problem in such a way that it applies to all 
members of the community.  Finally, any authoritative definition must recognize that hate speech 
is not just a problem when it takes place in the public sphere – social hate speech poses 
significant community risks as well.  Throughout this project, I have sought to expand the 
definition of meaningful political speech to include those communications that have traditionally 
been considered too private or social to be of public value.  This includes hate speech.  The fact 
that a given instance of hate speech is not nationally broadcasted or promoted by public persons, 
but instead, takes place in a private residence or place of business, does not mean that it is any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1105 See Corey Brettschneider, “When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? The Dilemmas of 
Freedom of Expression and Democratic Persuasion,” in Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4.  
As Corey Brettschneider explains, we must “distinguish between a state’s coercive power or its 
ability to place legal limits on hate speech, and its expressive power or its ability to influence 
beliefs and behavior by ‘speaking’ to hate groups and the larger society.  On my view, the state 
should simultaneously protect hateful viewpoints in its coercive capacity and criticize them in its 
expressive capacity” (Ibid., pp. 1006).  In other words, it is possible and desirable for the state to 
simultaneously use its coercive capacity to protect hateful viewpoints and criticize those same 
attitudes in its expressive capacity.   
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less likely to incite violence, provoke psychological distress or contribute to lower levels of 
political participation and cooperation.  In fact, because of its personal nature, social hate speech 
is likely to be more harmful than impersonal, public attacks on marginalized groups.1106 
 An authoritative, clear definition for hate speech—one that incorporates these three 
elements—would not only support and validate the experiences of target groups, but it would also 
set a higher standard for all American citizens, letting them know that, while they may have a 
constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech, social hate speech is both insupportable and 
morally repugnant.  A second option that would allow the United States to take a symbolic stance 
against social hate speech, while still protecting a broad understanding of the First Amendment, 
would be for the state to endorse an egalitarian agenda through its public policy choices.  Rather 
than attacking hate speech directly, government should focus its efforts on promoting policies that 
address the discriminatory attitudes that inform such speech. 
For example, state governments could provide curricula and funding for 
educational/professional programs that teach the values of equality and respect for difference.  
The state could also work with anti-discrimination organizations to develop a public service 
campaign aimed at educating the community regarding the potential harms of hate speech and 
encouraging private individuals to take responsibility for their social spaces.  As discussed in the 
section on cyberbullying, government actors have a history of teaming up with private citizens 
and nonprofit organizations in order to send a unified message denigrating hateful speech.  There 
is reason to think that a similar campaign, aimed at eradicating social hate speech, might be 
equally successful. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1106 Fortunately, there is already some precedent for this approach in the United States legal 
tradition:  Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers may be prosecuted for 
tolerating hate speech by their employees, if that speech contributes to a broader pattern of 
harassment, which results in a “hostile or offensive working environment.”  See Charles, R III 
Lawrence, “If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,” in Words that 
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, Mari J. Matsuda, 
Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw (eds.) (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, Inc., 1993), pp. 53-88.   
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 While these suggestions may be somewhat politically controversial, they are not unusual 
in the American context.  The United States government may have shied away from legislating 
hate speech, but it has also been more than willing to address the attitudes that undergird such 
statements-–especially in the case of race—and to try to transform them in ways that it deems 
appropriate.1107  This can take the form of non-action (e.g. when the judiciary “resists political 
demands for laws that disadvantage blacks”) or action (e.g. when the judiciary “refuses to enforce 
racially restrictive covenants, or when it registers interracial marriages”).1108  In either case, while 
the state may not be explicitly legislating on racial attitudes, it is sending a clear message as to its 
position on the subject.  And this messaging is hardly meant to be innocuous.  As stated above, 
the laws and institutional structures of a given community inherently influence the development of 
its social values and norms.  By choosing to put forth policies that promote equality and 
inclusiveness, the American state has already chosen to play a proactive role in the process of 
creating good democratic citizens. 
But there is still more that government can do to attack the root causes of those 
discriminatory ideologies that fuel hate speech.  In additional to issuing an official condemnation 
and promoting anti-discriminatory policies, the state must continue working to remedy the vast 
socioeconomic inequalities that lead to feelings of hatred in the first place.  By ensuring that 
targeted groups receive adequate access to employment and education, I argue that the 
American government will do more the eliminate hate speech than censorship ever could. 
 In Baker’s critique of anti-hate speech legislation (discussed above), he makes the 
compelling claim that the kind of aggressive racism, which fuels hate speech, is frequently born 
out of conditions of poverty.  He explains how “often purveyors of racism have themselves 
experienced forms of social or material discrimination (or deprivation) – and sometimes they even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1107 Although this approach may or may not line up with the direction of public opinion, it does 
tend to have a progressive bend that favors greater equality and civil rights.  See Koppelman, 
Antidiscrimination Law & Social Equity, pp. 4. 
1108 Ibid. 
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list their depressed conditions as evidence justifying disparaging racist views.”1109  Many 
Americans from impoverished backgrounds respond to their circumstances by taking their 
frustrations out upon members of already stigmatized groups.  By improving the material 
conditions of those who are likely to adopt discriminatory ideologies, the state decreases the odds 
that these individuals will come blame minority groups for their troubles. 
 Baker adds that it is equally important for the state to institute policy measures that are 
aimed at “integrating into the culture and economy typical target of racist oppression.”1110  
Historical legacies of state-sponsored discrimination and oppression have contributed to the 
ongoing socioeconomic vulnerability of minorities in the United States.  As each subsequent 
generation has inherited the disadvantages of its ancestors, over time, poverty has tended to 
become part of the popular characterization of those subjugated minority groups.  The 
classification of certain groups as poor—on top of whatever other negative signifiers they have 
already acquired—both contributes to their internal feelings of alienation, and also fuels external 
prejudice and discrimination on the basis of their economic status.  Thus, intergenerational 
conditions of poverty doubly hinder the social standing of traditionally marginalized groups, which 
clears the way for hate speech.   
Changes to the material conditions of these groups could significantly improve their social 
standing and diminish intergroup hatred, however.  While such policy recommendations are 
outside the scope of this project, like Baker, I agree that government efforts to eliminate hate 
speech must include the establishment (and “effective enforcement”) of anti-discrimination laws, 
aimed specifically at two areas: employment and education.1111  First, minority individuals must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1109 Baker, “Hate Speech,” pp. 75. 
1110 Ibid. 
1111 Baker also suggests that the state must incorporate “affirmative recruitment or subsidy of 
typical targets of racism, [which] could help change the material conditions that create 
oppression” (Ibid.).  
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given fair opportunities to work in order to achieve financial success and self-sufficiency.1112  
Second, the educational system must be restructured so that all Americans receive a higher 
standard of education, regardless of their backgrounds – education not only “promotes toleration,” 
but it also “constitutes a pillar by which people can pull themselves out of poverty.”1113  Thus, 
eliminating discrimination in employment and education should help to alleviate the 
socioeconomic imbalances that create a fertile breeding ground for hate speech. 
However, regardless of how effective the state may be at reducing socioeconomic 
inequalities, it will fail at its goal of eliminating social hate speech if individual citizens do not 
cooperate.  Like Mill, I have argued throughout this chapter that social censorship is not only the 
least constitutionally problematic, but also the most effective method of combatting social hate 
speech.  Of course, this is neither to say that informal social pressures offer a perfect solution to 
the problem of social hate speech, nor that the legal option lacks significant advantages; rather 
the two must be combined, with the state making symbolic and practical strides against 
discriminatory ideologies, and the people fortifying and enforcing positive community values.  
Ultimately, even with the support of the state, it is still up to each and every citizen to create a 
community that is inhospitable to hate speech.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1112 See United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, “The Right to Work: 
General comment no. 18,” Thirty-fifth session, Item 3 of the provisional agenda, Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (November 24, 2005). Available 
at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/403/13/PDF/G0640313.pdf?OpenElement:  Access to 
employment “constitutes an opportunity for economic self-reliance and in many cases a means to 
escape poverty” (Ibid., pp. 5). 
1113 United Nations, General Assembly, “Contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerances: Notes by the Secretary-General,” Sixty-eighth session, Item 
67 (b) of the provisional agenda, Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance: comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration 
and Programme of Action (August 19, 2013). Available at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/431/33/PDF/N1343133.pdf?OpenElement. Pp. 5. See also 
United Nations, General Assembly “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Art. 26 (December 
10, 1948), available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/; United Nations, General 
Assembly, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” Art. 13 (January 3, 
1976), available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
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Fortunately, the majority of Americans appear to agree – not only can informal, social 
pressures be expected to diminish social hate speech in theory, but many citizens have already 
shown themselves capable of maintaining robust social norms rejecting prejudiced ideologies in 
practice.  Thus, as Lee C. Bollinger explains, spectators to the ongoing battle over anti-hate 
speech regulations in the United States witness a wide discrepancy between the degree of 
support for anti-hate speech legislation and the actual use of moral disapprobation to punish 
those who express hateful viewpoints.1114  In other words, while Americans may be conflicted 
about how to approach hate speech as a legal matter, they are generally convinced of their own 
responsibility to condemn such speech when it takes place within their communities.  “If a person 
expresses some view we find deeply offensive,” Bollinger writes, “we will probably insist on 
censure of some kind and feel guilty if none occurs.  To implement our unofficial decree, we may 
draw on a myriad of coercive responses typically at our disposal: We may respond with ridicule or 
humiliation; we may practice any number of forms of social shunning; or we may withhold various 
practical benefits, like employment opportunities.”1115  These are natural reactions to hate speech, 
he argues.1116  And they are highly effective strategies for suppressing such hateful ideologies as 
well.   
 
IV. Looking forward: 
While this project has been a study of speech, it has not been a study of free speech in 
the traditional sense.  My goal, in writing this, has not simply been to expand freedom of speech 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1114 See Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone, “Dialogue,” in Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in 
the Modern Era (Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone, eds.) (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2002):  “When we compare our reluctance to impose legal restraints against 
speech with our readiness to employ a host of informal, or nonlegal, forms of coercion against 
speech behavior, the paradox is striking” (Ibid., pp. 12). 
1115 Ibid. 
1116 Bollinger claims that, if the state were to tell individuals that they ought to abstain from 
“coercing or penalizing any person for what that person says [it] would strike us not only as 
bizarre but as plainly wrong” (Ibid.). 
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protections to a new sphere of communication.  Rather, I have aimed to develop a political theory 
of speech, which can identify and explain the political impact of casual, everyday interactions.  
Throughout this project, I have tried to show that all communication—from the formal political 
debates that take place within the Capitol, to the informal conversations that take place around 
the kitchen table—can have important implications, not only for the kinds of people (and citizens) 
that the participants become, but also for the kinds of political communities that they come to 
inhabit.  And I believe that, by gaining understanding into the ways that social speech, in 
particular, creates, encourages and binds political communities—in both positive and negative 
ways—liberal democracies will be able to devise techniques to both foster good citizenship at an 
authentic, grassroots level, and also discourage speech practices that compromise republican 
virtues such as selflessness and a desire to participate in self-governance.   
As I have suggested in this chapter, the tools necessary to achieve these goals may be 
varied.  In many cases, public opinion can be changed on its own or, at least, without the long 
arm of the state pushing it along.  This is especially true in the case of social speech, which is 
naturally informal and subject to self-regulation.  There are also instances, however, when social 
norms and customs are so entrenched that efforts to self-reform would be insufficient.  For 
example, in the United States, this has often been the case when discrimination (whether formal 
or informal) against groups on the basis of ascriptive characteristics (e.g. race, sex, class, etc.) is 
at stake.  In these cases, often, the only way for attitudes and behaviors to change in a timely 
manner is for the state to take an authoritative stance.  And in order to do so effectively, 
government actors must understand the processes that take place when citizens engage in 
informal, social speech.   
Thus, I believe it is essential that we all begin to think in terms of the political potential of 
everyday, social interactions.  And I would argue that this is especially important at this particular 
point in history, when the formal, political boundaries of the nation state are being challenged.   
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Political problems have grown increasingly global in scale.  The negative environmental 
effects of mass industrialization, for example, cannot be confined to any one nation; rather, they 
are felt throughout the world.  The same is true for terrorism, oil drilling, overfishing, drug 
enforcement, health care initiatives, government bailouts and any number of other public policy 
matters.  Not only do these issues ultimately impact a wide range of political communities, but 
they can also only be remedied through the cooperation of multiple actors.   
In recent decades, transnational political organizations and international social 
movements have arisen (and become entrenched) as a response to this increasingly 
interconnected vision of global politics.  But before individuals can be expected to willingly 
support efforts that impose sacrifices on them for the sake of some distant other, they must build 
a wider sense of solidarity and community than that, which has prevailed under the model of the 
nation state.  In other words, for transnational endeavors to succeed, individuals must come to 
believe that they share in the same fate as those with whom they do not share national borders.  
The idea of who constitutes the “us,” worthy of consideration, must expand.1117   
  This is where the study of social speech may be especially helpful.  The advancement 
of modern transportation, information and communication technologies has made social speech, 
across political borders, easier and more accessible than ever before.  These developments have 
thereby opened up the potential to create new, super- and supranational political identities and 
communities.  And once political actors understand how best to parlay social speech into good 
democratic citizenship and positive political outcomes, they can begin to guide that process along 
in the best way possible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1117 See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), pp. 191. 
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